Cases Flashcards
Woolmington v DPP [1935]
It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the defendant is guilty, not for the defendant to prove he is innocent
Larsonneur (1933)
The actus reus was “being in the UK” – state of affairs offence
Winzar v CC of Kent (1983)
“Every person found drunk on a highway or public place is guilty of an offence” – state of affairs offence
R v Dytham [1979]
Certain job positions have a duty of care to others
Dytham was a constable who saw a man being kicked so badly that he later died. D did not attempt to stop the disturbance but drove away without calling for assistance. He was found guilty of wilfully neglecting to perform his duty.
R v Pittwood [1909]
Duty of care based on contract
Pittwood was employed as level crossing gate-keeper. He failed to close the gate when he went to lunch. A train came, collided with a passing cart and the train driver was killed. P’s failure was the actus reus. His duty arose out of the contract. Convicted of manslaughter.
R v Instan [1893]
Duty of care based on implied contract
Instan omitted to give food to her aunt, a helpless invalid, for 12 days before her aunt’s death, nor did Instan seek medical aid or nursing assistance. Nevertheless, Instan continued to stay at her aunt’s house and was maintained by her aunt’s money. Instan was convicted of manslaughter and her conviction was upheld. Lord Coleridge CJ stated, “…. There was a common law duty imposed upon the prisoner which she did not discharge.”
R v Gibbins & Proctor [1918]
Parents owe a duty to their children to act to save them from harm
Hood (2003)
spouses owe a duty to each other
Nicholls [1874]
Duty of care based on assumed responsibility
Brett J directed the jury that “if a person chooses to undertake the care of a person who is helpless either from infancy, mental illness or other infirmity, he is bound to execute that responsibility and if he by gross negligence allows him to die he is guilty of manslaughter.”
R v Stone & Dobinson [1977]
Duty of care based on assumed responsibility
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]
Doctors owe a duty of care to patients
A doctor’s duty is to act in the best interests of the patient. The House held that where the patient was incapable of communicating, there was no absolute obligation on doctors to prolong his life. The question was what was in the best interests of the patient. Where responsible and competent medical opinion is of the view that continuation of treatment is not in the patient’s best interests then discontinuation of life-preserving treatment will not involve a breach of the doctor’s duty.
R v Miller [1983]
Duty of care to counteract danger you create
M, a squatter, fell asleep in a bed whilst holding a lit cigarette. He awoke to find the mattress smouldering. He realised it was his cigarette which caused the fire but all he did was to move to another room and fall asleep. House damaged by fire. M convicted of arson
Kimsey (1996)
Legal causation
De minimis rule
Benge (1865)
Legal causation
Actions of third parties
If defendant significantly contributed to victim’s harm, they’re liable even if a third party contributed to harm
Hayward (1908)
Legal causation
Thin skull rule
Fact V had a pre-existing condition that made her more susceptible to death was irrelevant, whether or not D knew of the condition
Blaue (1975)
Legal causation
Thin skull rule application
Thin skull rule applies to pre-existing medical and psychological conditions
Jehovah’s Witness blood transfusion case
R v Kennedy (No.2) (2008)
Novus actus interveniens
Drug administration
D did not administer injection or cause victim to do so - victim made voluntary and informed decision to inject drug - chain of causation broken
Pagett (1983)
Novus actus interveniens
3P acting non-voluntarily/reflexively
Armed D used GF as shield; police shot and killed GF; D liable. Police shot in self-defence - wasn’t voluntary
Jordan (1956)
Novus actus interveniens
Improper/negligent medical treatment
Only breaks chain of causation if it is palpably wrong, or overwhelming, or independent and potent
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969]
Coincidence principle
AR & MR must align at same time/place
In this case, AR/MR did not align - P argued the AR was continuing act. Could also be prosecuted under Miller
Battery can be a continuing act
Mohan [1976]
Definition of direct intention
“a decision to bring about, insofar as it lies within the accused’s power, the commission of the offence which it is alleged the accused attempted to commit, no matter whether the accused desired that consequence of his act or not”
Woolin (1998)
Definition of indirect intention/oblique intent
the consequence is actually virtually certain to occur (objective test); and
D appreciates that it is a virtual certainty (subjective test).
R v G (2004)
Recklessness definition
A person acts recklessly with respect to:
(i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist;
(ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur;
and in the circumstances known to him, it is unreasonable to take the risk.”
Barnet London BC v Eastern Electricity Board [1973]
Definition of destroy
Requires elements of finality and totality and must go further than merely a material change
Roe v Kingerlee [1986]
Definition of damage
More context dependent. Not limited to permanent damage. Smearing mud graffiti on wall of police cell was criminal damage.
R v Jogee [2016]
MR for Accessorial Liability
Inward and outward MR
Inward: Conduct must be voluntary, and must intend to assist/encourage/cause principal offence
Outward: Must know essential matters for offence, and must intend P to act with MR required for principal offence
Longbottom (1849)
Causation - victim contributory negligence
Generally, the victim’s own contributory negligence will not break the chain of causation and absolve the defendant from liability, unless the negligence is so great as to prevent the defendant’s act from being a significant cause of the death.
Deaf guy walking in the middle of the road and is hit/killed by a car
R v Roberts [1971]
Causation - victim escaping
The foreseeability of the action is key to whether V’s actions will break the chain of causation. If V’s actions in trying to escape from D’s threats are regarded by the jury as so ‘daft’ (or ‘unexpected’ or ‘unreasonable’) that they could not be reasonably foreseen then the chain is broken and D escapes liability.
V jumps from moving car to avoid D
Holland (1841)
Causation - victim self-neglect
If V mistreats or neglects to treat injuries perpetrated by D it will not break the chain of causation.
Man refuses to have finger amputated after it’s cut in a fight. He gets tetanus and dies.
Thornton v Mitchell (1940)
Accomplice liability
Generally, the principal offence must have been committed for the accomplice to be liable
Bus driver kills pedestrians at conductor’s signal; bus driver not found to have been negligent for following signal, so conductor not liable as accomplice
R v Morris (1983)
Appropriation
Appropriation is assuming any rights of an owner - even touching
Ivey v Genting Casinos t/a Crockfords (2017)
Dishonesty Test
What was actual state of D’s knowledge or belief as to the facts (subjective)
In that context, was his conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people (objective)
R v White (1910)
Factual causation
But for test
D put cyanide in mother’s drink but she died of heart attack, not poisoning
Smith v Littlewoods Organisation (1987)
No liability for pure omissions
D bought theatre. Vandals broke in and started fires. D not held liable for damage at adjoining property.
Montilla (2004)
Knowledge - subjective test
A D has knowledge of something if 1) they believe it to be the case and 2) they are correct in that belief
R v Hall (1985)
Belief
Belief is short of knowledge (Montilla standard)
Belief is when there can be no other reasonable conclusion in the light of all the circumstances of all that has been heard and seen
Very close to virtual certainty
R v Bloxham (1982)
Handling
D acquires car as bona fide purchaser for value. D realises car is stolen. D sells car at knock down price.
D is not liable for handling because he didn’t know it was stolen when he bought it and when he sold it it wasn’t for the benefit of another. Benefit is for REALISATION, not PURCHASE.
R v Denton (1981)
Criminal Damage - Defence
D set fire to employer’s machinery because the owner had consented
Blake v DPP (1993)
Criminal Damage - Defence
A belief, however powerful, genuine and honestly held that God had given consent to damage was not a lawful excuse
R v Morris (1983)
It is an appropriation to assume any of the rights of an owner (even swapping labels on goods)
Gomez (1993)
Follows Lawrence, precedes Hinks
A person can appropriate property even though he had the owner’s consent or authority to exercise the right in question.
Lawrence v MPC (1971)
Precedes Gomez, Hinks
Italian tourist offered £1 and taxi driver took further £1 for 50p ride. HL held it was appropriation even though V consented to D taking money
R v Hinks (2001)
Follows Gomez, Lawrence
Person who receives a valid gift may be convicted of theft if he is dishonest and intends to permanently deprive the owner of it even if the owner consents
R v Hale (1979)
Appropriation for the purposes of robbery can be a continuing act
Appropriation and use of force don’t necessarily have to happen at the same time
R v Collins (1972)
Definition of trespass
Civil concept
AR: unlawful entry without express or implied consent of owner or agent
MR: D must know or be reckless that they are a trespasser
Brooks v Brooks (1982)
Making off has the ordinary natural meaning - departure from spot where payment is required
Lloyd (1985)
Borrowing only amounts to IPD if ‘all the goodness or value has gone’ upon return
P v DPP (2012)
Definition of force
Force is broader than violence but needs more than incidental physical contact (more than required for pickpocketing)
DPP v Ray (1974)
If D implies a representation that they will pay then changes their mind, that is a deception
Vincent (2001)
If V consents to later payment, D doesn’t make off if they leave the spot
AG’s References Nos. 1 and 2 of 1979
Conditional intention to permanently deprive will constitute a valid intention (e.g. if car is nice, we will steal = intention)
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969]
Assault: Any act by D that intentionally or recklessly, causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence
Battery: An act that applies or inflicts unlawful personal violence upon another person
R v Venna (1975)
MR for assault, battery, ABH
D must intend to cause another person to apprehend the immediate application of unlawful personal violence, or is reckless to it
*for ABH, no requirement that D intends or foresees ABH or any harm
Ireland; Burstow (1998)
Threatening telephone calls count as assault
Tuberville v Savage (1669)
Assault
Conditional threat can work against assault. “Were it not assize time…”
Read v Coker (1853)
Assault
Conditional threat can be an assault. This case: threat to break a neck
R v Constanza (1997)
Assault
V must apprehend violence at some point not excluding the immediate future
Logdon v DPP (1976)
Assault
D shows V gun. V apprehends violence. D says wasn’t their intention. Court rules for V.
Thomas (1985)
Battery
Touching someone’s clothes while they’re wearing them can be battery
DPP v K (1990)
Battery
D put acid in hand drying machine. D found guilty of ABH despite indirect battery.
R v Rook (1993)
Parties
A party must unequivocally communicate withdraw of their participation in offence in order to avoid liability
R v Miller (1954)
ABH
ABH is not defined in statute.
This case: any hurt or injury that is calculated to interfere with the health and comfort of the victim
T v DPP (2003)
ABH
Momentary loss of consciousness can be ABH
DPP v Smith (1961)
GBH
GBH means ‘really serious harm’
Eisenhower (1984)
GBH
For wounding, inner and outer skin must be broken
R v Bollom (2004)
GBH
No pre-condition to GBH that V required treatment or harm would have lasting consequences. Must look at totality of injuries caused by D.
Mowatt (1967)
GBH
MR for GBH is maliciously.
Maliciously means intention or recklessness as to some bodily harm
Tosti (1997)
Attempt
D1 and D2 caught examining padlock of barn door with tools. Convicted of attempted burglary.
Geddes (1996)
Attempt
D caught in kids lav with knife, rope and masking tape. Was waiting to kidnap pupil. Had not confronted a pupil. Merely preparatory.
Campbell (1991)
and
Gullefer (1990)
Attempt
Campbell: D in crash helmet with fake gun and note in his pocket outside a post office. Merely preparatory for robbery.
Gullefer: D jumped onto track to try to stop race, but stewards didn’t declare race void. Merely preparatory for theft.
Loss of control - subjective assessment
Loss of control - CJA 2009 s.54
Cocker (1989): mercy kill of wife. Started then stopped. Not loss of control.
Dawes (2010): loss of control is a high standard - extremely grave
Clinton (2012): greater the deliberation, less likely it’s loss of control
Byrne (1960)
Diminished responsibility - CJA 2009 s.52
What is abnormality of mental functioning?
Abnormality means a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal
Golds (2016)
Diminished responsibility
What is substantial impairment
Substantial is important or weighty
R v Dowds (2012)
Diminished responsibility
Voluntary intoxication is not a legally recognised medical condition
*NOTE alcohol dependence syndrome is recognised
Lidar (2000)
Subjectively reckless manslaughter
D foresaw serious risk that V would suffer serious injury and took that risk unjustifiably
Risk must be highly probable to result
DPP v Newbury and Jones (1977)
Unlawful act/constructive manslaughter
D performed criminally unlawful act
Unlawful act was cause of death
Unlawful act was dangerous
Adomako (1994)
Gross negligence manslaughter
- D owed V duty of care
- D breached duty of care
- Breach caused death
- There was obvious risk of death (Misra)
- Breach was sufficiently serious
Tort cases OK for duty, but remember Miller
