Behaviourism Flashcards
Logical behaviourism
Theory about the meaning of mentalistic expressions (belief, desire, etc)
Metaphysical theory about the nature of mental states
The problem of other minds (Ryle)
Argument against Descartes
P1) According to CD we have both a mind and a body
P2) Human bodies are in space, so can be observed by external observers
P3) Minds are not in space and private
P4) One person has no direct access to another’s mind
C) I have no good reason to believe that other minds exist
The best thing you can do is to try and infer the existence of other peoples minds form their behaviour»_space;> Reason by analogy (response)
The argument from analogy
P1) Every time i am sad, i behave in a certain way
P2) That person is behaving as i do when I am sad
P3) That person is similar to me
C) Therefore, that person is sad
Ryle’s response
This is problematic because I cannot access your mind so how do i know you are similar to me
Argument from private language (Ryle)
P1) For an expression to have meaning, it should be possible to say whether E is being applied correctly
P2) If an expression refers to a private episode then no one can say whether it has been correctly applied
C1) Therefore if E refers to a private episode, E is meaningless
P4) If CD is true then mentalistic expressions like believing and desiring refer to private episodes in ones mind
C2) Therefore, if CD is true, then mentalistic expressions are meaningless but they are not
C3) Therefore CD is false
Category mistake
Ryle maintains that CD makes a category mistake
It represents the facts of mental life as if they belong to one logical category when they actually belong to another (D assigns mental states to the wrong logical category
University example
He believed that mentalistic expressions (believing, feeling) refers to a series of private episodes in ones mind but this is a error
Mentalistic terms
According to Ryle, mentalistic expressions denote behaviours or behavioural dispositions
Mentalistic expressions can be defined solely in terms of behaviours
We can define M in terms of behaviours or dispositions (propensity of exhibiting a certain feature under certain conditions, property being soluble in water)
Behavioural dispositions
A behavioural disposition is something exhibiting a certain behaviour under certain conditions
Mental states are behaviours or behavioural dispositions (Reductive physicalism)
Behaviourism solving Mental causation
D faced this problem : How can the states of an immaterial substance have causal effects on the physical world?
Behaviourism says that’s there is no causal relation between MS and behaviours
No relation because they are behaviours
It is not that pauls feeling pain causes him to cry, paul’s feeling pain is constituted by his crying
Behaviourism solving : Seeing other minds
If minds are private (D) then we cannot be certain that others have a mind
If MS are behaviours and i can see your behaviour
Can directly observe Paul’s pain if i see him crying
If B is true then we can have knowledge of other minds via observation
Behaviourism solving : Private language
Problem : how can mentalistic expressions be meaningful if they refer to private episodes
Behaviours are directly observable
Problem : How can behaviourism account for self knowledge ?
At least some knowledge is independent from the observation of ones behaviour (I know that i believe that Milan is in Italy but this knowledge is not based on the observation of my behaviour)
P1) If B is true then MS are behaviours of behavioural dispositions
P2) The only way to gin knowledge of behaviours is via observation
P3) In many cases we gain knowledge of our own mental states without observing behaviours
C1) Therefore, there are at least some mental states that are not behaviours
C2) Therefore, behaviourism is false
Problem : Privileged access (another way to look at problem 1)
It seems intuitive that there is an asymmetry between the way we come to know our own MSs and the way we come to know others MSs
I have privileged access to my own MS, so i don’t need to observe my own behaviour since i can introspect my mind
Behaviour is incompatible with the claim that we have non-observational knowledge of our own minds
Problem : The intentional circle argument
Mentalistic expressions are synonymous with expressions for behaviours/behavioural dispositions
It is impossible to define mentalistic expressions in purely behavioural terms
Problem : Putnam’s Super Spartans
Spartans suppress all involuntary pain behaviour but they do feel pain
But behaviourism claims that MS = Behaviour so this doesn’t appear to be possible
Therefore, pain and pain behaviour are not necessarily equivalent so the former cannot be defined in terms of the latter
Response :
- Could respond by saying yes if asked which is still pain behaviour
However :
- Putnam says there is nothing self contradictory in thinking of a group of people who are pain but do not exhibit any pain behaviour
- Therefore, the expression to be in pain cannot be defined in terms of behavioural expressions
Therefore, the expression pain doesn’t have the same meaning as behaviour expressions
