CASELAW Flashcards

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1
Q

§§§§Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22.

A

Aron Salomon, a leather merchant and wholesale boot manufacturer who carried on business for many years as sole trader
Decided to set up a company, and it would consist of himself, his wife, his daughter and sons (7 people).*
Company created, as per the relevant act, and bought Salomon’s business at an over-valuation of £39,000
This was partly paid by issuing a debenture worth £10,000 to Salomon; and partly paid through shares
Shares 20,001 held by Salomon, 6 by wife and family
Thus, Salomon both the principal shareholder & principal creditor in the company
On the security of his debentures, a Mr Broderip paid Salomon £5,000
When the company went insolvent, Broderip was repaid based on his debentures, but aside from Borderip, the company could not repay the company’s unsecured creditors
The liquidator sued on behalf of unsecured creditors arguing, in effect, that company was a sham (‘a scheme’) intended to commit a fraud, and Salomon should be personally liable to the unsecured creditors, as the company’s principal, and it was his agent

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2
Q

AL Underwood Ltd v Bank of Liverpool [1924] 1 KB 775.

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES - CORPORATE PROPERTY

A

Underwood was the controlling shareholder in AL Underwood Ltd.
He occasionally endorsed cheques made out to the company into his own personal bank account.
Company changed ownership and sued Underwood and also the Bank
Underwood breached his duties as a director
The Bank was liable for Conversion for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and so was Underwood, but he had dissipated the assets

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3
Q

Macura v Northern Insurance [1925] AC 619 –

CORPORATE PROPERTY

A

Macura sold £42,000 worth of Timber to a saw mill company in which he was the main shareholder.
The timber was then destroyed by fire.
Macura claimed on his insurance policy
However, the insurance policy was owned by Macura and the Timber was owned by the company.
Macura had no insurable interest; the insurance company did not have to pay

“No shareholder has any right to any item of property owned by the company, for he has no legal or equitable interest therein”

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4
Q

Lennard’s Carrying Co v Asiatic Petroleum [1915] AC 705

TORT/ CONTRACT / CRIMINAL LAW

A

My lords, a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation … [T]he fault or privity is the fault or privity of somebody who is not merely a servant or agent for whom the company is liable upon the footing ofrespondeat superior; but somebody for whom the company is liable because the action is the very action of the company itself

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5
Q

The Lady Gwendolen [1965] 2 WLR 91.

COMPANY COMMITTING A TORT ?

A

A ship crashed as a result of not monitoring radar.
The captain had never been trained
The job of training the captain was the assistant managing director
His failure was seen as the company’s failure i.e. the court deemed he was sufficiently high up in the company for his actions to be equated with the company’s board of directors
Basically, whether the failure can be attributed to a high level (board) management failure (master’s fault) as distinct from VL (servant’s fault)

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6
Q

R v Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd [1997] 2 Cr App R 40 –

CORPORATE CRIME

A

employee fell to his death down an unguarded lift shaft. No reasonable precautions taken and company guilty of criminal sanctions under health and safety act.

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7
Q

Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass [1972] 2 AC 153

A

general rule that Managing director and company board represent and act as the company – their subordinates do not

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8
Q

R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551

A

ICR and 9 other people guilty of conspiracy to defraud after acts of MD were equated with acts of the company

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9
Q

Shinkwin v Quin Con Ltd Quinian [2001]

A
Pl lost finger and thumb at work 
Sued company as legal person 
And sued manager of factory 
Avoid separate legal personality 
Small company 
May not have enough assets 
Manager had failed to accurately train him 
Neighbour principle - proximity 
Independent tortious duty against manager
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10
Q

Williams v Natural Life Health Foods [1998]

A

Sues director not company as company has no assets

Negligent statement was made on behalf of the company not in personal capacity

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11
Q

D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. (wholesaler) v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852

breakthrough case

A

Case involved three linked companies: DHN Food Distribution Ltd, DHN Distribution Ltd and Bronze Ltd
Local council sold land to Bronze Ltd in 1963, and in 1971 compulsorily purchased land for housing; DHN X 2 wanted compensation for ‘disturbance’ (compensation for closing down a business) above and beyond amount paid by to acquire land (£360,000)
DHN X 2 used premises as primary site for warehousing, repair, storage, etc, and went into liquidation shortly after council’s purchase
DHN Food Ltd (parent) owned all share capital in Bronze, directors of both companies were the same people, but Bronze charged DHN rent; DHN Distribution Ltd set up later, but same set up
For disturbance to be made out, one must have an interesting in land; anything less (tenancy), then nominal damages
What’s the problem for DHN X2

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12
Q

Power Supermarkets Ltd v Crumlin Investments (22 June 1981, Unreported)

A

Crumlin Investment Ltd (CIL) owners of Crumlin Shopping Centre
Power Supermarkets Ltd (PSL) entered into a lease for one of the units in the shopping centre*
Agreement included a covenant that there would not be any other unit let out exceeding 3,000 sq feet (intention to exclude other supermarket chains)
Shopping centre failed, and Crumlin Investment Ltd sold all the shares in CIL to Cornelscourt Shopping Centre Ltd (CSC)
CSC part of the Dunnes Stores group; and CSC only notionally separate from Dunnes Stores Ltd – all CSC shares owned by Dunnes family and controlled by them
CSC then leased a store in Crumlin Shopping Centre to Dunnes Stores (Crumlin) Ltd for a nominal sum & without many conditions, which then Power Supermarkets Ltd v Crumlin Investments (22 June 1981, Unreported) in direct competition with PSL
PSL sought an injunction against Dunnes Stores (Crumlin) Ltd (DSCL) to enforce the lease agreement even though DSCL not a party to it aimed at getting them to cease trading

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13
Q

Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 433

A

Do not disregard slp on the justice of the case
An English company, Cape Industries plc, owned shares in multiple subsidiaries that mined and supplied asbestos around the world.
One of its subsidiaries NAAC, a marketing subsidiary, supplied asbestos to another company in Texas, whose employees sued Cape and NAAC
The employees sued and won the case in Texas; they tried to enforce the judgment in the UK against Cape
After the entry of judgment in the US and prior to the UK hearing, NAAC was liquidated and two new subsidiaries created
A requirement (as a matter of conflict of laws) was that Cape was present in the US for the claim to succeed; Cape argued that it was not and could not be held to be so through its subsidiary
In effect, the pls asked the court to lift the corporate veil

REJECTED ON THE FACTS OF SINGLE ECONOMIC ENTITY

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14
Q

Percival v Wright (1902) 2 Ch 421

DUTIES OF DIRECTORS

A

L negotiated to sell his 253 shares to 3 directors at a price of £12, 10 per share.
The 3 directors did not disclose that while negotiations were ongoing, they were in simultaneous negotiations to sell entire company at a much higher price per share than what they paid for the shares from the PL
PL argued that directors were in breach of fiduciary duty (can’t make a secret profit from your position as a fiduciary) by not disclosing the third party offer
Swinfen Eady J:
‘Directors must dispose of their company’s shares on the best terms obtainable, and must not allot them to themselves or their friends at a lower price in order to obtain a personal benefit. They must act bonâ fide for the interests of the company.’ (425)
BUT: Fiduciary duty owed to the company, not to the PL - he had no standing to enforce the duty

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15
Q

Allan v Hyatt (1914) 30 TLR 444

A

Directors may owe a duty to shareholders if they represent themselves as acting as agents for the shareholders

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16
Q

Crindle investments et al v Wymes [1998] 2 ILRM 275

DUTIES TO SHAREHOLDERS

A

“There can be no doubt that, in general, although directors of a company occupy a fiduciary position in relation to the company, they do not owe a fiduciary duty, merely by virtue of their offices, to the individual members. That was the effect of the decision in the leading case of Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421, but it has been emphasised in subsequent decisions that, in particular circumstances, a company director may indeed be in a position where he owes a fiduciary duty to individual shareholders”

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17
Q

Allied Irish Coal v Powell Duffryn [1998] 2 IR 519

A

Rejected any possibility of a general rule that that simply a close relationship between companies would mean that their separate legal personalities would be disregarded.
If a close economic connection was a basis for an exception to Salomon then every subsidiary company would not exist separately.
Similar to Re Polly Peck International plc (In Administration) (No 4), [1996] 2 ALL ER 987
the courts must look to the legal substance of any transaction, not its economic substance when deciding whether the company is a mere façade, regardless of any perceived injustice that arose when the company became insolvent.

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18
Q

R v Registrar of Joint Stock Companies [1931] 2 KB 197

A

Objects Clause - no longer required for private companies limited by shares
no objects contrary to the law.
No longer a requirement for private companies

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19
Q

Hennessy v National Agriculture and Industrial Development Association [1947] IR 159.-
Alteration of the constitution

A

An alteration of the articles was void as the company’s memorandum provided that an alteration of the articles was only valid with the consent of the Minister for Industry and Commerce.
No such consent given and so alteration was not valid.

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20
Q

Company as a whole??? - Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656

A

ried to alter articles to remove “not being full paid up”.
The reason was that a member had died personally owing the company £6,000 and the company wanted to extend the lien over the shares despite them being fully paid i.e. so they could take back the shares.
“the power to alter the articles must be sued for the benefit of the company as a whole”
Alteration valid as it benefited the company, even at the expense of 1 shareholder
Lien – a right to keep possession of some property – here shares – until a debt paid; it is a security interest granted or demanded over some property whether real or personal (meaning tangible or intangible; a share is intangible property…the property right is basically a right of action to redeem the share, so in the above case subjecting it to a lien)
Seems also to imply that benefit of company, as distinct from its members but ambiguous, Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1950] 2 All ER 1120 seemed to accept members as a whole. Later says all about whether minority v majority shareholders the key issue and minority basically expropriated.

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21
Q

Shuttleworth v Cox [1927] 2 KB 9

A

5 directors for life in constitution, 4 directors voted to change constitution to remove a director who failed to account for company monies on 22 separate occasions

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22
Q

Re USIT World PLC [2005] IEHC 285

directors duties

A

Pearl J on the difference between dishonesty and irresponsibility:
“Dishonesty is more fundamental and goes to the core of a person’s integrity…it implies something akin to improper dealing with money…while dishonesty will always amount to irresponsibility the converse is not true.”

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23
Q

Re: La Moselle Clothing [1998] 2 ILRM 345

A

Gives the most helpful outline of the criteria for detmining “acting honestly and responsibly” 


a) The extent to which the director has complied with the requirements of the Companies Acts
b) The extent to which his conduct was so incompetent as to amount to irresponsibility – objective test
c) The extent of his responsibility for the insolvency
d) The extent of his responsibility for shortfall in the winding up
e) The extent to which he has displayed a lack of commercial probity and proper standards

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24
Q

Re Welfab Engineering Ltd [2016]

A

Court of Appeal held it would be “contrary to the whole notion of proper corporate regulation that passive directors would be exonerated

Courtney: “It is thought that to go looking for real moral blame in somebody who has abdicated all responsibility….is to lose sight of the wood for the trees: abdication is by definition irresponsible.” P1049.

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25
Q

Nash v Lancegaye Safety Glass Ltd (1958) 92 ILTR 11

A

An allotment of shares was made resuting in 51% for one shareholder
It was held that rather than being issued to raise capital, this was done to shift control and was thus an abuse of the directors’ powers
The allotment was deemed invalid as it was for an improper purpose

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26
Q

G & S Doherty Ltd v Doherty (Unreported, High Court, Henchy J., 19th June 1969)

A

A director and shareholder took a series of economically costly decisions
Other directors and shareholders removed him as a director and issued shares to reduce his influence
Issuance was invalid as it was not for a proper purpose (such as raising finance)

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27
Q

Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] ALL ER 378

codified duties

A

Directors cannot make a secret profit from their position as a fiduciary
Regal Hastings owned a cinema. The directors/shreaholders wanted to sell but thought it would be best to acquire more cinemas and sell a chain.
To buy the new cinemas they set up a subsidiary company. Regal hastings invested £2,000 but this was insufficient.
The directors of Regal hastings invested £3,000 of their personal funds and acquired shares in the subsidiary which then bought 2 other cinemas.
They then sold both companies rather than the cinemas.
The directors made significant profit from the sale. The buyers of the company sued them.
HOL held that diretcors had to account for the profit earned – no need for mala fides – fiduciaries cannot make a secret profit from their position as a fiduciary

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28
Q

Industrial Developments Consultants v Cooley [1972] ALL ER 162

A

Cooley was managing director and tried, on behalf of the company, to obtain a construction contract with an English public authority.
He failed but the public authority liked Cooley and offered him the contract personally. Cooley feigned illness and resigned from his job with IDC and started the new contract.
Industrial developments found out and sued Cooley for his profits, Cooley claimed they hadn’t won the contract in any case
Nonetheless, the CH he had breached his fiduciary duty
He gained the contract through his position as director, didn’t declare this, and had to account for the profit earned.

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29
Q

Spring Grove Services (Ireland) Ltd. v O’ Callaghan [2000] IEHC 62.

A

The duty not to compete with the company was recognised by the Irish courts

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30
Q

Aerospares Ltd v Thomson et al (January 1999, unreported) HC

A

Def. diverted clients from one company to another company in the Seychelles. Court required damages rather than all profits
The profit would have lasted for a virtually indefinite period

31
Q

Clark v Workman [1920] 1 IR 107

A

Directors approved a transfer of shares. MD promised the person who bought the shares that he would do everything in his power to ensure the person took over the entire company
Other shareholders correctly argued this was a breach of duty and this was found to be the case

32
Q

Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates plc

A

Change of position in UK here where it was found that they may fetter discretion if it is in the best interests of the company

33
Q

Moore v M’Glynn [1894] 1 IR 74

A

A trustee was running a shop for the beneficiaries
The trustee set up a business in their personal capacity that competed with beneficiaries’ business.
No breach “provided he does not resort to deception or solicitation of custom from persons dealing with the shop”

34
Q

Faccenda Chickens v Fowler [1986] 1 ALL ER 617

A

Fowler was a former director of faccenda chickens. Faccenda sued him after he began competing with the business
He was using confidential information taken from Faccenda in his new business.
Ct held that because directorship had ended no duty was owed. If he was still a director then there would have been a conflict of interests
No non-compete clause

35
Q

Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd and Another [2015] UKSC 72

INTERPRETATION V IMPLICATION

A

Marks & Spencer, which was subleasing ‘The Point’ in Paddington Basin, W2 from BNP Paribas, claimed there should be an implied right to recover money that it had paid under its lease when it exercised the right to terminate. The basic rent was £1.23m a year, plus a premium of £919,800 plus VAT, service charge, and a car park licence fee.[1] The rent had to be paid by the quarter. The landlord could recover by rent a ‘fair proportion’ of building insurance costs and building service charges. Clause 8 allowed M&S to end the lease on 24 January 2012 with 6 months advance notice if there were no arrears in rent, and this meant the rent needed to be paid up to the end of the quarter, which was longer than the time M&S occupied the property. M&S did so, and then claimed it should get back the rent from 25 January to 24 March 2012. The default law on apportionability would have suggested the rent could not be recovered, under the Apportionment Act 1870, but it was argued that it was an implication of the contract that it should be.

The Supreme Court held that the term in the lease to recover the extra portion of the rent should not be implied. The Court discussed and affirmed Lord Hoffmann’s views in AG of Belize, noting that implication was part of the process of “determining the scope and meaning of the contract”.[2]

36
Q

Hutton v Warren (1836) 1 M&W 466 (Parke J)

TERMS IMPLIED BY CUSTOM

A

Hutton was the tenant farmer of land owned by Warren. Warren gave Hutton notice to quit and insisted he continue to cultivate the land throughout the notice period. Hutton continued to farm the land during the last year of the tenancy expending his own labour and purchasing seed and manure for use on the land. On quitting the farm, Hutton sought a reasonable payment for the labour and expenditure bestowed on the farm, and Warren refused to pay.

Issues
Hutton contended it was customary upon the expiry of farming tenancies that the landlord should pay the out-going tenant farmer a reasonable sum for the cost of tillage, sowing and cultivating. He argued he had bestowed considerable labour and expense during the last year of the tenancy and on termination of the lease, he was prevented from enjoying the crops arising from his labour and, therefore, sought recompense as calculated by an independent land valuer. Warren argued the original lease contained no such term regarding any provision for an out-going tenant and if the lease was silent, there was no obligation to pay. Warren disputed there was any such custom in place and, even if there was, it had not been incorporated into the contract because the lease was silent on the matter.

Decision/Outcome
Hutton was successful in his claim. The custom was by implication imported into the lease. Where a commercial contract is silent, extrinsic evidence of customary practice and usage is admissible and can be incorporated into the agreement. It was, therefore, an implied term of the lease that Hutton should recover a fair and reasonable price for the seeds and labour he bestowed on the land.

37
Q

Les Affreteurs Reunis Societé Anonyme v Walford [1919] AC 801

WHAT IMPLICATION REQUIRES

A

Leopold Walford (Walford) acted as brokers for a charterparty. Les Affreteurs were owners of a ship. A time charterparty was effected between the shipowners and the Lubricating and Fuel Oils Company as charters. Walford charged a 3% commission which was specified in the charterparty contract which was agreed to in 1916 and was a continuation of an early agreement on similar terms. In 1917, after Les Affreteurs’ ship was recommissioned, the charterparty expired. Les Affreteurs refused to pay Walford’s commission, holding that commission was only payable in respect of hire duly earned under the charterparty.

Issues:

Whether Walford could claim commission from the contract which had expired and after the ship was recommissioned.

Held:

The appeal by Les Affreteurs was dismissed. Les Affreteurs were found have been relying on custom, in that the brokerage was payable only out of the hire as earned. The French agreement was held to be incorporated in the charterparty and thus, the agreements were not separate and to be read and interpreted as one. The charterparty contract between the owners and the charters was relevant to the brokers (which had also long been custom). The case of Harley & Co v Nagata (1917) 23 Com Cas 121, was applied. Charters were entitled to bring action as trustees of the brokers where they were directly party to the contract. Therefore, allowing a third party to sue for an entitled commission.

38
Q

Noreside Construction Ltd v Irish Asphalt Ltd [2014] IESC 68

APPLIED BY CUSTOM - APPROVED

A

Dunne J. (O’Donnell J, and MacMenamin J. concurring) found there was one “master” contract for sale agreed at senior management level between the parties. She rejected Irish Asphalt’s claims that the terms and conditions referred to, but not contained, in the delivery dockets were incorporated in to the contract, so as to limit their liability to the costs of replacement of the defective goods.

39
Q

Petkevicius v Goode Concrete Limited (In Receivership) [2014] IEHC 66

A

Domantas Petkevicius (“the Appellant”) was employed from November 2005 with the Respondent company as a general operative until he was laid off, and eventually made redundant in December 2009.

  1. 08.09 The Appellant was given notice by way of letter of the need to lay him off.
  2. 09.09 The Appellant was laid off.
  3. 12.09 The Appellant was notified that he was being made redundant. He was paid two weeks’ remuneration in lieu of notice and redundancy. The Appellant was not paid any remuneration for the period of the lay-off.
  4. 10.10 The Appellant brought a complaint under the Payment of Wages Act seeking full pay for the sixteen week lay-off period, claiming custom
40
Q

Young Kwan Kim v Young Keun Oh [2013] NZHC 925.

CUSTOMS MUST BE CERTAIN

A

Application to recover legal costs incurred in having a High Court judgment set aside — plaintiff had been sued for defamation and had instructed the defendant solicitor to represent him — plaintiff failed to show for defamation hearing and damages were awarded against him — that judgment was set aside on the basis the defendant had withdrawn from the case without informing the plaintiff, in breach of r5.41(2)(b) High Court Rules (“HCR”) (withdrawal of solicitor) — plaintiff alleged defendant had breached obligations owed to him as a client — plaintiff alleged breaches of contract, duty of care and fiduciary duty — defendant alleged he had instructed a barrister to act in the defamation proceeding — plaintiff sought general and exemplary damages for anxiety and distress — whether relationship of solicitor and client existed — whether plaintiff had failed to mitigate his loss by selecting the most direct and least expensive procedure to restore his position by overturning the judgment under r10.9 HCR (judgment following non-appearance may be set aside).

The issues were: whether relationship of solicitor and client existed and if yes, whether O failed to comply with his obligations pursuant to that relationship.

41
Q

Sweeney v Duggan [1997] 2 IR 531 (Murphy J), Supreme Court

TERMS IMPLIED BY LAW

A

“There are at least two situations where the Courts will, independently of statutory requirement, imply a term which has not been expressly agreed by the parties to a contract., The first of these situations was identified in the well-known Moorcock case ( 1889 14 P.D. 64) where a term not expressly agreed upon by the parties was inferred on the basis of the presumed intention of the parties., The basis for such a presumption was explained by MacKinnon L.J. in Shirlaw and Southern Foundries 1939 2 K.B. 206 at 227 in an expression, equally memorable, in the following terms:-…”

42
Q

Lynch v Thorne [1956] 1 All ER 744.

A

Lynch v Thorne [1956] 1 WLR 303

Facts

Lynch entered into an agreement with Thorne, a builder, to buy land with a house under construction which Thorne agreed to complete in accordance with a detailed specification attached to the agreement.
The specification provided for 9-inch walls with no rendering.
Within days of Lynch moving into the house, rain began to penetrate the wall, rendering the room uninhabitable.
Result

The court held that there was no implied warranty of fitness for purpose with regard to the wall because it could not have been made water proof without departing from the express requirement to complete the building in accordance with the specification.

43
Q

Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 2 All ER 260 (Lord Pearson)

A

The court was requested to imply a term into a building contract.
Held: The term could not be implied, since at least four alternatives might also be implied.

44
Q

AG of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988 at 1994

USING THE TESTS

A

Facts
The Belize government established a company to take over the country’s telecommunications services. The articles of association provided the holder of the ‘special’ share who also owned 37.5% of the share capital, could appoint directors. Belize Telecom (BT) purchased the ‘special’ share, the requisite share capital and appointed directors. BT then went into financial difficulties and ceased to hold the 37.5% share. The articles made no provision for the removal of these appointed directors, and the attorney-general sought a declaration that a term should be implied into the articles that such appointed directors should vacate office.

Issues
BT argued that since the articles were silent as to the removal of the appointed directors, they were irremovable, unless they chose to resign. BT contended the court had no power to introduce new terms into the articles of association. The attorney general argued it would be absurd if there was no means of removing such appointed directors and, where a director is appointed by virtue of a specific shareholding, it should be an implied term that when there is no longer such a shareholding in existence, that director should resign.

Decision/Outcome
The term was successfully implied into the contract. When considering whether terms are implied, the court cannot imply terms simply to make a contract more reasonable or more efficient. The court should consider the construction of the agreement as a whole, and discern what the contract as a whole means. If the agreement is silent as to a particular provision, it can be implied only if the court finds the parties must have intended it to be incorporated.

45
Q

In Rowland v An Post [2017] IESC 20

TERMS IMPLIED BY THE CONSTITUTION

A

that the court should only intervene prior in an ongoing statutory process “where it was clear that the process has gone wrong; there is nothing that can be done to rectify it; and that it that it is more or less…

46
Q

Turquand v Marshall (1869) 4 Ch. App 376

A

Regardless of how “ridiculous and absurd” directors’ decision making may have been, “it was the misfortune of the company that they chose such unwise directors”.

47
Q

Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 392

A

“No one need join a company unless he likes, and if a person knows that if he becomes a member he will find as directors persons who, in his opinion, ought not to be directors, he should not join the company.

48
Q

Re Brazilian Rubber Plantation & Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425

A

The director was “entirely ignorant of business”, which prevented him from being found negligent
Sir Arthur only consented to act because he was told the office would give him a little pleasant employment without incurring any responsibility
He was a partner in a firm of bankers in a good position in Bath; he was seventy five years of age and deaf; he was induced to join the board by representations made to him

49
Q

Re Cardiff Savings Bank [1892] 2 CH 100

A

6 month old child appointed as president of the bank
20 years after his appointment the company was liquidated and liquidator sued the now adult president for fraudulently diverting funds while he was a baby.
Ct rejected the claim, held the standard of care was entirely subjective and a baby could not be liable for such decisions.

50
Q

Re City Equitable Fire Insurance [1925] Ch 405

A

Introduced a standard of reasonable care to fiduciary duties
The company lost £1.2m because of bad investments taken by a director
The liquidator sought to make all directors personally liable. The action failed; this judgment was the basis for a change in how the duty of care was seen by companies
Now been given statutory recognition in S.228(1)(g)- that a director shall exercise the care, skill and diligence which would be exercised by a reasonable person…
1 - Act honestly and exercise some degree of skill and diligence
2 - Reasonable care to be measured by the care an ordinary man might be expected to take in the circumstances on his own behalf
3 - Need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from a person with his knowledge and experience (Subjective test)
4 - Not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of the company (maybe if he is also a full-time employee)
5- Are justified in trusting that officials perform their duties honestly

51
Q


Re Barings plc et al (No. 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433

A

Nick Leeson collapsed Barings bank from a base in Singapore (Rogue Trader) – question was to what degree the other executives should have been supervising him – were they negligent?
“Each individual director owed duties to the company to inform himself about its affairs and to join with his co-directors in supervising and controlling them”
“[W]hilst directors were entitled to delegate particular functions….the exercise of delegation did not absolve a director from the duty to supervise the discharge of the delegated functions”

52
Q


Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing (1989) BCLC 498 –

A

Two non-executive directors were negligent after the third director (Stebbing) had made illegal loans
They had the ability to discover these illegal loans and to prevent the losses suffered by the company. They also signed blank cheques
Ct. held they failed to exercise sufficient care in the performance of their duties.

53
Q

Re Vehicle Imports (Unreported, November 2000) HC

responsibility of directors

A

The reason for the right of inspection for directors is that the responsibility for keeping adequate accounts is on directors (one of the main responsibilities of directors)
It is the responsibility of all directors to ensure books are kept properly unless this is properly delegated (even then the delegated person must be supervised)

54
Q

Lloyd Cheyham & Co Ltd v Littlejohn & Co [1987] BCLC 303

annual accounts

A

A departure from standard practices does not necessarily involve a breach of duty
However, current standards are strong evidence as to what should be included in the accounts and there must be some justification for deviation
The standard practice expected of a large company would be more demanding

55
Q


Newton v Birmingham Small Arms [1906] 2 Ch 378

auditors statutory duties

A

The members passed a resolution to create a special reserve fund and placed a requirement on auditors not to disclose this to other shareholders in their report.
CH that this was not allowed
Accounts must give a true and fair view

Exercise professional integrity - S.390 CA 2014
To report failure to keep proper books - S.392 CA 2014
To report suspected indictable offences – S.393 CA 2014

56
Q

Re Thomas Gerrard & Son Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 525

limitation son the role

A

Explanations of a managing director as to irregular invoices concerning the purchases of stock were accepted at face value by the auditor.
Pennycuick J relied on expert evidence of prevailing practice in holding that the auditor had failed to perform his duties by not examining the suppliers’ statements and, where necessary, communicating with the suppliers.

57
Q

Kelly v Haughey Boland [1989] I.L.R.M. 373

A

The auditor operated the same way for 20 years without any finding of a breach of duty– no defence, must keep up to date with prevailing standards of practice
Pl wished to buy a company and had been given audited accounts for the previous 3 years. The figures were explained to the Pl by the auditors at a number of meetings. Pl bought the company and discovered numerous inaccuracies in accounts and sued for negligence.
Lardner J found a duty of care was owed, relying on Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 and JEB Fasteners v Mark Bloom [1981] ALL ER 289
Proximity and foreseeability
consequential loss Failed to prove consequential loss, evidence to suggest that they would have bought the company even if they had access to the proper accounts.


58
Q

Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465

A

The court found that there is legal liability for a negligent misstatement by a person who gives information to another, knowing that the information is going to be relied upon.
On this basis, auditors may owe a duty of care to persons with whom they have a ‘special relationship’, and thus could foresee that the other person would rely on the annual accounts which they had audited

59
Q

Caparo Industries v Dickman (1992) BCLC 273

liability to third parties

A

Here, the scope of liability for auditors to third parties was significantly reduced
Pl bought shares in a company called Fidelity relying on audited accounts.
The shareholders took over the company in a series of stages
Once they took over the company they realised its true worth had been exaggerated and sued the auditors

60
Q

Moylan v Irish Whiting Manufacturers (1980, unreported) HC

4. Where the justice of the case requires

A

“Having regard to the constitution I am satisfied that an exception to Foss v Harbottle exists where the justice of the case requires it”

61
Q

Fanning v Murtagh [2008] IEHC 277

A

“More sophisticated shareholder agreements and the remedy for oppression have reduced the need for a wide ranging exception to the rule”

62
Q

Connolly v Seskin Ltd [2012] IEHC 332

A

“The rule should not be applied in such a way as to lead to injustice. Nevertheless exceptions to the rule should not be liberally applied. A very strong case would have to be made out. It would also have to be consistent with the principle underlying the rule in Foss v Harbottle and the exceptions to it. These include the reluctance of the courts to interfere in the management of the company.” 

The Supreme Court has similarly indicated that it would take extraordinary facts to provoke the acknowledgment of the existence of this exception– Keaney v Sullivan & Ors [2015] IESC 75

63
Q


Cockburn v Newbridge Sanitary Steam Company [1915] 1 IR 237

Ultra vires and illegal acts


A

Company’s managing director bribed officials in the War Office in exchange for lucrative contracts and 2 shareholders sued on the company’s behalf. Majority of shareholder disagreed with the 2 shareholders
“The rule of law and of good sense laid down in Foss v Harbottle is indisputable, but it is subject to the exception that where the acts complained of are of a fraudulent character or beyond the powers of the company the action may be maintained by a shareholder”

Only the illegality ground remains today

64
Q

Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70

Personal rights of members are infringed



A

The right to vote is a personal right of shareholders
The Chairman at AGM refused to permit the plaintiff’s nominee to vote. Plaintiff entitled to injunction preventing company from acting in accordance with the resolution in question– violation of the Articles of Association

65
Q

Crindle Investments v Wymes [1998] 4 IR 567

3. Fraud on the minority by those in control 



A

The Supreme Court defined fraud as the majority seeking to ‘appropriate benefits to themselves at the expense of the company as a whole’.

66
Q

Connolly v Seskin Properties Ltd [2012] IEHC 332

A

Kelly J refused to provide a specific definition of fraud but said that it usually had three elements: 1) a wrong done to the company, 2) wrongdoer control and 3) that the wrongdoers had benefitted personally from the wrongdoing.

67
Q

Russell v Wakefield Waterworks Co (1875) LR 20 Eq 474

wrongdoer control

A

‘It is not necessary that the corporation should absolutely refuse by vote at the general meeting, if it can be shewn either that the wrong-doer had command of the majority of the votes, so that it would be absurd to call the meeting’

68
Q

Glynn McCabe v Owen et al [2007] IEHC 328

The nature of the derivative action

A

Pl sought to take a derivative action on the basis that the three defendants had defrauded the company by buying assets that were overvalued
The court found that the company was the proper plaintiff but that exceptions did exist to F v H

69
Q

Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554

3. Fraud on the minority by those in control 


A

A successful derivative action
The directors diverted a contract from the company to themselves and then ratified the action at a general meeting
They held a majority of the shares and the Pl, a minority shareholder, was successful in a derivative action

70
Q

Walersteiner v Moir [1975] 1 QB 373

A

roblem:
“The rule in Foss v Harbottle is easy to apply when the company is defrauded by outsiders. The company itself is the only person who can sue. But suppose it is defrauded by insiders who control its affairs - by directors who hold the majority of shares – who then can sue for damages? If a general meeting is called, they will vote down any suggestion the company should sue themselves. Yet the company is the one person who is damnified. It is the one person who should sue. In one way or another some means must be found for the company to sue.”

Solution: Exception to F v H, plus derivative action

71
Q

Menier v Hooper’s Telegraphs (1874) 9 Ch App 350

Fraud on the minority

A

This concerned the laying of transatlantic telegraph cable
A cable manufacturer was the majority shareholder in a newly formed company, which held the necessary government concessions for this
The majority shareholder discovered it would be more profitable to supply the cable to a rival and did so, along with the concessions
The majority shareholder then wound up the company and appointed a favourable liquidator
Menier, a minority shareholder, brought a successful action to compel the majority shareholder to account for its clandestine dealings
A further test or series of factors was given by the court here:
Majority perpetrated fraud on minority
Majority was in control of the company
The wrong would have gone unaddressed if not for a derivative action (no alternative remedy)

72
Q

Moylan v Irish Whiting Manufacturers (1980, unreported) HC

4. Where the justice of the case requires

A

“Having regard to the constitution I am satisfied that an exception to Foss v Harbottle exists where the justice of the case requires it”

73
Q

Fanning v Murtagh [2008] IEHC 277

4. Where the justice of the case requires

A

“More sophisticated shareholder agreements and the remedy for oppression have reduced the need for a wide ranging exception to the rule”

74
Q

McAteer v Burke & Ors [2015] IECA 215


Distinguishing personal rights from corporate rights

A

Pl (shareholder) sued solicitors for damages for a breach of contract and negligence after they drafted a shareholders’ agreement and took part in the mismanagement of a company allegedly causing loss.
HC ordered a clarification of the facts as to who had caused the loss and who had suffered loss
COA allowed the plaintiff to make amendments his claim to exclude elements barred by Foss v Harbottle