Authority outside the EU Flashcards
F. De Witte (2015): Why should Cameron be concerned about changes to the Eurozone with regard to the interests of non-Euro members?
As the EU tries to ‘solve’ the Euro-crisis there has been a significant deepening of integration in the Eurozone.
The Eurozone countries have a built-in qualified majority in the Council. So if all the Eurozone states agree to a measure, the UK can’t do anything about it.
The Eurozone countries can then effectively change the rules, structures and institutions of the EU single market which will also affect non-Eurozone states, but this may not always be in their best interest.
F. De Witte (2015): Are Cameron’s demands to make the EU more competitive already being met?
Vice President of the Commission: making sure that the EU ‘does more on the big things, and less on the small things.’
The files for the single digital market and the Capital Markets Union are making their way through the legislative process.
The EU is negotiating a new trade and investment agreement with the US.
F. De Witte (2015): Will a protocol proclaiming the UK’s opt-out of the obligation to work towards an ‘ever closer Union’ have any legal implications?
No, the term is nothing but a symbolic one.
F. De Witte (2015): How much of a role do national parliament’s play in EU law-making already and what does Cameron want?
NP’s have the capacity to issue a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange’’ card when they feel a Commission proposal violates the principle of subsidiarity.
Cameron’s letter suggests he wants a ‘red card’ whereby they can block policy proposals.
Research suggests that national parliaments assess the normative and substantive merit of proposals rather than their compliance with subsidiarity already. ‘Yellow’ and ‘orange’ cards are effectively, in practice, red cards.
F. De Witte (2015): What is one possible proposal that could increase the role of national parliaments in EU law-making?
If more than half of the total number of national MPs across the 28 Member States vote against a Commission proposal, it should be abandoned. This would strengthen national oppositions and the politicisation of EU policies.
How could you describe the approach adopted by Norway in becoming a member of the EEA rather than the EU?
The UK would have to agree to continue to pay its share of the cost of running the EU and comply with all EU laws and regulations, without the ability to provide any input on their content: in effect ‘taxation without representation’.
Why should one think twice before celebrating Brexit on regulatory grounds?
(1) Europe is likely to make any EU/UK trade deal conditional upon compliance with the EU regulatory framework.
(2) Given that the UK played a significant role in shaping many standards and regulations, companies may find the UK government unwilling to change them.
McFadden and Tarrant (2015): What is an alternative way of thinking about sovereignty in the Brexit debate?
Every alternative to being in moves us from being a ‘rule maker’ to becoming a ‘rule taker’ and more dependent than at present on decisions over which we have no say.
McFadden and Tarrant (2015): What is the contextual nature of the EEA?
It was seen, politically, as a transitionary agreement between EFTA member states and the EU, as they were expected in time to become members of the EU.
McFadden and Tarrant (2015): What does the EEA agreement oblige the EU and Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway to do?
To uphold the EU’s four fundamental freedoms including the free movement of people.
McFadden and Tarrant (2015): What does the EEA commit Norway to do?
To adopt already existing EU rules (i.e. Norway associates to the acquis communautaire). The content of the EEA Agreement is EU law.
McFadden and Tarrant (2015): Does EEA law take priority over Norwegian law?
Yes. It is enforced through domestic institutions but also through the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA court which mimic the Commission and the ECJ.
McFadden and Tarrant (2015): What is the relevance of the EFTA court?
It’s autonomous and so could diverge from the ECJ in its interpretations of EU law. But, under the EEA agreement rules, the EFTA court shall follow the relevant ECJ case law on provisions of EU law that are identical in substance to provisions of EEA law before May 1992, and take account of the ECJ’s principles after the date. But the distinction has not been relevant in practice.
McFadden and Tarrant (2015):
What is the eurosceptic argument for a Norway approach?
Sceptics argue there are institutions in the EEA which allow Norway to have a ‘say’: the ministerial-level EEA Council, the EEA Joint-Committee of Senior officials, and subcommittees and working groups of officials and experts.
McFadden and Tarrant (2015): What did Norway’s own independent Norwegian committee, the INC, note about its approach?
‘The modest opportunities to influence decision processes that Norway can have through an active European policy, can neither formally nor actually compensate for it substantial transfer of powers.’
