Case Law Flashcards
Murray Wright Ltd [1970] NZLR 476.
Because the killing must be done by a human being, an organisation (such as a hospital or food company) cannot be convicted as a principal offender:
R v Myatt [1991] 1 NZLR 674; (1990) 7 CRNZ 304 (CA)
[Before a breach of any Act, regulation or bylaw would be an unlawful act under s 160 for the purposes of culpable homicide] it must be an act likely to do harm to the deceased or to some class of persons of whom he was one.
R v Tomars [1978] 2 NZLR 505
formulates the issues in the following way:
- Was the deceased threatened by, in fear of or deceived by the defendant?
- If they were, did such threats, fear or deception cause the deceased to do the act that caused their death?
- Was the act a natural consequence of the actions of the defendant, in the sense that reasonable and responsible people in the defendant’s position at the time could reasonably have foreseen the consequences?
- Did these foreseeable actions of the victim contribute in a [significant] way to his death?
R v Horry [1952] NZLR 111, 123
Death should be provable by such circumstances as render it morally certain and leave no ground for reasonable doubt – that the circumstantial evidence should be so cogent and compelling as to convince a jury that upon no rational hypothesis other than murder can the facts be accounted for.
Cameron v R
Recklessness is established if:
(a) the defendant recognised that there was a real possibility that:
(i) his or her actions would bring about the proscribed result; and/or
(ii) that the proscribed circumstances existed; and
(b) having regard to that risk those actions were unreasonable.
R v Piri [1987] 1 NZLR 66
Recklessness [here] involves a conscious, deliberate risk taking. The degree of risk of death foreseen by the accused under either s167(b) or (d) must be more than negligible or remote. The accused must recognise a “real or substantial risk” that death would be caused:
R v Desmond (1868) 11 Cox CC 146
Not only must the object be unlawful, but also the accused must know that his act is likely to cause death. It must be shown that his knowledge accompanied the act causing death.
R v Murphy [1969] NZLR 959.
When proving an attempt to commit an offence it must be shown that the accused’s intention was to commit the substantive offence. For example, in a case of attempted murder it is necessary for the Crown to establish an actual intent to kill:
R v Harpur [2010] NZCA 319, (2010) 24 CRNZ 909
[The Court may] have regard to the conduct viewed cumulatively up to the point when the conduct in question stops … the defendant’s conduct [may] be considered in its entirety. Considering how much remains to be done … is always relevant, though not determinative.
R v Mane (1989) 5 CRNZ 375
For a person to be an accessory the offence must be complete at the time of the criminal involvement. One cannot be convicted of being an accessory after the fact of murder when the actus reus of the alleged criminal conduct was wholly completed before the offence of homicide was completed.
R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411; [1975] 3 All ER 445
Those who use violence must take their victims as they find them.
R v Forrest and Forrest [1970] NZLR 545 (CA)
“The best evidence possible in the circumstances should be adduced by the prosecution in proof of [the victim’s] age.”
R v Cottle [1958] NZLR 999 (CA)
As to degree of proof, it is sufficient if the plea is established to the satisfaction of the jury on a preponderance of probabilities without necessarily excluding all reasonable doubt.
R v Clark [1983] 1 CRNZ 132
The decision as to an accused’s insanity is always for the jury and a verdict inconsistent with medical evidence is not necessarily unreasonable. But where unchallenged medical evidence is supported by the surrounding facts a jury’s verdict must be founded on that evidence which in this case shows that the accused did not and had been unable to know that his act was morally wrong.
R v Codere (1916) 12 Cr App R 21 (CA)
The nature and quality of the act means the physical character of the act. The phrase does not involve any consideration of the accused’s moral perception nor his knowledge of the moral quality of the act. Thus a person who is so deluded that he cuts a woman’s throat believing that he is cutting a loaf of bread would not know the nature and quality of his act.
