CASES Flashcards

1
Q

Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, G.R. No. 9069, 31 March 1915

A

Properties for public use may not be leased to private individuals. Such a lease is null and void for the reason that a municipal council cannot withdraw part of the plaza from public use. If possession has already been given, the lessee must restore possession by vacating it and the municipality must thereupon restore to him any sums it may have collected as rent.

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2
Q

b. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company, G.R. No. 11658, 15 February 1918

A

A factory building is real property, and the mere fact that it is mortgaged and sold, separate and apart from the land on which it stands, in no wise changes its character as real property.

The annotation or inscription of a deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage registry cannot be given the legal effect of an inscription in the registry of real property.

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3
Q

c. Standard Oil Co. vs. Jaramillo, G.R. No. 20329, 16 March 1923

A

The Register of Deed may not refuse the registration of a chattel mortgage on the pretext that the subject matter thereof is not a personal property. The Court clarifies that the duties of the register of deeds in respect to the registration of chattel mortgages are of purely ministerial in character. As earlier discussed, the classification of property into real or personal is provided for by law. In refusing the registration of a chattel mortgage on the ground that the subject matter thereof is not a personal property, the register of deeds is engaging itself in the interpretation of the law — which is the exclusive province of the courts.

The Standard Oil case is telling us that the registration of a chattel mortgage covering a real property before the chattel mortgage registry may not be prevented by the register of deeds.

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3
Q

d. Sibal vs. Valdez, G.R. No. L-26278, 04 August 1927

A

Ungathered products” as mentioned in the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase “personal property” should be understood to include “ungathered products.”

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3
Q

e. Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng, G.R. No. 41643, 31 July 1935

A

nasmuch as the central is permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessarily be permanent.”

essential and principal

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4
Q

f. Davao Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 40411, 07 August 1935

A

machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

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5
Q

g. Chua Guan vs. Samahang Magsasaka, G.R. No. 42091, 02 November 1935

A

They are personal property, and, therefore, can be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage. So are the certificates themselves evidencing the ownership of the shares.

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5
Q

h. Bachrach vs. Ledesma, G.R. No. 42462, 31 August 1937

A

Certificates of stock or of stock dividends, under the Corporation Law, are quasi negotiable instruments in the sense that they may be given in pledge or mortgage to secure an obligation.

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6
Q

i. Evangelista vs. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-11139, 23 April 1958

A

A house or a building constructed on a land belonging to another is still an immovable property.

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7
Q

j. Associated Insurance & Surety Co. vs. Iya, G.R. No. L-10837-38, 30 May 1958

A

A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another.

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8
Q

k. Mindanao Bus Company vs. City Assessor, G.R. No. L-17870, 29 September 1962

A

Before movables may be deemed immobilized in contemplation of paragraph 5 of Article 415, it is necessary that they must be “essential” and “principal” elements of the industry or works without which such industry or works would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.

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9
Q

l. Ago vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17898, 31 October 1962

A

Notice of sale on property on execution - Before the sale of real property or execution, notice thereof must be given.

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10
Q

m. Navarro vs. Pineda, G.R. No. L-18456, 30 November 1963

A

It is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement, treat as a personal property that which by nature would be real property.

It has been a constant criterion nevertheless that, with respect to third persons, who are not parties to the contract, and specially in execution proceedings, the house is considered as an immovable property.

estoppel

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11
Q

n. Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Meralco, G.R. No. L-15334, 31 January 1964

A

ABANDONED. The steel towers constructed by the Manila Electric Company were not considered as real properties because they were “removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.”

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12
Q

o. Hilario vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570, 27 April 1967

A

Riverbanks are of public ownership, including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Even if a river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the definition provided above.

A river is a compound concept consisting of three elements: (1) running waters, (2) the bed and (3) the banks. All these constitute the river. Since it is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature (i.e., either totally public or completely private). Since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same nature.

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13
Q

p. People’s Bank and Trust vs. Dahican Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-17500, 16 May 1967

A

Article 415 does not define real property but enumerates what are considered as such, among them being machinery, receptacles, instruments or replacements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and shall tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.

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14
Q

q. Inter-regional Development Corp. vs. CA and Caballero, G.R. No. L-39677, 22 July 1975

A

Trees, plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land, are immovable property.

For the ownership of crops planted on land belonging to another; Sower/planter in good faith to be indemnified by landowner before appropriation of the growing fruits.

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15
Q

r. Cebu Oxygen vs. Bercilles and Espeleta, G.R. No. L-40474, 29 August 1975

A

Withdrawal of an existing road from public use was valid thereby converting the withdrawn property into patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

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16
Q

s. Maneclang vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-66575, 30 September 1986

A

A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual. (Diego v. Court of Appeals)

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17
Q

t. Republic vs. Vda. De Castillo, G.R. No. L-69002, 30 June 1988

A

Accretion on Lakes
Private: Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866: belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.

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18
Q

u. Republic vs. Alagad, G.R. No. L-66807, 26 January 1989

A

In Republic v. Alagad, the Supreme Court defined the highest ordinary depth of the waters of the Laguna de Bay as the highest depth of the waters during the dry season or such depth being the regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year.
(during dry, not rainy bc rain = extraordinary)

Otherwise stated, where the rise in water level is due to the “extraordinary” action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable of registration as private property.

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19
Q

v. Binalay vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 92161, 18 March 1991

A

The regularly submerged portion of a river is property of public dominion pursuant to Article 70 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 which defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites:
that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).

What’s unique about this case is the river dries up during dry season. That dry part is it private? No. Art. 70 of the Law of waters “ground covered by its waters during the highest floods”

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20
Q

w. Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr., G.R. No. 93654, 06 May 1992

A

A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Article 420, 424). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract (Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas).

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21
Q

y. Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing, G.R. No. 137705, 22 August 2000

A

Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.

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21
Q

x. Villarico vs. CA, G.R. No. 105912, 28 June 1999

A

A forest land forms part of public domain hence inalienable unless there’s a declassification made by Director of Forestry. Possession for more than 30 years does not convert it to private property capable of private appropriation.

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22
Q

z. Tsai vs. CA, G.R. No. 120098, 02 October 2001

A

In the instant case, the parties herein: (1) executed a contract styled as “Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage,” instead of just “Real Estate Mortgage” if indeed their intention is to treat all properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate “LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT.”

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23
Q

aa. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, G.R. 133250, 11 November 2003

A

“Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution.”

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24
Q

bb. FELS Energy, Inc. vs. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 168557, 16 February 2007

A

Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that “[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.

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25
Q

cc. Chavez vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. 164527, 15 August 2007

A

Government owned lands, as long as they are patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations.

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26
Q

dd. SENR vs. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 & Sacay vs. SENR, G.R. No. 173775, 08 October 2008

A

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.

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27
Q

ee. Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, 13 January 2009

A

Any property which is not included in the enumeration of real properties under the Civil Code and capable of appropriation can be the subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code.

The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of “asportation”, which is defined as “carrying away”. Jurisprudence is settled that to “take” under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.

28
Q

ff. MIAA vs. Pasay, G.R. No. 163072, 02 April 2009

A

Airport lands and buildings are properties of public dominion intended for public use, and as such are exempt from real property tax under Section 234 (a) of the LGC. However, under the same provision, if it leases its real property to a taxable person, the specific property leased becomes subject to real property tax.

29
Q

gg. Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, 29 April 2009

A

Under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
[Prevailing]
(1) When there is an express government manifestation that the land if already patrimonial or no longer needed for public use, public service or the development of national wealth
(2) Land which has been classified as alienable and disposable land is actually alienated and disposed of by the State

30
Q

hh. Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. vs. Republic, G.R. No. 177168, 03 August 2015

A

Art 420 (1) “other similar character”
Military Reservations
Inalienable and non-disposable in view of Sec 88 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 specifically declaring them as non-alienable and not subject to disposition.
They remain as public domain lands until they are actually disposed of in favor of private persons.
- by act of congress or proclamation of President (expressed declaration)

Property which has been reserved for public or quasi-public use or purpose are non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable by law or by proclamation of the President.

Any sale or disposition of property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law and public policy.

Since the sale of the property, in this case, is void, the title issued to NOVAI is similarly void ab initio. It is a well-settled doctrine that registration under the Torrens System does not, by itself, vest title as it is not a mode of acquiring ownership; that registration under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant’s already existing title.

31
Q

ii. Manila Electric Company vs. City Assessor, G.R. No. 166102, 05 August 2015

A

Under Section 199 (o) of the Local Government Code, machinery, to be deemed real property subject to real property tax, need no longer be annexed to the land or building as these “may or may not be attached, permanently or temporarily to the real property,” and in fact, such machinery may even be “mobile.”

MYK: In this case there is LGC available, as compared to the Board of Assessment case in 1964.

32
Q

jj. Central Mindanao University vs. Republic, G.R. No. 195026, 22 February 2016

A

For the said President’s directive to file the necessary petition for compulsory registration of parcels of land be considered as an equivalent of a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable, the subject land, among others, should not have been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.

Therefore, the said directive on December 12, 1960 cannot be considered as a declaration that said land is alienable and disposable. Unlike in De la Rosa, the lands, having been reserved for public purpose by virtue of Proclamation No. 476, have not ceased to be so at the time the said directive was made. Hence, the lots did not revert to and become public agricultural land for them to be the subject of a declaration by the President that the same are alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, CMU failed to establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land reservations registered in its name are alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Aside from the series of indorsements regarding the filing of the application for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land and the said directive from the President, CMU did not present any proof of a positive act of the government declaring the said lands alienable and disposable.

33
Q

kk. Capitol Wireless, Inc. vs. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, G.R. No. 180110, 30 May 2016

A

Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission lines which, as ruled in the case of Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, are “no longer exempted from real property tax” and may qualify as “machinery” subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code.

34
Q

ll. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan vs. Garcia Jr., G.R. No. 174964, 05 October 2016

A

Under the well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are under the absolute control and ownership of the State.

35
Q

mm. Republic vs. Saromo, G.R. No. 189803, 14 March 2018

A

Without the official declaration that the subject land is alienable and disposable or proof of its declassification into disposable agricultural land, the “unclassified public forest land’s” legal classification of the subject land remains.

36
Q

nn. Republic vs. Alejandre, G.R. No. 217336, 17 October 2018.

A

Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been classified, reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable lands of public domain. Therefore, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.

37
Q

oo. Republic vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 211664, 12 Nov 2018

A

The present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by
a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

Absent sufficient evidence as to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for registration, possession of the same, no matter how long, cannot ripen into a registrable title.

38
Q

Nenita Quality Foods Corp. vs. Galabo

A

To prove prior physical possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the Deed of Transfer, Santos’ OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Order of the Bureau of Lands approving Santos’ free patent application. In presenting these pieces of evidence, NQFC is apparently mistaken as it may have equated possession that is at issue as an attribute of ownership to actual possession. The latter type of possession is, however, different from and has different legal implications than the former.

The word “possession” in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it “is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.”

39
Q

Heirs of Melchor vs. Melchor,

A

In an ejectment case, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. These actions, which deal with physical or de facto possession, may be distinguished as follows:

Forcible Entry – (1) Plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior possession of the premises until deprived thereof; (2) possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth

Unlawful Detainer – (1) Plaintiff need not have been in prior possession; (2) possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff

39
Q

Rhema International Livelihood Foundation, Inc. vs. Hibix, Inc.,

A

For forcible entry to prosper, an appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not required. However short it is, for as long as prior physical possession is established, recovery of possession under Rule 70 of the Rules may be granted.

40
Q

Peralta-Labrador vs. Bugarin

A

It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land.

However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it.

After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria , which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

41
Q

Mirallosa vs. Carmel Development, Inc.,

A

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.

An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key jurisdictional facts:
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

The Court ruled here when “tolerance” should be reckoned. Carmel only started its tolerance when the PD was overruled.

GR: Tolerance starts from possession. However, when there is an intervening event, like in this case, tolerance reckon started from the Tuason ruling which overturned the PD 293.

Two other doctrines cited:
* Matters adjudged between certain persons only affect them.
* Doctrine of operative fact – cannot be invoked to validate

Demand letter in April 2002 and subsequently filed the Complaint in January 2003, it did so still within the one-year prescriptive period imposed by the rules.

42
Q

Ganila vs. CA

A

A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.

His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.

43
Q

Province of Camarines Sur vs. Bodega Glassware, G.R. No. 194199, 22 March 2017

A

Rule 70 of the Rules of Court covers the ejectment cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

These actions are summary proceedings and are devised to provide for a particular remedy for a very specific issue. Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry involve only the question of actual possession.

44
Q

Baleares, et al vs. Espanto,

A

Petitioners who had continuous possession had a better right than respondents (who merely stepped into transferor’s shoes that had no right to the property) who had no right whatsoever.

45
Q

Heirs of Cullado vs. Gutierrez,

A

In an accion publiciana, the defense of ownership (i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiffs Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the issue of ownership is done only to determine the issue of possession.

45
Q

Hilario vs. Salvador,

A

An accion reivindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership.

On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.

46
Q

Modesto vs. Urbina

A

Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain, and its occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. It is only after the property has been declared alienable and disposable that private persons can legally claim possessory rights over it.

Obiter - An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The objective of a plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.

47
Q

Martinez vs. Martinez,

A

The person in whose name a vessel is registered is presumed to have the legal title thereto.

The exercise of acts of ownership over a vessel registered in another’s name, by one with whose funds the vessel was purchased, does not overcome the presumption that the registered owner is the legal owner.

48
Q

Sps. Cañezo vs. Sps. Bautista,

A

In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the courts, that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same. However, although the identity of the thing that a party desires to recover must be established, if the plaintiff has already proved his right of ownership over a tract of land, and the defendant is occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the portions occupied by the defendant within the plaintiff’s property.

49
Q

Distelleria Washington, Inc. vs. La Tondeña Distillers & CA,

A

La Tondeña not only sold its gin products but also the marked bottles or containers, as well. And when these products were transferred by way of sale, then ownership over the bottles and all its attributes (jus utendi, jus abutendi, jus fruendi, jus disponendi) passed to the buyer. It necessarily follows that the transferee has the right to possession of the bottles unless he uses them in violation of the original owner’s registered or incorporeal rights.

50
Q

PNB vs. CA,

A

The exercise of the rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. In this case, the Tenancy Act and P.D. 27 have imposed the limitations. As held by the SC in other cases, agricultural lessee’s rights are enforceable against the transferee or the landowner’s successor-in- interest. The adjudged legitimate tenant of such property may enforce his right of possession.

51
Q

Aneco Realty & Development Corp. vs. Landex Development Corp.,

A

The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. An owner of a land may fence his property subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, courts will not unduly restrain the landowner from exercising an inherent proprietary right.

52
Q

Custodio vs. CA

A

damnum absque injuria (Latin for “loss or damage without injury”) is a phrase expressing the principle of tort law in which some person (natural or legal) causes damage or loss to another, but does not injure them.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.

53
Q

German Management & Services, Inc. vs. CA

A

Doctrine of Self-help (Right to exclude)
The employment of such reasonable force in defense of his property is what is known in juridical science as the doctrine of self-help.

This right of the owner is so important that the law deems it appropriate to allow him to “use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.”

54
Q

Republic vs. CA & Cosalan,

A

It is a well settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, however long cannot ripen into private ownership, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry.

HOWEVER, THE PRIMARY RIGHT OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL WHO POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED THE LAND IN GOOD FAITH MUCH PRIOR TO THE CLASSIFICATION MUST BE RECOGNIZED.

55
Q

Republic vs. CA & Dela Rosa,

A

The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.

56
Q

Edwards vs. Sims

A

Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum ad infernos (to whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths), is an old maxim and rule. It is that the owner of realty, unless there has been a division of the estate, is entitled to the free and unfettered control of his own land above, upon, and beneath the surface. So whatever is in a direct line between the surface of the land and the center of the earth belongs to the owner of the surface. Ordinarily that ownership cannot be interfered with or infringed by third persons.

57
Q

U.S. vs. Causby,

A

Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum ad infernos (to whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths). However, the literal construction of the ad coelum doctrine has already been rejected by the courts.

58
Q

NAPOCOR vs. Ibrahim

A

The ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. The landowners’ right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest protected by law

59
Q

Bachrach vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co. & PNB

A

But a bonus which is paid to the owner of a piece of land for undertaking the risk of securing with his property a loan given to a sugar central is not civil fruits of the mortgaged property since it is not income derived rom the property itself but a compensation for the risk assumed by the owner.

60
Q

Villasi vs. Garcia

A

General Rule: Accessory follows the principal.
Exception: In cases where there is clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld.

61
Q

Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque vs. Ebio,

A

The alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

Banks of creeks = NOT PUBLIC DOMAIN

62
Q

Grande vs.

A

Doctrine: Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.

Relevant law: Article 457

63
Q

Vda. De Nazareno vs. CA,

A

Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.

Why relevant? Per Civil code, alluvion should be exclusive work of nature.

Contrary to this carved out rule in Meneses – where there’s human intervention, it will be public domain. Unlike in civil code, alluvion belongs to the riparian.

64
Q

Daclison vs. Baytion,

A

Interpreting Article 457:
Requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered, namely:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Article 445 uses the adverb “thereon” which is simply defined as “on the thing that has been mentioned.” In other words, the supposed improvement must be made, constructed or introduced within or on the property and not outside so as to qualify as an improvement contemplated by law. Otherwise, it would just be very convenient for land owners to expand or widen their properties in the guise of improvements.

65
Q

German Management & Services,

A

Doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession not when possession already lost. When possession has already been lost, owner must INSTEAD resort to judicial process for the recovery of property as required in Article 536 of the Civil Code.

65
Q

Jagualing vs. CA,

A

Under Art. 465, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof.

65
Q

Baes vs. CA

A

The riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes or, for more reason, due to artificial means.

If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through artificial means.

65
Q

Reynante vs. CA

A

While it is true that accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owner of the banks, such accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription.

66
Q

Bagaipo vs. CA,

A

Requisites when an accretion benefits a riparian owner (all must be present):
○ That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
○ That it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and
○ That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

67
Q

Heirs of Francisco Narvasa, Sr., vs. Imbornal,

A

Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: “[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”

68
Q

Bliss Development Corp. vs. Diaz,

A

The CA may have made the erroneous conclusion that Diaz acted in good faith, but because BDC equally acted in bad faith, Art. 453 of the Civil Code commands that the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.