Case Sentences Flashcards

1
Q

Crabb v Arun DC [1976] Ch 179

A

Dodgy D(istrict) C(ouncil)

Council was estopped from denying Mr Crabb access to his land, despite the fact that it was in the context of pre-contractual negotiations. CA

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2
Q

Greasley v Cooke [1980] 1 WLR 1306 (CA)

A

Greasey Greasley’s.

Presumption of reliance meant the Greasley’s representatives were estopped from evicting Cooke from the property, since she had previously been assured that she would have a home for life. CA

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3
Q

Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees [1982] QB 133(n)

A

Taylor’s and Old’s.

Proprietary estoppel can succeed even if B’s mistaken belief, is also believed by A ; therefore it does not matter whether A knows of the (in)validity of the mistaken belief, only that A assured/encouraged B to act on the belief.

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4
Q

Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1752

A

Cobbe, you can’t have your corn and eat it. The perceived autenticity or binding-nature of the alleged assurrance from Mrs LM to Cobbe was negated by tthe commerical context ( pre-contractaul negotiation stage) in which the alleged assurance was made, and it was not for the Court to go in wiedling a Denningesque sword of justice to rescue an improvident property developer such as Cobbe, by estopping Mrs LM. HL

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5
Q

Wayling v Jones [1995] 2 FLR 1030

A

Wayling was a deserving claimant. Although Mr Wayling was a desreving claimant the Court applied an extremely unusual test to achieve justice that involved making A show, in order to dispove reliance, that B would have continued on the same course of action, if A after making the promise had then told B of his intetnion to break the promise. CA

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6
Q

Gillett v Holt [2000] 2 All ER 289

A

Halt the farm. Holt was estopped from denying Gillet’s rights to the farm on the basis of Holt’s detriment which was not purely financial, and not wholly detrimental, but was nett detrmiental. CA

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7
Q

Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776

A

Major new strand.The transfer by statute of an estate was estopped in favour of the claimant, on the basis of a promise based (non-explict albeit obvious) assurance communication from A to B as to B’s future right in the estate. HL

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8
Q

Henry v Henry [2010] 1 All ER 988

A

My guy Calixtus. The detriment Calixtus suffered by remaining on the land (deprived opportunity of a better life elsewhere) on the basis of the promise of inheritance of a half-share outweighed any advantages he had gained so that there was potential for a claim for proprietary estoppel.

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9
Q

Southwell v Blackburn [2015] 2 FLR 1240

A

Snakey Southwell. A woman who had given up a secure tenancy to move into a house owned by her partner was entitled, on the breakdown of their relationship, to an enforceable equity by reason of proprietary estoppel on the basis of his assurances that she would have a home for life. CA

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10
Q

Davies v Davies [2016] 2 P & CR 10 (CA)

A

In proprietary estoppel cases where the claimant’s expectations were uncertain and it was unclear what weight was to be put on them when making an award, it could be useful to take a sliding scale by which the clearer the expectation, the greater the detriment and the longer the passage of time during which the expectation was reasonably held, the greater would be the weight that should be given to the expectation. CA

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11
Q

LCC v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642

A

Unimpressive Allen. The covenantee must own land for the benefit of which the covenant was entered into such that the council was unable to enfroce the covenant, not to develop property, against Allen. CA

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12
Q

P & A Swift Investments v Combined English Stores [1989] AC 632

A

A covenant which provides benefit to a person whilst he occupies land but is of no beenfit once occupation is relinquished is likely to be seen as one which touches and concerns that land.

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13
Q

Haywood v Brunswick Permanent Building Society (1881) 8 QBD 403

A

Burden of Brunswick. Burden of covenant will only run with land if the covenant is restrictive, so that there was no obgliation on D to keep buildings in good repair. CA

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14
Q

Thamesmead Town Ltd v Allotey (1998) 30 HLR 1052

A

Thamesmead Two. Burden of teh covenant passed to D via the doctrine of mutual benefit and burden since the burden was (1) relavant to enabling the exercise of the benefit, (2) there was an opportunity to choose whether to accept that benefit and burden. CA

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15
Q

Wilkinson v Kerdene [2013] 2 EGLR 163

A

Wilkinson pay up. Wilkinson was required to pay Kerdene under teh doctire of mutual benefit/burden since although the benefit and burden were sepreate in form, in practice the money earned via the fee (burden) was sed to maintain the recreational and road facilities (benefit). CA

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16
Q

Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121

A

Boat-hire Hill

Hill only had a personal right againt the Canal Co. his right was incapable of being a proprietary right therefore did not bind Tupper - (demonstration of numerus clausus)

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17
Q

Keppell v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517

A

Keppel’s covenant: Shareholders (Keppel) covenant with A only gave them a personal right against A which therefore did not burden A’s succesor in title (Bailey): Interest was of a type not recgonised at law (numerus clausus).

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18
Q

National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL)

A

Deserting Ainsworth

HL held that a ‘deserted wife’s equity’ was not an equitable proprietary interest however Lords appeared to assume that the court had the power to create new interests contra LPA 1925 s.4

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19
Q

Aspden v Elvy [2012] 2 FLR 807

A

Aspden Renovation: Mr A contributed funds to renovation of his ex Ms E’s property -> Mr A and Ms E held house via CICT In shares of 1:3 (N.b. Imputed Intent used to give ‘fair’ share)

20
Q

Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106

A

Gallant Express: Express declaration of trust viz. JT in equity, was conclusive - on severance parties held as TiC with 2 equal shares.

21
Q

Malayan Credit Ltd v Jack Chia-MPH Ltd [1986] AC 549 (PC)

A

Companies A and B leased premises as JT at law but TiC In equity - Indicated by (1) separate commerical interests; (2) separate space allocation ; (3) separate and unequal rent.

22
Q

Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 (HL)

A

Family home conveyed into 2 names creates strong presumption of JT in equity- this was rebutted on the facts by significant unequal purchase prices and keeping separate resources.

23
Q

Marr v Collie [2018] AC 631 (PC)

A

Beneficial ownership in a situation where a cohabiting couple purchase an investment property in joint names will not automatically be determined by the “resulting trust solution“ - starting point of equal legal and beneficial ownership not confined exclusively to the domestic setting - key determinant is intentions of parties: remitted back to FI to try and find and intentions.

24
Q

Re Draper’s Conveyance [1969] 1 Ch 486

A

Drapers Divorce: Divorce summons that asked for the house to be sold and the proceeds to be split in accordance with their shares constituted written notice to sever per s.36(2) LPA

25
Q

Harris v Goddard [1983] 1 WLR 1203 (CA)

A

(distinguished RE Drapers) Prayer of petition for divorce did not evince an i**mmediate intention to sever as required by s.36(2), merely invited the court to consider severance - no severance

(Divorce proceedings intiated, Husband dies, Wife claims no severance, and therefore JT so that she retains husbands beneficial interest via right of surviorship)

26
Q

Williams v Hensman (1861) 1 J & H 546, 557

A

established 3 common law methods of serverance: (i) unilateral act, (ii) mutual agreement; (iii) course of dealing

27
Q

First National Securities Ltd v Hegarty [1985] QB 850

A

Mr H obtained charge over co-owned property by forging Mrs H’s signature: fraud ->severing JT at equity - charge retained only over Mr Hs beneficial TiC (unilateral act)

28
Q

Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429

A

R and H JTs in equity, R made non-enforceable promise to sell share to H; severance by mutual agreement.

(Denning thought that there was also severance via a course of dealing (i.e. the offer of slae) howver this was dismissed by Pennycuick)

29
Q

Davis v Smith [2012] 1 FLR 1177

A

The act of putting the house on market, accepting offer and crucially agreeing as to how to divide proceeds -> severance via course of dealing.

30
Q

Gore and Snell v Carpenter (1990) 60 P & CR 456

A

Draft negotiation and seperation agreement which included severance not enough: had only been a draft, no agreement. -> no severance (restrictive approach)

31
Q

Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776

A

starting point of JT In equity and law, and end point of TiC (9:1) but no mention of serveance - does equitable tenancy in common results from beneficial joint tenants just drifting apart? (Briggs)

32
Q

Birmingham Midshires BS v Sabherwal (2000) 80 P &CR 256 at [22]-[34]

A

Interest in land (family home) arising through proprietary estoppel was capable of being overreached. (Flegg applied)

(NOTE LJ Walker’s disintction between interests that can be overreached (TiC) and interests that can’t (RoW) - why?)

33
Q

Bull v Bull [1955] 1 QB 234

A

Denning added common law right of occupation to the Tfs system - now has statutory force in the new ToL system, see TLATA s.12(1)

(Son held on trust for hiself and Mother - she had interest by virtue of finanical contribution, and this interest overrode the presumption of slae by virtue of this new common law right of occupation)

34
Q

TLATA s.12

A

Right of occupation

(1) A beneficiary who is beneficially entitled to an interest in possession in land subject to a trust of land is entitled by reason of his interest to occupy the land at any time if at that time—
(a) the purposes of the trust include making the land available for his occupation (or for the occupation of beneficiaries of a class of which he is a member or of beneficiaries in general), or
(b) the land is held by the trustees so as to be so available
(2) Subsection (1) does not confer on a beneficiary a right to occupy land if it is either unavailable or unsuitable for occupation by him.
(3) This section is subject to section 13.

35
Q

TLATA s.13 (3) - (6)

A

Power of trustee to impose conditions on occupation e.g:

  • occupation rent s.13(5)
36
Q

Bagum v Hafiz [2016] Ch. 241

A

Under TLATA s.14 court did not have power to compel Son 2 to sell share In house directly to Son 1, but did have power to coplet sale of House and give Son 1 option of early buy.

37
Q

Re Citro [1991] Ch 142

A

pre TLATA: H was bankrupt, but had equity In ex’s family home (W + 3 kids). TiB of H was able to obtain court order compelling sale of house to pay off H’s debts - sale could only be postponed In excpetional circumstances; this was not.

38
Q

TLATA s.14, 15

A

Power of court to make order concerning ToL

(a) relating to the exercise by the trustees of any of their functions
(b) declaring the nature or extent of a person’s interest in property

as the court thinks fit.

NOTE: power of court are more extensive/ dsicretionary then those of an orindary truste (e.g: not exclusively bound to take effect of benficiaaires inters, can look to interests of creditors, children etc.)

39
Q

Mortgage Corporation v Shaire [2001] Ch. 743

A

Neuberger J: In deciding how to resolve dispute, once the relevant factors (s.15 et al) to be taken into account have been identified, it is a matter for the court as to what weight to give to each factor in a particular case. [74]

40
Q

White v White [2004] 2 FLR 321

A

FI court ordered sale of family home (H + kids) at request of estranged wife: the judge had not erred by failing to recognise for teh pruposes of s.15(1) that an additional purpose of the home had been as a family home: prupose to be judgfed by intention at time of purchase, family home Intention had arisen later.

41
Q

Barca v Mears [2005] 2 FLR 1

A

In bankruptcy cases, automatic presumption of sale after one year (IA s.335A (3)), may infringe Art.8ECHR if it carries absolute priority. Perhaps ‘exceptional circumstances should also Include: (i) exceptionally severe consequences of the ‘usual kind’; (ii) only ‘slight’ loss to creditors as against the usual kind of melancholy consequences.

(Re Citro qualified)

(On facts neither exception applied and sale was ordered)

42
Q

Nicholls v Lan [2006] EWHC 1255 (Ch)

A

Probability of recurrent future hopsitalisation and loss of Independence for beneficiary = ‘exceptional circumstance’ -> order for sale posponed for min of 18 months

43
Q

Alliance & Leicester plc v Slayford (2001) 33 HLR 66

A

H mortgaged P with consent of W, however W’s consent was vitiated due to lack of legal advice, therefore W had overriding interest In P; but Bank was not prevented from suing H on personal covenant, even if those proceedings resulted in H being made bankrupt, and thus H’s TiB from bringing an order for sale on the house via TLATA, thus circumventing W’s equity in P.

44
Q

Abbey National BS v Cann [1991] 1 AC 56

A

Although if M were In AO, here Interest would hae been overriding, her constructive knowledge of the acquisition mortgage amounted to consent, thus denying her priority.

(NOTE - on facts M was not In AO and therefore did not have prima facie overridign Interest)

(Also: AO assessed on date of completion of conveyance, M was not in AO; arrival of furniture before conveyance completion was merely preparatory)

45
Q

Bristol and West BS v Henning [1985] 1 WLR 778

A

W’s equitable Interest was subject to H’s mortgage W knew house couldn’t have been bought without a mortgage -> Mortgagee took priority.

46
Q

City of London BS v Flegg [1988] AC 54

A

MB hold P on trust for MBs and Fs. Fs’ beneficial Interst In P was overreached by Bank since mortgage loan had been transferred to 2 trustees (MBs).