Case Law Flashcards

1
Q

Malone v UK (facts)

Art 8

A

The applicant was charged with offences relating to the handling of stolen goods. During his trial it emerged that telephone conversations made by the applicant had been monitored by the police. The applicant alleged that it was his belief that both his telephone conversations and correspondence had been intercepted for a number of years and accordingly he brought civil proceedings to have such monitoring declared unlawful. The applicant’s complaint was dismissed by the High Court. The case came before the European Court of Human Rights. Before the Court, the applicant contended a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to these interferences with his private life.
On a true construction of Article 8 the phrase ‘in accordance with the law’ did not merely refer back to domestic law, but also related to the quality of the law, and required it to be compatible with the rule of law. This implied that there should be a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities. In particular the law should be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which public authorities would be entitled to resort to secret and potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life. In the instant case, it was considered that the law of England and Wales had failed to indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of the exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities. To that extent they had not provided the minimum degree of legal protection to which citizens were entitled under the rule of law and, accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 8.

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2
Q

Malone v MPC

ROL, SOP

A

The plaintiff, an antique dealer, was tried at the Crown Court on a number of offences of handling stolen property. During the trial the prosecution counsel stated that the plaintiff’s telephone had been intercepted on behalf of the police on the authority of a warrant issued by the Secretary of State. Police practice regarding telephone tapping (ie the interception, monitoring and recording of private telephone conversations) was to obtain a warrant (a document giving official authorisation) to tap from the Home Secretary. The warrant was sent to the Post Office and the Post Office then made a recording of conversations on the line being tapped and forwarded that recording to the police.
Sir Robert McGarry B.C.E. rule that no trespass was committed by the police but the interception of communications was “a subject which cries out for legislation”. Megarry VC said that the executive could do anything that was not prohibited by law (purporting to reverse Entick v Carrington). The Court refused to declare that an act of telephone tapping carried out by the post office, at the request of the police, was not unlawful because an act which is not specifically prohibited is permitted

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3
Q

R v R (marital rape)

A

n this case the House of Lords set aside the long standing common law rule that a husband could not rape his wife. “The House of Lords then concluded that overturning the previous common law rule was a task that could appropriately be undertaken by the courts. There was no need to wait for Parliament to enact legislation changing the law.”

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4
Q

M v Home Office

ROL

A

Judicial Review – Home Secretary cannot ignore rule of law
M was to be deported. The Home Secretary’s counsel gave an undertaking that this would not happen until after the hearing of the appeal. However, M was deported. The court ordered that M should be taken off the plane when it stopped at Paris. The Home Secretary did not consider himself bound by the order and M was not taken off the plane.
Held: The Home Secretary was held in contempt of court but no punishment imposed.
The “rule of law” requires even government ministers to accept and obey the orders of the courts.
M disappeared shortly after his arrival in Zaire and was never heard from again.

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5
Q

R v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Fire Brigades Union
(ROL, SOP)

A

(1994) Supremacy of Parliament – the Royal Prerogative – used today by ministers as Orders in Council]
Concerned the payment for criminal injuries paid under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme created in 1964 under prerogative powers. the Home Sec. decided that he would introduce a new tariff for compensation by using the Royal prerogative to amend the criminal injuries compensation scheme which had been introduced under the Royal prerogative rather than through an act of Parliament. However, in 1988 Parliament had passed the criminal justice which in part provided for amendments to the criminal injuries compensation scheme. All the relevant provisions had the not yet been brought into force. The question was whether the Home Sec. could use the prerogative rather than the statute the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords ruled that where a statute was enforceable thew Secretary could not avoid provisions and act under the prerogative he could persuade parliament to amend the act or to repeal the provisions, but not to avoid the Act itself

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6
Q

A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department

ROL

A

The case began with 10 men who challenged a decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission to eject them from the country on the basis that there was evidence of them being a threat to national security. Under section 25 of this Act, they had the legal right to appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission against their detention. They argued that the antiterrorism, crime and security act (ACSA) 2001, S. 23 to detain foreign terror suspects indefinitely was incompatible with the articles of the Convention. S. 23 permitted detention of the suspected international terrorists without charge or trial. Such detention was incompatible with Art 5 of the Convention and so the UK had previously lodged a derogation from Art 5 to allow it to pass s. 23. The court ruled that the derogation did not satisfy the criteria required; crashed derogation order which then allowed them to issue declaration of incompatibility.

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7
Q

The Case of Proclamations

A

the king wanted to limit the building of new homes in London and also wanted to ensure that week was preserved for human consumption. He issued proclamations to give effect to these objectives. The House of Commons objected to this law making exercise and the king sought the opinions of the judges. The court stated that the law comprise statute, common law and custom and that the king’s proclamations were none of these. Coke Coke L. CJ ruled that the king had no power to create new offenses and it became “have no prerogative but that which the law of the land allows himLord Coke held that the Crown has no prerogative to change the common law or statute, or to create new offences. He also held that the King only has the powers that the law allows him. This case is important as it is a move away from arbitrary government. It cements the separation of powers and the subjection of the executive to the rule of law.

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8
Q

Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel

A

he House of Lords ruled that where an act of Parliament covers the same scope as the prerogative the act of Parliament prevails in the prerogative, if not expressly abolished, is placed in advance bracket effectively suspended]. Accordingly, the government could not choose to use the prerogative to award a lesser amount of compensation for occupation of property in wartime than the amount provided for under the defense of the rounds

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9
Q

exp Simms

A

convicted murderer who claimed to be innocent was intervied by a journalist. later HS imposed a blanket ban on journalists using info gained during the interviews with the prisoners. Court found that it was blanket ban and ultra vires.

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10
Q

GCHQ

A

In 1984 the British government under Margaret Thatcher decided that employees of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) would not be allowed to join any trade union for national security reasons. This was enforced through an Order in Council, an exercise of the Royal Prerogative. The Council of Civil Service Unions chose to bring this matter to court through judicial review, first to the High Court of Justice, which ruled the Order in Council was invalid. The case then went to the Court of Appeal, which decided that the national security issues trumped any problems of propriety.

From there the case went to the House of Lords, where it was decided on 22 November 1984. In their decision, the Lords found that exercises of the Royal Prerogative were generally subject to judicial review, with certain exceptions such as matters of national security. This was a significant break from the previous law, which held that prerogative powers were not in any way subject to judicial review. The GCHQ case served to identify that the application of judicial review would be dependent on the nature of the government’s powers, not their source

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11
Q

Inland Revenue v Rossminster

ROL, SOP

A

The Inland Revenue had certain powers under s20 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 which enabled them to apply to the court for a search warrant in connection with suspected tax fraud. Under the terms of the Act, once a warrant was granted the Revenue had 15 days in which to execute it and seize any appropriate evidence.

One such warrant was obtained against a number of persons including Rossminster Limited and the police and Revenue inspectors searched the relevant premises and seized a number of documents. They did not inform the persons of the offences of which they were suspected, nor did the search warrant contain particulars of the alleged offences.
The House of Lords concluded that:
the warrants in question were within the Revenue’s powers and the suspects had no right to be told the nature of the offences alleged against them (Lord Salmon dissenting);

whether there existed a ‘reasonable cause to believe’ that an offence had been committed was a question of fact to be determined on the evidence; and

when the criminal proceedings had ended the immunity would lapse and the Revenue would then be required to state the reasons for their belief.

Lord Wilberforce noted that many criminal tax evasion operations are highly skilled and that the public interest weighed heavily in support of his conclusion that the defendant did not need to be told the exact nature of the allegations against him.

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12
Q

Ex p Coughlan

HR: Art 8; JR: LE from express promise

A

In the case a severely disabled woman who had been receiving long term nursing care from the National Health Service sold her house after the promise was made by a health authority that she would have a “home for life” at Mardon House a specialist facility run by the NHS Trust “Where the Court considers that a lawful promise or practice has induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive, not simply procedural, authority now establishes that here too the Court will in a proper case decide whether to frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a new and different course will amount to an abuse of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the expectation is established, the Court will have the task of weighing the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the change of policy.”

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13
Q

exp Liverpool Taxi Operator’s Association

LE from express promise

A

A number of taxi cab owners challenged a decision of the Council to increase the numbers of hackney cabs operating in the city. At a public meeting with the council prior to the decision, the chairman had given a public undertaking that the numbers of hackney cabs would not be increased until the proposed legislation, which included provisions for controlling private hire vehicles, had been enacted by Parliament.
Held: (Majority) On account of this public representation, the applicants were ‘justifiably aggrieved’ by the council’s subsequent unfair conduct. Lord Denning obiter: Even in the absence of such a public undertaking, the applicants would have had a right to be consulted: ‘It is perhaps putting it a little high to say that they [Liverpool Corporation] are exercising judicial functions. They may be said to be exercising an administrative function. But even so, in our modern approach, they must act fairly: and the Court will see that they do so.

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14
Q

AG of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shin

LE from express promise

A

immigrant successfully argued that his case should be dealt with on its own merits based on an expressed policy.
where a public authority charged with the duty of making a decision promised to follow a certain procedure before reaching that decision, good administration required that it should act by implementing the promise provided the implementation did not conflict with the authority’s statutory duty; that, accordingly, assuming that an alien had no general right to be heard before being deported, the implementation of the promise to interview each illegal immigrant and decide each case on the merits required the applicant to be given an opportunity to state his case and the failure to ask him whether he wished to make representations why he should not be removed was a sufficient ground for setting aside the decision

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15
Q

R (Greenpeace) v SS for Trade and Industry

LE from express promise

A

The submissions of Greenpeace centred on the promise by the Government in the 2003 Energy White Paper, “Our energy future - creating a low carbon economy”, to carry out full public consultation on the issue before it decided whether or not to change its declared policy position not to support nuclear new build.

The High Court gave Greenpeace declaratory relief that their legitimate expectation had been frustrated and that the procedure followed was unfair, such that the decision to support nuclear new build was unlawful.

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16
Q

exp Uniliver

LE from practice

A

IRC wasn’t alowed to go back upon its practice of allowing Uniliver to file late tax reports
The categories of unfairness are not closed, and precedent should act as a guide not a cage’ thus the principle idea behind it, is that once a public authority makes a promise, it effectively amounts to a contract and to go back upon it is thus a breach and unfair for a public authority to do so, with Legitimate expectation thus being the public law equivalent to the doctrine of estoppel.

17
Q

exp MFK Underwriting Agents

LE criteria: clarity

A

promise must be clear, unambiguous and devoid (лишенный) of relevant qualification

18
Q

exp Zeqiri

LE criteria: clarity

A

no LE that asylum seeker’s claim would be considered in the UK. there was no conduct which amounted to the sufficiently clear representation

19
Q

R(Wheeler)

LE criteria: clarity

A

European Community Constitution for Europe. The failure to give the British public a referendum in respect of the Lisbon Treaty before the Royal Assent had been given to the European Union (Amendment) Bill, and hence the Treaty’s ratification in the United Kingdom, was not unlawful. There had been no promise that a referendum would be held in respect of the Lisbon Treaty. Further, a promise for a referendum could not be implied by the then government’s commitment to hold a referendum in respect of a previous treaty, the Constitutional Treaty, which, in the event, had failed. Even had there been such a promise, it would not have given rise to a legitimate expectation that could be enforced in public law. The subject-matter, nature and context of the promise of the kind contended for by the claimant was in the realm of politics, not of the courts.

20
Q

South Buckinghamshire DC v Flanagan

LE criteria: legality

A

A legitimate expectation based on a representation allegedly made on behalf of a public body could only arise if the person making the representation as to that body’s future conduct had actual or ostensible authority to make it on its behalf. An enforcement notice was an important public document and authority to withdraw such a notice went beyond what could reasonably be regarded as normally incidental to a solicitor’s conduct of prosecuting for a breach of an enforcement notice. The claimant would, accordingly, not be prevented from seeking an injunction against the defendants by the claimant’s solicitor’s earlier agreement.

21
Q

R(Bibi) v Newham LBC

LE criteria: legality

A

in order for expectation to be legitimate must be shown that that it lays within the powers of the body both to make representations and to fulfill it.
legal authority has promised to house a family in legally secure accommodation. Then it withdrawn the promise.
3 stage test when deciding how to approach cases involving LE:
1. what has decision maker committed itself to?
2. has the decision maker acted unreasonably?
3. what should the court do?

The more decision involves social/political values, the less intrusive court. Detrimental reliance isn’t essential in establishing LE

22
Q

ex p Walker

LE criteria: knowledge and reliance

A

The Ministry of Defence set up a criminal injuries compensation scheme for servicemen who were victims of crimes of violence abroad. The criteria of the scheme excluded injuries caused in war zones. Walker challenged the Ministry’s decision not to pay him compensation under the scheme after he was injured in Bosnia, on the basis of incorrect interpretation of the scheme, Wednesbury unreasonableness, and frustration of a legitimate expectation. The House of Lords rejected Walker’s appeal. Walker clarified the law, but it was decided on well-established principles. The courts will interfere with an administrative decisions in a very broad sense of ‘administrative’ (the decisions in Walker did not determine any legal rights). The courts have a discretion to interfere if such a decision is procedurally unfair, or if it is based on a misinterpretation of the law (or even of non-legal rules, such as the rules of criminal injury compensation in Walker), or (in a wide range of cases – see p248), if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could make it.

23
Q

R (Rashid)

LE criteria: knowledge and reliance

A

Immigration Deportation. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the claimant’s application for judicial review, held that, on balance, the claimant’s continuing detention pending deportation was lawful.

24
Q

ex p Begbie

A

no difference between 1st and 3rd categories. the more you’re taking away the more the court would intervene. decision in macro-political field should attract a less intrusive approach

25
Q

R(Nadarajah and Abdi)

A

any departure from LE must be justified by reference to proportionality

26
Q

Ex parte Venables and Thompson (facts)

A

The applicants, two boys aged ten, were convicted of the murder of a two-year-old boy in appalling circumstances.

The trial judge imposed the mandatory sentence of detention during Her Majesty’s pleasure provided for by s 53(1)a of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, and in his report to the Home Secretary recommended that the ‘tariff’ period of their sentence be eight years’ detention, which he considered to ‘very, very many years’ for a child of the applicants’ age.

The Lord Chief Justice then advised the Home Secretary that the tariff period should be increased to ten years. However, following a public petition containing some 278,300 signatures, a campaign of over 20,000 coupons organised by a popular newspaper, and over 5,000 letters, all demanding that the applicants should remain in detention for life, the Home Secretary, exercising his discretion under s 35b of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, decided that the penal element in the sentences should be increased to 15 years. In reaching that decision, the Home Secretary stated that he had had regard to the public concern about the case, as evidenced by the petitions and other correspondence he had received. His decision was also in accordance with a policy statement dated 27 July 1993 in which he stated that young offenders sentenced to detention during Her Majesty’s pleasure should, like adults on whom mandatory life sentences were imposed, serve an identified penal element in their sentence before their release was considered.

27
Q

Ex parte Venables and Thompson (ratio)

A

In fixing a tariff the Home Secretary was exercising a power equivalent to a judge’s sentencing power and, like a sentencing judge, he was required to remain detached from the pressure of public opinion. The public protests about the level of the tariff to be fixed in the applicants’ case were legally irrelevant and ought not to have been taken into account by the Home Secretary in fixing the tariff. The Home Secretary had therefore misdirected himself in giving weight to irrelevant considerations which influenced his decisions to the detriment of the applicants and in so doing he had acted in a procedurally unfair way. For that reason his decisions were unlawful

28
Q

Westminster Corp v London & North West Railway

simple illegality

A

the appellant had a statutory power to provide public sanitary conveniences and to construct these in, on, or under any road. It built an underground convenience on Parliament Street near Bridge Street in London with access to the pavement on either side of the street. London and North Western Railway Company, which owned property fronting Parliament Street and Bridge Street, objected to the construction. Lord Macnaghten considered whether the Corporation had constructed the subway “as a means of crossing the street under colour and pretence of providing public conveniences which were not really wanted at that particular place”, which would not have been authorized by statute. He concluded that the Corporation’s primary object had been to construct the public conveniences, together with proper means of approaching and exiting from them. Thus, the scheme was not unlawful

29
Q

AG v Fulham

simple illegality

A

the legal entity whom had statutory power to provide wash houses for the poor to prevent the poor from getting diseases. The legal entity opened up washing facilities but also charged money from the poor for them to clean their clothes, meaning that the legal entity had acted outside their authority which was clearly not within their power and therefore was an ultra vires.

30
Q
exp Leeach (no2)
(simple illegality: constitutional rights)
A

The applicant, a prisoner, applied for judicial review of r 33(3) of the Prison Rules 1964 which allowed a prison governor to read every letter to or from a prisoner and stop any letter that was objectionable or of inordinate length. unless it was between a prisoner who was a party to proceedings and his legal adviser.

The question was were the rules ultra vires of the Prison Act 1952, which authorised the making of rules.

Held: The more fundamental the right interfered with by a rule and the more drastic the interference, the more difficult it was to imply such a rule-making power.

A prisoner’s right of access to a solicitor for advice as to instituting proceedings was an inseparable part of his right of access to the court.

The rule created a substantial impediment to the exercise of the right to unimpeded access to the courts and to a solicitor for advice as to instituting proceedings.

31
Q

ex p Witham

simple illegality: constitutional rights

A

LC set the scale of fees. John Witham was in receipt of income support, wished to bring proceedings in person for defamation, for which no legal aid. He maintained he could not afford the fees which the amendment required him to pay.
The court found the Lord Chancellor went beyond his powers (ultra vires) in removing the provision that those on income support/low incomes to whom it could cause unnecessary financial hardship would be exempt from fees to access the courts which therefore denies their right to a fair trial. This application for judicial review was held.

The Lord Chancellors power to set fees under s130 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 was “impliedly limited by the common law right to access to the courts” – and by abolishing the fee exemptions he had exceed this limitation.

32
Q

Anisminic v FCC

illegality: ouster clauses, errors of law

A

Anisminic had an assets in Egypt nationalised after the Suez conflict.
UK law provided compensation to such companies.
The tribunal, however, decided that the appellants were not eligible for compensation.
There were two important issues on the appeal to the Court of Appeal and later, the House of Lords. The first was straightforward: whether the tribunal had made an error of law in construing the term “successor of title” under the subordinate legislation.

The second issue was more complex and had important implications for the law on judicial review. Even if the tribunal had made an error of law, the House of Lords had to decide whether or not an appellate court had the jurisdiction to intervene in the tribunal’s decision. Section 4(4) of the Foreign Compensation Act 1950 stated that:
“The determination by the commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called into question in any court of law”. This was a so called “ouster clause”.
Ruling: By a 3-2 majority, the House of Lords decided that section 4(4) of the Foreign Compensation Act did not preclude the court from inquiring whether or not the order of the tribunal was a nullity, and accordingly it decided that the tribunal had misconstrued the legislation (the term “successor in title”), and that the determination by the defendant tribunal that the appellant did not qualify to be paid compensation was null, and that they were entitled to have a share of the compensation fund paid by the Egyptian government.
The decision illustrates the courts’ reluctance to give effect to any legislative provision that attempts to exclude their jurisdiction in judicial review. Even when such an exclusion is relatively clearly worded, the courts will hold that it does not preclude them from scrutinising the decision on an error of law and quashing it when such an error occurs.

It also establishes that any error of law by a public body will result in its decision being ultra vires.

33
Q

exp Page

illegality: errors of law

A

held that since Parliament only confers power on a public authority on the basis that it is to be exercised on the correct legal basis, any misdirection in law will render the decision ultra vires.[43] Thus, in general, all errors of law are now considered as jurisdictional and ultra vires in a broad sense of the term, and the High Court can intervene to correct them.

34
Q

exp South Yourkshire Transport

illegality: limitation on principle of, errors of law

A

The Monopolies and Mergers Commission could only investigate mergers affecting ‘a substantial part of the United Kingdom’. A bus company sought judicial review on the ground that the Commission was investigating a merger that only affected a small part of the country (see p 335 for a map). The company argued that the Commission had jurisdiction only if the area affected was a substantial part of the UK, and that the court had to decide whether that was the case and impose it on the Commission in order to keep it within its jurisdiction.
Held: the court should not intervene unless the dec maker’s conclusion was irrational

35
Q

White&Collins v Minister of Health

illegality: errors of fact: precedent fact

A

under the relevant statute, the authority could only issue a compulsory purchase order affecting the applicants’ land if it was not part of, among other things, a park. A minister confirmed the purchase order but the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that it should be quashed, finding that the minister could not exercise power to acquire the land since it was part of a park. Whether the land was or was not a park was a precedent fact, and the minister had committed an error concerning this fact

36
Q

ex p Khawaja

illegality: errors of fact: precedent fact

A

the House of Lords held that the question whether the applicants were “illegal immigrants” was a question of fact that had to be positively proved by the Home Secretary before he could use the power to expel them. The power depended on them being “illegal immigrants” and any error in relation to that fact took the Home Secretary outside his jurisdiction to expel them. However, where a term to be evaluated by the authority so broad and vague that reasonable people may reasonably disagree about its meaning, it is generally for the authority to evaluate its meaning.

37
Q

SS for Education v Tameside MBC

illegality, errors of fact: ignorance or mistake of an established fact

A

In the Tameside area, local concil took decision to bring with scheme all schools under a comprehensive umbrella where every child would be let in and not selected like in Grammar schools. SS halt the introduction of grammar schools, as he had believe that re-introduction would led to a chaos.
Issue: Whether SS decision that it would lead to educational chaos can be challenged. Lord Wilberforce: ‘The statue has been framed, ‘if SS satisfied’. This decision must be made on basis of certain facts, and while that is for SS, seeing whether those relevant facts are present and taken into account is job for court.
Held: SS fundamentally misdirected himself, proposed actions of new council not unreasonable (makes sense, because they agreed to partly implement new scheme but in more phased a manner).