BE Third Deck Flashcards
Connor 1992
“egg-trading” between simultaneous hermaphrodites.
Modeling “pseudo-reciprocity” or what appears as reciprocity, but is really two individuals manipulating each other to extract what they need by giving the other something it needs. Cheating not possible.
Bs-Cs > Bl-Cl
Hawkes, O’Connell, Blurton Jones 2001
Hadza Meat Sharing
Tested risk reduction reciprocity. Hadza hunting ethnography does not support reciprocity because those who do not hunt still get meat and hunters don’t necessarily get more. Also, meat is not property of hunter. Authors argue, therefore, hunting is not a provisioning action, but instead is costly signaling (mating investment) and points to male-male competition as a primary driver in the evolution of human group dynamics.
Hawkes 1993 (with comments from various)
Why Hunter-Gatherers Work: An Ancient Version of the Problem of Public Goods
Original assumption: H-Gs work hard to meet family needs. Author makes case against.
Hunters would get more for family if hunted small game, but instead they hunt large game. Products of hunting large game is public good. Hunter gets benefits through deference in travel plans and public disputes and enhanced mating opps.
Can be seen as Prisoner’s Dilemma: If just considering consumption payoffs, then B/n < b, so hunters should go for private goods. Instead, they go for public goods, so perhaps they seek social payoff, where the ESS is always to target the collective good to gain social benefit (n-1)S/n.
Implications: There are tradeoffs between consumption and social benefits. Hunting as MI rather than PI. Variance reduction doesn’t explain patterns of sharing seen. Other explanations must be sought to explain sharing and hunting (such as male-male comp).
