Bi vs Multilateral Flashcards
Haggard (1995)
Chapter 1: Advanced developing countries are becoming important players in the trading system-> under strong pressure to conform with international norms of deep integration; Poorer countries concentrated on achieving shallow integration through removing trade and investment barriers.
Chapter 2: 1980s difficult decade for DVs: - economic problems, heavily indebted countries faced decline in availability of international commercial lending and strong pressures to adjust as a result - Expanding definition of conditionality for multi and bilateral assistance - Bilateral pressure on trade policy from the US - Changes in expectation of participation in the GATT
DiCaprio (2010)
By offering an analysis of the policy regime that such negotiations typically yield, this article sought to highlight the challenges the new environment will pose to the industrialisation process. It will be more costly (subsidies), less adjustable (safeguards), and more uncertain (financial liberalisation). But the outcome will also offer more influence over elements of US policy design (SPS, TBT), limit unilateral protectionism (worker rights, IPR), and improve market access (tariff reductions).
Tariffs affected by FTA (WTO: bound; FTA schedule to reduce)
Restrictions on safeguards introduced in FTA
Balance of payment remains unaffected
Underutilised Policy options:
- Green-light subsidies: (Non-specific, Research and development, Regional development, Environmental protection)
- Investment measures (not covered under WTO)
- Contingent protection measures (Anti-dumping, Countervailing, safeguard measures)
Shadlen (2008)
Political Trade dependence through GSP, lock in GSP market access through RBTAs.
Many of the countries in the americas rely heavily on US (only Canada and Brazil less than 40% exports to US). Many export products are highly concentrated in one sector. The US can alter the choice countries face from one between RBTA vs. no RBTA, to a choice between RBTA vs. no-RBTA-while-neighbour-has-preferential-access. What seems like undesirable policy choice becomes best option (Gruber 2000).
Heron (2011)
The CARIFORUM agreement was not simply a product of a unique set of institutional structures or economic interests. It also constituted a political bargain forged in a highly asymmetrical context, wherein the EU’s market and financial power was amplified by the vulnerabilities, competitive dynamics and interregional rivalries inside the ACP:
- ACP is dominated numerically by very small, trade- and aid-dependent states: the immediate concern for the smaller countries of the ACP was the fiscal rather than the trade implications of import liberalisation, due to a heavy dependence on tariff revenue to fund government spending
- the belief was that a willingness to sign a comprehensive agreement – and to do so first – was key to extracting important concessions from the EU in areas such as Mode IV, delayed liberalisation schedules and product exemptions, and – most importantly – preferential access to development finance
Gallagher (2013)
Sovereign debt often covered under IIAs, Creditors can use BITs to reclaim the full value off their bonds through ISDS, US has included SDR exemptions in some of its BITs (but they do not permit SDR to violate NT-> inadequate, because domestic interests need to be treated differently in a crises
Crystal (2009)
First, there are those (mainly in South Asia and Africa) that have not received and do not depend much on FDI. These countries, it appears, can take a hard-line position champion- ing the interests of the “South”—and thereby gain domestic political legitimacy— without worrying about paying too significant a cost.
second group—those countries (many in East Asia) that do seek FDI, but still have relatively restrictive policies—can afford to take a similar position because they are attractive investment locations. In other words, they have certain characteristics (large and growing markets, cheap but productive labour, and so forth) which make them attractive locations for FDI.
intermediate countries, however, the economic effect could indeed be significant. Latin American countries, which used to be the most popular region in the developing world for FDI (receiving close to 70% of all FDI in the developing countries back in 1980), received around 36% of developing country FDI inflows in 2000.
Elkins et al (2006)
BIT proliferation driven by competition for capital and credible commitments.
TRIMS vs BITs/RBTAs
TRIMs vs TRIPs Measures
WTO vs RBTAs
