Bar Q&A Special Civil Actions (Rules 62-71) (Bar Law Review for Dummies) Flashcards
(2018) #Rule 62 #Interpleader
VII
Dory Enterprises Inc. (Dory) leased to Digna Corporation (Digna) a parcel of land located in Diliman, Quezon City. During the term of the lease, Digna was informed by DBS Banking Corporation (DBS) that it had acquired the leased property from the former owner Dory, and required Digna to pay the rentals directly to it. Digna promptly informed Dory of DBS’ claim of ownership. In response, Dory insisted on its right to collect rent on the leased property.
Due to conflicting claims of Dory and DBS over the rental payments, Digna filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC of Manila. Digna prayed that it be allowed to consign in court the succeeding monthly rentals, and that Dory and DBS be required to litigate their conflicting claims. It later appeared that an action for nullification of a dacion in pago was filed by Dory against DBS in the RTC of Quezon City. In the said case, Dory raised the issue as to which of the two (2) corporations had a better right to the rental payments. Dory argued that, to avoid conflicting decisions, the interpleader case must be dismissed.
Does the action for nullification of the dacion in pago bar the filing of the interpleader case?
Yes. The interpleader case should be dismissed in view of the action for nullification of the dacion en pago.
Under Rule 2, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for dismissal of the others.
In the situation above, the interpleader case filed by Digna seeks to resolve who between Dory and DBS has the right to receive the rental payments. Similarly, Dory’s action for nullification of dacion en pago will determine who between Dory and DBS has the right to collect rental payment from Digna. Considering that the two cases involve the same cause of action, the interpleader case should be dismissed.
(2018) #Rule 62 #Interpleader
VII
Dory Enterprises Inc. (Dory) leased to Digna Corporation (Digna) a parcel of land located in Diliman, Quezon City. During the term of the lease, Digna was informed by DBS Banking Corporation (DBS) that it had acquired the leased property from the former owner Dory, and required Digna to pay the rentals directly to it. Digna promptly informed Dory of DBS’ claim of ownership. In response, Dory insisted on its right to collect rent on the leased property.
Due to conflicting claims of Dory and DBS over the rental payments, Digna filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC of Manila. Digna prayed that it be allowed to consign in court the succeeding monthly rentals, and that Dory and DBS be required to litigate their conflicting claims. It later appeared that an action for nullification of a dacion in pago was filed by Dory against DBS in the RTC of Quezon City. In the said case, Dory raised the issue as to which of the two (2) corporations had a better right to the rental payments. Dory argued that, to avoid conflicting decisions, the interpleader case must be dismissed.
Does the action for nullification of the dacion in pago bar the filing of the interpleader case?
Yes, the interpleader case must be dismissed.
Interpleader, in this case, should have been raised as a compulsory counterclaim. Failure to raise the same amounts to a waiver of the counterclaim.
(Wack Wack Gold & Country Club, Inc.
vs.
Wou and Tan,
G.R. No. L-23851,
March 26, 1976)
(2012) #Rule 65 #Certiorari
I(A)
After an information for rape was filed in the RTC, the DOJ Secretary, acting on the accused’s petition for review, reversed the investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. Upon the order of the DOJ Secretary, the trial prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information which the judge granted. The order of the judge stated only the following:
“Based on the review by the DOJ Secretary of the findings of the investigating prosecutor during the preliminary investigation, the Court agrees that there is no sufficient evidence against the accused to sustain the allegation in the information. The Motion to Withdraw Information is, therefore, granted.”
If you were the private prosecutor, what should you do? Explain.
If I were the private prosecutor, I would file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals.
(Cerezo
vs.
People,
G.R. No. 185230,
June 1, 2011)
It is well-settled that when the trial court is confronted with a Motion to Withdraw Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion. It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. Otherwise, the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion if he grants the Motion to Withdraw Information by the trial prosecutor.
(Harold Tamargo
vs.
Romulo Awingan, et al.,
G.R. No. 177727,
January 19, 2010)
(2012) #Rule 65 #Certiorari #Contempt
I(A)
After an information for rape was filed in the RTC, the DOJ Secretary, acting on the accused’s petition for review, reversed the investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. Upon order of the DOJ Secretary, the trial prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information which the judge granted. The order of the judge stated only the following:
“Based on the review by the DOJ Secretary of the findings of the investigating prosecutor during the preliminary investigation, the Court agrees that there is no sufficient evidence against the accused to sustain the allegation in the information. The Motion to Withdraw Information is, therefore, granted.”
If you were the private prosecutor, what should you do? Explain.
If I were the private prosecutor, I would file a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the trial court. If the same has been denied, I would file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on pure question of law, which actually encompasses both the criminal and civil aspects thereof. The filing of petition is merely a continuation of the appellate process.
(2012) #Rule 65 #Certiorari #Contempt
IV(B)
Mr. Sheriff attempts to enforce a Writ of Execution against X, a tenant in a condominium unit, who lost in an ejectment case. X does not want to budge and refuses to leave. Y, the winning party, moves that X be declared in contempt and after hearing, the court held X guilty of indirect contempt.
If you were X’s lawyer, what would you do? Why?
If I were X’s lawyer, I would file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The judge should not have acted on Y’s motion to declare X in contempt. The charge of indirect contempt is initiated through a verified petition.
(Rule 71, Section 4, Rules of Court)
The Writ was not directed to X but to the sheriff who was directed to delivery the property to Y. As the Writ did not command the judgment debtor to do anything, he cannot be guilty of the facts described in Rule 71, which is “disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of any court.”
The proper procedure is for the sheriff to oust X availing of the assistance of peace officers pursuant to Section 10(c) of Rule 39.
(Lipa
vs.
Tutaan,
G.R. No. L-16643,
September 29, 1983)
(2006) #Rule 65 #Mandamus
XVII(2)
In 1996, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, providing for computerization of elections. Pursuant thereto, the COMELEC approved the Voter’s Registration and Identification System (VRIS) Project. It issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the project. After the public bidding, Fotokina was declared the winning bidder with a bid of Php 6 billion and was issued a Notice of Award. But COMELEC Chairman Gener Go objected to the award on the ground that under the Appropriations Act, the budget for the COMELEC’s modernization is only Php 1 billion. He announced to the public that the VRIS Project has been set aside. Two Commissioners sided with Chairman Go, but the majority voted to uphold the contract.
Meanwhile, Fotokina filed with the RTC a petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to implement the contract. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing Chairman Go, opposed the petition on the ground that mandamus does not lie to enforce contractual obligations. During the proceedings, the majority of the Commissioners filed a manifestation that Chairman Go was not authorized by the COMELEC En Banc to oppose the petition.
Is a petition for mandamus an appropriate remedy to enforce contractual obligations?
No.
The petition for mandamus is not an appropriate remedy because it is not available to enforce a contractual obligation.
Mandamus is directed only to ministerial acts, directing, or commanding a person to do a legal duty.
(COMELEC
vs.
Quijano-Padilla,
G.R. No. 151992,
September 18, 2002;
Section 3, Rule 65)
(2002) #Rule 65 #Certiorari #Default
IV(A)
The defendant was declared in default in the RTC for his failure to file an answer to a complaint for a sum of money. On the basis of the plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence, judgment by default was rendered against the defendant. The default judgment was served on the defendant on October 1, 2001. On October 10, 2001, he filed a verified motion to file the order of default and to set aside the judgment. In his motion, the defendant alleged that, immediately upon receipt of the summon, he saw the plaintiff and confronted him with his receipt, evidencing his payment, and that the plaintiff assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion because it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. The defendant filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the denial order.
Is certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy? Why?
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the defendant is the proper remedy because appeal is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In appeal, the defendant in default can only question the decision in light of the evidence of the plaintiff. The defendant cannot invoke the receipt to prove payment of his obligation to the plaintiff.
(2002) #Rule 65 #Certiorari #Default
IV(A)
The defendant was declared in default in the RTC for his failure to file an answer to a complaint for a sum of money. On the basis of the plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence, judgment by default was rendered against the defendant. The default judgment was served on the defendant on October 1, 2001. On October 10, 2001, he filed a verified motion to file the order of default and to set aside the judgment. In his motion, the defendant alleged that, immediately upon receipt of the summon, he saw the plaintiff and confronted him with his receipt, evidencing his payment, and that the plaintiff assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion because it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. The defendant filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the denial order.
Is certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy? Why?
Under ordinary circumstances, the proper remedy of a party wrongly declared in default is either to appeal from the judgment by default or file a petition for relief from judgment.
(Jao & Company, Inc.
vs.
Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 93233,
December 19, 1995)
(2002) #Rule 65 #Certiorari #Default
IV(B)
The defendant was declared in default in the RTC for his failure to file an answer to a complaint for a sum of money. On the basis of the plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence, judgment by default was rendered against the defendant. The default judgment was served on the defendant on October 1, 2001. On October 10, 2001, he filed a verified motion to file the order of default and to set aside the judgment. In his motion, the defendant alleged that, immediately upon receipt of the summon, he saw the plaintiff and confronted him with his receipt, evidencing his payment, and that the plaintiff assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion because it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. The defendant filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the denial order.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying the defendant’s motion to lift the order of default judgment? Why?
Yes, the trial court gravely abused its discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in denying the defendant’s motion because it was not accompanied by a separate affidavit of merit.
In his verified motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the judgment, the defendant alleged that immediately upon the receipt of the summons, he saw the plaintiff and confronted him with his receipt, showing payment, and that the plaintiff assured him that he would instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. Since the good defense of the defendant was already incorporated in the verified motion, there was no need for a separate affidavit of merit.
(Capuz
vs.
Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 112795,
June 27, 1994)
(2000) #Rule 65 #Certiorari #Foreclosure
XV
AB mortgaged his property to CD. AB failed to pay his obligation, and CD filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. After trial, the court issued an Order granting CD’s prayer for foreclosure of mortgage and ordering AB to pay CD the full amount of the mortgage debt, including interest and other charges, not later than 120 days from date of receipt of the Order. AB received the Order on August 10, 1999. No other proceeding took place thereafter. On December 20, 1999, AB tendered the full amount adjudged by the court to CD, but the latter refused to accept it on the ground that the amount was tendered beyond the 120-day period granted by the court. AB filed a motion in the same court praying that CD be directed to receive the amount tendered by him on the ground that the Order does not comply with the provisions of Section 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which gives AB 120 days from entry of judgment, and not from date of receipt of the Order. The court denied his motion on the ground that the Order had become final and can no longer be amended to conform with Section 2, Rule 68. Aggrieved, AB files a petition for certiorari against the court and CD.
Will the petition for certiorari prosper? Explain.
Yes, AB’s petition will prosper.
The court erred in issuing an Order granting CD’s prayer for foreclosure of mortgage and ordering AB to pay CD the full amount of the mortgage debt, including interest and other charges not later than 120 days from receipt of the Order. The court should have rendered a judgment which is appealable.
Since no appeal was taken, the judgment became final on August 25, 1999, which is the date of entry of judgment.
(Section 2, Rule 36)
Hence, AB had up to December 24, 1999, within which to pay the amount due.
(Section 2, Rule 68)
The court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying AB’s motion praying that CD be directed to receive the amount tendered.
(2012) #Rule 65 #Mandamus #RecoveryofTitleandPossession
X(B)
A files for a Complaint against B for recovery of title and possession of land situated in Makati, with the RTC of Pasig. B files for a Motion to Dismiss for improper venue. The RTC Pasig Judge denies B’s Motion to Dismiss, which obviously was incorrect. Alleging that the RTC Judge “unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office”, B files a Petition for Mandamus against the judge.
Will Mandamus lie? Provide your reasons.
No, mandamus will not lie.
The proper remedy is a petition for prohibition.
(Serena
vs.
Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 162059,
January 22, 2008)
The dismissal of the case based on improper venue is not a ministerial duty. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.
(Nilo Paloma,
vs.
Danilo Mora,
G.R. No. 157783,
September 23, 2005)
(2012) #Rule 66 #QuoWarranto #Citizenship
XI(A)
In 2007, Court of Appeals Justice (CA Justice) Dread Dong (J. Dong) was appointed to the Supreme Court (Court) as Associate Justice. Immediately after the appointment was announced, several groups questioned his qualification to the position on the ground that he was not a natural-born Filipino citizen. In the same year, the Court issued an Order enjoining him from accepting the appointment or assuming the position and discharging the functions of his office until he is able to successfully complete all the necessary steps to show that he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. However, he continued to exercise his functions as CA Justice.
Since the qualification of a natural-born citizen applies as well to CA Justices, Atty. Dacio, a practicing lawyer, asked the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through a verified request, to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against J. Dong in the latter’s capacity as incumbent CA Justice. The OSG refused to initiate the action on the ground that the issue of J. Dong’s citizenship was still being litigated in another case.
When the OSG refused to initiate a quo warranto proceeding, Atty. Dacio filed a petition for certiorari against the OSG and certiorari and prohibition against J. Dong. The petition for certiorari against the OSG alleged that the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred the filing of a quo warranto proceeding against J. Dong, while the petition for certiorari and prohibition against J. Dong asked the Court to order him to cease and desist from further exercising his powers, duties, and responsibilities as CA Justice. In both instances, Atty. Dacio relied on the fact that, at the time of J. Dong’s appointment as CA Justice, his birth certificate indicated that he was a Chinese citizen and his bar records showed that he was a naturalized Filipino citizen.
May the OSG be compelled, in an action for certiorari, to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against J. Dong?
No.
The OSG has the discretion in determining the presence of the requisites for a quo warranto proceeding. Besides, there is already a pending case for the purpose of determining citizenship.
For a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the private person suing must show that a clear right to the contested office.
(Ferdinant Topacio
vs.
Associate Justice Gregory Ong and the Office of the Solicitor General,
G.R. No. 179895,
December 18, 2008)
(2012) #Rule 66 #QuoWarranto #Citizenship
XI(B)
In 2007, Court of Appeals Justice (CA Justice) Dread Dong (J. Dong) was appointed to the Supreme Court (Court) as Associate Justice. Immediately after the appointment was announced, several groups questioned his qualification to the position on the ground that he was not a natural-born Filipino citizen. In the same year, the Court issued an Order enjoining him from accepting the appointment or assuming the position and discharging the functions of his office until he is able to successfully complete all the necessary steps to show that he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. However, he continued to exercise his functions as CA Justice.
Since the qualification of a natural-born citizen applies as well to CA Justices, Atty. Dacio, a practicing lawyer, asked the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through a verified request, to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against J. Dong in the latter’s capacity as incumbent CA Justice. The OSG refused to initiate the action on the ground that the issue of J. Dong’s citizenship was still being litigated in another case.
When the OSG refused to initiate a quo warranto proceeding, Atty. Dacio filed a petition for certiorari against the OSG and certiorari and prohibition against J. Dong. The petition for certiorari against the OSG alleged that the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred the filing of a quo warranto proceeding against J. Dong, while the petition for certiorari and prohibition against J. Dong asked the Court to order him to cease and desist from further exercising his powers, duties, and responsibilities as CA Justice. In both instances, Atty. Dacio relied on the fact that, at the time of J. Dong’s appointment as CA Justice, his birth certificate indicated that he was a Chinese citizen and his bar records showed that he was a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Does Atty. Dacio have the legal personality to initiate the action for certiorari and prohibition against J. Dong?
No. He is not clothed with legal interest.
Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court state that only an aggrieved party may file petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the appropriate court. An “aggrieved party” is one who was a party to the original proceedings that give rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.
(Siguion-Reyna, Montecillo, and Ongsiako Law Offices
vs.
Chionlo-Sia,
G.R. No. 181186,
February 3, 2016)
In this case, since there is no original proceeding before J. Dong where Atty. Dacio is a party, Atty. Dacio cannot be considered an “aggrieved party” for purposes of Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Dacio, therefore, has no legal personality to file the same.
