Case Laws

Question 1

USE OF FORCE: GRAHAM V. CONNOR

Answer 1

GRAHAM V. CONNOR: Supreme Court decision which set forth the “Objective Reasonableness” standard on the application of force by police. Graham factors include seriousness of offense, level of resistance, level of threat to officer(s) on scene and the public, size of suspect vs. size of officer, known facts about the suspect’s training in combative sports, known facts about the suspect’s criminal history, known or suspected level of intoxication, training and experience of the officer, proximity of weapons, etc.

Question 2

USE OF FORCE: TENNESSE V. GARNER

Answer 2

TENNESSE V. GARNER: Fleeing felon doctrine. Officers must have articulable facts that a fleeing suspect is posing a threat of serious bodily injury or death to the officer or third party (public) prior to utilizing deadly force on the fleeing suspect. Warning should be given to suspect if feasible.

Question 3

USE OF FORCE: BRYAN V. MCPHERSON

Answer 3

BRYAN V. MCPHERSON: This is the case that was cited which led to the use of a Taser being considered an intermediate level of force. Police may now only use the Taser when they have facts they can articulate which show the suspect poses a threat to the officer or the public. Severity of crime, amount of resistance and level of threat against the officers are primary factors used to evaluate whether the application of the Taser was appropriate.

Question 4

USE OF FORCE: DEORLE V. RUTHERFORD

Answer 4

DEORLE V. RUTHERFORD: Police can use less than deadly force, (in this case a bean bag fired from a shotgun) when there is a strong government interest that warrants its use and when feasible a verbal warning should first be given before the use of the force option.

Question 5

USE OF FORCE: HAYES V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (NINTH CIRCUIT)

Answer 5

HAYES V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (NINTH CIRCUIT): Law enforcement officers can be held liable for negligence in pre-shooting conduct. Several factors relevant to the incident may be viewed in hindsight to determine if officers were derelict in tactical considerations before engaging the subject.

Question 6

USE OF FORCE: FORRESTER V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO

Answer 6

FORRESTER V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO: Police are not required to use the least intrusive degree of force possible when effecting an arrest, overcoming resistance or preventing escape. What is significant in the analysis of the incident is whether the force used to effect a particular seizure was “objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.” (GRAHAM).

Question 7

USE OF FORCE: WEEKS V. US

Answer 7

WEEKS V. US: A 1914 case in which the Supreme Court ruled that a warrantless seizure of items from a private residence constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment thus instigating the exclusionary rule. This standard only applied to federal law enforcement personnel until 1961 when MAPP V. OHIO applied this standards to state courts as well.

Question 8

USE OF FORCE: ARIZONA V. GANT

Answer 8

ARIZONA V. GANT: This case changed the “incident to arrest” search rule for vehicles. Police must have probable cause to search a vehicle for items associated with a suspect’s arrest OR the suspect must be unrestrained and within reaching distance of vehicle. An inventory search may be conducted ONLY if the department has a policy regarding inventory searches. Inventory searches must not be arbitrary.

Question 9

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: PEOPLE V. LOPEZ

Answer 9

PEOPLE V. LOPEZ: Police may no longer conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle or it’s contents for the purpose of locating a driver’s identification absent probable cause that a crime has been committed, i.e. 31 CVC or 148.9(a) PC. This case is prevailing over past legal authority cited in re Arturo D in which police were permitted to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles for driver’s identification.

Question 10

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: CARROL V. US

Answer 10

CARROL V. US: This case is known as the “Vehicle Exception” to a search warrant. When officers have probable cause that a suspect possesses contraband inside a vehicle (weapon, narcotics, etc.) they can search the vehicle in the field without a warrant. This case applies to motor homes as well, (See CALIFORNIA V. CARNEY.) This includes parked (operational) vehicles in which police have lawful access to, (See PENNSYLVANIA V. LABRON.)

Question 11

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: WHREN V. US

Answer 11

WHREN V. US: The SUBJECTIVE reason an officer has to stop a vehicle does not matter as long as they have an OBJECTIVE basis for the stop. Example: A police officer sees a vehicle with four suspected gang members driving down the road. He stops the vehicle for having expired registration. Despite the outcome of the investigation, the basis for the stop has an objective foundation and thus is lawful.

Question 12

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: CALIFORNIA V. RILEY

Answer 12

CALIFORNIA V. RILEY: Police must secure a search warrant for a suspect’s cell phone before they can search it incident to arrest or whenever there is an intrusion into the phone. Some regular search warrant exceptions apply, i.e.: consent, exigency. (Does not apply to active parolees. See PC section 1546.1(c)(9)

Question 13

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: MISSOURI V. MCNELLEY

Answer 13

MISSOURI V. MCNELLEY: Police must secure a search warrant to conduct a forced blood draw from a DUI suspect that will not consent to provide a blood sample to test BAC or blow into the breathalyzer.

Question 14

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN

Answer 14

MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN: This case was decided by the US Supreme Court and held that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test to determine blood alcohol concentration (BAC) without a warrant.

Question 15

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: US V. BYRD

Answer 15

US V. BYRD: A person who is driving a rental vehicle has a fourth amendment protection while driving the vehicle even if they are NOT on the rental agreement.

Question 16

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: CARPENTER V. US

Answer 16

CARPENTER V. US: Police must secure a search warrant to obtain geographical cell phone data of a suspect’s phone.

Question 17

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: US V. JONES

Answer 17

US V. JONES: Police must obtain a search warrant in order to place a GPS tracking device on the vehicle of a suspect in order to track their movements. (Does not apply to active parolees. See US V. KORTE.)

Question 18

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: HARRIS V. US

Answer 18

HARRIS V. US: This is the case that gave birth to phrase we know today as “The Plain View Doctrine.” This is an exception to Fourth Amendments warrant requirement that permits police to seize evidence or contraband that are discovered in plain view during lawful observation. In order for the plain view doctrine to apply, the officer must lawfully be in a place where they can view the item, they must have lawful access to the item and the item must immediately be recognized as contraband.

Question 19

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: PEOPLE V. HUNTER

Answer 19

PEOPLE V. HUNTER: A parolee’s search terms/fourth amendment waiver remain in effect until his or her parole has officially been revoked through the superior court. This remains true even if the parolee is in local custody or an absconder from parole supervision.

Question 20

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: MARYLAND V. BUIE

Answer 20

MARYLAND V. BUIE: Police may conduct a “Protective Sweep” inside a residence if certain criteria exists: They must lawfully be inside the residence and be making an arrest. They may only look in immediately adjoining areas. The officer(s) must have an articulable suspicion that there may be a subject(s) on scene who may cause them harm. “Protective Sweeps” cannot be performed as a matter of “routine” and cannot be made for the purpose of locating a weapon or contraband.

Question 21

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: SEGURA V. US

Answer 21

SEGURA V. US: Police may “freeze” a residence in order to obtain a search warrant. The purpose being to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence from the location. Police may not make a warrantless entry into the residence for the purpose of “freezing” it unless they have specific and articulable facts that support that evidence will be destroyed or removed if entry is not made at that time. Police may “freeze” or “lockdown” an unoccupied residence by not allowing anyone to make entry into it as a search warrant is being obtained. (Police may not use observations made once they enter a residence to “freeze” it as grounds to obtain a search warrant. See MURRAY V. US.)

Question 22

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: PEOPLE V. SCHMITZ

Answer 22

PEOPLE V. SCHMITZ: If police encounter a parolee in a vehicle, they are authorized to conduct a search of areas within the passenger compartment in which the officer reasonably believes the parolee could have stowed personal property or discarded items upon becoming aware of police presence. Additionally, police may search personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them.

Question 23

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: NEW YORK V. CLASS, US V. NGUMEZI

Answer 23

NEW YORK V. CLASS, US V. NGUMEZI: These cases hold that physical intrusion by police into the interior of a vehicle without probable cause constitute a search under the fourth amendment. Examples of physical intrusion are opening a door or leaning inside the vehicle. Cases in which courts have upheld an entry into a vehicle have involved some type of particularized justification. Examples are to check a VIN number if it cannot be accessed from outside the vehicle, checking a driver for impairment or other reasonable officer safety concerns.

Question 24

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: COLLINS V. VIRGINIA

Answer 24

COLLINS V. VIRGINIA: Police must be mindful of curtilage limitations regarding how and where they access property around a residence to conduct a search. In this case, police entered onto the suspect’s property, without a warrant, and lifted a tarp that was placed over a motorcycle that was parked a few feet from the house. The motorcycle was discovered to be stolen. This case went to the Supreme Court where it was decided by an 8-1 vote that the search was unlawful. Additionally, in FLORIDA V. JARDINES, the US Supreme Court ruled that the use of a drug-detecting police K-9 at the front door of a residence constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Question 25

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: TERRY V. OHIO

Answer 25

TERRY V. OHIO: Police may pat search outer clothing for weapons during detentions, based on reasonable suspicion the person may be armed or dangerous. Terry factors include time of day, subject’s behavior (Refusal to comply), mannerisms or furtive gestures (Reaching under seat, angling body away from officer, keeping hands out of view or reaching into pockets or toward waist line), high crime area (Must have first-hand knowledge), secluded or remote areas, bulky clothing or bulge in clothing, prior knowledge of suspect (Knowledge of weapons history or history of resisting), known gang member, number of subjects to officer(s), etc. Furtive gestures are especially concerning. They can further be described as “a movement by a suspect, usually of the hands or arms, that (1) reasonably appeared to have been made in response to seeing an officer or patrol car; and (2) was secretive in nature, meaning that it appeared the subject was trying to hide, discard, or retrieve an object.”

Question 26

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: PEOPLE V. BOWER

Answer 26

PEOPLE V. BOWER: In order for a detention to be lawful, police must be able to articulate specific facts which reasonably caused them to believe: (1) Some activity out of the ordinary was occurring, had occurred or was about to occur, (2) The activity was related to crime and (3) The individual(s) was connected to the activity.

Question 27

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: US V. SOKOLOW, US V. CORTEZ

Answer 27

US V. SOKOLOW, US V. CORTEZ: In determining what cause is sufficient to permit police detentions, the totality of the circumstances must be evaluated. Based upon that whole picture, police must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the detained person of being involved in criminal activity. This is the litmus test the courts will use, specifically in a 1538.5 PC hearing (motion to suppress.)

Question 28

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: STEAGALD V. US

Answer 28

STEAGALD V. US: Police must secure a search warrant to arrest a suspect in a third party location (Residence not belonging to suspect.) Commonly referred to a Steagald warrant.

Question 29

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: US. V. RAMEY

Answer 29

US. V. RAMEY: When formal charges have not yet been filed with the district attorney’s office, Police may seek a Ramey arrest warrant for a suspect when they have probable cause for the arrest and have probable cause to believe the suspect is in his/her residence.

Question 30

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: PENNSLYVANIA V. MIMMS, ARIZONA V. JOHNSON & MARYLAND V. WILSON

Answer 30

PENNSLYVANIA V. MIMMS, ARIZONA V. JOHNSON & MARYLAND V. WILSON: Police may order the driver out of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop with no needed justification. Police may also order occupants out or into the vehicle during a lawful traffic stop with no needed justification.

Question 31

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: US. V. SANDERS

Answer 31

US. V. SANDERS: During a lawful traffic stop, police may order occupants back into the vehicle if they attempt to exit or walk away from the vehicle.

Question 32

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: BRENDLIN V. CA

Answer 32

BRENDLIN V. CA: Passengers inside lawfully stopped vehicles are detained and not free to leave.

Question 33

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: MICHIGAN V. LONG

Answer 33

MICHIGAN V. LONG: Police may search a vehicle for weapons when they have reasonable suspicion to believe there are weapons inside the vehicle. Scope of search must be for weapons only.

Question 34

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: US. V. SANTANA

Answer 34

US. V. SANTANA: Police may arrest a suspect who does not have an arrest warrant in the doorway of their residence if they are within arm’s reach of the officer.

Question 35

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: WARDLOW V. ILLINIOS

Answer 35

WARDLOW V. ILLINIOS: Police may detain a suspect who is fleeing from them if they have reasonable suspicion that they are involved in criminal activity. This doctrine is known as “Flight plus” meaning mere flight alone does not justify the detention but other factors associated with the flight of the suspect can raise the circumstances to reasonable suspicion. Examples of these factors are time of day, area the suspect is in, mannerisms of the suspect prior to flight (furtive gestures, warning to accomplices, attempt to hide or attempt to avoid) and, officer’s prior knowledge of the suspect.

Question 36

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: FERNANDEZ V. US, SORIANO-JARQUIN V. US and US V. DIAZ-CASTENEDA

Answer 36

FERNANDEZ V. US, SORIANO-JARQUIN V. US and US V. DIAZ-CASTENEDA: Police may “as a matter of course” request identifying information from passengers in legally stopped vehicles. During traffic stops police may ask passengers for their information as “Interrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.”

Question 37

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: US V. LANDEROS

Answer 37

US V. LANDEROS: Police may not extend a traffic stop to conduct an investigation of an occupant(s) of the vehicle if they do not have an independent basis (Reasonable Suspicion) for the investigation. The duration of the detention must remain within the scope of the initial reason for the traffic stop. (Ex. A passenger refuses to identify himself during the traffic stop.)

Question 38

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: US V. MENDENHALL

Answer 38

US V. MENDENHALL: A person contacted by police is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if a “reasonable person” in the same position would not have believed that they were free to leave. This analysis must be viewed under the totality of the circumstances. Some factors include but are not limited to: The presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by the officer(s), physical contact between the officer and the subject, the use of language or commanding tone that suggests to the subject that compliance is required.

Question 39

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: US V. DE CASTRO, US V. BARNES

Answer 39

US V. DE CASTRO, US V. BARNES: Police do not escalate a consensual encounter into a detention by requesting that a subject show his hands during the contact. If a subject refuses, this combined with other factors may lawfully elevate the contact into a detention in which a “Terry” search may be justified. Case brief: In the Barnes case, the officer approached Barnes (the defendant) when he observed him acting “suspicious,” and asked him to take his hands out of his pockets. The officer asked Barnes what he was doing and Barnes replied that he was “just hanging out.” The officer asked him if he had any prior arrests and Barnes said that he had been arrested for armed robbery. While speaking to Barnes, the officer observed an unusual bulge under Barnes’ windbreaker jacket. Suspecting that it was a gun, the officer conducted a frisk and discovered that it was a revolver. Barnes was arrested for weapons charges. The district court suppressed the gun and held that the officer seized Barnes the moment he asked him to take his hands out of his pockets. The State appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals observed that, when the officer asked Barnes to remove his hands from his pockets and asked what he was doing, the request and question were not said in an intimidating manner and were no different than a simple request for a driver’s license. They also observed that the officer did not touch Barnes or draw his weapon. The court ruled that the initial request that Barnes remove his hands from his pockets and the question regarding what the defendant was doing did not amount to a seizure. They also ruled that the answer to the question, his initial behavior, and the weapon like bulge in Barnes’ stomach area did provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to detain Barnes and conduct a frisk. As such, the court reversed the decision of the district court and upheld the evidence.

Question 40

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: PEOPLE V. PADILLA

Answer 40

PEOPLE V. PADILLA: Police may order a subject to remove their hands from their pockets and to keep them in plain sight during detentions.

Question 41

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: PEOPLE V. OSBORNE

Answer 41

PEOPLE V. OSBORNE: Police may handcuff a subject during a detention without escalating it into a de facto arrest if officers reasonably believe the restraint was warranted. Factors that may be considered include but are not limited to: Subject is hostile or agitated, subject pulled away from officer, subject tensed up during pat search, subject refused to keep hands in sight, subject tried to reach inside clothing, subject is evasive regarding identity, multiple detainees, hostile onlookers.

Question 42

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: PEOPLE V. LOUDERMILK

Answer 42

PEOPLE V. LOUDERMILK: Police who have lawfully detained a suspect may take reasonable steps to identify that individual. This conduct is permitted because “it serves important government interests.” The courts explain in their ruling that “Without question, an officer conducting a lawful Terry stop (detention) must have the right to make this limited inquiry, otherwise the officer’s right to conduct an investigative detention would be mere fiction.” Additionally, if an officer discovers a wallet during a pat search, the officer may order the detainee to look through the wallet for ID while the officer watches or the officer may search the wallet themselves. If detainees refuse to identify themselves, the officer may decide if the conduct of the detainee rises to the level of a violation of PC section 148(a)(1). See also: PEOPLE V. RIOS, PEOPLE V. LONG & FLORIDA V. HAYES.

Question 43

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: CALIFORNIA V. HODARI D

Answer 43

CALIFORNIA V. HODARI D: A suspect is not considered “Detained or Seized” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment while fleeing from police until they actually submit to the authority of the police either voluntarily or by force from the officer. Consequently, any evidence they discard while attempting to evade the officer is not subject to the exclusionary rule and may be admitted as evidence against the defendant.

Question 44

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: PEOPLE V. BROWN

Answer 44

PEOPLE V. BROWN: Police may rely on information received through “official channels” to make arrests or detain suspects. Official channels can be BOLs or wanted fliers of a suspect or a specific vehicle used in a crime. See also PEOPLE V. SOUN which tells us in part “a detaining officer who is not personally aware on all the facts on which a reasonable suspicion might be based may nevertheless properly detain an individual on the basis of a direction or information transmitted by police officers who were personally aware of such facts.

Question 45

DETENTIONS AND ARRESTS: MICHIGAN V. SUMMERS

Answer 45

MICHIGAN V. SUMMERS: Police may detain occupants of a residence during the service of a valid search warrant. Police may also detain subjects on scene in handcuffs during the search according to MUEHLER V. MENA.

Question 46

INVESTIGATIONS: MIRANDA. V. ARIZONA

Answer 46

MIRANDA. V. ARIZONA: Law Enforcement must advise of specific rights to a suspect they are attempting to illicit incriminating statements from who is in “custody.” In order for a suspect’s statements to be admissible, the prosecution will have to demonstrate that the statements were obtained lawfully and that the suspect “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” waived his/her rights. Police may not conduct custodial interrogations of suspects who are under the age of 17 without first allowing them to consult with an attorney (W&I 625.6). The suspect shall consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by video conference. The consultation may not be waived.

Question 47

INVESTIGATIONS: BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS

Answer 47

BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS: Suspects must clearly invoke their right to remain silent or request an attorney during police questioning in order to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege. The request must be clear and unambiguous. Ex: “I want an attorney” and more commonly: “Take me to jail, I am not going to answer any of your questions.”

Question 48

INVESTIGATIONS: PEOPLE V. DUFF

Answer 48

PEOPLE V. DUFF: Police must clarify an ambiguous or equivocal invocation during the initial admonishment of the Miranda rights to a suspect in custody who is being questioned. Subsequent ambiguous invocations during the interview need no clarification. At that point, it is up to the suspect to clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously assert their right to counsel or silence.

Question 49

INVESTIGATIONS: CALIFORNIA V. BEHELER

Answer 49

CALIFORNIA V. BEHELER: Police may illicit incriminating statements from suspects when they create a non-custodial environment through a number of factors. Example: Suspect enters police interview room; they are told they are free to leave at any time; the door is left open and unlocked; suspects ingress/egress is not blocked in any way; suspect must feel they are free to leave at any time thus creating the non-custodial environment.

Question 50

INVESTIGATIONS: BRADY V. MARYLAND

Answer 50

BRADY V. MARYLAND: This was a 1963 case out of the United States Supreme Court that established that prosecutors must turn over all evidence that could possibly exonerate the defendant to defense counsel. This type of material is known as exculpatory evidence. The Supreme Court held that withholding exculpatory evidence violates a defendant’s due process. This case was the catalyst to the formation of what we now know as the “Brady List.” Because of the Brady ruling, prosecutors are required to inform defendants and their attorneys whenever a law enforcement official involved in a case has a confirmed record of knowingly lying in an official capacity. See also GIGLIO V. US.

Question 51

INVESTIGATIONS: BRUTON V. US, PEOPLE V. ARANDA

Answer 51

BRUTON V. US, PEOPLE V. ARANDA: Prosecutors may NOT use statements made by co-defendants against one another in a trial if the co-defendants are prosecuted together. Police should be aware of this and conduct interviews of suspects with this in mind.

Question 52

INVESTIGATIONS: FRAZIER V. CUPP

Answer 52

FRAZIER V. CUPP: This US Supreme Court case set precedent for police being permitted to use of deception when interviewing suspects. There are parameters that police must be aware of when utilizing deception during interviews. Most important to note is that the voluntariness of a confession may be deemed coerced if extreme deception tactics are employed.

Question 53

INVESTIGATIONS: WHITELEY V. WARDEN

Answer 53

WHITELEY V. WARDEN: Information must be properly documented in police reports and affidavits to support probable cause. All relevant information known to the officer at the time of the report or affidavit must be included. The saying goes: “If it wasn’t written down, it didn’t happen.”