Cases

Question 1

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) FACTS

Answer 1

Planned Parenthood sued the Governor of PA to challenge laws about abortion. Women had to be told about the procedure and wait 24 hours before having an abortion. Minors had to get permission from a parent, and married women had to tell their husbands.

Question 2

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) RULE

Answer 2

A state regulation on abortion is invalid if it puts a big hurdle in the way of a woman wanting an abortion before the fetus can live outside the womb.

Question 3

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) ISSUE

Answer 3

Is a state law that makes women wait 24 hours and get informed consent before an abortion unconstitutional?

Question 4

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) HOLDING

Answer 4

Applying the undue burden standard to the Pennsylvania statute, the spousal notification requirement constitutes an undue burden, according too much power to a husband over his wife, and is therefore invalid. However, the informed consent, parental notification, and 24-hour waiting period restrictions do not constitute an undue burden and are upheld.

Question 5

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) FACTS

Answer 5

In 1973 and 1992, the Supreme Court said that people have a right to get an abortion. But in 2018, Mississippi made a law that said you can’t have an abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy. A clinic in Mississippi sued, saying the law was unconstitutional. The lower courts agreed with the clinic. But Mississippi and 25 other states asked the Supreme Court to change its old decisions and let states decide their own abortion laws.

Question 6

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) ISSUE

Answer 6

(1) Does the United States Constitution confer a right to abortion?

(2) May the Supreme Court overrule a wrongly decided constitutional decision?

Question 7

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) HOLDING

Answer 7

(1) Constitutional challenges to state abortion regulations must be evaluated under rational-basis review. Regulations will be entitled to a strong presumption of validity and will be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest, including an interest in preserving fetal life. Under this standard, Mississippi’s statute is constitutional.

(2) The Supreme Court may overrule a wrongly decided constitutional decision. Stare decisis is not an absolute requirement. This is particularly true in constitutional cases, in which it is critical to ensure that important matters are decided correctly.

Question 8

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) RULE

Answer 8

(1) The United States Constitution does not confer a right to abortion.

(2) The Supreme Court may overrule a wrongly decided constitutional decision.

Question 9

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) FACTOR TEST FOR DECIDING TO OVERRULE A CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION

Answer 9

(1) the nature of the error in the prior decision, (2) the quality of the decision’s reasoning, (3) the workability of the rule announced by the decision, (4) the disruptive effect of the decision on other areas of law, and (5) the absence of concrete reliance on the decision.

Question 10

Calder v. Bull (1798) RULE

Answer 10

The United States Constitution’s ban on ex post facto laws does not apply to civil cases.

Question 11

Calder v. Bull (1798) FACTS

Answer 11

Normand Morrison’s will was invalidated by a court, which meant that the Calders got some property. But then, the Connecticut legislature passed a law that allowed for a new hearing about the will. After the new hearing, the property went to the Bulls instead. The Calders didn’t think this was fair and said the new law was an ex post facto law, which is not allowed. But the superior court, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, and the United States Supreme Court all said the new law was okay.

Question 12

Calder v. Bull (1798) ISSUE

Answer 12

Does the United States Constitution’s ban on ex post facto laws apply to civil cases?

Question 13

Calder v. Bull (1798) HOLDING

Answer 13

The United States Constitution’s ban on ex post facto laws does not apply to civil cases, only to criminal cases. If the ban did apply to civil cases, it would limit the power of legislatures to make laws too much. In this case, the law was about a will, which is a civil matter, so the law is not an ex post facto law.

Question 14

Marbury v. Madison (1803) FACTS

Answer 14

President John Adams appointed several people to the judiciary just before his term ended. Congress approved these appointments and Adams signed their commissions. But, the commissions weren’t delivered to the appointees before Adams’s term ended. The next president, Thomas Jefferson, didn’t want to finalize Adams’s appointments and told his Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the commissions. One of the appointees, William Marbury, took Madison to the Supreme Court to make him deliver the commission.

Question 15

Marbury v. Madison (1803) RULE

Answer 15

The Supreme Court of the United States has the authority to review laws and legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the United States Constitution.

Question 16

Marbury v. Madison (1803) ISSUE

Answer 16

Can the Supreme Court check if laws and actions by lawmakers follow the United States Constitution?

Question 17

Marbury v. Madison (1803) HOLDING

Answer 17

The Supreme Court can check if laws and actions by lawmakers follow the Constitution. In this case, Marbury should have gotten his commission because he was lawfully appointed. Madison’s refusal to give Marbury his commission was wrong, and Marbury should get a remedy under federal law. But, even though a writ of mandamus would have been the right remedy, the part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that lets the Supreme Court give this remedy is unconstitutional. This part of the Act tries to give the Supreme Court more power than the Constitution allows, so the Court can’t use it to decide Marbury’s claim.

Question 18

Eakin v. Raub (1825) GIBSON DISSENT/REBUTTAL OF MARBURY V. MADISON

Answer 18

The Pennsylvania Constitution does not specify which branch of government should decide whether a law passed by the legislative branch is consistent with the constitution. Logically, in the absence of specific provisions in the constitution, each branch of government should be empowered to perform the functions for which it has expertise. Under this logic, the legislature should have the final authority in determining whether a law being considered is constitutional or not. However, judges should be empowered to overturn state laws that violate the United States Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land.

Question 19

Rucho v. Common Cause (2019) RULE

Answer 19

Partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question.

Question 20

Rucho v. Commo Cause (2019) FACTS

Answer 20

State legislatures redrew voting districts to favor their own political parties. Voters in both NC and Maryland challenged these maps in court, and the lower courts sided with the voters. The legislators appealed to the Supreme Court, which had to decide if it could rule on this issue.

Question 21

Rucho v. Commo Cause (2019) ISSUE

Answer 21

Can courts make decisions about partisan gerrymandering?

Question 22

Rucho v. Commo Cause (2019) HOLDING

Answer 22

The Supreme Court decided that partisan gerrymandering is a political issue, not a legal one, so courts can’t make decisions about it.

Question 23

Rucho v. Commo Cause (2019) KAGAN DISSENT

Answer 23

The Court should have stepped in to correct a violation of the Constitution. The gerrymandering was extreme and undermined democracy by diluting the votes of the opposing party. The lower courts had used a fair and workable standard to prevent this dilution of votes, and the Supreme Court should have supported these efforts.

Question 24

Baker v. Carr (1962) RULE

Answer 24

A challenge to malapportionment of state legislatures brought under the Equal Protection Clause is not a political question and is thus justiciable.

Question 25

Baker v. Carr (1962) FACTS

Answer 25

Baker sued the Secretary of State in Tennessee, because Tennessee hadn’t redrawn its legislative districts since 1901. Baker’s urban district had ten times more people than the rural districts. Baker argued that this made rural votes count more than urban votes, which he said was unfair. Tennessee argued that this was a political issue, not a legal one, and so the courts couldn’t decide on it.

Question 26

Baker v. Carr (1962) ISSUE

Answer 26

Does an equal protection challenge to malapportionment of state legislatures qualify as a non-justiciable political question?

Question 27

Baker v. Carr (1962) HOLDING

Answer 27

The case at bar is brought under the Equal Protection Clause so there is no question the Court is meant to adjudicate plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection under the laws due to its precedent.

Question 28

Baker v. Carr (1962) NON-JUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTION TEST

Answer 28

One of six tests must be satisfied: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of that issue to another political branch; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue; (3) an impossibility of deciding the issue without making an initial policy determination of a kind not suitable for judicial discretion; (4) a lack of respect for the other branches of government in undertaking independent resolution of the case; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potential for embarrassment for differing pronouncements of the issue by different branches of government.

Question 29

Baker v. Carr (1962) HARLAN DISSENT

Answer 29

The complaint, taken as a whole to be true, does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Nothing in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that state legislatures must deliberately structure their districts so as to reflect absolute equality of votes. Additionally, the complaint does not adequately show that Tennessee’s existing system of apportionment is so arbitrary and capricious as to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Without more facts alleging a violation, Baker does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Question 30

Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) RULE

Answer 30

People of African descent brought to the United States and held as slaves, as well as their descendants (either slave or free), are not considered citizens of the United States and are not entitled to the protections and rights of the Constitution.

Question 31

Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) FACTS

Answer 31

Dred Scott was a slave who was taken by his owner to areas where slavery was illegal. He was allowed to marry and was left in Wisconsin when his owner moved to Louisiana. After his owner’s death, Scott tried to buy his freedom from the owner’s widow but was refused. He sued for his freedom, but the Missouri Supreme Court upheld his status as a slave. He then sued in federal court, but was again ruled to still be a slave.

Question 32

Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) ISSUE

Answer 32

IS a person of African descent who was born a slave but lived in free states, is considered a citizen of the United States and entitled to the rights and privileges of the Constitution?

Question 33

Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) HOLDING

Answer 33

The court ruled people of African descent, whether slaves or free, are not citizens of the United States and do not have Constitutional protections. At the time the Constitution was written, people of African descent were considered an inferior race and not entitled to Constitutional protections.

Question 34

Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) RULE

Answer 34

A private party does not have standing in federal court to defend the constitutionality of a state law if the responsible state officials fail to do so.

Question 35

Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) FACTS

Answer 35

In 2008, California’s Supreme Court ruled banning same-sex marriage violated equal protection. Voters passed Prop 8, amending the constitution to define marriage as between a man and a woman. The state Supreme Court upheld this. Same-sex couples sued in federal court, officials refused to defend, so Prop 8 proponents intervened. District court found Prop 8 unconstitutional, intervenors appealed to Ninth Circuit, which certified standing to California Supreme Court. California SC confirmed standing, Ninth Circuit upheld district court, US Supreme Court took the case. The American Psychological Association and others submitted a brief supporting same-sex parents’ ability to provide healthy environments for children.

Question 36

Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) ISSUE

Answer 36

Does a private party have standing in federal court to defend the constitutionality of a state law if the responsible state officials fail to do so?

Question 37

Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) HOLDING

Answer 37

Proponents of a state law have no authority to enforce the enacted law and, therefore, lack any personal stake and do not have standing to defend the law in federal court. Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies. Part of this requirement is that all litigants must have standing, i.e., a particularized injury caused by the challenged conduct that can be redressed by a favorable court decision. To have suffered a particularized injury, a litigant must have a personal stake in the outcome of the case and more than just a generalized grievance.

Question 38

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007) RULE

Answer 38

(1) For standing to be appropriate, an actual case or controversy must be present, which is characterized by a truly adversarial relationship.

(2) The Clean Air Act provides the Environmental Protection Agency with the statutory authority to regulate new motor-vehicle-emissions greenhouse gases as an “air pollutant.”

Question 39

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007) FACTS

Answer 39

The EPA refused to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions from new cars. A group of states, including Massachusetts, sued the EPA, saying that the EPA had the power to regulate these emissions under the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts said that without regulation, it would lose coastal lands due to global warming. The EPA argued that the Clean Air Act didn’t give them the power to regulate for climate change and that it wasn’t a good idea to regulate these emissions yet. The lower court agreed with the EPA, but the states appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question 40

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007) ISSUE

Answer 40

(1) For standing to be appropriate, must an actual case or controversy be present, characterized by a truly adversarial relationship?

(2) Does the Clean Air Act provide the Environmental Protection Agency with the statutory authority to regulate new motor-vehicle-emissions greenhouse gases as an “air pollutant”?

Question 41

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007) HOLDING

Answer 41

(1) Yes. For standing to be appropriate, an actual case or controversy must be present, which is characterized by a truly adversarial relationship.
(2) Yes. The Clean Air Act provides the EPA with the statutory authority to regulate new motor-vehicle-emissions greenhouse gases as an “air pollutant.”

Question 42

Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) RULE

Answer 42

A state can be liable in suit to a private individual.

Question 43

Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) FACTS

Answer 43

Alexander Chisholm (plaintiff), a citizen of South Carolina, brought a common-law suit against the State of Georgia (defendant) in the United States Supreme Court. Chisholm sought to recover payment for goods that were sold to Georgia during the Revolutionary War. Georgia claimed sovereign immunity and failed to appear in court.

Question 44

Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) ISSUE

Answer 44

Can a state be liable in suit to a private individual?

Question 45

Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) HOLDING

Answer 45

A state can be liable in suit to a private individual. Article III of the Constitution states that the power of the judiciary extends to controversies between a state and citizens of another state.

Question 46

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816) FACTS

Answer 46

In 1791, Martin (plaintiff) instituted a land dispute case against Hunter’s Lessee (Hunter) (defendant) in Virginia state court. In 1810, the Virginia Court of Appeals held for Hunter. The United States Supreme Court reversed in 1813, but the Virginia state courts did not respect this ruling. The Virginia judges argued that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, a law providing that the United States Supreme Court had appellate review over state-court decisions, was unconstitutional and thus unbinding. The United States Supreme Court reconsidered the case.

Question 47

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816) ISSUE

Answer 47

Does the United States Supreme Court have the authority to exercise appellate review of state-court decisions?

Question 48

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816) RULE

Answer 48

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has authority to exercise appellate review of state-court decisions.

Question 49

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816) HOLDING

Answer 49

The United States Supreme Court has authority to review the decision of the Virginia state courts. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has authority to exercise appellate review of state-court decisions. Article III does not limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to particular lower courts.

Question 50

Cohens v. Virginia (1821) FACTS

Answer 50

The Cohen brothers (defendants) were charged with selling lottery tickets in violation of a law of the state of Virginia (plaintiff). In state court, the Cohens claimed that their actions were legal under federal law. The Virginia court analyzed the relevant state and federal laws and determined that the Cohens were guilty of violating Virginia law. The Cohens appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court. Virginia moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the United States Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the case.

Question 51

Cohens v. Virginia (1821) RULE

Answer 51

The United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from state courts over matters arising under the United States Constitution or federal laws.

Question 52

Cohens v. Virginia (1821) HOLDING

Answer 52

The United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from state courts over matters arising under the United States Constitution or federal laws. Article III of the United States Constitution gives federal courts the power to hear cases that arise under the federal constitution or other federal laws, regardless of whether the parties to the case are private citizens or government entities. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorizes the United States Supreme Court to review the decisions of state courts on matters involving federal law.

Question 53

Cohens v. Virginia (1821) ISSUE

Answer 53

Does the United States Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear appeals from state courts over matters arising under the United States Constitution or federal laws?

Question 54

Fletcher v. Peck (1810) FACTS

Answer 54

A majority of the Georgia legislature was bribed in 1795 to convey approximately 35 million acres of state land to private companies at a bargain price. The following year, Georgia’s legislature rescinded the grant. However, large parcels of the land had already been sold to investors. A lawsuit was filed based on warranty of title to determine whether the 1796 rescission could affect the rights of one of the purchasers of the land. The United States Supreme Court took up the question.

Question 55

Fletcher v. Peck (1810) RULE

Answer 55

A state legislature cannot take away rights that have vested by repealing a law that is essentially a contract.

Question 56

Fletcher v. Peck (1810) HOLDING

Answer 56

A state legislature cannot take away rights that have vested by repealing a law that is essentially a contract. Generally, a state legislature has the authority to repeal any legislation that the state legislature had the authority to pass. However, some legislation is, by its nature, a contract. The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits state legislatures from passing laws that retroactively impair private contract rights.

Question 57

Fletcher v. Peck (1810) ISSUE

Answer 57

Can a state legislature take away rights that have vested by repealing a law that is essentially a contract?

Question 58

Barron v. Baltimore (1833) FACTS

Answer 58

John Barron owned a wharf in Baltimore. He sued the city because he said they ruined his wharf when they changed the flow of streams during street construction, making the water too shallow for boats. He wanted to use the Fifth Amendment’s rule about government taking property. The case went all the way to the United States Supreme Court after a Maryland court sided with the city.

Question 59

Barron v. Baltimore (1833) RULE

Answer 59

The Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment’s rule that the government must pay fair money when it takes property for public use, only applies to the federal government, not state or local governments.

Question 60

Barron v. Baltimore (1833) HOLDING

Answer 60

The United States Constitution was formed to create a government for individuals in the union as a whole, not for the creation of governments of individual states. Each state adopted its own constitution to create a state government. Thus, the amendments to the U.S. Constitution necessarily only apply to the federal government, which it created.

Question 61

Barron v. Baltimore (1833) ISSUE

Answer 61

May a city undertake construction that destroys an individual’s property without providing just compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Question 62

Ableman v. Booth (1858) FACTS

Answer 62

Sherman Booth (defendant) was an abolitionist editor from Wisconsin. Booth was arrested in the 1850s and charged with violating the federal Fugitive Slave Act by helping a slave escape. Booth petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted the writ, ruling that the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional. The federal government petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review. The federal trial court then convicted Booth and sentenced him to a year in prison and to pay a fine of $1,000. Booth again petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which again granted the writ based on the unconstitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act. The federal government again petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.

Question 63

Ableman v. Booth (1858) RULE

Answer 63

Federal courts have supremacy over state courts regarding matters of federal law.

Question 64

Ableman v. Booth (1858) HOLDING

Answer 64

Federal courts have supremacy over state courts regarding matters of federal law.

Question 65

Ableman v. Booth (1858) ISSUE

Answer 65

Do federal courts have supremacy over state courts regarding matters of federal law?

Question 66

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) FACTS

Answer 66

In 1816, Congress created the Bank of the United States. A year later, a branch opened in Maryland. In 1818, Maryland decided to tax all out-of-state banks operating in Maryland. The Bank of the United States was the only such bank, so it was the only one affected by the tax. James McCulloch, who ran the Maryland branch, refused to pay the tax, leading to a lawsuit.

Question 67

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) ISSUE

Answer 67

(1) Does Congress have implied constitutional power to create a bank? (2) If so, may individual states tax a federally created bank?

Question 68

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) HOLDING

Answer 68

(1) Congress has the constitutional power to charter the Bank of the United States. This power is ultimately derived from the Constitution’s grant to Congress of the general power to “tax and spend” for the general welfare.
(2) The Bank was created by federal statute. Maryland may not tax the Bank as a federal institution because federal laws are supreme to state laws. A federally created institution may not be inhibited by a state law.

Question 69

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) RULE

Answer 69

The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, and to make such other laws as it deems necessary and proper to carry out this enumerated power. Federal laws are supreme and states may not make laws that interfere with the federal government’s exercise of its constitutional powers.

Question 70

Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) FACTS

Answer 70

In 1837, Edward Prigg (defendant) captured Margaret Morgan and her children in Pennsylvania. Prigg claimed that Morgan was a fugitive slave. Pennsylvania was a non-slave-holding state and was a common refuge for fugitive slaves. The federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 authorized the owner of a fugitive slave to seize the slave and bring the slave before a federal judge or state magistrate to obtain a certificate after proving that the slave was actually a fugitive slave. Prigg did not prove that Morgan was a slave before any federal judge or state magistrate in Pennsylvania. Instead, Prigg forcibly removed Morgan and her children to Maryland, where a county judge adjudged them to be slaves. Prigg was charged and convicted under a Pennsylvania law designed to prevent self-help in the return of fugitive slaves. Prigg challenged this law as unconstitutional.

Question 71

Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) RULE

Answer 71

The United States Constitution grants exclusive authority to the federal government for making laws regulating the capture and return of fugitive slaves.

Question 72

Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) HOLDING

Answer 72

The United States Constitution grants exclusive authority to the federal government for making laws regulating the capture and return of fugitive slaves. The Constitution states, “No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.”

Question 73

Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) ISSUE

Answer 73

Does the United States Constitution grant exclusive authority to the federal government for making laws regulating the capture and return of fugitive slaves?

Question 74

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) RULE

Answer 74

If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, the federal law governs pursuant to Congress’s constitutional grant of power to regulate interstate commerce.

Question 75

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) ISSUE

Answer 75

If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, does the state law govern?

Question 76

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) HOLDING

Answer 76

Congress is granted the power to regulate interstate commerce in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The word “commerce” includes traffic, intercourse, and navigation, as well as commodities associated with interstate commerce. Congress may regulate all commercial activities occurring between states but not activities occurring solely within one state’s borders. If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, the federal law governs pursuant to Congress’s constitutional grant of power to regulate interstate commerce.

Question 77

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) FACTS

Answer 77

Ogden got a license from New York state to be the only one to operate steamboats in New York waters. Gibbons got a similar license from the federal government and started to compete with Ogden. Ogden sued Gibbons to stop him from operating his boats in New York. The New York court sided with Ogden, but Gibbons appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 78

Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852) FACTS

Answer 78

Pennsylvania made a law that all ships coming or going from the Port of Philadelphia had to use a local captain or pay a fine. Cooley, a ship master from another state, sued the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia because he didn’t think he should have to pay the fine. He said it was unfair for the state to make him pay when he didn’t need a Pennsylvania pilot. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said the state law was okay, so Cooley took his case to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 79

Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852) RULE

Answer 79

In the absence of definitive congressional regulation, federal rules apply to business that requires uniformity of treatment among several states, and business characterized by local peculiarities is governed by legislative decisions passed by the states.

Question 80

Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852) ISSUE

Answer 80

Is Pennsylvania’s law requiring all ships entering or leaving its port to use a local pilot or pay a pilot support fee is a constitutional regulation of pilotage in general based on the Commerce Clause?

Question 81

Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852) HOLDING

Answer 81

While Congress has exclusive Constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce, foreign commerce and interstate commerce can be separated into distinct categories to which different national and local rules may apply. Federal rules apply to business “of a character to require uniformity of treatment,” while “local peculiarities of ports” can be regulated by the individual legislative judgments of the states.

Question 82

United States v. EC Knight (1895) FACTS

Answer 82

In 1890, Congress made the Sherman Antitrust Act to stop monopolies and trade agreements that would hurt competition between businesses. In 1892, the American Sugar Refining Company took over the E.C. Knight Company and other sugar makers by buying their stock. This gave the American Sugar Refining Company almost total control over the American sugar industry. The U.S. government sued the E.C. Knight Company for breaking the Sherman Antitrust Act to stop the takeover.

Question 83

United States v. EC Knight (1895) RULE

Answer 83

Congress may not use its general powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate manufacturing.

Question 84

United States v. EC Knight (1895) ISSUE

Answer 84

May Congress use its general powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate manufacturing?

Question 85

United States v. EC Knight (1895) HOLDING

Answer 85

Manufacturing affects commerce incidentally and is not a part of it. Congress’s power to regulate commerce involves prescribing the rules by which commerce may be governed and is independent of the power to suppress monopoly. Although the Constitution reserves the power to regulate interstate commerce to Congress, the power to police activities and provide for the health, safety, and welfare of state citizens is reserved to the states. Hence all regulation of manufacturing should come from state laws because manufacturing is a local activity.

Question 86

Swift & Co. v. United States (1905) FACTS

Answer 86

The United States government (plaintiff) sued Swift & Company and other major meat processors (defendants) for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. The government alleged that the defendants colluded in several ways to manipulate pricing. The government contended that the defendants agreed among themselves to coordinate the livestock market at slaughterhouses. The defendants argued that any such agreements did not affect interstate commerce and thus were not subject to the act. The defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 87

Swift & Co. v. United States (1905) ISSUE

Answer 87

To fall under the Commerce Clause, must conduct’s effect on interstate commerce be direct?

Question 88

Swift & Co. v. United States (1905) HOLDING

Answer 88

To fall under the Commerce Clause, conduct’s effect on interstate commerce must be direct. Conduct that only indirectly affects interstate commerce, in that the conduct is accidental, secondary, remote, or only possible, does not necessarily fall within the purview of the Commerce Clause.

Question 89

Swift & Co. v. United States (1905) RULE

Answer 89

To fall under the Commerce Clause, conduct’s effect on interstate commerce must be direct.

Question 90

Champion v. Ames (1905) FACTS

Answer 90

Congress made a law in 1895 that said you can’t buy or sell lottery tickets across state lines. Charles Champion got in trouble for bringing lottery tickets from Paraguay into the U.S. and sending them from Texas to California. He said that Congress can’t completely stop a type of commerce, only regulate it. His case was dismissed, but he appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question 91

Champion v. Ames (1905) RULE

Answer 91

The rule in this case is that selling lottery tickets across state lines is considered interstate commerce. This means that Congress can completely stop it if they want to, according to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

Question 92

Champion v. Ames (1905) ISSUE

Answer 92

Does the trafficking of lottery tickets across state lines constitute interstate commerce that Congress may prohibit under the Commerce Clause?

Question 93

Champion v. Ames (1905) HOLDING

Answer 93

Congress alone can regulate all aspects of interstate commerce and can do so in whatever manner it deems appropriate. Congress’s plenary power includes the power to prohibit items (such as lottery tickets) that are deemed to be harmful to the welfare of the people of the United States.

Question 94

Hoke v. United States (1913) FACTS

Answer 94

Effie Hoke and Basile Economides (defendants) were convicted under the Mann Act for enticing women from New Orleans to Texas to engage in prostitution. Hoke and Economides appealed their convictions, arguing that the Mann Act encroached on a state’s right to regulate morality using its police power. Hoke and Economides also argued that the Mann Act was unconstitutional because it violated the right of citizens to move freely between states.

Question 95

Hoke v. United States (1913) RULE

Answer 95

The Mann Act is constitutional.

Question 96

Hoke v. United States (1913) HOLDING

Answer 96

The Mann Act is constitutional. Through the Commerce Clause, Congress has the right to regulate interstate commerce, including the transportation of people and property across state lines. The Mann Act criminalizes the act of transporting women and girls across state lines for the immoral purpose of prostitution. Congress has the right to use the Commerce Clause to regulate morality.

Question 97

Hoke v. United States (1913) ISSUE

Answer 97

Is the Mann Act constitutional?

Question 98

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) FACTS

Answer 98

In 1916, Congress made a law to stop goods made by young children from being sold in interstate commerce. Dagenhart, a father of two boys working in a cotton mill, sued, saying this law was not allowed. He said Congress was trying to control something that should be up to each state. The district court agreed with him. The case was then taken to the Supreme Court.

Question 99

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) ISSUE

Answer 99

May Congress regulate the interstate commerce of goods produced in factories with child labor?

Question 100

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) RULE

Answer 100

Congress may not use its Commerce Clause power to regulate child labor in the states as this is a purely local matter.

Question 101

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) HOLDING

Answer 101

Congress can’t do that. They said the law was wrong for two reasons. First, Congress was trying to control child labor, which doesn’t have anything to do with interstate commerce. Second, child labor is a local issue that each state should decide. Once goods are in the stream of commerce, it doesn’t matter how they were made.

Question 102

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) FACTS

Answer 102

The National Recovery Act (NRA) let the President stop the transport of oil made over state limits. In 1933, the President used this power and stopped oil transport. Panama Refining Co. didn’t like this and sued Ryan, the Secretary of the Interior, saying the NRA was not constitutional because it gave too much power to the President.

Question 103

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) ISSUE

Answer 103

Can Congress let the President stop oil transport under the National Recovery Act?

Question 104

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) HOLDING

Answer 104

The NRA didn’t give the President any rules on when to stop oil transport. The Constitution says Congress can’t give away its law-making powers, but it can give some powers to the President if it gives clear rules. The NRA didn’t give clear rules, so it’s not constitutional.

Question 105

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) RULE

Answer 105

Congress can’t give law-making power to the President without clear rules on how the President should use that power.

Question 106

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) FACTS

Answer 106

Schechter Poultry Corp., a wholesale poultry business in Brooklyn, was convicted for violating the Live Poultry Code (LPC) regulations and for conspiracy. The LPC was created under the National Industrial Recovery Act, which let the president approve ‘codes of fair competition’ for industries. Schechter appealed, saying Congress overstepped its power by regulating their in-state activities and that the president shouldn’t have full power to approve or disapprove the LPC provisions. The appeals court agreed with Schechter on some points, but not all.

Question 107

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) RULE

Answer 107

(1) Congress may not delegate legislative power to the executive without outlining strict standards for how the executive is to exercise that power. (2) Congress does not have the authority to regulate wholly intrastate activities that have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce.

Question 108

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) HOLDING

Answer 108

(1) No. Congress may not delegate legislative power to the executive branch to exercise unlimited lawmaking discretion to promote trade or industry. For a delegation of legislative power to the president to be appropriate, Congress must also prescribe specific standards for how the president must exercise that power. The standards and restrictions outlined by Congress in the National Industrial Recovery Act do not offer substantive direction for the president to formulate policy. Congress does not prescribe rules of conduct, but instead permits the president complete discretion to make codes and create rules of conduct. This type of unfettered legislative power given to the executive is unprecedented and an unconstitutional grant of power to the executive by Congress. (2) No. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the authority to regulate activities that directly affect interstate commerce. Purely intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce only indirectly are outside the scope of Congress’s authority and remain under the control of the states. Allowing Congress to regulate intrastate activities with only

Question 109

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) ISSUE

Answer 109

(1) May Congress delegate lawmaking functions to the executive branch without outlining strict standards for how the executive is to exercise that power? (2) Does Congress have the authority to regulate wholly intrastate activities that have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce?

Question 110

Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) FACTS

Answer 110

Congress made a law called the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act (BCCA) to help control the coal mining industry. This law created a group of coal miners, coal producers, and regular people to set rules for fair competition, production, wages, hours, and labor relations. The law also set the minimum and maximum prices for coal at every mine in the U.S. and gave coal mine workers the right to organize and make collective bargaining agreements. Even though following this law was optional, Congress gave tax breaks to coal mines that did. Carter sued his own company, Carter Coal Co., to stop it from paying the tax for not following the BCCA.

Question 111

Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) RULE

Answer 111

Congress cannot use its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate actions that are purely local.

Question 112

Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) HOLDING

Answer 112

The Constitution says that commerce is trade between states. It includes everything related to selling and transporting goods, but it doesn’t include making goods within a state. In this case, making coal at local mines and issues about wages, hours, and organizing workers are local issues that only affect the state where they happen. So, the BCCA is not constitutional because it gives a national group the power to regulate local issues about making coal.

Question 113

Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) ISSUE

Answer 113

May Congress regulate a purely local act under its Commerce Clause powers?

Question 114

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) FACTS

Answer 114

In 1935, Congress created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce fair labor practices, including the right to form unions. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (JLSC) fired ten employees who tried to form a union, and the NLRB punished the company. JLSC sued, saying that Congress didn’t have the power to regulate labor relations. The lower courts agreed with JLSC, but the NLRB appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question 115

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) RULE

Answer 115

Congress has the power to regulate labor relations under its Commerce Clause power. This is because labor relations are closely related to interstate commerce and controlling them is necessary to protect commerce from problems.

Question 116

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) HOLDING

Answer 116

Congress can regulate labor relations. This is because the power to regulate commerce includes the power to make laws to protect or advance it. The issue here is about employees’ right to form a union without being discriminated against. Even though JLSC says this is a local issue, they need to think about how labor practices can affect interstate commerce. If operations stop because of disputes between employers and employees, it could harm interstate commerce. So, Congress can regulate labor relations to prevent harm to interstate commerce.

Question 117

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) ISSUE

Answer 117

May Congress regulate labor relations under its Commerce Clause power to regulate interstate commerce?

Question 118

Wickard v. Filburn (1942) FACTS

Answer 118

In the 1930s, during the Great Depression, President Roosevelt and Congress made a law to limit how much wheat farmers could grow to help control the price of wheat. Filburn, a farmer, grew more wheat than the law allowed and was punished. He sued the Secretary of Agriculture, Wickard, saying that the law shouldn’t apply to him because he only used the extra wheat for himself and didn’t sell it. The lower courts agreed with Filburn, but Wickard appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question 119

Wickard v. Filburn (1942) ISSUE

Answer 119

May Congress regulate, under the Commerce Clause, the production of wheat designed wholly for individual consumption and not for sale in commerce, interstate or otherwise?

Question 120

Wickard v. Filburn (1942) HOLDING

Answer 120

Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. By growing his own wheat, Filburn decreases the amount of wheat purchased in the market and negatively impacts the price of wheat grown for interstate commerce. It does not matter that Filburn himself only exerts a small impact on the wheat market. When taken together with all the other farmers similarly situated, Filburn’s activity has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. On account of the aggregate effect of homegrown wheat on the commercial wheat market, Congress may regulate Filburn’s activities.

Question 121

Wickard v. Filburn (1942) RULE

Answer 121

Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.

Question 122

US v. Darby (1941) FACTS

Answer 122

Congress made a law called the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to stop goods made under bad labor conditions from being sold in interstate commerce. The U.S. government sued Darby Lumber Company because they said the company was not following the FLSA’s rules and was planning to sell their goods in interstate commerce. The lower courts said Darby didn’t do anything wrong, but the U.S. government didn’t agree and took the case to the Supreme Court.

Question 123

US v. Darby (1941) RULE

Answer 123

Congress has the power to set labor standards for the production of goods that will be sold in interstate commerce. They can also stop goods made under poor labor conditions from being sold in interstate commerce.

Question 124

US v. Darby (1941) ISSUE

Answer 124

May Congress prohibit the shipment of goods in interstate commerce made by workers in unfair employment conditions and the employment of such workers in manufacturing goods for interstate commerce?

Question 125

US v. Darby (1941) HOLDING

Answer 125

While manufacturing is not itself interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods between states falls within the definition of commerce and is thus capable of regulation by Congress under its plenary Commerce Clause powers.

Question 126

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964) FACTS

Answer 126

In 1964, the Civil Rights Act was passed by Congress to stop racial discrimination in public places like hotels. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Georgia, which mostly served out-of-state guests, refused to rent rooms to African Americans. They sued the U.S. government, saying the Civil Rights Act was an overstep of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. The district court and the court of appeals both said the Act was okay. The motel then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question 127

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964) RULE

Answer 127

Congress can make rules to stop racial discrimination in hotels because it can negatively affect interstate commerce.

Question 128

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964) HOLDING

Answer 128

The Commerce Clause lets Congress remove things that block or limit interstate commerce. Not having enough places for African Americans to stay can seriously affect travel between states. Also, racial discrimination can disrupt business. So, passing the Civil Rights Act is a proper use of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. The district court’s decision to uphold the Act is confirmed.

Question 129

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964) ISSUE

Answer 129

May Congress enact the Civil Rights Act as a measure to regulate interstate commerce?

Question 130

South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) FACTS

Answer 130

South Carolina filed a complaint saying that parts of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 went beyond what Congress could do and broke rules in the United States Constitution about state powers. The Supreme Court took the case because it was a dispute between a state and a citizen from another state.

Question 131

South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) ISSUE

Answer 131

Do the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandating the abolition of literacy tests require advance federal approval of proposed changes to voting regulations and authorize the Attorney General to appoint federal examiners to oversee voter registrations violate the United States Constitution or exceed the scope of congressional authority?

Question 132

South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) HOLDING

Answer 132

Congress is expressly authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment to enact legislation in furtherance of its purpose. Congress tailored the Voting Rights Act to implement anti-discrimination measures that take effect without the requirement of advance judicial approval. Given the time and effort that would be required to individually litigate the merits of individual states’ voting registration policies, this provision represents a reasonable approach.

Question 133

South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) RULE

Answer 133

The provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandating the abolition of literacy tests require advance federal approval of proposed changes to voting regulations and authorize the Attorney General to appoint federal examiners to oversee voter registrations do not violate the United States Constitution or exceed the scope of congressional authority

Question 134

United States v. Lopez (1995) FACTS

Question 135

United States v. Lopez (1995) RULE

Answer 135

Congress may not, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, pass a law that prohibits the possession of a gun near a school.

Question 136

United States v. Lopez (1995) HOLDING

Answer 136

While Congress has broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, this power does not extend so far as to authorize the regulation of the carrying of handguns, particularly when doing so has no clear effect on the economy overall. Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activities: the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate commerce; and activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce.

Question 137

United States v. Lopez (1995) ISSUE

Answer 137

May Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, pass a law that prohibits the possession of a gun near a school?

Question 138

United States v. Morrison (2000) FACTS

Answer 138

In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which allowed victims of gender-based violence to seek federal civil remedies. Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Tech, was allegedly assaulted by Antonio Morrison and James Crawford. She and the US government sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech under the VAWA. Morrison argued that the VAWA was unconstitutional. The case went through various courts and finally reached the Supreme Court.

Question 139

United States v. Morrison (2000) ISSUE

Answer 139

(1) May Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, create civil remedies for victims of gender-based violence to sue their attackers in civil court?
(2) May Congress regulate the discriminatory conduct of private actors under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Question 140

United States v. Morrison (2000) HOLDING

Answer 140

(1) No. In United States v. Lopez (1995), the Court held that Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activities: the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate commerce; and activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce. The United States argues that Congress may regulate gender-based violence because it is an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. However, a key consideration in Lopez was the criminal, non-economic nature of the conduct at issue.
(2) No. The Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. For example, it is a well-settled principle from the precedent decisions in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits discriminatory state action, not private action.

Question 141

United States v. Morrison (2000) RULE

Answer 141

(1) Congress does not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate violence against women because it is not an economic activity.
(2) Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may only regulate the discriminatory conduct of state officials, not private actors.

Question 142

Gonzales v. Raich (2005) FACTS

Answer 142

In 1970, the U.S. Congress passed laws to fight illegal drug use. One of these laws, the Controlled Substances Act, categorized illegal drugs and made it illegal to sell, buy, or have them. In 1996, California made a law allowing medical marijuana. Two California residents, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, used marijuana for medical reasons. Even though California said it was okay, federal agents took and destroyed Raich’s marijuana plants. Raich sued the U.S. Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, to stop the enforcement of the federal law. The appeals court said the federal law was not valid, but Gonzales appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question 143

Gonzales v. Raich (2005) ISSUE

Answer 143

May Congress regulate the use and production of homegrown marijuana?

Question 144

Gonzales v. Raich (2005) HOLDING

Answer 144

The Court held in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), that Congress has the power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In this case, Raich’s activity of growing marijuana for home use can be seen rationally as having a substantial effect on interstate commerce because there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market for marijuana.

Question 145

Gonzales v. Raich (2005) RULE

Answer 145

Congress may regulate the use and production of home-grown marijuana as this activity, taken in the aggregate, could rationally be seen as having a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.

Question 146

South Dakota v. Dole (1987) FACTS

Answer 146

South Dakota allowed people 19 and older to buy beer with up to 3.2% alcohol. In 1984, a federal law was passed that said states allowing people under 21 to buy alcohol could lose some highway funds. South Dakota sued, saying this violated limits on Congress’s spending power and the 21st Amendment. The lower courts said the law was okay, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

Question 147

South Dakota v. Dole (1987) RULE

Answer 147

The rule says that the government can give money to states with certain conditions. These conditions must be clear, related to a national project, and not violate any other parts of the Constitution.

Question 148

South Dakota v. Dole (1987) ISSUE

Answer 148

May Congress withhold federal funds to states that do not comply with federally imposed conditions?

Question 149

South Dakota v. Dole (1987) HOLDING

Answer 149

The government can put conditions on money it gives to states. The conditions must be for the good of the country, clear, related to a national project, and not violate any other parts of the Constitution. The law about highway funds meets these conditions. It’s not forcing states to do anything, just taking away a small amount of money if they don’t follow the rules.

Question 150

Printz v. United States (1997) FACTS

Answer 150

In 1993, Congress made a law called the Brady Act to control guns. This law said that state and local officials had to check the backgrounds of people who wanted to buy guns. Two officials, Printz and Mack, said this was not fair and sued the government. The lower courts had different opinions about whether the Brady Act was okay. The Supreme Court then decided to look at the case.

Question 151

Printz v. United States (1997) ISSUE

Answer 151

May Congress compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs?

Question 152

Printz v. United States (1997) RULE

Answer 152

Congress may not compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs.

Question 153

Printz v. United States (1997) HOLDING

Answer 153

Congress may not compel state CLEOs to administer federal programs. Firstly, no clear evidence exists that historical Congresses believed they had the power to compel state executives into federal service. Secondly, the Constitution creates a system of dual sovereignty whereby the states and the federal government are independent entities with different governmental functions. Thus, the Constitution’s structure suggests that it is inappropriate for the federal government to violate states’ status as separate entities by compelling their officials to perform federal roles. Additionally, the Constitution clearly states the execution of the laws is the responsibility of the President.

Question 154

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) RULE

Answer 154

Congress’s enforcement authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend to legislation that changes the meaning of the constitutional right the legislation seeks to enforce.

Question 155

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) ISSUE

Answer 155

Does Congress’s enforcement authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to legislation that changes the meaning of the constitutional right the legislation seeks to enforce?

Question 156

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) HOLDING

Answer 156

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress authority to enact legislation that enforces the amendment’s provisions, including the due-process provision. Congress’s enforcement power is broad, but not unlimited. Specifically, Congress’s power under § 5 is strictly remedial and not plenary. Accordingly, Congress has the power to enact laws that prevent the violation of a constitutional right, but not to define the substance of that constitutional right. There must be congruence and proportionality between the means Congress uses and the harm to be prevented or remediated. Without this congruence and proportionality, Congress’s actions may cross into unacceptable substantive legislation, changing a right’s meaning rather than merely enforcing it. This interpretation of Congress’s powers is supported by the legislative history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption and has been confirmed by caselaw.

Question 157

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) FACTS

Answer 157

In 1993, Congress made the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to overturn a Supreme Court decision. The RFRA stops the government from heavily limiting a person’s freedom to practice their religion. Archbishop Flores sued the City of Boerne under the RFRA when the city didn’t let his church expand its building. The city said no because the church was in a historic district. The district court said the RFRA was not constitutional, but the appeals court disagreed.

Question 158

Shelby County v. Holder (2013) FACTS

Answer 158

In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act to stop racial discrimination in voting. Some states had tests or requirements that made it harder for African Americans to vote. The Act said these states had to get approval from the federal government before changing their voting rules. These rules were supposed to end after five years, but Congress kept renewing them. By 2004, the number of white and African American voters was almost the same. Shelby County in Alabama sued the federal government, saying these rules were not needed anymore and were against the Constitution.

Question 159

Shelby County v. Holder (2013) ISSUE

Answer 159

Must a federal law that departs from the fundamental principles of federalism be justified by current needs?

Question 160

Shelby County v. Holder (2013) RULE

Answer 160

A federal law that departs from the fundamental principles of federalism must be justified by current needs.

Question 161

Shelby County v. Holder (2013) HOLDING

Answer 161

A federal law that changes the balance of power between states and the federal government needs to be justified by current needs. The Voting Rights Act made some states get federal approval before changing voting rules. This was needed in 1965, but not anymore because there is no big difference in voter registration between white and African American citizens. The rules are based on old data and do not reflect the present situation. So, the part of the Voting Rights Act that requires federal approval is against the Constitution.

Question 162

Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1886) HOLDING

Answer 162

Generally, there are certain subjects concerning commerce that the states may regulate in the absence of regulation by Congress. However, there is a class of subjects concerning commerce that requires uniform national standards to be applied, and such a standard should always be set by Congress. The Illinois statute at issue might be valid if it concerned only transportation within the state of Illinois and did not implicate interstate commerce. However, the statute applies to transportation that extends through several states, each of which might set its own rates of transportation. This could lead to a harmful effect upon interstate commerce. Thus, it is clear that the Illinois statute involves a type of regulation that should be governed by a uniform national standard set by Congress. Therefore, the statute is invalid, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed.

Question 163

Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1886) FACTS

Answer 163

Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company (Wabash) (defendant) is a railroad company that charged differing rates to two different companies for transporting goods over the same road from Illinois to New York. Wabash was found guilty of violating an Illinois statute prohibiting unjust discrimination in rates charged by railroad companies. The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the Illinois statute on the ground that states may regulate subjects over which Congress has not exercised its power.

Question 164

Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1886) ISSUE

Answer 164

Under the Commerce Clause, may states regulate subjects that require a uniform national standard?

Question 165

Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1886) RULE

Answer 165

Under the Commerce Clause, states may not regulate subjects that require a uniform national standard.

Question 166

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) RULE

Answer 166

Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the wages and hours of state employees.

Question 167

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) FACTS

Answer 167

Congress passed a law in 1938 about fair labor standards, but a court case in 1976 said that this law didn’t give Congress the power to set rules about pay and hours for state government employees. The San Antonio Metro Transit Authority (SAMTA) used to pay its employees according to this law, but stopped after the 1976 court case. In 1979, a part of the Department of Labor said that SAMTA could be regulated by the fair labor law because its actions weren’t a traditional government function. SAMTA sued the Department of Labor, saying that its actions weren’t subject to Congress’s rules. At the same time, Garcia and other SAMTA employees also sued SAMTA for overtime back-pay. The district court ruled in favor of SAMTA, but Garcia and the Department of Labor appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question 168

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) ISSUE

Answer 168

Does Congress have authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the wages and hours of state employees?

Question 169

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) HOLDING

Answer 169

The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. That authority also extends to intrastate economic activities if those activities impact interstate commerce. When Congress adopts labor regulations, it is generally considered to have the authority to do so under the Commerce Clause.

Question 170

Granholm v. Heald (2005) FACTS

Answer 170

Michigan and New York set up comprehensive schemes for regulating wine. Under their systems, wine producers, wholesalers, and retailers were required to have their own, separate licenses. Moreover, only in-state wineries could directly sell wine to consumers. The two states did not allow out-of-state wineries to directly sell wine to their consumers. The United States Supreme Court considered whether the schemes violated the Dormant Commerce clause.

Question 171

Granholm v. Heald (2005) ISSUE

Answer 171

Under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, may states enact legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce?

Question 172

Granholm v. Heald (2005) RULE

Answer 172

Under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, states cannot enact legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce.

Question 173

Granholm v. Heald (2005) HOLDING

Answer 173

Under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, states cannot enact legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. In this case, New York and Michigan’s regulations prohibiting out-of-state wineries from making direct sales to their consumers explicitly discriminates against interstate commerce. Even though Congress can authorize states to regulate interstate commerce in ways that would otherwise violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Webb-Kenyon Act, which bars the shipment of alcohol into a state in violation of that state’s law, cited by the dissent does not do so. There is no evidence that Congress intended to give the states plenary authority over liquor in the Webb-Kenyon Act or allow states to discriminate against out-of-state commerce. Moreover, the regulatory schemes are not saved by § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment, which more broadly prohibits the importation of alcohol into a state against its laws. That amendment does not affect this Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.

Question 174

Arizona v. United States (2012) FACTS

Answer 174

The Arizona Legislature passed S.B. 1070, a law designed to deter the unlawful entry and presence of illegal aliens in the state. The federal government (plaintiff) filed suit against the State of Arizona (defendant) in district court and sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the implementation of four specific provisions of the statute. The district court granted the injunction which prohibited the state law from taking effect. Arizona appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.

Question 175

Arizona v. United States (2012) ISSUE

Answer 175

Is a state law that addresses immigration and alien registration preempted where Congress has completely occupied the entire field?

Question 176

Arizona v. United States (2012) RULE

Answer 176

A state law that addresses immigration and alien registration is preempted where Congress has completely occupied the entire field.

Question 177

Arizona v. United States (2012) HOLDING

Answer 177

Congress possesses vast authority to enact laws and govern over immigration issues and the regulation of aliens. Immigration policy can affect federal and international trade, tourism, diplomatic relations, and other vital interests of the United States. The federal government argues that four provisions of Arizona’s law are preempted by federal law covering the field of immigration. Section 3 of the statute penalizes an individual for failing to carry an alien registration document on his person.

Question 178

Moore v. Harper (2023) RULE

Answer 178

The Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures from the ordinary exercise of state judicial review.

Question 179

Moore v. Harper (2023) ISSUE

Answer 179

Does the Elections Clause exempt state legislatures from the ordinary exercise of state judicial review?

Question 180

Moore v. Harper (2023) FACTS

Answer 180

By 2020, North Carolina’s population had increased to the point that the state was entitled to an additional seat in Congress. North Carolina’s legislature decided to redraw the state’s congressional districts and, in 2021, adopted three new maps. Voters (plaintiffs) sued state legislative representatives (defendants) in state court, alleging that each map constituted an impermissible partisan gerrymander in violation of the state constitution. The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed, finding that it had authority to review the matter, that the legislative representatives had violated state law beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the maps substantially infringed on the voters’ fundamental right to equal voting power. The state supreme court remanded the matter to the trial court to oversee the redrawing of maps. The legislative representatives petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review, claiming that the North Carolina Supreme Court violated the Elections Clause in reviewing the action of the state legislature. The United States Supreme Court declined to grant emergency relief but granted certiorari.

Question 181

Moore v. Harper (2023) HOLDING

Answer 181

The Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures from the ordinary exercise of state judicial review. Under the Elections Clause, a state “legislature” holds the authority to set the time, places, and manner of holding congressional elections. However, it is the duty of courts to decide the constitutionality of legislative acts. State legislatures are created by their state constitutions, which therefore restrict the state’s legislative power. If a state legislature acts pursuant to the Elections Clause, then the United States Constitution likewise restricts the state legislature’s power. Laws that violate the constitution are void. State courts may review challenges to the state legislature’s actions that implicate the Elections Clause, and federal courts may then review the state-court decisions to ensure that the state court has not violated the Elections Clause. Here, the North Carolina Supreme Court was entitled to judicially review the state legislature’s newly drawn congressional districts in the context of a claim of gerrymandering. The court found that the state legislature had violated the state constitution. No party has meaningfully argued that the North Carolina Supreme Court usurped the role of the state legislature. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Question 182

Adar v. Smith (2011) FACTS

Answer 182

Mickey Smith and Oren Adar (the couple) (plaintiffs), an unmarried, same-sex couple residing in Louisiana, legally adopted a child in New York. The couple wanted to have the child’s birth certificate reissued in Louisiana, listing them both as legal parents. Louisiana law allowed the reissuance of birth certificates for adoptive parents, but the Louisiana registrar of vital records and statistics (the registrar) (defendant) refused the request. The registrar concluded that unmarried parents could not be adoptive parents, citing Louisiana law providing that only couples who were married could adopt a child together. Instead, the registrar offered to list one parent’s name on the certificate, because single mothers and fathers were allowed to adopt under Louisiana law. The couple filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the registrar’s actions denied them full faith and credit under the United States Constitution and violated their equal-protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled for the couple on their full-faith-and-credit claim. A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but that judgment was vacated upon a decision to rehear the case en banc

Question 183

Adar v. Smith (2011) ISSUE

Answer 183

Is a same-sex unmarried couple who legally adopts a child in a different state entitled to a birth certificate naming both partners as legal parents in their home state if state law allows only couples who are married to adopt a child together?

Question 184

Adar v. Smith (2011) HOLDING

Answer 184

A same-sex unmarried couple who legally adopts a child in a different state is not entitled to a birth certificate naming both partners as legal parents in their home state if state law allows only married couples to adopt a child. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that full faith and credit be given in each state to judicial proceedings from other states. This clause was intended to create a preclusive effect for adjudications across the country, forcing state courts to honor adjudications from other states. Full faith and credit does not give rise to a § 1983 action, because the violators of full faith and credit are state judicial actors rather than nonjudicial state actors, and a § 1983 action affords relief to individuals who suffer a violation of constitutional rights by nonjudicial state actors.

Question 185

Adar v. Smith (2011) RULE

Answer 185

A same-sex unmarried couple who legally adopts a child in a different state is not entitled to a birth certificate naming both partners as legal parents in their home state if state law allows only couples who are married to adopt a child together.

Question 186

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) FACTS

Answer 186

Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to stop the sale of arms to countries involved in the Chaco border dispute. That same day, President Roosevelt issued an executive order prohibiting munitions sales to warring countries involved in the Chaco border dispute. In 1936, an indictment was issued alleging that Curtiss-Wright Export Co. (defendant) illegally sold arms to Bolivia, a country engaged in the Chaco border dispute. The transaction was in violation of the congressional resolution and the President’s executive order. The district court issuing the indictment held for Curtiss-Wright, ruling that the indictment was not supported by sufficient information to charge Curtiss-Wright. The United States government (plaintiff) appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 187

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) RULE

Answer 187

An otherwise unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive may nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive goal is to provide relief in a foreign conflict.

Question 188

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) HOLDING

Answer 188

There are significant differences in the federal government’s power to regulate internal versus foreign affairs. All powers given to the federal government over internal affairs are carved out by enumerated provisions in the Constitution from the powers generally reserved to the states. In contrast, any powers given to the federal government over foreign affairs are not carved out from state power because the states never possessed powers over foreign affairs. The grant of power over foreign affairs vested in the federal government after it usurped power from the British Crown. The President is the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations. Any exercise of power by the President must be exercised within the constitutional parameters granted to him, but the scope of the President’s powers in international affairs is broad. In order to effectively maintain international relations, congressional legislation concerning foreign affairs must accord the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction that would not be admissible if domestic affairs alone were involved. The President’s executive order is constitutional and the decision of the district court is reversed.

Question 189

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) ISSUE

Answer 189

Can an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive may nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive goal is to provide relief in a foreign conflict?

Question 190

Clinton v. City of NY (1998) FACTS

Answer 190

The Line Item Veto Act (Act) gave the President the power to “cancel in whole” three types of provisions signed into law. Specifically, the Act allowed for the cancellation of (1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit. The effect of the cancellation was the prevention of the item from having any legal force or effect. President Clinton (defendant) invoked the Act to cancel a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that would have allowed New York to avoid repaying funds received under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. Individuals who would have benefitted under those provisions of the Social Security Act (plaintiffs) challenged the cancellation. The district court found that the Act was unconstitutional. The case came before the United States Supreme Court.

Question 191

Clinton v. City of NY (1998) RULE

Answer 191

There is no provision in the United States Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes.

Question 192

Clinton v. City of NY (1998) HOLDING

Answer 192

There is no provision in the United States Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes. Instead, Article I, § 7 of the Constitution requires that legislation originate in Congress and only be presented to the President upon passage in both the House and the Senate. The Constitution further provides that if the President does not approve the bill, he shall return it to the house where it originated. This “return,” which is also known as a “veto”, is subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote in each house of Congress.

Question 193

Clinton v. City of NY (1998) ISSUE

Answer 193

Is the Line Item Veto Act constitutional?

Question 194

Trump v. Hawaii (2018) FACTS

Answer 194

President Trump stopped people from seven countries from coming to the U.S. for 90 days because these countries were seen as a risk for terrorism. This was challenged in court and blocked, but then Trump made a similar order. After a review of all countries, Trump made a new rule that put restrictions on people from eight countries. Hawaii sued, saying this rule was against the law and was unfairly against Islam. The case ended up in the Supreme Court.

Question 195

Trump v. Hawaii (2018) ISSUE

Answer 195

Is a presidential proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nationals of particular countries sufficiently justified by national-security concerns to survive rational-basis review?

Question 196

Trump v. Hawaii (2018) HOLDING

Answer 196

A presidential proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nationals of particular countries is sufficiently justified by national-security concerns to survive rational-basis review. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), the president may suspend the entry of foreign nationals if the president deems such entry to be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from discriminating based on religion. If the president exercises his constitutional power on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, courts will not look behind the exercise of that discretion. Courts also will not test the president’s discretion by balancing the president’s justification against the asserted constitutional interests of U.S. citizens. Here, President Trump fulfilled the requirement of § 1182(f) that his proclamation be based on a finding that entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.

Question 197

Trump v. Hawaii (2018) RULE

Answer 197

A presidential proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nationals of particular countries is sufficiently justified by national-security concerns to survive rational-basis review.

Question 198

Myers v. US (1926) FACTS

Answer 198

On July 21, 1917, the president appointed Myers (plaintiff) as a postmaster of the first class at Portland, Oregon for a four-year term. This appointment was made with the advice and consent of the Senate. On February 2, 1920, Myers was removed from his position by order of the president. Myers brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover back pay in the amount of $8,838.71. The Court of Claims found that Myers’s removal without the advice and consent of the Senate was proper. Myers appealed.

Question 199

Myers v. US (1926) HOLDING

Answer 199

The U.S. Constitution grants the president the sole power to remove executive officers. Congress passed an act providing that postmasters of the first class must be appointed and removed “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The United States argues that this provision violates the Constitution, which it interprets as granting the president the sole power to remove executive officers. The president’s removal powers under the Constitution were the subject of debate before the First Congress in 1789. The majority of the First Congress found the removal power to be held solely by the president.

Question 200

Myers v. US (1926) RULE

Answer 200

The U.S. Constitution grants the president the sole power to remove executive officers.

Question 201

Myers v. US (1926) ISSUE

Answer 201

Does the U.S. Constitution grant the president the sole power to remove executive officers?

Question 202

National Labor Relations Board v. Canning (2014) FACTS

Answer 202

The U.S. president nominated three people to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) during a Senate break. The Senate didn’t confirm these nominations before their break. The president used the Recess Appointments Clause to appoint these individuals without the Senate’s approval. A company, Noel Canning, challenged the NLRB’s authority to issue an order because they believed the new members were not validly appointed.

Question 203

National Labor Relations Board v. Canning (2014) ISSUE

Answer 203

Under the Recess Appointments Clause, may the president of the United States fill a vacancy during a Senate recess only if the recess is at least 10 days long or very unusual circumstances exist?

Question 204

National Labor Relations Board v. Canning (2014) HOLDING

Answer 204

Under the Recess Clause, the president may fill a vacancy during a Senate recess only if the recess is at least 10 days long or very unusual circumstances exist. The Appointments Clause in Article II of the US Constitution requires that the president obtain the Senate’s advice and consent before appointing high-level public officials. The Recess Clause creates a backup mechanism to allow the president to temporarily fill vacancies during a Senate recess. The clause’s purpose is to allow the president to keep the government running when Congress is not available. A recess appointment lasts only until the end of Congress’s next session. Historically, Congress has acquiesced to thousands of presidential recess appointments. However, this case presents the first opportunity for a judicial interpretation of the Recess Clause. Considering the clause’s language, its purpose, and its historical use, the term recess includes both the Senate’s annual inter-session break between formal congressional sessions and the various shorter intra-session breaks. However, a pro forma session is still a Senate session, not a recess.

Question 205

National Labor Relations Board v. Canning (2014) RULE

Answer 205

Under the Recess Appointments Clause, the president of the United States may fill a vacancy during a Senate recess only if the recess is at least 10 days long or very unusual circumstances exist.

Question 206

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) FACTS

Answer 206

After a big financial crisis, Congress made a new agency called the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The CFPB had one boss who was chosen by the president and could only be fired for a good reason. The CFPB asked a law firm called Seila Law for some information, but Seila Law said no because they thought the CFPB was set up in a way that violated the Constitution. The case went to court, and the lower courts said the CFPB was set up correctly. Seila Law didn’t agree and took the case to the Supreme Court.

Question 207

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) ISSUE

Answer 207

Is it a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine for an administrative agency to be headed by a single director not removable by the president at will?

Question 208

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) HOLDING

Answer 208

It is a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine for an administrative agency to be headed by a single director not removable by the president at will. The Constitution contemplates a government in which power is divided everywhere it is held. The exception is the president, who possesses significant power but is directly accountable to the people via regular elections. If an administrative agency possesses significant governmental power and is headed by a single director not subject to removal by the president at will, then the director may act unilaterally, without oversight.

Question 209

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) RULE

Answer 209

It is a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine for an administrative agency to be headed by a single director not removable by the president at will.

Question 210

Ex parte Quirin (1942) FACTS

Answer 210

During World War II, a group of German military personnel attempted to sabotage the American government by secretly landing German submarines on American shores. The saboteurs removed their uniforms and carried with them a supply of explosives, fuses, and incendiary and timing devices. All had been instructed by the German government to destroy war industries and facilities in the United States. The saboteurs were captured and held in detention for trial by military commission, which was appointed by an executive order of the president in 1942 to try them for violations of the law of war and the Articles of War. The saboteurs (defendants) petitioned for habeas corpus in federal district court, which was denied. The saboteurs appealed to the court of appeals but petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari prior to judgment. The writ of certiorari was granted.

Question 211

Ex parte Quirin (1942) ISSUE

Answer 211

May Congress and the President of the United States constitutionally place unlawful combatants on trial before a military commission for offenses against the law of war?

Question 212

Ex parte Quirin (1942) RULE

Answer 212

Congress and the President of the United States, through the Articles of War and executive orders, may constitutionally place unlawful combatants on trial before a military commission for offenses against the law of war.

Question 213

Ex parte Quirin (1942) HOLDING

Answer 213

Congress and the President of the United States, under the Articles of War and executive orders, may constitutionally place unlawful combatants on trial before a military commission for offenses against the law of war. Unlawful combatants have traditionally been recognized as individuals who act as secret spies or enemy combatants without uniform who infiltrate behind military lines for the purpose of gaining secret information or conducting “sabotage” against a nation’s military forces. Although lawful enemy combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces, unlawful combatants are additionally subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for violations of the law of war. The U.S. Constitution gives the president the power to wage war declared by Congress and carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and regulation of the armed forces, as well as all laws that pertain to the conduct of war. Thus, the president has the constitutional authority to enforce, through executive order, the Articles of War enacted by Congress.

Question 214

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) FACTS

Answer 214

In 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed a law allowing the President to use force against suspected terrorists. Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was captured in Afghanistan and handed over to the U.S. military. He was moved around a few times before ending up in South Carolina. The government said they could hold him without charges because he was an ‘enemy combatant’. Hamdi’s dad said this was against the law and asked for a fair hearing and a lawyer for his son. The government tried to dismiss the case, but the lower court said there wasn’t enough evidence to hold Hamdi without a trial. The higher court disagreed, so the case went to the Supreme Court.

Question 215

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) ISSUE

Answer 215

Does a United States citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant have the due-process right to a meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual basis for his detention before a neutral decision-maker?

Question 216

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) HOLDING

Answer 216

A U.S. citizen accused of being an enemy combatant must be given a chance to be heard by a neutral decision maker. The government must provide basic procedures for the citizen to challenge his detention. While Congress did authorize the President to use force against terrorists, the Constitution guarantees the right to due process. This means that a person can’t be held indefinitely without a trial, a lawyer, or a chance to ask for freedom if they’re wrongfully imprisoned.

Question 217

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) RULE

Answer 217

A United States citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant has the due-process right to a meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual basis for his detention before a neutral decision-maker.

Question 218

United States v. Nixon (1974) FACTS

Answer 218

President Nixon (defendant) was named as a co-conspirator in various charges including conspiracy to defraud the United States. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia subpoenaed various tapes and documents relating to specific meetings in which Nixon was a participant. Nixon filed a formal claim of privilege and a motion to quash the subpoenas. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 219

United States v. Nixon (1974) ISSUE

Answer 219

May the President of the United States assert an absolute claim of privilege over all confidential communications?

Question 220

United States v. Nixon (1974) HOLDING

Answer 220

Although there is a presumptive presidential privilege for his confidential communications, when the communications do not concern military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, that presumption may be rebutted due to the constitutional need to produce all relevant evidence in a criminal case. Thus there is no absolute, unqualified presidential privilege. Separate powers were not meant to operate with absolute independence. A generalized claim of presidential privilege based on a claim of public interest in confidentiality does not overcome the interest in producing all relevant evidence consistent with the fair administration of justice.

Question 221

United States v. Nixon (1974) RULE

Answer 221

A presidential claim of privilege asserting only a generalized interest in confidentiality is not sufficient to overcome the judicial interest in producing all relevant evidence in a criminal case.

Question 222

Clinton v. Jones (1997) RULE

Answer 222

The United States Constitution does not grant the President of the United States immunity from civil litigation involving actions committed before entering office.

Question 223

Clinton v. Jones (1997) FACTS

Answer 223

President Clinton was sued by Paula Jones, who claimed that he made inappropriate sexual advances towards her in 1991, before he was President. She also said that her bosses treated her badly because she rejected Clinton’s advances. She wanted $75,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The district court said that the President couldn’t be sued and that the case had to wait until after Clinton’s term was over. But the court of appeals disagreed, and the Supreme Court decided to look at the case.

Question 224

Clinton v. Jones (1997) HOLDING

Answer 224

The Supreme Court said that the Constitution does not protect the President from being sued for things they did before they became President. The reason we usually protect public officials from being sued for their official actions is so they can do their jobs without worrying about being sued. But this protection doesn’t apply to things they did before they were in office. Clinton wanted the case to be put on hold until after his term, but the Court said this wasn’t necessary. They said it was unlikely that allowing the case to go forward would interfere with his duties as President or lead to a lot of other lawsuits against Presidents. They also said that putting the case on hold could harm Jones’s right to a speedy trial and make it harder to gather evidence and witnesses.

Question 225

Clinton v. Jones (1997) ISSUE

Answer 225

Does the United States Constitution protect the President of the United States from suits based on actions committed before entering office?

Question 226

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP (2020) FACTS

Answer 226

The House of Representatives, through three committees, asked for personal banking and tax information about President Donald Trump, his family, and his businesses from third parties. They said they needed this information to check on banking rules, investigate Russian interference in US politics, and see if Trump had been honest about his finances. Trump said these requests were not for making laws and broke the rules about the different parts of government not interfering with each other. He didn’t say the information was protected by executive privilege. The lower courts said the requests were okay, but the Supreme Court decided to review the cases.

Question 227

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP (2020) ISSUE

Answer 227

Can Congress ask for a president’s information if it needs it for making laws and if asking for it doesn’t break the rules about the different parts of government not interfering with each other?

Question 228

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP (2020) HOLDING

Answer 228

Congress can ask for a president’s information if it needs it for making laws and if asking for it doesn’t break the rules about the different parts of government not interfering with each other. But, Congress can’t use this power to punish people or to control the president.

Question 229

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP (2020) RULE

Answer 229

Congress may subpoena a president’s information if it has a valid legislative purpose and the subpoena does not violate separation-of-powers principles.

Question 230

Munn v. Illinois (1876) RULE

Answer 230

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that a private business, in which the public has a significant interest, be compensated for any losses it incurs due to government regulation.

Question 231

Munn v. Illinois (1876) ISSUE

Answer 231

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that a private business, in which the public has a significant interest, be compensated for any losses it incurs due to government regulation?

Question 232

Munn v. Illinois (1876) HOLDING

Answer 232

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that a private business, in which the public has a significant interest, be compensated for any losses it incurs due to government regulation. Private citizens necessarily part with some of their rights and privileges when they enter society and submit to the power of the society’s government. The essence of government power is to regulate the interactions between society’s citizens and their use of private property in order to prevent them from unnecessarily harming each other. In effect, when a citizen starts a business that affects the public good, that citizen grants the public an interest in that business. The government may tend that public interest by regulating the business. A citizen who objects to such regulation is free to sell or close the business. In this case, in 1871 the state legislature saw that the public interest in protecting grain farmers from ruinous storage rates required the exercise of government power to limit those rates.

Question 233

Munn v. Illinois (1876) FACTS

Answer 233

Midwestern grain farmers had to store their grain in grain elevators until the grain could be transported and sold to eastern buyers. The firm of Munn and Scott (defendant) was founded in 1862 and soon, along with a few other companies, acquired monopoly control over the rates farmers paid to store grain in Chicago. In 1871, the Illinois legislature attempted to curb the companies’ power by limiting the prices they could charge, forcing the companies to lower their rates. Munn and Scott refused to comply with the law. Illinois (plaintiff) successfully prosecuted the firm for noncompliance. Munn and Scott appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which affirmed the trial verdict. Munn and Scott appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 234

Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) FACTS

Answer 234

Allgeyer, a company in New Orleans, asked the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company in New York to insure a shipment of cotton. The State of Louisiana said Allgeyer broke a state law that limited foreign companies from doing business in Louisiana. The trial court sided with Allgeyer, but the Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and fined Allgeyer $1,000. The United States Supreme Court decided to review the case.

Question 235

Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) ISSUE

Answer 235

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, may a state prohibit its citizens from entering into contracts outside the state?

Question 236

Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) HOLDING

Answer 236

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not prohibit its citizens from entering into contracts outside the state. The Due Process Clause protects citizens from being deprived of their liberty without due process of law. This protected liberty encompasses both physical liberty and economic liberties, including the right to work. The right to work includes the right to freely negotiate and enter contracts necessary to earn a living. Thus, using a theory sometimes called substantive due process, the Due Process Clause gives individual citizens a freedom to contract. However, a citizen’s individual liberties, like the freedom to contract, may give way to a state’s right to promote the general welfare. Accordingly, a state’s police powers give it the authority to police the contracts that occur within the state to protect the general welfare of its citizens. In contrast, a state’s police powers do not extend to matters outside the state.

Question 237

Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) RULE

Answer 237

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not prohibit its citizens from entering into contracts outside the state.

Question 238

Lochner v. New York (1905) FACTS

Answer 238

In 1896, the New York legislature enacted the Bakershop Act which limited the hours bakers were permitted to work to no more than ten per day. Joseph Lochner (defendant) owned a bakery in New York (plaintiff) and was fined twice under the law for overworking an employee. His conviction was upheld in the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, and was affirmed in the New York Court of Appeals. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question 239

Lochner v. New York (1905) ISSUE

Answer 239

May a state regulate the working hours of certain classes of workers without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Question 240

Lochner v. New York (1905) HOLDING

Answer 240

The general right of an employer to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this Amendment, unless there are circumstances that exclude the right. States may impose reasonable conditions on the right to contract that further the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.

Question 241

Lochner v. New York (1905) RULE

Answer 241

A state may not regulate the working hours mutually agreed upon by employers and employees as this violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to contract freely under the Due Process Clause.

Question 242

United States v. Adair (1983) FACTS

Answer 242

The Klamath Marsh and Williamson River are located in south-central Oregon. Both rivers were important water sources to the Klamath Indians, who lived in the area for over a thousand years. In 1864, the Klamath Indians signed a treaty relinquishing most of their land in exchange for a reservation that included the Klamath Marsh and part of the Williamson River watershed. Later, through a series of acts, much of the Klamath reservation was sold off, with the retained land placed in trust for the Klamath Tribe. The United States later purchased much of the trust land for wildlife sanctuaries and national forests. In 1975, the United States (plaintiff) sued for a declaration of the water rights in the former Klamath Reservation area. The government named as defendants individual owners of land in the area, including Adair (defendant). The United States argued that the Klamath Indians retained reserved water rights for hunting and fishing under the 1864 treaty, but the landowners argued that the Indians had water rights under the treaty only for agricultural purposes. The district court agreed with the United States, holding that the Klamath Indians had an implied reservation of water rights for hunting and fishing.

Question 243

United States v. Adair (1983) ISSUE

Answer 243

Can a treaty create an implied reservation of water rights, with a priority date of immemorial use, to support a moderate exercise of hunting and fishing rights?

Question 244

United States v. Adair (1983) HOLDING

Answer 244

A treaty creating an Indian reservation can reserve water rights for hunting and fishing purposes, with a priority date of immemorial use. This Court has previously held that there is an implied reservation of water rights any time Congress creates an Indian reservation. In subsequent cases, this Court has also found reserved water rights applicable to public lands, such as national monuments, if those water rights are necessary to meet the purposes for which the public lands were created. However, those water rights are implied only if necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of the public lands, not any secondary purposes, and entail only as much water as necessary to fulfill the primary purpose.

Question 245

United States v. Adair (1983) RULE

Answer 245

A treaty may create an implied reservation of water rights, with a priority date of immemorial use, to support a moderate exercise of hunting and fishing rights.

Question 246

Muller v. Oregon (1907) FACTS

Answer 246

In 1903, the State of Oregon (plaintiff) passed a law that limited the working hours of female employees to no more than ten per day. Curt Muller (defendant), owner of a laundry business, was convicted of violating the statute after he made a female employee work more than ten hours in one day. Muller appealed his conviction to the Oregon Supreme Court, which affirmed. Muller then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 247

Muller v. Oregon (1907) RULE

Answer 247

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may constitutionally limit the working hours of women and not men because of the state’s strong interest in promoting the health of women as the “weaker sex.”

Question 248

Muller v. Oregon (1907) HOLDING

Answer 248

Reports and affidavits from committees, bureaus of statistics, commissioners of hygiene, and inspectors of factories all suggest that working long hours are particularly dangerous to women because of their “special physical organization.” In addition to describing the effects of long hours on women’s health, the reports also suggest that working more than ten hours per day outside the home diminishes women’s abilities to perform maternal functions, rear and educate children, and maintain the home. Although the right to contract to work long hours was upheld in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), that case is distinguished from the present case on the grounds that a state has a strong interest in preserving the health and maternal capabilities of women as a sex. The existence of healthy mothers is vital to the existence of a healthy human race, which is an important interest for states. The Oregon law, which restricts women’s working hours to ten per day, is upheld because women are uniquely qualified to fulfill these roles, and the natural order of society is for women to depend on men to work long hours.

Question 249

Muller v. Oregon (1907) ISSUE

Answer 249

May a state, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, limit the working hours of women?

Question 250

Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) FACTS

Answer 250

In 1918, Congress passed a law providing for the fixing of minimum wages for women and children in the District of Columbia. Children’s Hospital (plaintiff) employed several adult women for wages mutually agreed upon by and satisfactory to all parties. However, the wages were less than required by federal law. Children’s Hospital brought suit in Federal District Court for the District of Columbia against Adkins (defendant), the federal official responsible for administering the minimum wage program, seeking to enjoin the program on the grounds that the minimum wage requirements interfered with the hospital’s Fifth Amendment Due Process right to contract freely. The district court denied the injunction, but the court of appeals reversed. Adkins appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 251

Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) ISSUE

Answer 251

May the federal government enact a minimum wage for female employees in the District of Columbia without violating the freedom to contract under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Question 252

Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) HOLDING

Answer 252

Although the freedom to contract is firmly established in the Court’s jurisprudence, nothing in its precedent decisions suggests that this freedom is absolute. However, the legislature may only interfere with the freedom to contract in the case of exceptional circumstances. While the difference between the sexes was acceptably upheld in its previous decision in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), the health and maternal functions concerns justifying legislative restraints on women’s working hours are not present in the area of women’s wages. Changing times means modifications to the way women are treated in society. Absent health and safety concerns, this same equality should be afforded women in their civil and contractual relationships. The monetary requirements for protecting women’s health and safety are different for each woman based on her individual circumstances and thus cannot be reasonably standardized by the federal government. This differs from women’s health concerns, which are found by numerous sources to be widely and uniformly affected by working long hours.

Question 253

Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) RULE

Answer 253

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Congress cannot make a law regulating the federal minimum wage for women as this violates the freedom of contract.

Question 254

Nebbia v. New York (1934) FACTS

Answer 254

In 1933, the State of New York (plaintiff) established a Milk Control Board which had the power to fix the prices of milk sold by New York stores. Nebbia (defendant) owned a grocery store in Rochester, New York and was convicted of selling milk at a price below the fixed price. The County Court of Appeals for Monroe County affirmed the conviction, and Nebbia appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question 255

Nebbia v. New York (1934) ISSUE

Answer 255

May a state fix the price of goods sold within its borders without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Question 256

Nebbia v. New York (1934) HOLDING

Question 257

Nebbia v. New York (1934) RULE

Answer 257

Without the presence of other constitutional prohibitions, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent states from enacting economic policies such as price regulations to further the public good as long as those policies are not unreasonable or arbitrary.