BarQs Flashcards
Q: Several employees of Novo Jeans filed a case of illegal dismissal against Novo Jeans. However, Novo Jeans argued that they were able to present the First Notice of Termination of
Employment sent to employees, asking them to explain their sudden absence from work without proper authorization. In contrast, the employees alleged that there were only sample
letters of the Notices, and there was no evidence to prove that the Notices were sent to them at
their last known addresses. They insist that if doubt exists between the evidence presented by
the Er and the evidence presented by the employees, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the employees, consistent with the Labor Code’s policy to afford protection to labor. Are the employees correct?
YES. Under the law, where both parties in a labor case have not presented substantial evidence to
prove their allegations, evidence will be considered in equipoise. In such a case, the scales of justice are tilted in favor of labor. (Charlie Hubilla et al. v. HSY
Marketing Ltd., Co., et al. G.R. No. 207354, 10 Jan.
2008)
What is the quantum of evidence required in labor cases? (2012 BAR)
In labor cases, as in other administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of proof
necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (Valencia
v. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No.
206390, 30 Jan. 2017)
Are the constitutional provisions on labor self-executing?
The constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-
executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any
enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and
the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. (Agabon v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 158693, 17 Nov. 2004)
A crew agreement was entered into by Nerry Balatongan and Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply for the employment of the former as a seaman on board the vessel “Santa Cruz” which was approved by the National Seaman’s Board (NSB). While on board vessel, the parties entered into a supplementary contract of employment providing for accident and death benefits. Balatongan met an accident in Egypt, and subsequently at the Makati Medical Center. The medical certificate was issued describing his disability as “permanent in nature.” He demanded payment for his claim
for total disability, as provided for in the contract of employment, but his claim was denied. Can the second contract of employment
be enforced against Philimare despite the absence of NSB verification or approval?
YES. The supplementary contract of employment was entered into between petitioner and private
respondent to modify the original contract of employment. The reason why the law requires that
the POEA should approve and verify a contract under Art. 34(i) of the Labor Code is to ensure that
the employee shall not be placed in a disadvantageous position and that the same are within the minimum standards of the terms and conditions of such employment contract set by the
POEA.
However, there is no prohibition against stipulating in a contract more benefits to the employee than those required by law. Thus, in this case wherein a “supplementary contract” was entered into affording greater benefits to the employee than the
previous one, and although the same was not submitted for the approval of the POEA, the same
should still be considered to be valid and enforceable. (Seagull Maritime Corp. v. Balatongan,
G.R. No. 82252, Feb. 28, 1989)
Bugo, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent representation, convinced Dado to give the amount of P120,000.00 for processing the latter’s papers so that he can be deployed to
Japan. Dado later on found out that Bugo had misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
money for her own personal use and benefit.
Can Dado file the cases of illegal recruitment and estafa simultaneously?
YES. Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be filed simultaneously or separately. The filing of charges for illegal recruitment does not bar the filing of estafa, and vice versa. Bugo’s acquittal in the illegal recruitment case does not prove that she is not guilty of estafa.
Illegal recruitment and estafa are entirely different offenses and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In the same manner, a
person acquitted of illegal recruitment may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set inbecause illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is necessary. (Sy v. People, G.R. No. 183879, 14 Apr. 2010)
Toston was charged with illegal recruitment and estafa. Records reveal that Mary Ann dealt
with Toston in the latter’s capacity as an employee of Steadfast. The records reveal that Mary Ann was found to be medically unfit for
overseas deployment, contrary to the representations made to Mary Ann by Gutierrez.
However, the prosecution did not present proof that Toston knew about the result of Mary Ann’s
medical examination or that he was privy to Gutierrez’ concealment of this fact from Mary Ann. Will the charges prosper?
NO, with respect to both charges. As to the charge of illegal recruitment, Toston did not
personally represent himself as a licensee or holder of authority but only as an employee.
As to estafa, the element of fraud by abuse of confidence or deceit with respect to Toston is negated by the fact that, at the time of the act complained of, Toston was an employee of a validly licensed recruitment agency. (Toston y Hular v. People, G.R. No. 23204, 3 Mar. 2021)
Santosa Datuman was deployed to Bahrain after paying the required placement fee.
However, her employer took her passport and instead of working as a saleslady, she was forced
to work as a domestic helper contrary to the agreed salary approved by POEA. She worked
without compensation for two years because of
her employers’ continued failure and refusal to pay her salary despite demand. When she finally
returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against the local agency that recruited her. Should the suit prosper?
YES. Under Sec. 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations, the local agency shall
assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may
arise in connection with the implementation of the contract, including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and
repatriation. Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment, to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. This is in line with the
policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. (Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower, G.R. No. 156029, 14 Nov. 2008)
Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), deployed to Taiwan Montehermozo as a domestic helper under a 12-month contracteffective Feb. 1, 1997. The deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang, President of Jet Crown International Co., Ltd. After her 12-month contract expired on Feb. 1, 1998, Montehermozo continued working for her Taiwanese employer for two more years, after which she returned to the Philippines on Feb. 4, 2000.
Shortly after her return she filed a complaint before the NLRC against Sunace, one Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for three months and that she was underpaid. Should Sunace be held liable for the underpayment for the additional two years that she worked for her Taiwanese employer under the theory of imputed knowledge?
NO. The Theory of Imputed Knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal Taiwanese Er, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign Er cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace. There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and
consented to be bound under the two-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to
be privy thereto. As such, it and its owner cannot be held solidarily liable for and of Montehermozo’s
claims arising from the two-year employment extension. (Sunace v. NLRC, G.R. No. 161757, 25 Jan.
2006)
WTTA is a well-known travel agency and an authorized sales agent of PAL. Since majority of
its passengers are overseas workers, WTTA applied for a license for recruitment and
placement activities.
It stated in its application that its purpose is not for profit but to help Filipinos find employment
abroad. Should the application be approved?
(2006 BAR)
NO. The application should be disapproved, because it is prohibited by Art. 26 of the LC, which provides that travel agencies and sales agencies of airline companies are prohibited from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of
workers for overseas employment, whether for profit or not.
Rule I, Part II POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of
Land-Based Workers also disqualifies any entity
having a common director or owner of travel agencies and sales agencies of airlines, including
any business entity, from the recruitment and placement of Filipino workers overseas, whether
they derive profit or not.
Concerned Filipino contract workers in the Middle East reported to the DFA that XYZ, a private recruitment and placement agency, is covertly transporting extremists to terrorist training camps abroad. Upon being alerted by the DFA, the DOLE issued orders cancelling the licenses of XYZ, and imposing an immediate travel ban on its recruits for the Middle East. XYZ appealed to the Office of the President to reverse and set aside the DOLE orders, citing damages from loss of employment of its recruits, and violations of due process including lack of notice and hearing by the DOLE.The DOLE in its answer claimed the existence of an emergency in the Middle East which required prompt measures to protect the life and limb of OFWs from a clear and present danger posed by the ongoing war against terrorism. Should the DOLE orders be upheld or set aside? (2004 BAR)
The DOLE order cancelling the licenses of XYZ shall be set aside. A report that an agency is
covertly transporting extremists is not a valid ground for cancellation of a Certificate of Registration (Art. 247, LC). There is also failure of
due process as no hearing was conducted prior to the cancellation. (Art. 245, LC) The DOLE order imposing the travel ban should be upheld because it is a valid exercise of police
power to protect the national interest (Sec. 3, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution) and on the rule making= authority of the SOLE. (Art. 5, LC; Phil. Ass’n. of
Service Exporters v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, 30 June
1988)
Serrano, a seafarer, was hired by Gallant Maritime and Marlow Navigation Co. for 12 months as Chief Officer. On the date of his
departure, he was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer, upon the assurance that he would be made Chief Officer after a
month. It was not done; hence, he refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the
Phils. He had served only 2 months & 7 days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of 9
months & 23 days.
Serrano filed with the LA a Complaint against Gallant Maritime and Marlow for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims.
The LA rendered a favorable decision to Serrano awarding him $8,770.00, representing his salary for 3 months of the unexpired portion of his contract of employment applying RA 8042,
Sec 10, par. 5:
Money Claims. - In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid
or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement
fee with interest of 12% per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for 3 months or every year of the unexpired term,whichever is less.
Is the subject clause constitutional?
NO. The subject clause contains a “suspect classification” in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term Ees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a three-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed- term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. The clause is a violation of the right of Serrano to equal protection and right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose.
Thus, Serrano is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of hisemployment contract, pursuant to law andjurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
8042. (Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services &Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., G.R. No. 167614, 24 Mar.
2009)
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. on 26 June 1997 for 1 year. She alleged
that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of P70,000.00. On 14 July
1997, Mr. Huwang of Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and was given a salary from 26 June to 14 July 1997 only.
Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. She asked for the return of her
placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23
months as well as moral and exemplary damages.
The NLRC ruled that Joy was illegally dismissed and awarded her three months’ worth of salary,
the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees. Should Joy be awarded three months’ worth of salary and reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation?
NO. Joy is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 8042. Since she started working on 26 June 1997 and was terminated from employment on 14 July 1997, Joy is entitled to her salary from 15
July 1997 to 25 June 1998.Furthermore, there is an implied stipulation in contracts between the placement agency and the overseas worker that in case the overseas worker is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his or her
placement fees, the amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per annum. This implied stipulation
has the effect of removing awards for reimbursement of placement fees from Circular No.
799’s coverage.
However, if judgment did not become final and executory before 01 July 2013 and there was no
stipulation in the contract providing for a different interest rate, other money claims under Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 8042 shall be subject to the six percent
(6%) interest per annum in accordance with Circular No. 799. (Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, 05 Aug. 2014)
The DOLE issued an alien employment permit for Earl Cone, a U.S. citizen, as sports consultant
and assistant coach for GMC. Later, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation approved Cone’s application for a change of admission status
from temporary visitor to pre-arranged employee. A month later, GMC requested that it
be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach.
The DOLE Regional Director granted the request.
The Basketball Association of the Phils. appealed the issuance of said permit to the SOLE who cancelled Cone’s employment permit because GMC failed to show that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent and willing to do the services nor that the hiring of Cone would redound to the national interest. Is the act of the SOLE valid?
YES. GMC’s claim that hiring a foreign coach is an Er’s prerogative has no legal basis. Under Art. 40 of the LC, an Er seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the DOLE.
GMC’s right to choose who to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit. (GMC v. Torres, G.R. No. 93666, 22 Apr. 1991)
