Case Law Flashcards
Tennessee v. Garner
Deadly Force, Fleeing Felon Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a police officer may use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect only if the officer has a good-faith belief that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. When a non-violent felon is ordered to stop and submit to police, ignoring that order does not give rise to a reasonable good-faith belief that the use of deadly force is necessary, unless it has been threatened.
Terry v. Ohio
Terry Frisk Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a police officer may stop a suspect on the street and frisk him or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person “may be armed and presently dangerous.”
Pennsylvania V. Mimms
Order a suspect onto the curb The order to get out of the car, issued after the respondent was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The State’s proffered justification for such order - the officer’s safety - is both legitimate and weighty, and the intrusion into respondent’s personal liberty occasioned by the order, being at most a mere inconvenience, cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety. Under the standard announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate” - the officer was justified in making the search he did once the bulge in respondent’s jacket was observed.
Wyoming V. Houghton
Automobile exception search but for passengers too Police officers with probable cause to search a vehicle, as in this case, may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.
Carroll v. United States
Automobile Exception - Search on PC without warrant In Carroll, the court established the “automobile exception” to the 4th Amendment protections against warrantless searches. In this prohibition-era case, the court noted the inherent difference between buildings and vehicles - buildings remain stationary, while cars and other vehicles can be moved and hidden before a warrant can be issued. The court held that if Officers have probable cause that an automobile contains evidence of a crime, the vehicle in question can be searched without a warrant.
Miranda v. Arizona
Under the Fifth Amendment, any statements that a defendant in custody makes during an interrogation are admissible as evidence at a criminal trial only if law enforcement told the defendant of the right to remain silent and the right to speak with an attorney before the interrogation started and the rights were either exercised or waived in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner.
Mike Smoore v. The LSPD
Protective sweepo - poppu the trunko In Smoore, the court established two facts relating to felony stops. First, when effectuating an arrest or once an arrest has been effectuated, police may conduct a “protective sweep” of the premises or location from which the individual is arrested or detained. This includes opening the trunk of a vehicle to inspect the trunk for occupants when an attack may be launched against the officers or others from that area. Secondly, that absent separate probable cause or exception (i.e. probable cause that evidence of the crimes of arrest will be found or an inventory search of a vehicle to be impounded) officers may not search the or inventory the trunk of the vehicle when performing a protective sweep, and the contents of the trunk shall not be considered to be in “plain sight” when a protective sweep is conducted.
Miranda v. Arizona
Under the Fifth Amendment, any statements that a defendant in custody makes during an interrogation are admissible as evidence at a criminal trial only if law enforcement told the defendant of the right to remain silent and the right to speak with an attorney before the interrogation started and the rights were either exercised or waived in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner.
The People v. Georgina Williams “The Wrangler Decree”
Conversations between suspects and undercover law enforcement officers are not afforded Miranda Protection. Statements made by individuals to undercover officers will be admissible in Court.
The People v. Meg Kyracruz
An express statement by a Defendant, including a request as to whether an attorney is available, shall constitute an affirmative invocation of the Miranda Rights as read in the State of San Andreas. When such an invocation is made by the Defendant, questioning may not resume again until either (1) counsel has been provided or (2) the suspect has waived the right to an attorney. For instance, if no attorney is available an officer should (1) inform the Defendant that no attorney is available and (2) ask if the Defendant is waiving their right to an attorney to continue questioning in light of that fact.
The People v. Cedric Stanfield “Coyote’s Clause”
Even if a gun is broken, it still counts for possession charges The possession of an inoperable or broken firearm shall constitute sufficient evidence for the Criminal Possession of a Firearm [Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3], regardless of whether the firearm is functional. However, individuals shall not be charged with Criminal Possession of a Firearm [Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3] for any broken or inoperable firearms when that individual is turning the firearm in to the Unified Police Department for the purposes of disposal. Individuals turning in inoperable or broken firearms may still be investigated for non-possession related charges.
The People v. Brett Maxwell “The Raven Regulation”
An individual shall per se be guilty of the offense of Burglary where (1) local dispatch calls in the area indicate a breaking and entering or attempted breaking and entering; (2) the individual’s DNA is found on the front or back door of a residence; (3) the individual is apprehended on scene (i.e. within the residence, within the suburb, or within on mile) of the breaking and entering report, and; (4) the individual is found with scratches on their hands or other signs of attempting to forcibly enter a home or residence. The burden of proof shall shift to the Defense to then provide lawful reason or consent for entering the property.
Deadly Force, Fleeing Felon Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a police officer may use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect only if the officer has a good-faith belief that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. When a non-violent felon is ordered to stop and submit to police, ignoring that order does not give rise to a reasonable good-faith belief that the use of deadly force is necessary, unless it has been threatened.
Tennessee v. Garner
Terry Frisk Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a police officer may stop a suspect on the street and frisk him or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person “may be armed and presently dangerous.”
Terry v. Ohio
Order a suspect onto the curb The order to get out of the car, issued after the respondent was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The State’s proffered justification for such order - the officer’s safety - is both legitimate and weighty, and the intrusion into respondent’s personal liberty occasioned by the order, being at most a mere inconvenience, cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety. Under the standard announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate” - the officer was justified in making the search he did once the bulge in respondent’s jacket was observed.
Pennsylvania V. Mimms
