Bill of Rights - Article 12: Miranda Doctrine Flashcards
2018 Political Law
XVII
The police served a warrant of arrest on Ariston who was suspected of raping and killing a female high school student. While on the way to the police station, one of the police officers who served the warrant asked Ariston in the local dialect if he really raped and killed the student, and Ariston nodded and said, “Opo.” Upon arriving at the police station, Ariston saw the City Mayor, whom he approached and asked if they could talk privately. The Mayor led Ariston to his office and, while there in conversation with the Mayor, Ariston broke down and admitted that he raped and killed the student. The Mayor thereafter opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness Ariston’s confession. In the presence of the Mayor, the police and the media, and in response to questions asked by some members of the media, Ariston sorrowfully confessed his guilt and sought forgiveness for his actions.
Which of these extrajudicial confessions, if any, would you consider as admissible in evidence against Ariston?
Ariston was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform him of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession to the police is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
His confession before the mayor, however, is admissible. While it may be true that a mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Sections 12(1) and 12(3) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Ariston’s confession to the mayor, as described in the problem, was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not appear as having questioned Ariston at all. No police authority ordered Ariston to talk to the mayor. It was he himself who spontaneously, freely, and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that he was going to confess his guild to him. When he talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to the Mayor did not violate his constitutional rights.
His confession to the media can likewise be properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statement spontaneously made by suspects to news reporters during televised reviews are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence (People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997).
2016 Political Law
I
The contents of the vault of ABC company consisting of cash and documents were stolen. Paulyn, the treasurer of ABC, was invited by the Makati City Police Department to shed light on the amount of cash stolen and the details of the missing documents. Paulyn obliged and volunteered the information asked. Later, Paulyn was charged with qualified theft together with other suspects. Paulyn claims her rights under the Constitution and pertinent laws were blatantly violated. The police explained that they were just gathering evidence when Paulyn was invited for a conference and she was not a suspect at that time. Rule on her defense.
No, the defense of Paulyn is not valid. When she was invited for questioning by the Makati City Police Department and she volunteered information, she was not yet a suspect. Her constitutional rights of a person under investigation for the commission of an offense under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution begins to operate when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry upon an unsolved crime and begins to be aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and the questions tend to elicit incriminating statements (People v. Marra, G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994).
2016 Political Law
XVI
Jojo filed a criminal complaint against Art for theft of a backpack worth P150.00 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. The crime is punishable with arresto mayor to prision correccional in its minimum period, or not to exceed 4 years and 2 months. The case was assigned to Prosecutor Tristan and he applied Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112 which reads: “(a) If filed with the prosecutor. - If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in Sec. 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Prosecutor shall act on the complaint within ten (10) days from its filing.”
On the other hand, Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112 provides: “(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. x x x”
Since Sec. 8(a) authorizes the Prosecutor to decide the complaint on the basis of the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant, Prosecutor Tristan did not notify Art nor require him to submit a counter-affidavit. He proceeded to file the Information against Art with the Metropolitan Trial Court. Art vehemently assails Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112 as unconstitutional and violative of due process and his rights as an accused under the Constitution for he was not informed of the complaint nor was he given the opportunity to raise his defenses thereto before the Information was filed. Rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112. Explain.
The contention of Art is not meritorious. The right to be informed of the complaint and to be given the opportunity to raise one’s defenses does not apply to preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation is merely procedural. It may be dispensed with without violating the right of the accused to due process (Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. 2068, October 20, 1948).
2014 Political Law
XXIII.
The police got a report about a shooting incident during a town fiesta. One person was killed. The police immediately went to the scene and started asking the people about what they witnessed. In due time, they were pointed to Edward Gunman, a security guard, as the possible malefactor. Edward was then having refreshment in one of the eateries when the police approached him. They asked him if he had a gun to which question he answered yes. Then they asked if he had seen anybody shot in the vicinity just a few minutes earlier and this time he said he did not know about it. After a few more questions, one of the policemen asked Edward if he was the shooter. He said no, but then the policeman who asked him told him that several witnesses pointed to hi m as the shooter. Whereupon Edward broke down and started explaining that it was a matter of self-defense. Edwardwas eventually charged with murder. During his trial, the statements he made to the police were introduced as evidence against him. He obj ected claiming that they were inadmissible since he was not given his Miranda rights. On the other hand, the prosecution countered that there was no need for such rights to be given since he was not yet arrested at the time of the questioning. If you wer e the judge, how would you rule on the issue?
If I were the judge, I would rule that the confession is inadmissible. First, the rights under investigation in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution are applicable to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. The investigation began when a policeman told Edward that several witnesses pointed to him as a suspect (People v. Bariquit, G.R. No. 122733, October 2, 2000). Second, under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7438, for a confession to be admissible, it must be in writing (People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 127493, December 8, 1999).
2013 Political Law
VII.
As he was entering a bar, Arnold -who was holding an unlit cigarette in his right hand -was handed a match box by someone standing near the doorway. Arnold unthinkingly opened the matchbox to light his cigarette and as he did so, a sprinkle of dried leaves fell out, which the guard noticed. The guard immediately frisked Arnold, grabbed the matchbox, and sniffed its contents. After confirming that the matchbox contained marijuana, he immediately arrested Arnold and called in the police.
At the police station, the guard narrated to the police that he personally caught Arnold in possession of dried marijuana leaves. Arnold did not contest the guard’s statement; he steadfastly remained silent and refused to give any written statement. Later in court, the guard testified and narrated the statements he gave the police over Arnold’s counsel’s objections. While Arnold presented his own witnesses to prove that his possession and apprehension had been set-up, he himself did not testify.
The court convicted Arnold, relying largely on his admission of the charge by silence at the police investigation and during trial.
From the constitutional law perspective, was the court correct in its ruling?
The court was wrong in relying on the silence of Arnold during the police investigation and during the trial. Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, he had the right to remain silent. His silence cannot be taken as a tacit admission, otherwise, his right to remain silent would be rendered nugatory. Considering that his right against self-incrimination protects his right to remain silent, he cannot be penalized for exercising it (People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 157221, March 30, 2007).
