Authorities Flashcards

1
Q

Trespass to the Person > Steps

A

Step 1: State, ‘The claimant may sue the defendant in tort of trespass to the person for [insert conduct from facts]
Step 2: Define relevant tort, assault or battery
Step 3: Consider what defences are available to the defendant

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2
Q

Trespass to the Person > Step 1 > State?

A

‘The claimant may sue the defendant in tort of trespass to the person for [insert conduct from facts]

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3
Q

Trespass to the Person > Step 1 > Assault and Battery

A

Both assault and battery are actionable per se, so there is no need to prove the physical harm

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4
Q

Assault > Define

A

An intentional act by the defendant causing the claimant to reasonably apprehend the immediate infliction of unlawful force

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5
Q

Assault > Intentional Act > Letang v Cooper

A

Intentional conduct is essential, if not, relevant tort is negligence

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6
Q

Assault > Intentional Act > Intentional conduct is essential, if not, relevant tort is negligence

A

Letang v Cooper

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7
Q

Assault > Intentional Act > R v Ireland

A

Words, as well as actions, may constitute an assault. ‘A thing said is a thing done.’

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8
Q

Assault > Intentional Act > Words, as well as actions, may constitute an assault. ‘A thing said is a thing done.’

A

R v Ireland

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9
Q

Assault > Intentional Act > Tuberville v Savage

A

However, words may also negate an assault, e.g. ‘if we weren’t being watched…’

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10
Q

Assault > Intentional Act > However, words may also negate an assault, e.g. ‘if we weren’t being watched…’

A

Tuberville v Savage

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11
Q

Assault > Immediate > R v Ireland

A

Means within a minute or so

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12
Q

Assault > Immediate > Means within a minute or so

A

R v Ireland

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13
Q

Battery > Define

A

The intentional direct application of unlawful force to another person

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14
Q

Battery > Define > Wilson v Pringle

A

‘Intentional’: the defendant must intend his actions only, not the consequences.

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15
Q

Battery > Define > ‘Intentional’: the defendant must intend his actions only, not the consequences.

A

Wilson v Pringle

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16
Q

Battery > Define > Direct application of force

A

Force must flow almost immediately and without intervention. Physical contact is not necessary

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17
Q

Battery > Define > F v West Berkshire Health Authority

A

‘Unlawful force’: physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of everyday life will not be unlawful

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18
Q

Battery > Define >

A

F v West Berkshire Health Authority

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19
Q

Trespass to the Person > Defences > List of defences

A

Consent
Defence of the person
Defence of property
Necessity

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20
Q

Trespass to the Person > Defences > Co-operative Group Ltd v Pritchard

A

Defendant cannot allege contributory negligence as a defence to claims for assault and battery

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21
Q

Trespass to the Person > Defences > Defendant cannot allege contributory negligence as a defence to claims for assault and battery

A

Co-operative Group Ltd v Pritchard

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22
Q

Trespass to the Person > Defences > Consent

A

May be implied or express consent

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23
Q

Trespass to the Person > Defences > Consent > Chatterson v Gerson

A

Medical cases – a patient is deemed to have consented to a medical treatment once informed in broad terms of the nature of procedure intended

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24
Q

Trespass to the Person > Defences > Consent > Medical cases – a patient is deemed to have consented to a medical treatment once informed in broad terms of the nature of procedure intended

A

Chatterson v Gerson

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25
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Consent > Chester v Afshar
Medical cases – a doctor’s failure to disclose risks will NOT invalidate the patient’s consent
26
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Consent > Medical cases – a doctor’s failure to disclose risks will NOT invalidate the patient’s consent
Chester v Afshar
27
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Consent > Condon v Basi
A sports competitor consents not only to all conduct within the rules of the sport, but also, the conduct outside the rules, but within the spirit of the sport
28
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Consent > A sports competitor consents not only to all conduct within the rules of the sport, but also, the conduct outside the rules, but within the spirit of the sport
Condon v Basi
29
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Defence of the Person > Cockroft v Smith
The defendant must establish that the force was: (a) used in self-defence (b) reasonable; and (c) proportionate to the force used/threatened by the claimant
30
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Defence of the Person > The defendant must establish that the force was: (a) used in self-defence (b) reasonable; and (c) proportionate to the force used/threatened by the claimant
Cockroft v Smith
31
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Defence of Property > 2 rules
(a) One may take reasonable steps to defend one’s property | b) This includes taking reasonable steps to eject a trespasser (which might mean first asking trespasser to leave
32
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Defence of Property > Green v Goddard
(b) This includes taking reasonable steps to eject a trespasser (which might mean first asking trespasser to leave)
33
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Defence of Property > | b) This includes taking reasonable steps to eject a trespasser (which might mean first asking trespasser to leave
Green v Goddard
34
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Necessity > What must the defendant show?
(a) the defendant must show that: 1. that a situation of necessity existed, and 2. that his actions were reasonable
35
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Necessity > F v West Berkshire Health Authority
Identified two situations where defence of necessity could justify treating an adult medically without consent: i. An emergency situation where patient is unconscious ii. a state of affairs (e.g. stroke) rendering patient incapable of giving consent.
36
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Necessity > Identified two situations where defence of necessity could justify treating an adult medically without consent: i. An emergency situation where patient is unconscious ii. a state of affairs (e.g. stroke) rendering patient incapable of giving consent.
F v West Berkshire Health Authority
37
Trespass to the Person > Defences > Necessity > 2 situations identified without consent
F v West Berkshire Health Authority Identified two situations where defence of necessity could justify treating an adult medically without consent: i. An emergency situation where patient is unconscious ii. a state of affairs (e.g. stroke) rendering patient incapable of giving consent.
38
Tort under the Rule in Wilkinson v Downtown > Rule
Only consider this rule if assault and battery are ruled out
39
Tort under the Rule in Wilkinson v Downtown
Established a separate tort, in cases where the defendant intends to cause shock to the claimant, who suffers tangible damage as a result.
40
What is the alternative tort to assault or battery?
Wilkinson v Downtown Established a separate tort, in cases where the defendant intends to cause shock to the claimant, who suffers tangible damage as a result.
41
Tort under the Rule in Wilkinson v Downtown > Rhodes v OPO
Reformulated Wilkinson v Downtown to comprise the following elements: • Conduct requiring words or conduct directed at the claimant for which there was no justification or excuse • An intention to cause at least severe mental or emotional distress and • Cause physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness
42
Tort under the Rule in Wilkinson v Downtown > Causation
Not actionable per se, must cause damage
43
Defamation (Essay Only) > Steps
Intro 1. State claimant may sue defendant for damages in the tort of defamation for [insert conduct from the facts] 2. Consider whether the elements of defamation are present 3. Consider what defences are available
44
Defamation > Libel
Defamation in permanent form (actionable per se);
45
Defamation > Slander
Defamation in transient or temporary form (requires loss)
46
Defamation > Defamation Act 2013
Consider the changes this bought into force, particularly ss.1 and 8
47
Defamation > Defamation Act 2013 > s.1
Serious harm 1. A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. 2. For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that trades for profit is not “serious harm” unless it has caused or is likely to cause the body serious financial loss.
48
Defamation > Defamation Act 2013 > s.8
Single publication rule 1. This section applies if a person— a. publishes a statement to the public (“the first publication”), and b. subsequently publishes (whether or not to the public) that statement or a statement which is substantially the same. 2. In subsection (1) “publication to the public” includes publication to a section of the public.
49
Defamation > Defamation Act 2013 > pursuant to s.1...
Pursuant to s.1, a statement will be defamatory if its publication has or is likely to cause serious harm to the claimant’s reputation (this rules out trivial claims)
50
Defamation > Defamation Act 2013 > Difference between Libel and Slander
Defamation in the form of libel is actionable per se – the claimant does not need to show tangible loss.
51
Defamation > 2. Elements of defamation
1. Defendants words are defamatory 2. The words are to REFER TO the claimant 3. The words have been published
52
1. Defendants words are defamatory. Words will be defamatory if: > Sim v Stretch
They lower the claimant in the eyes of right-thinking members of society;
53
1. Defendants words are defamatory. Words will be defamatory if: > They lower the claimant in the eyes of right-thinking members of society;
Sim v Stretch
54
1. Defendants words are defamatory. Words will be defamatory if: > Youssoupoff v MGM
They cause the claimant to be shunned/avoided;
55
1. Defendants words are defamatory. Words will be defamatory if: > They cause the claimant to be shunned/avoided;
Youssoupoff v MGM
56
1. Defendants words are defamatory. Words will be defamatory if: > Parmiter v Coupland
The expose the claimant to hatred/contempt/ridicule
57
1. Defendants words are defamatory. Words will be defamatory if: > The expose the claimant to hatred/contempt/ridicule
Parmiter v Coupland
58
Defamation > 2. The words are to REFER TO the claimant. Where the claimant is not named, the relevant test is: > J’Anson v Stewart
Whether the description is so detailed, and the resemblance so strong, that a reasonable person who knew the claimant would assume the article is about him (intention not required)
59
Defamation > 2. The words are to REFER TO the claimant. Where the claimant is not named, the relevant test is: Whether the description is so detailed, and the resemblance so strong, that a reasonable person who knew the claimant would assume the article is about him (intention not required) > Authority?
J’Anson v Stewart
60
Defamation > 3. The words have been published
i.e. communication to a third party
61
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > List
Truth Fair Comment Qualified Privilege
62
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Truth > s.2 Defamation Act 2013
The defendant has a complete defence if his statement is factual, and the facts are substantially true
63
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Truth > The defendant has a complete defence if his statement is factual, and the facts are substantially true
s.2 Defamation Act 2013
64
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Fair Comment > 2 factors
(a) an EXPRESSION of OPINION (rather than fact), as set out in s.3 (b) On a matter of PUBLIC INTEREST
65
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Fair Comment > (a) an EXPRESSION of OPINION (rather than fact), as set out in s.3
Defamation Act 2013. In particular, the statement will have to fulfil the following conditions: 1. The statement was a statement of opinion 2. The statement set out the basis of the opinion expressed therein; and 3. An honest person could have held the opinion on the basis of: i. Any fact which existed at the time the statement complained of was published ii. Anything asserted to be a fact in a privileged statement published before the statement complained of
66
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Fair Comment > Note
This defence will be defeated if the claimant is able to show that the defendant did not hold the opinion.
67
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Fair Comment > s.3(6) Defamation Act 2013
Pursuant to s.3(6) Entities reproducing someone else's statement (for instance a newspaper publishing a letter from a reader) would only be liable if the claimant is able to show that the publisher knew that the author of the statement did not hold the opinion expressed.
68
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Fair Comment > Entities reproducing someone else's statement would only be liable if the claimant is able to show that the publisher knew that the author of the statement did not hold the opinion expressed.
s.3(6) Defamation Act 2013
69
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Fair Comment > s.4 Defamation Act 2013
(b) On a matter of PUBLIC INTEREST – a defendant has a valid defence against an action for defamation for both statements of facts and statements of opinion if he can show that: 1. the statement complained of was on a matter of public interest; and 2. the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest
70
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Fair Comment > (b) On a matter of PUBLIC INTEREST – a defendant has a valid defence against an action for defamation for both statements of facts and statements of opinion
s.4 Defamation Act 2013
71
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Fair Comment > under s4 Defamation Act 2013 what must the defendant show to prove it is a matter of public interest?
1. the statement complained of was on a matter of public interest; and 2. the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest
72
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Fair Comment > Moreover, under s.4 Defamation Act 2013
Moreover, under Section 4, the court must: i. have regard to all circumstances of the case, and ii. make allowances for editorial judgement when determining whether or not the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest
73
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Qualified Privilege
Applies to statements of both fact and opinion There is a defence where the maker of a statement has a duty (legal, moral or social) to make the statement, and the recipient has an interest in receiving the information. This defence does not apply if the claimant can show that the defendant acted with malice and making the statement
74
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Qualified Privilege > What does it apply to?
Applies to statements of both fact and opinion
75
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Qualified Privilege > What is the defence?
There is a defence where the maker of a statement has a duty (legal, moral or social) to make the statement, and the recipient has an interest in receiving the information.
76
Defamation > Step 3. Defences > Qualified Privilege > When does it not apply?
This defence does not apply if the claimant can show that the defendant acted with malice and making the statement
77
Defamation > Missuse of Private Information > Following Campbell v MGM Ltd
The action for misuse of private information will succeed if the claimant can show the two conditions are satisfied: 1. The information divulged must be private. this can be established by analysing whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the information disclosed. 2. There must not be a legitimate public interest in disclosure of the information. for example, there would be legitimate public interest in the disclosure of the private information if publication would i. show that the claimant had previously lied on the matter disclosed ii. that the claimant had engaged in illegal or iniquitous behaviour iii. where it concerns political figures in their public role
78
Defamation > Misuse of Private Information > Following Campbell v MGM Ltd, contractual duty of confidence
If private information is divulged in breach of a confidential relationship (especially a contractual duty of confidence) then it is more likely that this tort has been committed.
79
Defamation > Misuse of Private Information Authority
Campbell v MGM Ltd
80
Negligence > Steps
1. state - The claimant can consider suing the defendant for [insert harm] in the tort of negligence 2. Consider whether the defendant owes the claimant a legal DUTY OF CARE 3. Consider whether there has been a breach of that duty of care – apply two stage test. 4. Causation – did the defendant’s breach of duty CAUSE the harm suffered by the claimant? 5. Defences – consider whether the defendant can raise any defences
81
Negligence > 1. State?
State - The claimant can consider suing the defendant for [insert harm] in the tort of negligence Claimant v Defendant [insert the relevant names]
82
Negligence > 1. State > Define Negligence
A breach by the defendant of a legal duty of care owed to the claimant that results in actionable damage to the claimant unintended by the defendant
83
Negligence > 1. State > 4 elements
For a negligence claim, run through the four elements: duty of care, breach, causation, defences
84
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations
(a) one road user to another (b) teacher to pupil (c) doctor to patient (d) manufacturer to the ultimate consumer of the product (e) defendant to RESCUER, where the defendant has created a dangerous situation so that it is reasonable that somebody will attempt to resuce (f) Driver to pedestrians and passengers (g) Referee to Sports Player (h) Parent/adult in loco parentis to child (i) Advocate to client (j) In limited circumstances, ambulance service to emergency callers
85
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > London Passenger Transport Board v Upson
(a) one road user to another
86
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > (a) one road user to another
London Passenger Transport Board v Upson
87
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > Baker v Hopkins
(e) defendant to RESCUER, where the defendant has created a dangerous situation so that it is reasonable that somebody will attempt to rescue
88
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > (e) defendant to RESCUER, where the defendant has created a dangerous situation so that it is reasonable that somebody will attempt to rescue
Baker v Hopkins
89
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > Nettleship v Weston
(f) Driver to pedestrians and passengers
90
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > (f) Driver to pedestrians and passengers
Nettleship v Weston
91
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > Vowles v Evans
(g) Referee to Sports Player
92
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > (g) Referee to Sports Player
Vowles v Evans
93
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > Arthur J S Hall and Co. v Simmons
(i) Advocate to client
94
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > (i) Advocate to client
Arthur J S Hall and Co. v Simmons
95
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > Kent v Griffiths
(j) In limited circumstances, ambulance service to emergency callers
96
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Established Duty Situations > (j) In limited circumstances, ambulance service to emergency callers
Kent v Griffiths
97
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > NO Established Duty Situations > Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence
Soldier to Colleague
98
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > NO Established Duty Situations > Soldier to Colleague
Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence
99
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > NO Established Duty Situations > Capital and Counties v Hampshire County Council
Fire Service to Emergency Caller
100
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > NO Established Duty Situations > Fire Service to Emergency Caller
Capital and Counties v Hampshire County Council
101
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > NO Established Duty Situations > Morris
You can discharge your duty of care if you ask your supervisor for advice.
102
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > NO Established Duty Situations > You can discharge your duty of care if you ask your supervisor for advice.
Morris
103
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire
General Rule: Public policy driven – The Police do NOT owe A duty of care to individuals, only to the public at large.
104
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > General Rule: Public policy driven – The Police do NOT owe A duty of care to individuals, only to the public at large.
Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire
105
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Brooks and Osman
confirmed Hill’s General Rule: The Police do NOT owe A duty of care to individuals, only to the public at large.
106
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > confirmed Hill’s General Rule: The Police do NOT owe A duty of care to individuals, only to the public at large.
Brooks and Osman
107
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police
However, in 2018 the Supreme Court held unanimously that was a misrepresentation of the law and there is no general rule that, in the prevention and investigation of the crime, the police are free from liability. the police owe a duty of care to avoid causing by a positive action foreseeable personal injury to another person
108
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > However, in 2018 the Supreme Court held unanimously that was a misrepresentation of the law and there is no general rule that, in the prevention and investigation of the crime, the police are free from liability. the police owe a duty of care to avoid causing by a positive action foreseeable personal injury to another person
Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police
109
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Main Exception > Kirkman
Where the police have assumed responsibility for someone, or someone who's been entrusted to their care the police owe a duty of care to that person
110
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Main Exception > Where the police have assumed responsibility for someone, or someone who's been entrusted to their care the police owe a duty of care to that person
Kirkman
111
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Other Exceptions > Rigby
to take action with reasonable care
112
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Other Exceptions > to take action with reasonable care
Rigby
113
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Other Exceptions > Swinney
to keep the identity of informants safe
114
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Other Exceptions > to keep the identity of informants safe
Swinney
115
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Other Exceptions > The Worboys Case
HOWEVER, throws into doubt the established duty for police a test cases needed to fully interpret the decision.
116
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Police > Other Exceptions > HOWEVER, throws into doubt the established duty for police a test cases needed to fully interpret the decision.
The Worboys Case
117
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > Steps
(a) Starting point (AKA the neighbour principle) (b) explain how the Donoghue v Stevenson ratio was redefined in Caparo and apply the three part test for whether a duty of care is owed.
118
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > Donoghue v Stevenson
(a) Starting point (AKA the neighbour principle) ‘You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.’
119
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > (a) Starting point (AKA the neighbour principle) ‘You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.’
Donoghue v Stevenson
120
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and others
i. Is it reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's actions will affect this particular claimant? (Bourhill v Young) ii. is there sufficient proximity of relationship between the claimant and defendant? iii. is it fair just and reasonable to impose a duty? E.g. it may not be fair if the defendant is a non-profit organization or acting in a quasi-public capacity (Marc Rich v Bishop Rock Marine Co)
121
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > i. Is it reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's actions will affect this particular claimant? (Bourhill v Young) ii. is there sufficient proximity of relationship between the claimant and defendant? iii. is it fair just and reasonable to impose a duty? E.g. it may not be fair if the defendant is a non-profit organization or acting in a quasi-public capacity (Marc Rich v Bishop Rock Marine Co)
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and others
122
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > Bourhill v Young
Caparo: | i. Is it reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's actions will affect this particular claimant? (Bourhill v Young)
123
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > Caparo: i. Is it reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's actions will affect this particular claimant?
Bourhill v Young
124
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > Caparo: iii. is it fair just and reasonable to impose a duty? E.g. it may not be fair if the defendant is a non-profit organization or acting in a quasi-public capacity
Marc Rich v Bishop Rock Marine Co
125
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > | Marc Rich v Bishop Rock Marine Co
Caparo: iii. is it fair just and reasonable to impose a duty? E.g. it may not be fair if the defendant is a non-profit organization or acting in a quasi-public capacity
126
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Novel Duty Situations > Robinson
[For extra points, note that] the court has confirmed in Robinson that where the courts have already determined that a duty exists it is unnecessary to accept to assess whether it should exist using the Caparo test. Caparo should be used as a framework to analyse whether it is fair and reasonable that a duty come into existence in law it will only be used where a novel situation arises and the law needs to develop (albeit in line with existing authorities.
127
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Omissions > Stovin v Wise
General Rule: there is no liability for pure omissions, and you do not owe a duty to the world for doing nothing to prevent harm.
128
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Omissions > General Rule: there is no liability for pure omissions, and you do not owe a duty to the world for doing nothing to prevent harm.
Stovin v Wise
129
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Omissions > East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent
This rule applies if you decide to act despite no duty to do so, even if you act carelessly – UNLESS you make matters worse
130
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Omissions > This rule applies if you decide to act despite no duty to do so, even if you act carelessly – UNLESS you make matters worse
East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent
131
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Omissions > Exceptions > Home office v Dorset Yacht
There is a duty to act positively in some cases where a person has a special relationship of control over another (Smith v Littlewoods – but this duty does not extend to cover actions of third parties who are OUTSIDE the defendant’s control.)
132
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Omissions > Exceptions > There is a duty to act positively in some cases where a person has a special relationship of control over another (Smith v Littlewoods – but this duty does not extend to cover actions of third parties who are OUTSIDE the defendant’s control.)
Home office v Dorset Yacht
133
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Omissions > Exceptions > Smith v Littlewoods
this duty [to positively act] does not extend to cover actions of third parties who are OUTSIDE the defendant’s control
134
Negligence > 2. Legal Duty of Care > Omissions > Exceptions > this duty [to positively act] does not extend to cover actions of third parties who are OUTSIDE the defendant’s control
Smith v Littlewoods
135
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test
1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved? Identify the standards of care expected in the circumstances; a question of law. 2. How did the defendant behave? Identify whether the defendant fell below the relevant standard of care; a question of fact.
136
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved?
(a) General Standard: standard of the REASONABLE PERSON | (b) Where the defendant is a PROFESSIONAL
137
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks
(a)General Standard: standard of the REASONABLE PERSON
138
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (a)General Standard: standard of the REASONABLE PERSON
Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks
139
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (a)General Standard: standard of the REASONABLE PERSON > Glasgow Corp v Muir
i. This is an objective test
140
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (a)General Standard: standard of the REASONABLE PERSON > i. This is an objective test
Glasgow Corp v Muir
141
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (a)General Standard: standard of the REASONABLE PERSON > Roe v Ministry of Health
ii. The defendant’s conduct should be considered in relation to the state of knowledge at the time of the event only
142
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (a)General Standard: standard of the REASONABLE PERSON > ii. The defendant’s conduct should be considered in relation to the state of knowledge at the time of the event only
Roe v Ministry of Health
143
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee
(b) Where the defendant is a PROFESSIONAL: the standard of the defendant’s profession/ a reasonably competent professional in the circumstances.
144
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (b) Where the defendant is a PROFESSIONAL
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee
145
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (b) Where the defendant is a PROFESSIONAL > Bolam
i. The Courts will consider compliance with common practice in the relevant profession as strong evidence that the defendant is not negligent
146
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (b) Where the defendant is a PROFESSIONAL > i. The Courts will consider compliance with common practice in the relevant profession as strong evidence that the defendant is not negligent
Bolam
147
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (b) Where the defendant is a PROFESSIONAL > Bolitho
ii. BUT – the final decision whether a skilled defendant’s behaviour is reasonable is the court’s
148
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (b) Where the defendant is a PROFESSIONAL > the final decision whether a skilled defendant’s behaviour is reasonable is the court’s
Bolitho
149
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (b) Where the defendant is a PROFESSIONAL > Re the Herald of Free Enterprise
iii. Common practice won’t necessarily justify the taking risks, as the courts can reject ‘expert evidence’ and condemn commonly accepted practice as negligent
150
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (b) Where the defendant is a PROFESSIONAL > iii. Common practice won’t necessarily justify the taking risks, as the courts can reject ‘expert evidence’ and condemn commonly accepted practice as negligent
Re the Herald of Free Enterprise
151
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > Nettleship v Weston
there is no allowance for inexperience
152
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > there is no allowance for inexperience
Nettleship v Weston
153
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > Nettleship
E.g. care drivers must reach the standard of a reasonably competent driver, even if learners
154
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > E.g. care drivers must reach the standard of a reasonably competent driver, even if learners
Nettleship
155
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > Mansfield v Weetabix
EXCEPTION: Where the defendant suffers from an unexpected disability
156
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > EXCEPTION: Where the defendant suffers from an unexpected disability
Mansfield v Weetabix
157
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority
Rule also applies in cases of professional inexperience
158
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > Rule also applies in cases of professional inexperience
Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority
159
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > Wells v Cooper
Rule applies for cases of Home DIY – requires certain level of expertise
160
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (c) Where the defendant is INEXPERIENCED > Rule applies for cases of Home DIY – requires certain level of expertise
Wells v Cooper
161
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > Mullin v Richards
(d) Where the defendant is a CHILD: reasonable child of the defendant’s age
162
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 1. How OUGHT the defendant have behaved > (d) Where the defendant is a CHILD: reasonable child of the defendant’s age
Mullin v Richards
163
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave
Consider the following factors in deciding if there has been breached? (a) If the RISK OF HARM is particularly small, and neglect is reasonable, it is justifiable not to take steps to mitigate. (b) If there is a VERY SERIOUS HARM, one must take appropriate steps to mitigate (c) Consider the COST AND PRACTICABILITY of solutions. If taking precautions would have been impracticable and incurred great expense, this may excuse the defendant for not doing so, provided the risk of harm is small. (d) If the defendant’s actions are in the PUBLIC INTEREST/ have substantial social utility, this may justify the defendant’s taking greater risk (e) There is no duty on the defendant to protect against “fantastic” probabilities (f) The defendant is not liable if his actions were due to a sudden incapacity (g) Res Ipsa Loquitor – the defendant may be liable even if there is no conclusive proof of blame (in limited situations only).
164
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > Bolton v Stone
(a) If the RISK OF HARM is particularly small, and neglect is reasonable, it is justifiable not to take steps to mitigate.
165
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > (a) If the RISK OF HARM is particularly small, and neglect is reasonable, it is justifiable not to take steps to mitigate.
Bolton v Stone
166
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > Paris v Stepney Borough Council
(b) If there is a VERY SERIOUS HARM, one must take appropriate steps to mitigate
167
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > (b) If there is a VERY SERIOUS HARM, one must take appropriate steps to mitigate
Paris v Stepney Borough Council
168
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > Latimer v AEC Ltd
(c) Consider the COST AND PRACTICABILITY of solutions. If taking precautions would have been impracticable and incurred great expense, this may excuse the defendant for not doing so, provided the risk of harm is small.
169
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > (c) Consider the COST AND PRACTICABILITY of solutions.
Latimer v AEC Ltd
170
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > Watt
(d) If the defendant’s actions are in the PUBLIC INTEREST/ have substantial social utility, this may justify the defendant’s taking greater risk
171
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > (d) If the defendant’s actions are in the PUBLIC INTEREST/ have substantial social utility, this may justify the defendant’s taking greater risk
Watt
172
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington
(e) There is no duty on the defendant to protect against “fantastic” probabilities
173
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > (e) There is no duty on the defendant to protect against “fantastic” probabilities
Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington
174
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > Waugh v James K Allen
(f) The defendant is not liable if his actions were due to a sudden incapacity
175
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > (f) The defendant is not liable if his actions were due to a sudden incapacity
Waugh v James K Allen
176
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > Scott v London and St Katherine’s Docks
(g) Res Ipsa Loquitor – the defendant may be liable even if there is no conclusive proof of blame (in limited situations only).
177
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > (g) Res Ipsa Loquitor – the defendant may be liable even if there is no conclusive proof of blame (in limited situations only).
Scott v London and St Katherine’s Docks
178
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > s.11 Civil Evidence Act 1968
If guilty in criminal proceedings, the defendant is also presumed liable in tort.
179
Negligence > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Stage Test > 2. How DID the defendant behave > If guilty in criminal proceedings, the defendant is also presumed liable in tort.
s.11 Civil Evidence Act 1968
180
Negligence > 4. Causation
Causation is only established once all three elements are satisfied: FACTUAL CAUSATION, INTERVENING ACT, LEGAL CAUSATION
181
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Barnett
(a) Apply the ‘BUT FOR’ test – actual causation is established if, ‘but for the defendant’s breach, the claimant would not have sustained the harm.’
182
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > (a) Apply the ‘BUT FOR’ test – actual causation is established if, ‘but for the defendant’s breach, the claimant would not have sustained the harm.’
Barnett
183
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Approaches to the BUT FOR test.
1. All or nothing approach (standard) – the claimant must show on the balance of probabilities that the defendant caused harm. 2. Modified Test (often employed where multiple causes have together contributed to the harm) – the claimant must show the defendant’s breach: i. MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTED to the harm ii. MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISK of harm through recent decisions
184
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Hotson
1. All or nothing approach (standard) – the claimant must show on the balance of probabilities that the defendant caused harm.
185
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > 1. All or nothing approach (standard) – the claimant must show on the balance of probabilities that the defendant caused harm.
Hotson
186
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw
i. MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTED to the harm
187
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > i. MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTED to the harm
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw
188
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > McGhee v National Coal Board
ii. MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISK of harm through recent decisions
189
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > ii. MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISK of harm through recent decisions
McGhee v National Coal Board
190
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Sienkiewicz v Grieff
Appear to have the restricted the application of this second limb only to cases where there is scientific uncertainty on causation (mesothelioma)
191
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Appear to have the restricted the application of this second limb only to cases where there is scientific uncertainty on causation (mesothelioma)
Sienkiewicz v Grieff
192
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > (b) Where the claimant’s harm has more than one cause > Holtby v Bigham
If the harm is DIVISIBLE, court will apportion damages accordingly
193
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > (b) Where the claimant’s harm has more than one cause > If the harm is DIVISIBLE, court will apportion damages accordingly
Holtby v Bigham
194
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > (b) Where the claimant’s harm has more than one cause > Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978
If the harm is INDIVISIBLE (more than one party is responsible for the same harm), the claimant may sue any one defendant for the whole loss – but under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, the defendant may seek a just and equitable contribution from other liable parties.
195
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > (b) Where the claimant’s harm has more than one cause > If the harm is INDIVISIBLE the claimant may sue any one defendant for the whole loss.
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978
196
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Mesothelioma Cases > Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.
If more than one employer is being sued, the responsibility of each employer need not be categorically proven
197
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Mesothelioma Cases > If more than one employer is being sued, the responsibility of each employer need not be categorically proven
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.
198
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Mesothelioma Cases > Barker v Corus UK Ltd
Awarded damages for creation of risk, and in proportion to the extent each defendant added to it.
199
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Mesothelioma Cases > Awarded damages for creation of risk, and in proportion to the extent each defendant added to it.
Barker v Corus UK Ltd
200
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Mesothelioma Cases > s.3 Compensation Act 2006
BUT, this act overruled Barker v Corus and each employer will now be wholly liable (contribution can then be sought from other parties.)
201
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Mesothelioma Cases > BUT, this act overruled Barker v Corus and each employer will now be wholly liable (contribution can then be sought from other parties.)
s.3 Compensation Act 2006
202
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act
Causation can only be established if the chain of causation has not been broken by an intervening event: (a) Intervening events by third parties (b) Intervening acts by the claimant
203
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > Knightley v Johns, Rouse v Squires
i. NEGLIGENT ACTS – only break the chain if unforeseeable
204
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > i. NEGLIGENT ACTS – only break the chain if unforeseeable
Knightley v Johns, Rouse v Squires
205
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > Lamb Stansbie v Troman
ii. RECKLESS or INTENTIONAL ACTS – more likely to break the chain (Lamb), unless unforeseeable (Stansbie v Troman)
206
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > ii. RECKLESS or INTENTIONAL ACTS – more likely to break the chain (X), unless unforeseeable (Y)
Lamb | Stansbie v Troman
207
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > Scott v Shepherd
iii. INSTINCTIVE/ NATURAL RESPONSE ACTS – will not break the chain
208
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > iii. INSTINCTIVE/ NATURAL RESPONSE ACTS – will not break the chain
Scott v Shepherd
209
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > Rahman v Arearose Ltd
iv. Negligent MEDICAL TREATMENT – will not usually break the chain
210
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > iv. Negligent MEDICAL TREATMENT – will not usually break the chain
Rahman v Arearose Ltd
211
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > McKew and Wieland
(b) Intervening acts by the claimant – will only break the chain if ENTIRELY UNREASONABLE in all the circumstances.
212
Negligence > 4. Causation > Factual > Intervening Act > (b) Intervening acts by the claimant – will only break the chain if ENTIRELY UNREASONABLE in all the circumstances.
McKew and Wieland
213
Negligence > 4. Causation > Legal
The defendant can only be said to have caused the harm in question if it is not too REMOTE.
214
Negligence > 4. Causation > Legal > The Wagon Mound (No.1)
Remoteness Rule: the defendant is ONLY liable for REASONABLY FORESEEABLE DAMAGE – i.e. damage is only recoverable if a reasonable man could have foreseen it
215
Negligence > 4. Causation > Legal > Remoteness Rule: the defendant is ONLY liable for REASONABLY FORESEEABLE DAMAGE – i.e. damage is only recoverable if a reasonable man could have foreseen it
The Wagon Mound (No.1)
216
Negligence > 4. Causation > Legal > Jolley
Applied Wagon Mound (No.1)’s Remoteness Rule
217
Negligence > 4. Causation > Legal > Applied Wagon Mound (No.1)’s Remoteness Rule
Jolley
218
Negligence > 4. Causation > Legal > 2 Provisos > Hughes v Lord Advocate
It is not necessary to foresee the precise WAY in which the harm is caused, provided the TYPE OF HARM is reasonably foreseeable;
219
Negligence >4. Causation > Legal > 2 Provisos > It is not necessary to foresee the precise WAY in which the harm is caused, provided the TYPE OF HARM is reasonably foreseeable;
Hughes v Lord Advocate
220
Negligence > 4. Causation > Legal > 2 Provisos > Robinson v Post Office
The Egg Shell Skull Rule: Take your victim as you find them. If the claimant suffers from a particular disability or condition, the claimant may recover in full from the defendant, even where the defendant could not have foreseen the claimant’s losses.
221
Negligence > 4. Causation > Legal > 2 Provisos > The Egg Shell Skull Rule
Robinson v Post Office
222
Negligence > 5. Defences
1. VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK (Complete defence volenti non fit injuria) 2. ILLEGALITY 3. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
223
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > Nettleship v Weston
The defendant must prove: i. The claimant had FULL KNOWLEDGE of nature and extent of risk; and ii. The claimant WILLINGLY ACCEPTED THE RISK of being injured due to the defendant’s negligence (hard to show)
224
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > The defendant must prove: i. The claimant had FULL KNOWLEDGE of nature and extent of risk; and ii. The claimant WILLINGLY ACCEPTED THE RISK of being injured due to the defendant’s negligence (hard to show)
Nettleship v Weston
225
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > Smith v Baker
(b) Rare for employers to succeed with defence against employees because of doubts as to whether truly voluntary.
226
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > (b) Rare for employers to succeed with defence against employees because of doubts as to whether truly voluntary.
Smith v Baker
227
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > Haynes v Harwood
(c) Rare for defence to succeed against rescuers, who are deemed to be ‘compelled by moral instinct’
228
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > (c) Rare for defence to succeed against rescuers, who are deemed to be ‘compelled by moral instinct’
Haynes v Harwood
229
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > | Ratcliff v McConnell and another
More successful against trespassers
230
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > More successful against trespassers
Ratcliff v McConnell and another
231
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > Dann v Hamilton
Knowledge must be sufficient to inform the consent for voluntary assumption of risk, BUT this was a drunk driver case. Following Road Traffic Act 1988 s.149, consent will not be a valid defence for motor vehicle cases (still valid for other cases)
232
Negligence > 5. Defences > 1. Voluntary Assumption of Risk > Knowledge must be sufficient to inform the consent for voluntary assumption of risk, BUT this was a drunk driver case. Following Road Traffic Act 1988 s.149, consent will not be a valid defence for motor vehicle cases (still valid for other cases)
Dann v Hamilton
233
Negligence > 5. Defences > 2. Illegality > Pitts v Hunt
The defendant may have a defence if the claimant was involved in an illegal enterprise when injured.
234
Negligence > 5. Defences > 2. Illegality > The defendant may have a defence if the claimant was involved in an illegal enterprise when injured.
Pitts v Hunt
235
Negligence > 5. Defences > 2. Illegality > Revill v Newbury
The injury must directly flow as a result of the criminal act.
236
Negligence > 5. Defences > 2. Illegality > The injury must directly flow as a result of the criminal act.
Revill v Newbury
237
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence
(a) To prove contributory negligence, the defendant must show that: i. The claimant was careless; and ii. The claimant’s careless behaviour contributed to the claimant’s harm.
238
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > s.1(1) Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
(b) Operates to reduce the claimants’ damages, if shown
239
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > (b) Operates to reduce the claimants’ damages, if shown
s.1(1) Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
240
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Caswell
(c) Employees: courts typically generous and rarely reduce employees’ damages, particularly where the work involved is dull/repetitive
241
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > (c) Employees: courts typically generous and rarely reduce employees’ damages, particularly where the work involved is dull/repetitive
Caswell
242
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Gough v Thorne
(d) Children: judged according to their own standard – would a child of that age have taken more care for his safety
243
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > (d) Children: judged according to their own standard – would a child of that age have taken more care for his safety
Gough v Thorne
244
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Baker v TE Hopkins and Sons Ltd
(e) Rescuers: findings of contributory negligence are very rare – only where rescuer has shown a ‘wholly unreasonable disregard for his/her own safety.’
245
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > (e) Rescuers: findings of contributory negligence are very rare – only where rescuer has shown a ‘wholly unreasonable disregard for his/her own safety.’
Baker v TE Hopkins and Sons Ltd
246
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Jones v Boyce
(f) Situations of imminent danger: where the claimant’s response is reasonable there will be no finding of contributory negligence
247
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > (f) Situations of imminent danger: where the claimant’s response is reasonable there will be no finding of contributory negligence
Jones v Boyce
248
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Froom v Butcher
(g) passengers and drivers will be liable for not wearing seatbelts
249
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > (g) passengers and drivers will be liable for not wearing seatbelts
Froom v Butcher
250
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Capps v Miller
(g) passengers and drivers will be liable for not wearing helmets
251
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > (g) passengers and drivers will be liable for not wearing helmets
Capps v Miller
252
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Owens v Brimmell
Passengers who accept ride with drunken drivers can see damages reduced, even if themselves are highly intoxicated
253
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Passengers who accept ride with drunken drivers can see damages reduced, even if themselves are highly intoxicated
Owens v Brimmell
254
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Capps v Miller
Manufacturers can be liable, e.g. helmets (Capps v Miller) or seatbelts (Froom v Butcher)
255
Negligence > 5. Defences > 3. Contributory Negligence > Reductions
* 25% reduction if injury could have been avoided * 15% reduction if injury would have been less servere * 0% reduction if it made no difference
256
Pure Economic Loss > Steps
Step One: state – the claimant can consider suing the defendant for [insert harm] in the tort of NEGLIGENCE Step Two: Is the Harm in question Pure Economic Loss (PEL) Step Three: Is a DUTY OF CARE owed? Step Four: has there been a BREACH of this duty? Step Five: CAUSATION – did the defendant’s breach of duty CAUSE the harm suffered by the claimant? Step Six: Consider whether the defendant may raise any defences
257
Pure Economic Loss > 1. State?
the claimant can consider suing the defendant for [insert harm] in the tort of NEGLIGENCE
258
Pure Economic Loss > 2. Define and Apply
PEL = Financial Loss that does not flow from: (a) physical injury or (b) property damage
259
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Murphy v Brentwood District Council
1. GENERAL RULE: no duty of care is owed in tort in respect of PEL
260
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > 1. GENERAL RULE: no duty of care is owed in tort in respect of PEL
Murphy v Brentwood District Council
261
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Weller & Co v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute
(a) illustrated that a duty is not owed if financial loss is caused by actions rather than physical damage
262
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > (a) illustrated that a duty is not owed if financial loss is caused by actions rather than physical damage
Weller & Co v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute
263
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Spartan Steel & Alloys v Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd.
(b) recovered consequential economic loss that stemmed from the property damage but not pure economic loss
264
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > (b) recovered consequential economic loss that stemmed from the property damage but not pure economic loss
Spartan Steel & Alloys v Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd.
265
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd
2. Exception: in cases of NEGLIGENT MISSTATEMENT, a duty of care is owed if there is a SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP between the parties.
266
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > 2. Exception: in cases of NEGLIGENT MISSTATEMENT, a duty of care is owed if there is a SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP between the parties.
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd
267
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Two elements to the exception (Exception: in cases of NEGLIGENT MISSTATEMENT, a duty of care is owed if there is a SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP between the parties. (Hedley Byrne))
(a) An ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY to the claimant by the defendant (b) REASONABLE RELIANCE on the defendant’s statement, by the claimant
268
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Elements to the Hedley Byrne Exception> (a) An ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY to the claimant by the defendant > Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and others
The four criteria required to establish an ‘assumption of responsibility’ are: i. Adviser knew the purpose for which the advice was required ii. Adviser knew the advice would be communicated to the advisee iii. Adviser knew the advisee was likely to act on the advice without further inquiry; and iv. Advisee acted on the advice to his detriment
269
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Elements to the Hedley Byrne Exception> (a) An ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY to the claimant by the defendant > The four criteria
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and others The four criteria required to establish an ‘assumption of responsibility’ are: i. Adviser knew the purpose for which the advice was required ii. Adviser knew the advice would be communicated to the advisee iii. Adviser knew the advisee was likely to act on the advice without further inquiry; and iv. Advisee acted on the advice to his detriment
270
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Elements to the Hedley Byrne Exception> (a) An ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY to the claimant by the defendant > "knew"
Constructive Knowledge will suffice
271
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Extending the Hedley Byrne principle > White v Jones; Henderson v Merritt Syndicates Ltd
(a) Extends Hedley Byrne to the negligent provision of professional services, providing there is an assumption of responsibility and clearly foreseeable damage (no need for reliance)
272
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Extending the Hedley Byrne principle > (a) Extends Hedley Byrne to the negligent provision of professional services, providing there is an assumption of responsibility and clearly foreseeable damage (no need for reliance)
White v Jones; Henderson v Merritt Syndicates Ltd
273
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Extending the Hedley Byrne principle > Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc
(b) Extends Hedley Byrne to cases where the negligent misstatement is made to a THIRD PARTY (not to the claimant), provided the third party relies on it to the detriment of the claimant
274
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Extending the Hedley Byrne principle > (b) Extends Hedley Byrne to cases where the negligent misstatement is made to a THIRD PARTY (not to the claimant), provided the third party relies on it to the detriment of the claimant
Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc
275
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Extending the Hedley Byrne principle > Desmond v Chief Constable
Narrows the Spartan ruling (recovered consequential economic loss that stemmed from the property damage but not pure economic loss) – the duty to act in the public interest overrides the duty of care owed to the claimant. If there is a conflict between Common Law duty and statue, statute prevails.
276
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Extending the Hedley Byrne principle >
Desmond v Chief Constable
277
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Limitations to the Hedley Byrne Principle
(a) The duty will NOT be owed in a SOCIAL SITUATION (b) Insufficient proximity of relationship defeats a negligent misstatement PEL claim (James McNaughton Papers Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co)
278
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Limitations to the Hedley Byrne Principle > (a) The duty will NOT be owed in a SOCIAL SITUATION > i. Unless – the defendant’s advice has gone beyond social advice, and he has assumed a responsibility.
Chaudhry v Prabhakar
279
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Limitations to the Hedley Byrne Principle > (a) The duty will NOT be owed in a SOCIAL SITUATION > Chaudhry v Prabhakar
i. Unless – the defendant’s advice has gone beyond social advice, and he has assumed a responsibility.
280
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Limitations to the Hedley Byrne Principle > (a) The duty will NOT be owed in a SOCIAL SITUATION > (Chaudhry v Prabhakar) This will be the case where?
- It was clear that the claimant would be relying on advice; and - The defendant has more experience/knowledge
281
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Limitations to the Hedley Byrne Principle > (a) The duty will NOT be owed in a SOCIAL SITUATION > Full Limitation
(a) The duty will NOT be owed in a SOCIAL SITUATION i. Unless – the defendant’s advice has gone beyond social advice, and he has assumed a responsibility. This will be the case where: - It was clear that the claimant would be relying on advice; and - The defendant has more experience/ knowledge
282
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Limitations to the Hedley Byrne Principle > James McNaughton Papers Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co
(b) Insufficient proximity of relationship defeats a negligent misstatement PEL claim
283
Pure Economic Loss > 3. Duty of Care > Limitations to the Hedley Byrne Principle > (b) Insufficient proximity of relationship defeats a negligent misstatement PEL claim
James McNaughton Papers Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co
284
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
To rely on a disclaimer/exclusion notice as a defence
285
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > To rely on a disclaimer/exclusion notice as a defence
EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
286
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > Two Criteria:
INCORPORATION and CONSTRUCTION
287
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > INCORPORATION
a) The defendant must have taken reasonable steps to bring it to the claimant’s attention before the tort was committed
288
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > CONSTRUCTION
b) The wording of the clause/notice must cover the loss
289
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > C =
UCTA 1977
290
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > c) UCTA 1977
c) Applies to the exclusion notice (provided the defendant is acting in the course of a business, the claimant may be a consumer or trader)
291
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > c) UCTA 1977 > s.2(1) UCTA 1977
I. The defendant cannot exclude liability for death or personal injury
292
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > c) UCTA 1977 > I. The defendant cannot exclude liability for death or personal injury
s.2(1) UCTA 1977
293
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > c) UCTA 1977 > II. In order to exclude liability for other loss or damage, the clause must be reasonable
s.2(2) UCTA 1977
294
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > c) UCTA 1977 > s.2(2) UCTA 1977
II. In order to exclude liability for other loss or damage, the clause must be reasonable
295
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > c) UCTA 1977 > s.11(3) UCTA 1977
III. Defines reasonableness: must be fair and reasonable to allow reliance on the clause, having regard to all circumstances
296
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > c) UCTA 1977 > III. Defines reasonableness: must be fair and reasonable to allow reliance on the clause, having regard to all circumstances
s.11(3) UCTA 1977
297
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > UCTA > Reasonableness > Smith v Eric S Bush
In deciding reasonableness, take into account the following: 1. Were the parties of equal bargaining power? 2. In the case of advice – would it have been reasonably practicable to obtain the advice from an alternative source? 3. How difficult is the task from which liability is excluded? 4. What are the practical consequences – are the parties able to bear the loss?
298
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > UCTA > In deciding reasonableness, take into account the following: 1. Were the parties of equal bargaining power? 2. In the case of advice – would it have been reasonably practicable to obtain the advice from an alternative source? 3. How difficult is the task from which liability is excluded? 4. What are the practical consequences – are the parties able to bear the loss?
Smith v Eric S Bush
299
Pure Economic Loss > 6. Defences > EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY > UCTA > Reasonableness
Smith v Eric S Bush In deciding reasonableness, take into account the following: 1. Were the parties of equal bargaining power? 2. In the case of advice – would it have been reasonably practicable to obtain the advice from an alternative source? 3. How difficult is the task from which liability is excluded? 4. What are the practical consequences – are the parties able to bear the loss?
300
Pure Psychiatric Harm > Steps
Step One: State: the Claimant can consider suing the defendant for [insert harm] in the tort of negligence. Step Two: Is the harm in Question ‘Pure Psychiatric Harm’? Step Three: Is there a Duty of Care Owed? Step Four+: Breach, Causation, Defences
301
Pure Psychiatric Harm > Define
Psychiatric harm that stands alone, i.e. does not flow from physical injury
302
Pure Psychiatric Harm > Requirements to be PPH
(a) caused by sudden shock to the nervous system; and (b) either a medically recognised psychiatric illness, OR a shock induced physical condition (no gradual build up) e.g. miscarriage, heart attack.
303
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed?
This depends on whether the claimant is a primary or secondary victim
304
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Steps to determining a primary or secondary victim
1. Is the harm medically recognised 2. Caused by sudden shock? 3. In the area of danger? If YES = Primary / If NO = Secondary
305
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Primary Victims > Page v Smith
To be a primary victim, the claimant must have: i. been in the actual area of danger; OR ii. reasonably believed he was in danger
306
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Primary Victims > To be a primary victim, the claimant must have: i. been in the actual area of danger; OR ii. reasonably believed he was in danger
Page v Smith
307
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Primary Victims > Page v Smith, Dulieu v White & Sons
A duty of care is owed to a primary victim in respect of PPH if the risk of PHYSICAL injury is FORESEEABLE. • (For primary victims it is not necessary for the risk of psychiatric harm to be foreseeable)
308
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Primary Victims > A duty of care is owed to a primary victim in respect of PPH if the risk of PHYSICAL injury is FORESEEABLE.
Page v Smith, Dulieu v White & Sons
309
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Primary Victims > Bourhill v Young
If not foreseeable, no duty is owed --> consider whether the claimant was a secondary victim
310
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Primary Victims > If not foreseeable, no duty is owed
Bourhill v Young
311
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > Page v Smith
To be a secondary victim, the claimant must have: i. Witnessed injury to someone else; and ii. Feared for the safety of that person
312
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > To be a secondary victim, the claimant must have: i. Witnessed injury to someone else; and ii. Feared for the safety of that person
Page v Smith
313
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > Authority and Criteria to be a secondary victim
Page v Smith To be a secondary victim, the claimant must have: i. Witnessed injury to someone else; and ii. Feared for the safety of that person
314
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > NORMAL FORTITUDE, CLOSE RELATIONSHIP OF LOVE AND AFFECTION, PRESENT, OWN SENSES
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police A duty is owed for PPH suffered by a secondary victim if the following criteria are satisfied (NORMAL FORTITUDE, CLOSE RELATIONSHIP OF LOVE AND AFFECTION, PRESENT, OWN SENSES)
315
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > A duty is owed for PPH suffered by a secondary victim if the following criteria are satisfied?
NORMAL FORTITUDE, CLOSE RELATIONSHIP OF LOVE AND AFFECTION, PRESENT, OWN SENSES Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police
316
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police
i. It is reasonably foreseeable that a person of NORMAL FORTITUDE in the claimants position would suffer a psychiatric illness ii. The claimant has a CLOSE RELATIONSHIP OF LOVE AND AFFECTION with the person endangered by the claimants negligence iii. The Claimant was PRESENT at the accident or its immediate aftermath iv. The claimant saw/heard the accident, or its immediate aftermath with his OWN SENSES
317
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > Close relationship > Alcock
Such relationships are presumed with a parent-child, husband-wife, fiancé-fiancée relationships
318
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > Close relationships > Such relationships are presumed with a parent-child, husband-wife, fiancé-fiancée relationships
Alcock
319
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > Present > McCloughlin v O’Brian
One hour after accident with victims in the same state deemed to be ‘immediate aftermath’
320
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > Present > One hour after accident with victims in the same state deemed to be ‘immediate aftermath’
McCloughlin v O’Brian
321
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > own senses > McCloughlin
The shock must come to the claimant through sight or hearing of the event, or its immediate aftermath
322
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > own senses > The shock must come to the claimant through sight or hearing of the event, or its immediate aftermath
McCloughlin
323
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > own senses > Alcock
Seeing the event on TV will not be sufficient – unless the impact of a Live TV broadcast is as great or greater than seeing the actual accident
324
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Secondary Victims > Own senses > Seeing the event on TV will not be sufficient – unless the impact of a Live TV broadcast is as great or greater than seeing the actual accident
Alcock
325
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Rescuers > White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police
Where the claimant is a rescuer, there are no special rules. A rescuer will therefore, fall into the category of either primary or secondary victim, as any other person would.
326
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Rescuers > Where the claimant is a rescuer, there are no special rules. A rescuer will therefore, fall into the category of either primary or secondary victim, as any other person would.
White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police
327
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Rescuers > Chadwick v British Railway Board
Where a rescuer was a primary victim
328
Pure Psychiatric Harm > 3. Duty of Care Owed > Rescuers > | Where a rescuer was a primary victim
Chadwick v British Railway Board
329
Pure Psychiatric Harm > Problems with Existing Status of law
(exam questions sometimes touch upon the satisfaction with the current state of the law) • What is immediate? • Why must the harm be caused by sudden shock when mesothelioma and asbestos can be cumulative harm? • What about stress which is not medically recognised, as in Walker? • Why must the claimant hear/see the shock through his own senses? i.e. what if a mother heard of her child’s accident over the phone? • Why a person of ‘normal fortitude’, when the egg shell skull rule is normal in tort?
330
Pure Psychiatric Harm > Problems with Existing Status of law > Walker v Northumberland County Council
• What about stress which is not medically recognised, as in Walker?
331
Pure Psychiatric Harm > Problems with Existing Status of law > • What about stress which is not medically recognised, as in Walker?
Walker v Northumberland County Council
332
Remedies > Steps (all)
Step One: State the principle of Remedies in Tort For non-fatal claims Step Two: Set out the two heads of NON-PECUNIARY Losses, and consider whether they apply to the facts Steps Three: Set out the PECUNIARY Heads of Loss and consider whether they apply to the facts Step Four: note (1) deductions that will be made from the claimant’s damages, and (2) exceptions to the ‘one action rule’ For Fatal Claims Step Two: Consider what claims may be brought under the LR(MP)A 1934 Step Three: Consider what claims may be brought under the FAA 1976
333
Remedies > Steps (non-fatal claims)
Step One: State the principle of Remedies in Tort Step Two: Set out the two heads of NON-PECUNIARY Losses, and consider whether they apply to the facts Steps Three: Set out the PECUNIARY Heads of Loss and consider whether they apply to the facts Step Four: note (1) deductions that will be made from the claimant’s damages, and (2) exceptions to the ‘one action rule’
334
Remedies > Steps (fatal claims)
Step One: State the principle of Remedies in Tort Step Two: Consider what claims may be brought under the LR(MP)A 1934 Step Three: Consider what claims may be brought under the FAA 1976
335
Remedies > 1. Principles > Damages
Damages are awarded to put the claimant in the position he would have been in had the tort not been committed
336
Remedies > 1. Principles > One Action Rule
The claimant may bring only one claim based on one set of facts --> one lump sum is awarded to the claimant to cover both past and future losses
337
Remedies > 1. Principles > Mitigation of Loss
The claimant has a duty to take reasonable steps to avoid losses --> the claimant should not profit from the incident
338
Remedies > 1. Principles > Contributory Negligence
Any Damages will be reduced for any findings of contributory negligence
339
Non-Fatal Remedies > 2. Non-Pecuniary
One Figure is generally given to cover pain and suffering and loss of amenity. Lawyers use Kemp and Kemp (also – JSB guidelines) as a guide to come to this figure
340
Non-Fatal Remedies > 2. Non-Pecuniary > Pain and Suffering
a) Covers: past, present and future pain, physical and mental anguish, fear of future surgery etc. b) A SUBJECTIVE test is used to award damages for pain and suffering. Thus, the claimant must be aware of his injuries to claim (wise v Kaye) --> The claimant cannot claim for a period where he was unconscious (e.g. in a coma) c) Consider facts such as: whether the injury was to a dominant/ non-dominant limb; the number of operations required; recovery time; the permanence of any disability; any scarring.
341
Non-Fatal Remedies > 2. Non-Pecuniary > Pain and Suffering > Wise v Kaye
b) A SUBJECTIVE test is used to award damages for pain and suffering. Thus, the claimant must be aware of his injuries to claim -> The claimant cannot claim for a period where he was unconscious (e.g. in a coma)
342
Non-Fatal Remedies > 2. Non-Pecuniary > Pain and Suffering > b) A SUBJECTIVE test is used to award damages for pain and suffering. Thus, the claimant must be aware of his injuries to claim -> The claimant cannot claim for a period where he was unconscious (e.g. in a coma)
Wise v Kaye
343
Non-Fatal Remedies > 2. Non-Pecuniary > Loss of Amenity
a) Covers: loss of enjoyment of life, e.g. inability to pursue hobbies, loss of sight/smell/freedom of movement/marriage prospects etc… b) An OBJECTIVE test used to award damages for Loss of Amenities. The Claimant may claim for periods where he was unconscious/unaware of his own loss of enjoyment of life (West v Shepherd) c) Consider: how active was the claimant? If very active, likely to receive more than if not active.
344
Non-Fatal Remedies > 2. Non-Pecuniary > Loss of Amenity > West v Shepherd
b) An OBJECTIVE test used to award damages for Loss of Amenities. The Claimant may claim for periods where he was unconscious/unaware of his own loss of enjoyment of life
345
Non-Fatal Remedies > 2. Non-Pecuniary > Loss of Amenity > b) An OBJECTIVE test used to award damages for Loss of Amenities. The Claimant may claim for periods where he was unconscious/unaware of his own loss of enjoyment of life
West v Shepherd
346
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary Heads of Losses
1. Medical Expenses 2. Loss of Earnings Pre-Trial 3. Loss of Earnings Post-Trial 4. Loss of Earnings – THE LOST YEARS 5. Loss of Earnings – CHILDREN 6. THE COST OF CARE 7. LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY 8. OTHER PECUNIARY EXPENSES
347
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > Medical Expenses
a) Covers all those reasonably incurred resulting from accident (e.g. prescription charges) b) If pre-trial = special damages c) If post-trial = general damages: use multiplier method (annual cost of treatment X number of years your treatment is likely to continue d) Under s.2(4) Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 one may recover reasonable cost of PRIVATE medical treatment
348
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > Medical Expenses > Under s.2(4) Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948
d) One may recover reasonable cost of PRIVATE medical treatment
349
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > Medical Expenses > One may recover reasonable cost of PRIVATE medical treatment
Under s.2(4) Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948
350
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 2. Loss of Earnings Pre-trial
a) Covers net loss of earnings from date of accident, to date of trial. (includes bonuses/perks) b) Special damages (i.e. capable of being calculated precisely at the time of trial)
351
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 3. Loss of Earnings Post-Trial
a) Lump sum which when invested, aims to provide claimant with income for the rest of his life b) General Damages (i.e. not capable of being calculated precisely at time of trial --> left for court to determine) c) Worked out using the multiplier method
352
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 3. Loss of Earnings Post-Trial > The method – damages for loss of future earnings
MULTIPLICAND X MULTIPLIER Multiplicand (= net annual loss of earnings) X Multiplier (= actual period of loss from trial)
353
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 3. Loss of Earnings Post-Trial > The method – damages for loss of future earnings > MULTIPLICAND
= net annual loss of earnings | Adjusted (increased) for bonuses/perks and the likelihood of promotion, but ignoring inflation
354
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 3. Loss of Earnings Post-Trial > The method – damages for loss of future earnings > MULTIPLIER
= actual period of loss from trial Reduced for early receipt (claimant assumed to invest money at standard rate of return for low risk investment – minus 0.75%) and for the ‘contingencies of life’ (e.g. possibilities of redundancy.) Ogden tables are used to determine reductions
355
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 4. Loss of Earnings – THE LOST YEARS
a) The claimant may claim for ‘lost years’, i.e. where the claimant’s life expectancy, and therefore number of years he would have worked, has been shortened (Pickett v British Rail Engineering) b) But deduct from this figure the amount that the claimant would have spent on self (25% if married with dependant children; 33% if no dependants)
356
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 4. Loss of Earnings – THE LOST YEARS > Pickett v British Rail Engineering
a) The claimant may claim for ‘lost years’, i.e. where the claimant’s life expectancy, and therefore number of years he would have worked, has been shortened
357
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 4. Loss of Earnings – THE LOST YEARS > a) The claimant may claim for ‘lost years’, i.e. where the claimant’s life expectancy, and therefore number of years he would have worked, has been shortened
Pickett v British Rail Engineering
358
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 5. Loss of Earnings – CHILDREN
a) Children may also be compensated for loss of earnings b) Calculation will be based on factors such as: national average salary, parents’ earnings, typical earnings for area of work in which child has shown potential
359
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 6. THE COST OF CARE > (a) Schneider v Eistovich
i. The claimant may recover for necessary post-injury care services, provided the need for services follows from the injuries caused by the defendants negligence. ii. How it works: Carer him/herself doesn’t claim – rather the claimant claims on behalf of claimant and holds on trust
360
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 6. THE COST OF CARE > i. The claimant may recover for necessary post-injury care services, provided the need for services follows from the injuries caused by the defendants negligence. ii. How it works: Carer him/herself doesn’t claim – rather the claimant claims on behalf of claimant and holds on trust
(a) Schneider v Eistovich
361
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 6. THE COST OF CARE > (b) Housecroft v Burnett
A RELATIVE who gives up work to take care for the claimant may also be compensated according to their loss of earnings, but only up to a commercial cost ceiling (s/he may only recover commercial rates)
362
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 6. THE COST OF CARE > A RELATIVE who gives up work to take care for the claimant may also be compensated according to their loss of earnings, but only up to a commercial cost ceiling (s/he may only recover commercial rates)
(b) Housecroft v Burnett
363
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 6. THE COST OF CARE > Two Cases
(a) Schneider v Eistovich | (b) Housecroft v Burnett
364
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 7. LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY > AKA?
Smith v Manchester Award
365
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 7. LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
Smith v Manchester a) Damages are awarded where the claimant is still able to work and continues to work in original job but is now disadvantaged in the job market or has a reduced ability to earn highly b) Award: typically 0-2 net annual loss of earnings (speculative head of damages)
366
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 7. LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY > Smith v Manchester Award
a) Damages are awarded where the claimant is still able to work and continues to work in original job but is now disadvantaged in the job market or has a reduced ability to earn highly b) Award: typically 0-2 net annual loss of earnings (speculative head of damages)
367
Non-Fatal Remedies > 3. Pecuniary > 8. OTHER PECUNIARY EXPENSES > Definition
Any reasonable loss, such as damage to property or cost of household aids (e.g. dishwasher) will be awarded.
368
Non-Fatal Remedies > 4. Deductions and Exceptions > Deductions
a) Tax and National Insurance contributions will ALWAYS be deducted b) Insurance payments, charitable/family help and ill-health pension payments are NEVER deducted (this is an exception to the principle of not over-compensating claimants, justified on public policy grounds) c) STATE BENEFITS received as a result of the tort are to be deducted from: i. Loss of earnings ii. Cost of care iii. Loss of mobility iv. But NOT from pain and suffering or Loss of Amenity
369
Non-Fatal Remedies > 4. Deductions and Exceptions > Method of payment
One Action Rule = one lump sum to be awarded for the rest of the claimants life
370
Non-Fatal Remedies > 4. Deductions and Exceptions > Exceptions to the One Action Rule > s.32A Senior Courts Act 1981
PROVISIONAL DAMAGES: In cases of personal injury, where there’s a chance the claimant’s condition will deteriorate in the future, damages are awarded to the claimant assuming this won’t happen. If it DOES happen at a later date, courts may award another sum of damages.
371
Non-Fatal Remedies > 4. Deductions and Exceptions > Exceptions to the One Action Rule > PROVISIONAL DAMAGES: In cases of personal injury, where there’s a chance the claimant’s condition will deteriorate in the future, damages are awarded to the claimant assuming this won’t happen. If it DOES happen at a later date, courts may award another sum of damages.
s.32A Senior Courts Act 1981
372
Non-Fatal Remedies > 4. Deductions and Exceptions > Exceptions to the One Action Rule > s.2 Damages Act 1996
PERIODIC PAYMENT: Allows court to order periodic pay,ent of damages for personal injury
373
Non-Fatal Remedies > 4. Deductions and Exceptions > Exceptions to the One Action Rule > PERIODIC PAYMENT: Allows court to order periodic pay,ent of damages for personal injury
s.2 Damages Act 1996
374
Non-Fatal Remedies > 4. Deductions and Exceptions > What are the two Exceptions to the One Action Rule?
PROVISIONAL DAMAGES | PERIODIC PAYMENT
375
Fatal Remedies > LR(MP)A 1934
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934
376
Fatal Remedies > 2. LR(MP)A 1934
1. State: where the claimant has died, the claimant’s ESTATE can continue/commence a claim on his behalf 2. How it works: PR’s bring a claim on behalf of the estate 3. What can be recovered: a. SURVIVAL PERIOD LOSSES (losses between tort and death) i. All pecuniary losses up to the date of death; and ii. All non-pecuniary losses up to the date of death b. Property damage c. Reasonable funeral expenses incurred by the estate
377
Fatal Remedies > 2. LR(MP)A 1934 > 1. State
1. State: where the claimant has died, the claimant’s ESTATE can continue/commence a claim on his behalf
378
Fatal Remedies > 2. LR(MP)A 1934 > How it works
PR’s bring a claim on behalf of the estate
379
Fatal Remedies > 2. LR(MP)A 1934 > What can be recovered
3. What can be recovered: a. SURVIVAL PERIOD LOSSES (losses between tort and death) i. All pecuniary losses up to the date of death; and ii. All non-pecuniary losses up to the date of death b. Property damage c. Reasonable funeral expenses incurred by the estate
380
Fatal Remedies > 2. LR(MP)A 1934 > BUT
LR(MP)A 1934 DOES NOT allow any surviving DEPENDENTS of the claimant to be compensated
381
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976
Fatal Accidents Act 1976
382
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976 > Steps
1. State: the FAA allows DEPENDANTS to sue for the death of a person on whom they were dependent. 2. How it works: PR’s bring a claim on behalf of the DEPENDANTS 3. Who qualifies as a dependant? To claim, the person: • Must fall within the class of dependants listed in s.1(3) FAA; and • Must have been actually financially dependent on the deceased If these conditions are satisfied, the following three claims may be brought under the Act: a) Damages for LOSS OF DEPENDANCY. Assessed using the Multiplier Method (see below) b) BEREAVEMENT ALLOWANCE: fixed sum of £12,980 (but only available to deceased’s spouse, or, if deceased was an unmarried minor, for his parents) c) Reasonable FUNERAL EXPENSES incurred by the dependants
383
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976 > 1. State
1. State: the FAA allows DEPENDANTS to sue for the death of a person on whom they were dependent.
384
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976 > 2. How it works
PR’s bring a claim on behalf of the DEPENDANTS
385
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976 > 3, Who qualifies as a dependant?
To claim, the person: • Must fall within the class of dependants listed in s.1(3) FAA; and • Must have been actually financially dependent on the deceased
386
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976 > If these conditions are satisfied, the following three claims may be brought under the Act:
a) Damages for LOSS OF DEPENDANCY. Assessed using the Multiplier Method (see below) b) BEREAVEMENT ALLOWANCE: fixed sum of £12,980 (but only available to deceased’s spouse, or, if deceased was an unmarried minor, for his parents) c) Reasonable FUNERAL EXPENSES incurred by the dependants
387
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976 > The Multiplier Method – damages for loss of dependency
MULTIPLICAND X MULTIPLIER Multiplicand = salary x Multiplier = the period of dependency
388
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976 > The Multiplier Method – damages for loss of dependency > MULTIPLICAND
Multiplicand = salary Figure reduced by (a) the amount decease would have spent on himself – 25% if married with children, 33% where no dependants – and (b) any finding of contributory negligence against the deceased. Figure may be increased to take account of value of household work.
389
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976 > The Multiplier Method – damages for loss of dependency > MULTIPLIER
Multiplier = the period of dependency For the deceased’s spouse = retirement age; for the deceased’s children = date at which they leave education
390
Fatal Remedies > 3. FAA 1976 and LR(MP)A 1934 > Remember
Limitation period for either act is THREE YEARS
391
Employer's Liability > Three areas of potential liability for employers
1. Health and Safety 2. Common Law Negligence 3. Vicarious Liability
392
Employer's Liability > Steps
1. Statutory Health and Safety Regulations 2. Common Law Negligence: Step One: DUTY OF CARE – set out the duties the employer owed to their employee Step Two: Has there been a breach of this duty? Step Three: Did the breach of Duty CAUSE the harm in question? Step Four: Are any DEFENCES available to the employer? 3. Vicarious Liability Step One: Define the principle of vicarious liability Step Two: Has a tort been committed by an Employer or by someone in a relationship akin to employment? Step Three: Was this IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT? Step Four: Consider the Employer’s Indemnity
393
Employers Liability > Statutory Health and Safety Regulations > ERRA 2013
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013
394
Employers Liability > Statutory Health and Safety Regulations > Impact of s.69 ERRA 2013
Has made employers criminally liable for breaches of regulations relating to Health and Safety, relating to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. This means that employees who have suffered damage because of their employer’s non-compliance can no longer action these breaches under a civil claim for breach of statutory duty. Wronged employees are still able to bring a claim against their employer in negligence however.
395
Employers Liability > Statutory Health and Safety Regulations > How the courts assess a claim for breach of duty in negligence
The court assessing a claim for breach of duty in negligence by an employer will most likely look answer two questions: 1. Which risks the employer should have foreseen; and 2. Which precautions should he have taken to respond to those risks? Where relevant, existing statutory Health and Safety regulations will likely be used by the courts to answer those questions.
396
Employers Liability > Common Law Negligence > Steps
Step One: DUTY OF CARE – set out the duties the employer owed to their employee Step Two: Has there been a breach of this duty? Step Three: Did the breach of Duty CAUSE the harm in question? Step Four: Are any DEFENCES available to the employer?
397
Employers Liability > Common Law Negligence > 1. Duty of Care
An employer owes its employees a duty to take reasonable care of their safety while at work (non-delegable). This established duty situation involves four separate, non-delegable, duties.
398
Employers Liability > Common Law Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > Memorise first sentence
An employer owes its employees a duty to take reasonable care of their safety while at work (non-delegable). This established duty situation involves four separate, non-delegable, duties.
399
Employers Liability > Common Law Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > Lord Wright’s judgement in Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co. v English
1. A duty to provide COMPETENT STAFF 2. A duty to provide ADEQUATE PLANT, EQUIPMENT AND MACHINERY 3. A duty to provide A SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK AND SUPERVISION; and 4. A duty to provide a SAFE WORKPLACE (added by Latimer v AEC Ltd)
400
Employers Liability > Common Law Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 1. A duty to provide COMPETENT STAFF 2. A duty to provide ADEQUATE PLANT, EQUIPMENT AND MACHINERY 3. A duty to provide A SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK AND SUPERVISION; and 4. A duty to provide a SAFE WORKPLACE (added by Latimer v AEC Ltd)
Lord Wright’s judgement in Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co. v English
401
Employers Liability > Common Law Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > Latimer v AEC Ltd
Added: | 4. A duty to provide a SAFE WORKPLACE
402
Employers Liability > Common Law Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > Added: 4. A duty to provide a SAFE WORKPLACE
Latimer v AEC Ltd
403
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 1. Competent Staff > Hudson v Ridge Manufacturing Co. Ltd (Confirmed in Waters)
a) This duty arises when an employer KNOWS OR OUGHT TO KNOW of the RISK posed by an employee
404
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 1. Competent Staff > a) This duty arises when an employer KNOWS OR OUGHT TO KNOW of the RISK posed by an employee
Hudson v Ridge Manufacturing Co. Ltd (Confirmed in Waters)
405
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 1. Competent Staff > Waters v Commissioner for Police of the Met
b) The Risk posed by the employee may be one of psychiatric harm (e.g. bullying)
406
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 1. Competent Staff > b) The Risk posed by the employee may be one of psychiatric harm (e.g. bullying)
Waters v Commissioner for Police of the Met
407
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 1. Competent Staff
a) This duty arises when an employer KNOWS OR OUGHT TO KNOW of the RISK posed by an employee (Hudson v Ridge Manufacturing Co. Ltd (Confirmed in Waters)) b) The Risk posed by the employee may be one of psychiatric harm (e.g. bullying) (Waters v Commissioner for Police of the Met)
408
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 2. Adequate plant, equipment and machinery > Relevant where?
a) Relevant where: i. Employer provides plant/equipment which is inadequate in some way ii. Employer does not supply ALL the plant/equipment required for the job
409
``` Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 2. Adequate plant, equipment and machinery > Employers Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, s.1 ```
i. Relevant where a defect in equipment was caused by a third party (manufacturer/supplier) ii. If injured by this defect, employee must sue EMPLOYER themselves, provided he can establish: 1. Fault on the part of someone; and 2. This fault CAUSED employee’s injury
410
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 2. Adequate plant, equipment and machinery > i. Relevant where a defect in equipment was caused by a third party (manufacturer/supplier) ii. If injured by this defect, employee must sue EMPLOYER themselves, provided he can establish: 1. Fault on the part of someone; and 2. This fault CAUSED employee’s injury
Employers Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, s.1
411
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 3. Safe System of work and Supervision
a) Employer must not only devise a safe system of work, but take reasonable steps to ensure that it is complied with. Covers: physical lay-out, training, warnings, notices, safety equipment etc. b) Duty extends to stress-induced (psychiatric) harm (Walker v Northumberland County Council) c) Confirmed Walker, but added the rule – the employer’s duty only arises where injury to health through stress at work is REASONABLY FORESEEABLE. (Hatton v Sutherland) d) Most Commonly Invoked Duty
412
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 3. Safe System of work and Supervision > Walker v Northumberland County Council
b) Duty extends to stress-induced (psychiatric) harm
413
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 3. Safe System of work and Supervision > b) Duty extends to stress-induced (psychiatric) harm
Walker v Northumberland County Council
414
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 3. Safe System of work and Supervision > Hatton v Sutherland
c) Confirmed Walker, but added the rule – the employer’s duty only arises where injury to health through stress at work is REASONABLY FORESEEABLE.
415
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 3. Safe System of work and Supervision > c) Confirmed Walker, but added the rule – the employer’s duty only arises where injury to health through stress at work is REASONABLY FORESEEABLE.
Hatton v Sutherland
416
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 4. Safe Workplace
Overlap with duty under Occupier’s Liability Act, but common law duty: i. Applies WHEREVER employees are at work; not just premises of employer (General Cleaning Contracts v Christmas); and ii. Cannot be delegated to an independent contractor
417
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 4. Safe Workplace > General Cleaning Contracts v Christmas
Applies WHEREVER employees are at work; not just premises of employer
418
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 1. Duty of Care > 4. Safe Workplace > Applies WHEREVER employees are at work; not just premises of employer
General Cleaning Contracts v Christmas
419
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty
Has the employer reached the standard of a REASONABLE EMPLOYER? Duty is owed to each individual employee, taking into account their individual circumstances.
420
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > Bolton v Stone
(a) If the RISK OF HARM is particularly small, and neglect is reasonable, it is justifiable not to take steps to mitigate.
421
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > (a) If the RISK OF HARM is particularly small, and neglect is reasonable, it is justifiable not to take steps to mitigate.
Bolton v Stone
422
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > Paris v Stepney BC
(b) If there is a VERY SERIOUS HARM, one must take appropriate steps to mitigate
423
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > | (b) If there is a VERY SERIOUS HARM, one must take appropriate steps to mitigate
Paris v Stepney BC
424
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > Latimer v AEC Ltd
(d) If the defendant’s actions are in the PUBLIC INTEREST/ have substantial social utility, this may justify the defendant’s taking greater risk
425
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > (d) If the defendant’s actions are in the PUBLIC INTEREST/ have substantial social utility, this may justify the defendant’s taking greater risk
Latimer v AEC Ltd
426
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington
(e) There is no duty on the defendant to protect against “fantastic” probabilities
427
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > | (e) There is no duty on the defendant to protect against “fantastic” probabilities
Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington
428
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > | Waugh v James K Allen
(f) The defendant is not liable if his actions were due to a sudden incapacity
429
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > | (f) The defendant is not liable if his actions were due to a sudden incapacity
Waugh v James K Allen
430
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > | Scott v London and St Katherine’s Docks
(g) Res Ipsa Loquitor – the defendant may be liable even if there is no conclusive proof of blame (in limited situations only).
431
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 2. Breach of Duty > (g) Res Ipsa Loquitor – the defendant may be liable even if there is no conclusive proof of blame (in limited situations only).
Scott v London and St Katherine’s Docks
432
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 4. Defences
1. Consent | 2. Contributory Negligence
433
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 4. Defences > Consent > Smith v Baker
Rarely allowed, employees not deemed to have freely consented to risk of being injured by employer’s negligence – rather, are obliged to
434
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 4. Defences > Consent > Rarely allowed, employees not deemed to have freely consented to risk of being injured by employer’s negligence – rather, are obliged to
Smith v Baker
435
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 4. Defences > Contributory Negligence
Available to Employers under Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
436
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 4. Defences > Contributory Negligence > Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd
Courts will make allowances for employees working in noisy conditions.
437
Employers Liability > CL Negligence > 4. Defences > Contributory Negligence > Courts will make allowances for employees working in noisy conditions.
Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd
438
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Steps
Step One: Define the principle of vicarious liability Step Two: Has a tort been committed by an Employer or by someone in a relationship akin to employment? Step Three: Was this IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT? Step Four: Consider the Employer’s Indemnity
439
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Define > Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society and Others
Vicarious liability is not a tort, but a principle of law. If the claimant can show that a tort has been committed by an employee in the course of employment (or in the course of a relationship akin to employment [case]), then the claimant can sue the employer.
440
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Define > Vicarious liability is not a tort, but a principle of law. If the claimant can show that a tort has been committed by an employee in the course of employment (or in the course of a relationship akin to employment [case]), then the claimant can sue the employer.
Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society and Others
441
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 2. Employer or akin
a) Firstly, apply all tests below and determine whether you are dealing with an employer or an independent contractor b) If the tortfeasor if an independent contractor, explain that following [Barclays Bank Plc v Various Claimants], the Court of Appeal has said employers are vicariously liable for the torts of independent contractors (such as a self-employed roofer) if there is a relationship akin to employment.
442
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 2. Employer or akin > Employees will have the following characteristics:
• They are usually employed under a contract of service, i.e. they: o Provide work (in the performance of a service of employer) for remuneration. o Agree that they are subject to sufficient control of another in the performance of this service; and o Other provisions of the contract are consistent with a contract of service (Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance) * They work for only one person (the employer) * They work for the employer’s business interests
443
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 2. Employer or akin > Employees characteristic > Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance
• They are usually employed under a contract of service, i.e. they: o Provide work (in the performance of a service of employer) for remuneration. o Agree that they are subject to sufficient control of another in the performance of this service; and o Other provisions of the contract are consistent with a contract of service
444
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 2. Employer or akin > Employees characteristic > • They are usually employed under a contract of service, i.e. they: o Provide work (in the performance of a service of employer) for remuneration. o Agree that they are subject to sufficient control of another in the performance of this service; and o Other provisions of the contract are consistent with a contract of service
Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance
445
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 2. Employer or akin > Independent contractors will have the following characteristics:
* They are employed under a contract for services and/or work for several people. * They work in their own business interests
446
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 2. Employer or akin > part b
b) If the tortfeasor if an independent contractor, explain that following [Barclays Bank PLC v Various Claimants], the Court of Appeal has said employers are vicariously liable for the torts of independent contractors (such as a self-employed roofer) if there is a relationship akin to employment.
447
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 2. Employer or akin > Barclays Bank PLC v Various Claimants
b) If the tortfeasor if an independent contractor, explain that following [Barclays Bank PLC v Various Claimants], the Court of Appeal has said employers are vicariously liable for the torts of independent contractors (such as a self-employed roofer) if there is a relationship akin to employment.
448
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 2. Employer or akin > Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society and Others
Test for: AKIN TO EMPLOYMENT: • The employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the employee and can be expected to have insured against that liability; • The tort will have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee on the employer’s behalf; • The activity is part of the business activity of the employer • The employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity, will have created the risk of the tort being committed by the employee; and • The employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the control of the employer.
449
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 2. Employer or akin > Test for: AKIN TO EMPLOYMENT
Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society and Others Test for: AKIN TO EMPLOYMENT: • The employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the employee and can be expected to have insured against that liability; • The tort will have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee on the employer’s behalf; • The activity is part of the business activity of the employer • The employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity, will have created the risk of the tort being committed by the employee; and • The employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the control of the employer.
450
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > Lister Test
Salmond’s classic definition, given common law authority in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd – employer will be liable for: • Wrongful ACTS it has authorised (Poland v Parr); and • Wrongful/unauthorised MODES of carrying out authorised acts (Century Insurance v NI Road Transport Board)
451
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > Poland v Parr
employer will be liable for: | • Wrongful ACTS it has authorised;
452
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > employer will be liable for: • Wrongful ACTS it has authorised;
Poland v Parr
453
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > Century Insurance v NI Road Transport Board
employer will be liable for: | • Wrongful/unauthorised MODES of carrying out authorised acts
454
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > employer will be liable for: • Wrongful/unauthorised MODES of carrying out authorised acts
Century Insurance v NI Road Transport Board
455
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > Poland v Parr
Off-duty employee protecting his employer’s property deemed to have IMPLIED PERMISSION to protect master’s property
456
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > Off-duty employee protecting his employer’s property deemed to have IMPLIED PERMISSION to protect master’s property
Poland v Parr
457
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > Century Insurance v NI Road Transport Board
Oil Tanker drivers smoking while unloading Tank of Oil
458
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > Oil Tanker drivers smoking while unloading Tank of Oil
Century Insurance v NI Road Transport Board
459
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > Century Insurance v NI Road Transport Board
Oil Tanker drivers smoking while unloading Tank of Oil
460
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. In the course of Employment > Oil Tanker drivers smoking while unloading Tank of Oil
Century Insurance v NI Road Transport Board
461
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. NOT In the course of Employment > Warren v Henleys Ltd
Employee’s punching customer in the face after insult deemed as a PERSONAL ACT
462
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > 3. NOT In the course of Employment > Employee’s punching customer in the face after insult deemed as a PERSONAL ACT
Warren v Henleys Ltd
463
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition
1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit 2. Torts expressly PROHIBITED by employer 3. ‘FROLIC’ cases
464
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit
Salmond definition suggests would NOT be in the course of employment – but employer CAN be vicariously liable for employee’s intentional torts, provided: i. Tort STEMMED from an act authorise by employer (Lloyd Grace v Smith) ii. Tort was SUFFICIENTLY CONNECTED to the work employee is employed to do. (Lister v Hesley)
465
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit > Lloyd Grace v Smith
i. Tort STEMMED from an act authorise by employer
466
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit > i. Tort STEMMED from an act authorise by employer
Lloyd Grace v Smith
467
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit > Lister v Hesley
ii. Tort was SUFFICIENTLY CONNECTED to the work employee is employed to do.
468
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit > ii. Tort was SUFFICIENTLY CONNECTED to the work employee is employed to do.
Lister v Hesley
469
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit > Mattis v Pollock
Can be interpreted widely
470
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit > Can be interpreted widely
Mattis v Pollock
471
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit > Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc
Is authority that in order to apply the Lister test, the courts must first ask: • What function(s) was(were) entrusted to the employee? • Was there a sufficient connection between the function an the wrongful conduct such that it is fair/just that his employer should be held liable.
472
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 1. INTENTIONAL torts committed purely for employee’s benefit > ?? Is authority that in order to apply the Lister test, the courts must first ask: • What function(s) was(were) entrusted to the employee? • Was there a sufficient connection between the function an the wrongful conduct such that it is fair/just that his employer should be held liable.
Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc
473
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 2. Torts expressly PROHIBITED by employer >
a) Where an act is done to further employer’s business, it may be deemed as done in the course of employment. (Rose v Plenty) b) Where act is something employee had no right to do, and act NOT done to further employees business, NOT done in the course of employment (no vicarious liability) (Twine v Bean's Express)
474
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 2. Torts expressly PROHIBITED by employer > Rose v Plenty
a) Where an act is done to further employer’s business, it may be deemed as done in the course of employment.
475
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 2. Torts expressly PROHIBITED by employer > a) Where an act is done to further employer’s business, it may be deemed as done in the course of employment.
Rose v Plenty
476
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 2. Torts expressly PROHIBITED by employer > Twine v Bean’s Express
b) Where act is something employee had no right to do, and act NOT done to further employees business, NOT done in the course of employment (no vicarious liability)
477
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 2. Torts expressly PROHIBITED by employer > b) Where act is something employee had no right to do, and act NOT done to further employees business, NOT done in the course of employment (no vicarious liability)
Twine v Bean’s Express
478
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 3. ‘FROLIC’ cases
(e.g. where employee deviates from a driving route authorised by employer and thus acts outside the course of his employment.)
479
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 3. ‘FROLIC’ cases > Joel v Morrison
a) Is the employee in a ‘frolic of his own?’
480
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 3. ‘FROLIC’ cases > a) Is the employee in a ‘frolic of his own?’
Joel v Morrison
481
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 3. ‘FROLIC’ cases > Hilton v Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd
Question of degree/ Consider i. EXTENT of the deviation (major departure or minor detour?); and ii. PURPOSE of the deviation – if employee was still going about the employer’s business at time of tort, not on ‘frolic of his own.’
482
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 3. ‘FROLIC’ cases > Question of degree/ Consider i. EXTENT of the deviation (major departure or minor detour?); and ii. PURPOSE of the deviation – if employee was still going about the employer’s business at time of tort, not on ‘frolic of his own.’
Hilton v Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd
483
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 3. ‘FROLIC’ cases > Harvey v R G O’Dell
b) Consider whether deviation was REASONABLY INCIDENTAL to one’s work
484
Employers Liability > 3. Vicarious Liability > Development and extension of the Salmond definition > 3. ‘FROLIC’ cases > b) Consider whether deviation was REASONABLY INCIDENTAL to one’s work
Harvey v R G O’Dell
485
Employers Liability > 4. Employers Indemnity > Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd
Employers have the right at common law to claim an indemnity (full loss) from the employee who committed the tort. But, gentleman’s agree-ment not to pursue claim unless misconduct by employee was wilful
486
Employers Liability > 4. Employers Indemnity > Employers have the right at common law to claim an indemnity (full loss) from the employee who committed the tort. But, gentleman’s agree-ment not to pursue claim unless misconduct by employee was wilful
Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd
487
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > Steps
Step One: State the COMMON DUTY OF CARE as an occupier Step Two: Does the defendant owe the claimant a DUTY OF CARE? Step Three: Has the defendant BREACHED this duty of care? Step Four: Did the defendant’s breach of duty CAUSE the claimant’s harm? Step Five: Consider the defences that may be available to the defendant Step Six: Conclude – explain the liability of the occupier to the visitor
488
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 1. State
Under s.2(2) OLA 1957 (Occupier’s Liability Act) the occupier owes a duty to take such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances to see that the visitor is reasonably safe in using the premises for the purpose for which he is permitted to be there.
489
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > The claimant must show what?
1. The claimant has suffered loss due to the STATE OF THE PREMISES 2. The defendant is an OCCUPIER 3. The Claimant is a VISITOR
490
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 1. The claimant has suffered loss due to the STATE OF THE PREMISES > s.1(3)(a) OLA 1957
Broad definition of premises = open land; fixed and movable structures (included vessels, vehicles) If the claimant is injured due to naturally occurring features (e.g. rabbit holes), his injuries may not be due to the state of the premises
491
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 1. The claimant has suffered loss due to the STATE OF THE PREMISES > Broad definition of premises = open land; fixed and movable structures (included vessels, vehicles)
s.1(3)(a) OLA 1957 If the claimant is injured due to naturally occurring features (e.g. rabbit holes), his injuries may not be due to the state of the premises
492
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The defendant is an OCCUPIER > Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd
An occupier is ‘anyone with a ‘sufficient degree of control over the premises’, including: i. Someone other than the owner; ii. Multiple individuals; and, iii. An independent contractor working on another person’s premises (if have required degree of control over area working in – a question of degree)
493
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The defendant is an OCCUPIER > An occupier is ‘anyone with a ‘sufficient degree of control over the premises’, including: i. Someone other than the owner; ii. Multiple individuals; and, iii. An independent contractor working on another person’s premises (if have required degree of control over area working in – a question of degree)
Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd
494
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The defendant is an OCCUPIER
Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd An occupier is ‘anyone with a ‘sufficient degree of control over the premises’, including: i. Someone other than the owner; ii. Multiple individuals; and, iii. An independent contractor working on another person’s premises (if have required degree of control over area working in – a question of degree)
495
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The defendant is an OCCUPIER > AC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden
It was held that where a contractor is not an occupier under the 1957 or 1984 Acts, he may still be liable for negligence under the established duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm to people he could reasonably expect to be affected by his work.
496
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The defendant is an OCCUPIER > It was held that where a contractor is not an occupier under the 1957 or 1984 Acts, he may still be liable for negligence under the established duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm to people he could reasonably expect to be affected by his work.
AC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden
497
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The defendant is an OCCUPIER > Buckland v Guildford Gaslight & Coke Co
this could include trespassers
498
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The defendant is an OCCUPIER > this could include trespassers
Buckland v Guildford Gaslight & Coke Co
499
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The Claimant is a VISITOR
a) Anyone with express or implied permission is allowed to be there (s.1(2) OLA 1957) b) Implied permission could be permission: i. In exercise of legal right, e.g. firemen; (s.2(6) OLA 1957) or ii. Under terms of a contract (s.5(2) OLA 1957) c) If the claimant has exceeded his permission, he becomes a trespasser --> OLA 1984 applies instead
500
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The Claimant is a VISITOR > s.1(2) OLA 1957
Anyone with express or implied permission is allowed to be there
501
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The Claimant is a VISITOR > Anyone with express or implied permission is allowed to be there
s.1(2) OLA 1957
502
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The Claimant is a VISITOR > s.2(6) OLA 1957
a) Implied permission could be permission: | i. In exercise of legal right, e.g. firemen; or
503
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The Claimant is a VISITOR > a) Implied permission could be permission: i. In exercise of legal right, e.g. firemen; or
s.2(6) OLA 1957
504
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The Claimant is a VISITOR > s.5(2) OLA 1957
b) Implied permission could be permission: | ii. Under terms of a contract
505
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The Claimant is a VISITOR > b) Implied permission could be permission: ii. Under terms of a contract
s.5(2) OLA 1957
506
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty
1. State test 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ 3. Warning notices 4. Where visitor has been injured by faulty work of INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
507
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 1. State Test > Authority
s.2(2) OLA 1957
508
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 1. State Test > s.2(2) OLA 1957
‘The defendant will have breached the duty of care owed to the claimant if his conduct fell below the standard of the reasonable occupier.’ Factors to consider and assessing whether there has been a breach a) NATURE of the danger b) PURPOSE of the visit; and c) HOW LONG the danger had been on the premises
509
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 1. State Test > ‘The defendant will have breached the duty of care owed to the claimant if his conduct fell below the standard of the reasonable occupier.’
s.2(2) OLA 1957
510
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 1. State Test > Factors to consider and assessing whether there has been a breach
a) NATURE of the danger b) PURPOSE of the visit; and c) HOW LONG the danger had been on the premises s.2(2) OLA 1957 ‘The defendant will have breached the duty of care owed to the claimant if his conduct fell below the standard of the reasonable occupier.’
511
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > S.2(3)(a) OLA 1957
a) CHILDREN are owed a higher standard of care
512
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > a) CHILDREN are owed a higher standard of care
S.2(3)(a) OLA 1957
513
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > Glasgow Corporation v Taylor
If the danger is an allurement (e.g. red berries) occupier must do even more to protect child safety
514
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > If the danger is an allurement (e.g. red berries) occupier must do even more to protect child safety
Glasgow Corporation v Taylor
515
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > Phillips v Rochester Corporation
BUT Very young children: if the occupier makes the premises reasonably safe for a young child AS ACCOMPANIED by the sort of guardian they could reasonably expect in the circumstances, this will amount to compliance with this duty.
516
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > BUT Very young children: if the occupier makes the premises reasonably safe for a young child AS ACCOMPANIED by the sort of guardian they could reasonably expect in the circumstances, this will amount to compliance with this duty.
Phillips v Rochester Corporation
517
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > Bourne Leisure Ltd v Marsden
Will not be liable of dangers so obvious that adults should be present
518
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > Will not be liable of dangers so obvious that adults should be present
Bourne Leisure Ltd v Marsden
519
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > s.2(3)(b) OLA 1957
b) VISITORS coming to exercise their skills
520
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > b) VISITORS coming to exercise their skills
s.2(3)(b) OLA 1957
521
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > Roles v Nathan
the occupier can expect these visitors to appreciate and safeguard against risks that are incidental to their job (but must be linked to their job)
522
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 2. Standard owed to ‘special visitors’ > the occupier can expect these visitors to appreciate and safeguard against risks that are incidental to their job (but must be linked to their job)
Roles v Nathan
523
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 3. Warning notices
Warning notices will amount to compliance with, and will discharge an occupier’s common duty of care providing the following: (s.2(4)(a) OLA 1957) The warning is SUFFICIENT to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe In consideration of the following factors: 1. Location of the notice (near the danger, or not)? 2. How specific is the warning? 3. Is the danger hidden or obvious? 4. Who is the visitor in question (e.g. consider reading ability of children)?
524
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 3. Warning notices > s.2(4)(a) OLA 1957
The warning is SUFFICIENT to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe
525
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 3. Warning notices > The warning is SUFFICIENT to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe
s.2(4)(a) OLA 1957
526
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 3. Warning notices > consider the following factors
1. Location of the notice (near the danger, or not)? 2. How specific is the warning? 3. Is the danger hidden or obvious? 4. Who is the visitor in question (e.g. consider reading ability of children)?
527
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 4. Where visitor has been injured by faulty work of INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS > S.2(4)(b) OLA 1957
Occupier will not be liable for injury to a visitor caused by faulty work done by independent contractors if: a) The occupier ACTED REASONABLY in entrusting work to contractor; b) The occupier took reasonable steps to check CONTRACTOR WAS COMPETENT; and c) The occupier took reasonable steps to check the WORK WAS COMPLETED PROPERLY
528
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 4. Where visitor has been injured by faulty work of INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS > Occupier will not be liable for injury to a visitor caused by faulty work done by independent contractors if: a) The occupier ACTED REASONABLY in entrusting work to contractor; b) The occupier took reasonable steps to check CONTRACTOR WAS COMPETENT; and c) The occupier took reasonable steps to check the WORK WAS COMPLETED PROPERLY
S.2(4)(b) OLA 1957
529
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 4. Where visitor has been injured by faulty work of INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS > Occupier will not be liable for injury to a visitor caused by faulty work done by independent contractors if:
a) The occupier ACTED REASONABLY in entrusting work to contractor; b) The occupier took reasonable steps to check CONTRACTOR WAS COMPETENT; and c) The occupier took reasonable steps to check the WORK WAS COMPLETED PROPERLY
530
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 4. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS > Checking the work > Haseldine v Daw & Son Ltd
Work of a technical nature (e.g. servicing a lift) cannot be reasonably checked by an occupier
531
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 4. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS > Checking the work > Work of a technical nature (e.g. servicing a lift) cannot be reasonably checked by an occupier
Haseldine v Daw & Son Ltd
532
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 4. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS > Checking the work > Woodward v The Mayor of Hastings
Work of non-specialist nature (e.g. de-icing steps can be reasonably checked by occupier
533
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 4. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS > Checking the work > Work of non-specialist nature (e.g. de-icing steps can be reasonably checked by occupier
Woodward v The Mayor of Hastings
534
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 3. Breach of Duty > 4. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS > Conclude
Has the occupier breached his duty of care to ensure a visitor is reasonably safe in using the premises for the purpose for which he is permitted to be there?
535
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 4. Causation > Jolley v Sutton London BC
The test for remoteness is ‘reasonable foreseeability’
536
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 4. Causation > The test for remoteness is ‘reasonable foreseeability’
Jolley v Sutton London BC
537
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences
1. Consent 2. Contributory Negligence 3. Exclusion of Liability
538
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 1. Consent > s.2(5) OLA 1957
Usual rules – the claimant must have known of the precise risk that caused injury, and, as shown by his conduct, must have willingly accepted the legal risk
539
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 1. Consent > Usual rules – the claimant must have known of the precise risk that caused injury, and, as shown by his conduct, must have willingly accepted the legal risk
s.2(5) OLA 1957
540
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > s.2(1) OLA 1957
a) On breach of the common duty of care, the defendant may rely on an exclusion notice to escape liability
541
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > a) On breach of the common duty of care, the defendant may rely on an exclusion notice to escape liability
s.2(1) OLA 1957
542
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > White v Blackmore
a) A notice is valid if: i. It is CLEARLY WORDED ii. Reasonable steps are taken to DRAW VISITOR’S ATTENTION TO NOTICE
543
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > a) A notice is valid if: i. It is CLEARLY WORDED ii. Reasonable steps are taken to DRAW VISITOR’S ATTENTION TO NOTICE
White v Blackmore
544
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > s.2 UCTA 1977
c) In the case of business occupiers, exclusion of liability to non-consumers (i.e. other business) s.2 UCTA 1977 applies: i. Can’t exclude liability for personal injury or death (s.2(1)) ii. Can exclude for other loss, if satisfies the UCTA reasonableness test: (s.2(2))
545
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > c) In the case of business occupiers, exclusion of liability to non-consumers (i.e. other business) s.2 UCTA 1977 applies:
s.2 UCTA 1977
546
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > s.2(1) UCTA 1977
a) In the case of business occupiers, exclusion of liability to non-consumers (i.e. other business) s.2 UCTA 1977 applies: i. Can’t exclude liability for personal injury or death
547
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > i. Can’t exclude liability for personal injury or death
s.2(1) UCTA 1977
548
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > s.2(2) UCTA 1977
a) In the case of business occupiers, exclusion of liability to non-consumers (i.e. other business) s.2 UCTA 1977 applies: ii. Can exclude for other loss, if satisfies the UCTA reasonableness test:
549
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > ii. Can exclude for other loss, if satisfies the UCTA reasonableness test
s.2(2) UCTA 1977
550
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > s.11 UCTA
Defines reasonableness: must be fair and reasonable to allow reliance on the clause, having regard to all circumstances
551
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > Defines reasonableness: must be fair and reasonable to allow reliance on the clause, having regard to all circumstances
s.11 UCTA
552
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > Smith v Eric S Bush
In deciding reasonableness, take into account the following: 1. Were the parties of equal bargaining power? 2. In the case of advice – would it have been reasonably practicable to obtain the advice from an alternative source? 3. How difficult is the task from which liability is excluded? 4. What are the practical consequences – are the parties able to bear the loss?
553
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > In deciding reasonableness, take into account the following: 1. Were the parties of equal bargaining power? 2. In the case of advice – would it have been reasonably practicable to obtain the advice from an alternative source? 3. How difficult is the task from which liability is excluded? 4. What are the practical consequences – are the parties able to bear the loss?
Smith v Eric S Bush
554
Occupier’s Liability > VISITORS – OLA 1957 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability > 2 authorities for the reasonableness test
s.11 UCTA and | Smith v Eric S Bush
555
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > Steps
Step One: State – ‘under Occupier’s Liability Act 1984, an occupier may owe a TRESPASSER a duty of care in certain situations. Step Two: Does the defendant owe the claimant a DUTY OF CARE? Step Three: Has the defendant BREACHED his duty of care Step Four: Did the defendant’s breach of duty CAUSE the claimants harm? Step Five: Consider the defences that might be available to the defendant. Step Six: Conclude – explain the liability of the occupier to the trespasser
556
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 1. State
‘under Occupier’s Liability Act 1984, an occupier may owe a TRESPASSER a duty of care in certain situations.'
557
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > Claimant must show the following
1. The defendant is an OCCUPIER 2. The Claimant is a TRESPASSER 3. The claimant suffered loss due to the state of the premises 4. And, per se s.1(3)
558
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 1. The defendant is an OCCUPIER > Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd
An occupier is ‘anyone with a ‘sufficient degree of control over the premises’, including: i. Someone other than the owner; ii. Multiple individuals; and, iii. An independent contractor working on another person’s premises (if have required degree of control over area working in – a question of degree)
559
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 1. The defendant is an OCCUPIER > An occupier is ‘anyone with a ‘sufficient degree of control over the premises’, including: i. Someone other than the owner; ii. Multiple individuals; and, iii. An independent contractor working on another person’s premises (if have required degree of control over area working in – a question of degree)
Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd
560
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The Claimant is a TRESPASSER > s.1(1)(a) OLA 1984
a) A person ‘other than a visitor’
561
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The Claimant is a TRESPASSER > a) A person ‘other than a visitor’
s.1(1)(a) OLA 1984
562
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The Claimant is a TRESPASSER > Robert Addie & Sons (Colliery) Ltd v Dumbreck
b) One who goes upon land without invitation and whose presence is either unknown to the occupier, or if known, practically objected to.
563
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 2. The Claimant is a TRESPASSER > b) One who goes upon land without invitation and whose presence is either unknown to the occupier, or if known, practically objected to.
Robert Addie & Sons (Colliery) Ltd v Dumbreck
564
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The claimant suffered loss due to the state of the premises > Tomlinson v Congleton BC
a) If the claimant is injured due to naturally occurring features (e.g. rabbit holes), his injuries will NOT have been due to ‘the state of the premises’
565
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The claimant suffered loss due to the state of the premises > a) If the claimant is injured due to naturally occurring features (e.g. rabbit holes), his injuries will NOT have been due to ‘the state of the premises’
Tomlinson v Congleton BC
566
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The claimant suffered loss due to the state of the premises > s.1(8) OLA 1984
b) N.B. the claimant may only claim damages for injury (not property damage)
567
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 3. The claimant suffered loss due to the state of the premises > b) N.B. the claimant may only claim damages for injury (not property damage)b) N.B. the claimant may only claim damages for injury (not property damage)
s.1(8) OLA 1984
568
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 4. And, per se s.1(3)
a) Occupier is aware of danger/has reasonable grounds to believe it exists b) Occupier knows/has reasonable grounds to believe the trespasser is in/may come into the vicinity of danger c) Risk is one against which occupier may reasonably be expected to offer trespasser some protection
569
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 4. And, per se s.1(3) > a) Occupier is aware of danger/has reasonable grounds to believe it exists > Rhind v Astbury Water Park
No reasonable grounds for the occupier to believe there was an obstruction to the lake --> no duty of care owed.
570
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 4. And, per se s.1(3) > a) Occupier is aware of danger/has reasonable grounds to believe it exists > No reasonable grounds for the occupier to believe there was an obstruction to the lake --> no duty of care owed.
Rhind v Astbury Water Park
571
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 4. And, per se s.1(3) > b) Occupier knows/has reasonable grounds to believe the trespasser is in/may come into the vicinity of danger > Donoghue v Folkestone Properties
Man dived into water and hit head on pole; as it was on a winter’s night, no reasonable grounds to believe anyone would be in the vicinity of danger.
572
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 4. And, per se s.1(3) > b) Occupier knows/has reasonable grounds to believe the trespasser is in/may come into the vicinity of danger > Man dived into water and hit head on pole; as it was on a winter’s night, no reasonable grounds to believe anyone would be in the vicinity of danger.
Donoghue v Folkestone Properties
573
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 4. And, per se s.1(3) > c) Risk is one against which occupier may reasonably be expected to offer trespasser some protection > Grimes v Hawkins
ii. Swimming pool was not inherently dangerous, and the injury was caused by the claimant’s actions, not the ‘state of the premises.’ The defendant was not required to adopt a ‘paternalistic approach’ to his visitors. All of whom are adults, all of whom were making choices about their behaviour, exercising their free will.
574
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 2. Duty of Care > 4. And, per se s.1(3) > c) Risk is one against which occupier may reasonably be expected to offer trespasser some protection > The defendant was not required to adopt a ‘paternalistic approach’ to his visitors. All of whom are adults, all of whom were making choices about their behaviour, exercising their free will.
Grimes v Hawkins
575
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > s.1(4) OLA 1984
1. Standard: take such care as is reasonable in the circumstances
576
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 1. Standard: take such care as is reasonable in the circumstances
s.1(4) OLA 1984
577
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 2. Children > S.2(3)(a) OLA 1957
CHILDREN are owed a higher standard of care
578
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 2. Children > CHILDREN are owed a higher standard of care
S.2(3)(a) OLA 1957
579
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 2. Children > Glasgow Corporation v Taylor
if the danger is an allurement (e.g. red berries) occupier must do even more to protect child safety
580
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 2. Children > if the danger is an allurement (e.g. red berries) occupier must do even more to protect child safety
Glasgow Corporation v Taylor
581
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 2. Children > Phillips v Rochester Corporation
BUT Very young children: if the occupier makes the premises reasonably safe for a young child AS ACCOMPANIED by the sort of guardian they could reasonably expect in the circumstances, this will amount to compliance with this duty.
582
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 2. Children > BUT Very young children: if the occupier makes the premises reasonably safe for a young child AS ACCOMPANIED by the sort of guardian they could reasonably expect in the circumstances, this will amount to compliance with this duty.
Phillips v Rochester Corporation
583
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 2. Children > Bourne Leisure Ltd v Marsden
Will not be liable of dangers so obvious that adults should be present
584
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 2. Children > Will not be liable of dangers so obvious that adults should be present
Bourne Leisure Ltd v Marsden
585
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 3. Warnings > s.1(5) OLA 1984
Occupiers may discharge a duty by taking reasonable steps to: a) Give warning of danger; and b) Discourage persons from incurring the risk (e.g. putting barriers in place)
586
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 3. Breach > 3. Warnings > Occupiers may discharge a duty by taking reasonable steps to: a) Give warning of danger; and b) Discourage persons from incurring the risk (e.g. putting barriers in place)
s.1(5) OLA 1984
587
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 5. Defences
1. Consent 2. Contributory Negligence 3. Exclusion of Liability 4. Illegality
588
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 5. Defences > 1. Consent > s.1(6) OLA 1984
Usual rules apply
589
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 5. Defences > 1. Consent > Usual rules apply
s.1(6) OLA 1984
590
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 5. Defences > 1. Consent > Ratcliff v McConnell and another
Example of successful reliance on consent. Claimant was aware of risk of voluntarily
591
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 5. Defences > 1. Consent > Example of successful reliance on consent. Claimant was aware of risk of voluntarily
Ratcliff v McConnell and another
592
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 5. Defences > 3. Exclusion of Liability
Position is unclear, as OLA 1984 is silent on whether liability can be excluded
593
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 5. Defences > 4. Illegality > Revill v Newberry
If the trespasser entered onto land for a criminal purpose, the court may thwart Parliament’s intention to provide a protection to trespassers.
594
Occupier’s Liability > TRESPASSERS – OLA 1984 > 5. Defences > 4. Illegality > If the trespasser entered onto land for a criminal purpose, the court may thwart Parliament’s intention to provide a protection to trespassers.
Revill v Newberry
595
Defective Products > Four possible claims a person effected by a defective product may bring
Negligence Consumer Protection Act 1987 Breach of contract Breach of statutory duty
596
Defective Products > Contract Law > Steps
Step One: Introduce the claim by stating the parties and the type of contract that exists Step Two: Identify the relevant EXPRESS and IMPLIED terms. Have these been breached. Step Three: What remedies are available? (Damages)
597
Defective Products > Contract Law > Criteria for bringing a claim in Contract Law
a) The claimant is the buyer of the product (or comes within the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999) b) The defendant is the supplier of the defective product – not manufacturer c) Supplier has not gone out of business
598
Defective Products > Contract Law > Types of contract relevant for a claim
a) Contract for the sale or goods | b) Contract for the sale of goods and services
599
Defective Products > Contract Law > | s.14(2) Sale of Goods Act 1979
Goods must be of a satisfactory quality
600
Defective Products > Contract Law > | s.4(2) Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982
Goods must be of a satisfactory quality
601
Defective Products > Contract Law > | s.9 Consumer Rights Act 2015
Goods must be of a satisfactory quality
602
Defective Products > Contract Law > | Goods must be of a satisfactory quality
s. 14(2) Sale of Goods Act 1979 s. 4(2) Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 s. 9 Consumer Rights Act 2015
603
Defective Products > Contract Law > Aim of Damages
Put the claimant in the position as if contract had been fulfilled
604
Defective Products > Contract Law > Hadley v Baxendale
a) Losses flowing naturally from the breach; and b) Losses within reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract; c) Including pure economic loss.
605
Defective Products > Contract Law > a) Losses flowing naturally from the breach; and b) Losses within reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract; c) Including pure economic loss.
Hadley v Baxendale
606
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Steps
Step One: Can the claimant bring a claim? State – to bring a claim under s.2(1) CPA 1987, the claimant must show that they… Step Two: Is the defendant liable? State, to be liable under s.2(2) CPA 1987, the defendant must be… Step Three: What defences are available to the defendant? Step Four: Conclude as to what is recoverable under the CPA 1987
607
Defective Products > Negligence > Steps
Step One: Introduce negligence claim – see WS2 (duty and breach) Step Two: Is a duty of care owed? Step Three: has the defendant Breached this duty Step Four: Did the defendant’s breach cause the claimant’s loss? Step Five: Are any defences available to the defendant? Step Six: What Remedies are available to the claimant?
608
Defective Products > Breach as Statutory Duty > Steps
Step One: Does the statute, if breached, allow a claim in tort? Step Two: Is there a duty under statue? Step Three: Has there been a breach of this specific statutory duty? Step Four: Damage Step Five: Causation – did the defendant’s breach of statutory duty cause the claimant’s harm? Step Six: Consider relevant defences
609
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > State
To bring a claim under s.2(1) CPA 1987, the claimant must show that they… 1. Have suffered Damage 2. Caused by 3. A defect 4. In a product
610
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Bring a claim under which provision
s.2(1) CPA 1987
611
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > s.5 CPA 1987
What is included as damage suffered is outlined in s.5 CPA 1987. a) Death and Personal Injury (‘any disease and any other impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition.’ s.45 CPA1987) b) Private property damage – but – i. S.5(4) – only if £275 or over (in aggregate); and ii. S.5(3) – damage to business property is not recoverable (must be ‘property ordinarily intended for private use, occupation or consumption.’ s.5(3)(a)) c) Unlike in contract law, X cannot recover pure economic loss (s.5(2) CPA 1987, Murphy v Brentwood)
612
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > s.45 CPA 1987
‘any disease and any other impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition.’
613
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > ‘any disease and any other impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition.’
s.45 CPA 1987
614
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > S.5(4) CPA 1987
Private property damage – but – only if £275 or over (in aggregate)
615
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > Private property damage – but – only if £275 or over (in aggregate)
S.5(4) CPA 1987
616
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > S.5(3) CPA 1987
Damage to business property is not recoverable (must be ‘property ordinarily intended for private use, occupation or consumption.’ s.5(3)(a))
617
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > Damage to business property is not recoverable (must be ‘property ordinarily intended for private use, occupation or consumption.’ s.5(3)(a))
S.5(3) CPA 1987
618
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > s.5(3)(a) CPA 1987
must be ‘property ordinarily intended for private use, occupation or consumption.’
619
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > must be ‘property ordinarily intended for private use, occupation or consumption.’
s.5(3)(a) CPA 1987
620
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > s.5(2) CPA 1987, Murphy v Brentwood
Unlike in contract law, the claimant cannot recover pure economic loss
621
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Suffered Damage > Unlike in contract law, the claimant cannot recover pure economic loss
s.5(2) CPA 1987, Murphy v Brentwood
622
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Caused by > Causation rules for the CPA 1987
a) But for the defect, would the claimant have suffered the damage in question? b) The Act is silent on the rules for remoteness, therefore the defendant will likely be found liable for all ‘direct consequences’ of the defect, regardless of whether foreseeable or not (Re Polemis).
623
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Caused by > Re Polemis
The Act is silent on the rules for remoteness, therefore the defendant will likely be found liable for all ‘direct consequences’ of the defect, regardless of whether foreseeable or not
624
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Caused by > The Act is silent on the rules for remoteness, therefore the defendant will likely be found liable for all ‘direct consequences’ of the defect, regardless of whether foreseeable or not
Re Polemis
625
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > A defect > s.3(1) CPA 1987
Defective means that the safety of the product is, ‘not such as persons generally are entitled to expect.’
626
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > A defect > Defective means that the safety of the product is, ‘not such as persons generally are entitled to expect.’
s.3(1) CPA 1987
627
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > A defect > s.3(2) CPA 1987
In applying this definition consider: the whole get-up and presentation of the product taking into account its expected use and age
628
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > A defect > In applying this definition consider: the whole get-up and presentation of the product taking into account its expected use and age
s.3(2) CPA 1987
629
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > A defect > A v National Blood Authority
Strict Liability: even where the risk is unavoidable, the courts may still find a defect, providing the public would reasonably expect the product to be safe.
630
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > A defect > Strict Liability: even where the risk is unavoidable, the courts may still find a defect, providing the public would reasonably expect the product to be safe.
A v National Blood Authority
631
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > In a Product > s.1(2) CPA 1987
the meaning of product is a very wide category and includes goods, electricity, component part of a product, raw material and even blood (A v National Blood Authority).
632
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > In a Product > the meaning of product is a very wide category and includes goods, electricity, component part of a product, raw material and even blood (A v National Blood Authority).
s.1(2) CPA 1987
633
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > In a Product > A v National Blood Authority
Property includes blood
634
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > In a Product > Property includes blood
A v National Blood Authority
635
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Is the defendant liable? State:
To be liable under s.2(2) CPA 1987, the defendant must be… 1. Producer: if a component part is faulty, both the manufacturer of part AND the manufacturer of the whole will be liable. 2. An own-brander: person who is putting their trademark on the product holds himself out as being its producer. 3. An importer: person who imports the product into an EU member state from a Non-EU member state. 4. Supplier: but only under s.2(3), only where the supplier is ‘forgetful’ i.e. unable to meet victim’s request to identify any of the other people involved in the chain of supply.
636
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > What are the two defences?
s.4 Complete Defence (including s.4(1)(e) developmental risk) Contributory negligence under s.6(4)
637
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > s.4 CPA 1987
1. S.4 Complete Defences • Defect was an inevitable consequence of compliance with legal requirements. • The defendant did not supply the product to another (e.g. the claimant obtained the product from someone who had stolen it.) • The defendant did not supply the product in the course of business (e.g. solf between two friends). Defect did not exist when the defendant supplied the product (was instead caused by fair wear and tear or missuse) • A manufacturer of a component part is not liable if the defect in the finished product is wholly attributable to design of finished product/compliance with instructions given by the manufacturer of the finished product. • DEVELOPMENTAL RISK s.4(1)(e)
638
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > s.4(1)(e) CPA 1987
DEVELOPMENTAL RISK o The defendant must prove that the state of knowledge at the time the product was supplied, amongst producers of product in question, was not such as to allow a producer of the product to discover the defect. o Commission v UK: state of knowledge interpreted to mean the highest standard of knowledge accessible anywhere in the world at that time. o A v National Blood Authority: only available where defect/risk was unforeseeable (this is not equivalent to the risk being unavoidable.)
639
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > Developmental Risk s.4(1)(e) > Commission v UK
state of knowledge interpreted to mean the highest standard of knowledge accessible anywhere in the world at that time.
640
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > Developmental Risk s.4(1)(e) > state of knowledge interpreted to mean the highest standard of knowledge accessible anywhere in the world at that time.
Commission v UK
641
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > Developmental Risk s.4(1)(e) > A v National Blood Authority
only available where defect/risk was unforeseeable (this is not equivalent to the risk being unavoidable.)
642
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > Developmental Risk s.4(1)(e) > only available where defect/risk was unforeseeable (this is not equivalent to the risk being unavoidable.)
A v National Blood Authority
643
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > s.6(4) CPA 1987
Contributory Negligence is available
644
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > Contributory Negligence is available
s.6(4) CPA 1987
645
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > s.7 CPA 1987
Exclusion of liability and consent are not available as defences
646
Defective Products > CPA 1987 > Defences > Exclusion of liability and consent are not available as defences
s.7 CPA 1987
647
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > Donoghue v Stevenson
a) A manufacturer owes a duty of care to his ultimate consumer; or b) “A manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care,”
648
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > State
a duty of care will be owed under the narrow rule in Donoghue v Stevenson if the claimant can show the following: (a) The defendant is a Manufacturer (b) The item causing the damage is a Product (c) The claimant is a Consumer (d) The product reached the Consumer in the form which it left the manufacturer
649
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > a duty of care will be owed under the narrow rule in Donoghue v Stevenson if the claimant can show the following:
(a) The defendant is a Manufacturer (b) The item causing the damage is a Product (c) The claimant is a Consumer (d) The product reached the Consumer in the form which it left the manufacturer
650
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > Haseldine v Daw & Son Ltd
‘Manufacturer’ includes repairers
651
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > ‘Manufacturer’ includes repairers
Haseldine v Daw & Son Ltd
652
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > Stennett v Hancock
‘Manufacturer’ includes installers
653
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > ‘Manufacturer’ includes installers
Stennett v Hancock
654
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > Andrews v Hopkinson
‘Manufacturer’ includes suppliers of products if they ought reasonably to inspect or test the products which they supply
655
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > ‘Manufacturer’ includes suppliers of products if they ought reasonably to inspect or test the products which they supply
Andrews v Hopkinson
656
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > Kulbach v Hollands
The product reached the consumer in the form in which it left the manufacturer with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination.
657
Defective Products > Negligence > Duty owed > The product reached the consumer in the form in which it left the manufacturer with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination.
Kulbach v Hollands
658
Defective Products > Negligence > Breach > Standard of care
To exercise reasonable care; that of a reasonable manufacturer in the circumstances, taking into account the magnitude of the risk, gravity of the potential injury, cost and practicality of precautions.
659
Defective Products > Negligence > Breach > Donoghue v Stevenson (obiter)
the claimant must prove the defendant’s breach, as res ipsa loquitur will not apply in product liability, the breach cannot be inferred.
660
Defective Products > Negligence > Breach > the claimant must prove the defendant’s breach, as res ipsa loquitur will not apply in product liability, the breach cannot be inferred.
Donoghue v Stevenson (obiter)
661
Defective Products > Negligence > Breach > Establish in Grant v Australian Knitting Mills and followed in Carroll v Fearon
Unlike Contract Law and the CPA 1987 claims, there is no strict liability, however the courts will sometimes infer a breach if the defect would have been averted, had the manufacturers taken reasonable care
662
Defective Products > Negligence > Breach > Unlike Contract Law and the CPA 1987 claims, there is no strict liability, however the courts will sometimes infer a breach if the defect would have been averted, had the manufacturers taken reasonable care
Establish in Grant v Australian Knitting Mills and followed in Carroll v Fearon
663
Defective Products > Negligence > Causation > Evans v Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd
‘But for’ test applies as illustrated
664
Defective Products > Negligence > Causation > ‘But for’ test applies as illustrated
Evans v Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd
665
Defective Products > Negligence > Causation > Wagon Mound
Test for legal causation
666
Defective Products > Negligence > Causation > Test for legal causation
Wagon Mound
667
Defective Products > Negligence > Defences > Grant v Australian Knitting Mills
Consent is available, but typically hard to show.
668
Defective Products > Negligence > Defences > Consent is available, but typically hard to show.
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills
669
Defective Products > Negligence > Defences > s.2(1) CPA 1987
Exclusion of liability is available, but consider the following: Liability in negligence for death/personal injury cannot be excluded
670
Defective Products > Negligence > Defences > Exclusion of liability is available, but consider the following: Liability in negligence for death/personal injury cannot be excluded
s.2(1) CPA 1987
671
Defective Products > Negligence > Defences > s.2(2) CPA 1987
Exclusion of liability is available, but consider the following: Liability for loss/damage, other than death or personal injury may only be excluded if the reasonableness test is satisfied.
672
Defective Products > Negligence > Defences > Exclusion of liability is available, but consider the following: Liability for loss/damage, other than death or personal injury may only be excluded if the reasonableness test is satisfied.
s.2(2) CPA 1987
673
Defective Products > Negligence > Remedies > State what the claimant can and can’t recover
1. Losses within the scope of the duty: personal injury; property damage 2. Cannot claim for pure economic loss (Murphy v Brentwood), but can claim for consequential economic loss.
674
Defective Products > Negligence > Remedies > Murphy v Brentwood
Cannot claim for pure economic loss in negligence
675
Defective Products > Negligence > Remedies > Cannot claim for pure economic loss in negligence
Murphy v Brentwood
676
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum
If the statute protects a limited, ascertainable class, a claim in tort can be brought
677
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > If the statute protects a limited, ascertainable class, a claim in tort can be brought
Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum
678
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Groves v Lord Wimborne
Where the statute imposes a sanction, it is less likely that Parliament intended it to give rise to a civil claim in tort but according to Groves v Lord Wimborne, this is rebuttable where: i. The size of the penalty is inadequate considering the claimant’s loss; ii. The victim is not entitled to receive all of this fine.
679
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Where the statute imposes a sanction, it is less likely that Parliament intended it to give rise to a civil claim in tort but according to Groves v Lord Wimborne, this is rebuttable where: i. The size of the penalty is inadequate considering the claimant’s loss; ii. The victim is not entitled to receive all of this fine.
Groves v Lord Wimborne
680
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > O’Rourke v Camden LBC
Context gives rise to a statutory duty (e.g. legislation which serves a general social welfare function is unlikely to give rise to a claim)
681
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Context gives rise to a statutory duty (e.g. legislation which serves a general social welfare function is unlikely to give rise to a claim)
O’Rourke v Camden LBC
682
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Wilsons duties
Where the statutory duty coincides with the common law (see Wilsons duties below), it is more likely that Parliament intended a Civil claim to be available.
683
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > is there a duty? > Hartley v Mayoh & Co
Does the claimant fall within the protected class?
684
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > is there a duty? > Does the claimant fall within the protected class?
Hartley v Mayoh & Co
685
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > is there a duty? > Smith v Northampton County Council
Do the facts fall within the statutory wording
686
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > is there a duty? > Do the facts fall within the statutory wording
Smith v Northampton County Council
687
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > breach of duty? > Stark v Post Office
The duty is absolute. (Check the wording of statute. If mandatory language is used (e.g. ‘shall’, ‘must’) this imposes strict liability)
688
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > breach of duty? > The duty is absolute. (Check the wording of statute. If mandatory language is used (e.g. ‘shall’, ‘must’) this imposes strict liability)
Stark v Post Office
689
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Damage > Gorris v Scott
The damage or harm must be of the kind that the statute was trying to prevent.
690
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Damage > The damage or harm must be of the kind that the statute was trying to prevent.
Gorris v Scott
691
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Causation >
* Apply the but for test, and consider whether there were any intervening events? * No need to consider the remoteness rule, as this has been dealt with under ‘Damage’
692
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Defences > Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd
Contributory negligence is available as a defence, but courts slower to make a finding of CN against an employee working in factory-type conditions – noisy conditions, repetitive tasks
693
Defective Products > Breach of statutory duty > Defences > Contributory negligence is available as a defence, but courts slower to make a finding of CN against an employee working in factory-type conditions – noisy conditions, repetitive tasks
Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd
694
Private Nuisance > Steps
Step One: Heading – Claimant v Defendant Step Two: State – the claimant can consider suing the defendant in the tort of private nuisance for [insert conduct] Step Three: Consider what the claimant has to prove Step Four: Consider who can be sued Step Five: Are there any defence Step Six: What are the available Remedies? Step Seven: Conclude
695
Private Nuisance > State
the claimant can consider suing the defendant in the tort of private nuisance for [insert conduct]
696
Private Nuisance > Define > Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, used in Read v Lyons & Co Ltd
Define Private nuisance: an unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it.’
697
Private Nuisance > Define > Define Private nuisance: an unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it.’
Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, used in Read v Lyons & Co Ltd
698
Private Nuisance > What must the claimant prove?
1. Does the Claimant have locus standi? 2. Has there been an actionable interference with the claimant’s land? 3. Is this interference ‘unlawful’? 4. Has the claimant suffered damage that is recoverable? 5. Causation and Remoteness
699
Private Nuisance > Locus Standi > Hunter v Canary Wharf
The claimant must have a proprietary interest in the land – freeholders and tenants and occupiers in exclusive possession e.g. not licenses [case]
700
Private Nuisance > Locus Standi > The claimant must have a proprietary interest in the land – freeholders and tenants and occupiers in exclusive possession e.g. not licenses [case]
Hunter v Canary Wharf
701
Private Nuisance > Locus Standi > Malone v Laskey
• Neither children nor spouse [case] of owner-occupier of land can sue in private nuisance
702
Private Nuisance > Locus Standi > • Neither children nor spouse [case] of owner-occupier of land can sue in private nuisance
Malone v Laskey
703
Private Nuisance > actionable interferences > Three types of nuisance according to Hunter v Canary Wharf:
a) Encroachment on the neighbour’s land (must be permanent) b) Direct physical injury to land; and c) Interference with quiet enjoyment of the land, a.k.a loss of amenity (inc. smells, dust, vibration, noise)
704
Private Nuisance > NON-actionable interferences > Hunter v Canary Wharf
• Disruption to TV Reception
705
Private Nuisance > NON-actionable interferences > Disruption to TV Reception
Hunter v Canary Wharf
706
Private Nuisance > NON-actionable interferences > Walter v Selfe
• Interferences with ‘elegant or dainty models of living.’
707
Private Nuisance > NON-actionable interferences > • Interferences with ‘elegant or dainty models of living.’
Walter v Selfe
708
Private Nuisance > NON-actionable interferences > Aldred’s Case
• Right to view is not actionable
709
Private Nuisance > NON-actionable interferences > Right to view is not actionable
Aldred’s Case
710
Private Nuisance > actionable interferences > Walter v Selfe
Must be something that materially interferes with ‘ordinary conduct.’
711
Private Nuisance > actionable interferences > Must be something that materially interferes with ‘ordinary conduct.’
Walter v Selfe
712
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan
(a) Unlawful means ‘substantial and unreasonable.’ • State test for unlawfulness: ‘what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of mankind living in… a particular society.’ (b) This is a question of fact. Factors the court will consider are: (i) Frequency and duration (ii) Excessiveness of conduct/extent of harm (iii) Abnormal Sensitivity (an application of the egg shell skull rule) (iv) Character of neighbourhood (v) Public Benefit (vi) Malice on part of defendant
713
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > Define
Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan (a) Unlawful means ‘substantial and unreasonable.’ • State test for unlawfulness: ‘what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of mankind living in… a particular society.’ (b) This is a question of fact. Factors the court will consider are: (i) Frequency and duration (ii) Excessiveness of conduct/extent of harm (iii) Abnormal Sensitivity (an application of the egg shell skull rule) (iv) Character of neighbourhood (v) Public Benefit (vi) Malice on part of defendant
714
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (i) Frequency and duration > Miller v Jackson (cricket ball case)
The longer the duration and frequency of the interference, the more likely the court will consider it to be unreasonable.
715
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (i) Frequency and duration > The longer the duration and frequency of the interference, the more likely the court will consider it to be unreasonable.
Miller v Jackson (cricket ball case)
716
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (i) Frequency and duration > Spicer v Smee
An isolated event will be unlawful ONLY if it emanates from a continuous state of affairs on the defendant’s property.
717
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (i) Frequency and duration > An isolated event will be unlawful ONLY if it emanates from a continuous state of affairs on the defendant’s property.
Spicer v Smee
718
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (ii) Excessiveness of conduct/extent of harm
1. Behaviour of the defendant – how far removed from ‘normal’ behaviour is it (objective test)? a) Noise from 8am-6pm is excessive (Matania v National Provincial Bank) b) Physical damage to the land is usually excessive 2. Impact on the claimant (subjective test)
719
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (iii) Abnormal Sensitivity (an application of the egg shell skull rule)
1. The Claimant’s claim will only succeed if the interference in question would have affected a normal user. (Robinson v Kilvert – claim failed because the interference would not have affected a normal user). 2. If (1) can be shown, the claimant can recover for all loss, even if it is due to his abnormal sensitivity (McKinnon v Walker – claim succeeded because fumes would have damaged regular plants, not just the claimant’s sensitive orchids, so the claimant recovered for his loss.
720
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (iv) Character of neighbourhood > Sturges v Bridgman
1. What might be considered nuisance in a fancy area, might not be in another area (e.g. does the area have an undue amount of noise anyway?)
721
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (iv) Character of neighbourhood > 1. What might be considered nuisance in a fancy area, might not be in another area (e.g. does the area have an undue amount of noise anyway?)
Sturges v Bridgman
722
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (iv) Character of neighbourhood > Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co
2. But, is only relevant to an interference which causes personal discomfort – i.e. of the claimant has incurred physical loss, character of neighbourhood is not considered.
723
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (iv) Character of neighbourhood > 2. But, is only relevant to an interference which causes personal discomfort – i.e. of the claimant has incurred physical loss, character of neighbourhood is not considered.
Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co
724
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (iv) Character of neighbourhood > Gillingham BC v Medway Docks Co Ltd
3. Whether planning permission has been given, this may be deemed to have changed the character of the neighbourhood: an interference that would have been unlawful in the old neighbourhood is now lawful.
725
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (iv) Character of neighbourhood > 3. Whether planning permission has been given, this may be deemed to have changed the character of the neighbourhood: an interference that would have been unlawful in the old neighbourhood is now lawful.
Gillingham BC v Medway Docks Co Ltd
726
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (iv) Character of neighbourhood > Coventry v Lawrence
4. The court should start from the proposition that the defendant’s activities are taken into account when assessing the character of the locality. However, such activity should only be considered to the extent to which they would not cause a nuisance to the claimant
727
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (iv) Character of neighbourhood > 4. The court should start from the proposition that the defendant’s activities are taken into account when assessing the character of the locality. However, such activity should only be considered to the extent to which they would not cause a nuisance to the claimant
Coventry v Lawrence
728
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (v) Public Benefit
1. A smelly chip shop can have a benefit to the community (Adams v Ursell) 2. But, public benefit is more likely to be considered by the court during the discussion of remedies, as courts consistently take the view that public benefit cannot exonerate the defendant of liability for private nuisance (see below)
729
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (vi) Malice on part of defendant > Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett
If the defendant has been trying to annoy the claimant, interference more likely to be considered unreasonable and therefore unlawful.
730
Private Nuisance > 'unlawful' interference > (vi) Malice on part of defendant > If the defendant has been trying to annoy the claimant, interference more likely to be considered unreasonable and therefore unlawful.
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett
731
Private Nuisance > 4. Has the claimant suffered damage that is recoverable?
a) Nuisance is not actionable per se – the claimant must prove that he has suffered any damage to the land itself/buildings, or any interference with quiet enjoyment of the land. b) No claims for personal injury (Hunter v Canary Wharf) or for personal property (sometimes exceptions – Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd). In reality the claimant would run negligence claims for both c) Can recover for consequential economic loss, where has flowed from damage to property and/or personal discomfort (Andreae v Selfridge & Co Ltd)
732
Private Nuisance > Causation and Remoteness
(a) Did the unlawful interference cause the claimant’s damage? i. But for test (Barnett) for factual causation ii. NAI (b) Was the kind of damage reasonably foreseeable to someone in the defendant’s position at time acts we're done? have (Wagon Mound No.1 test for remoteness and legal causation as confirmed by Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc.)
733
Private Nuisance > Who can be sued?
1. The CREATOR of the nuisance 2. The current OCCUPIER of the land 3. The LANDLORD
734
Private Nuisance > Who can be sued? > The Creator of the nuisance
Liable, even if land now owned by someone else
735
Private Nuisance > Who can be sued? > The current OCCUPIER of the land
Liable for nuisances he created (either positively or by failing to take steps). Also liable for the following nuisances created by other persons: a) Nuisance created by employee acting in the course of his employment (vicarious liability) b) nuisance created by independent contractor, provided the nature of the work carries a special danger of the nuisance being created; and c) nuisance created by visitor (Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire CC), predecessor in title (St Anne’s Well Brewery Co v Roberts), trespasser (Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan) or natural event (Leakey v National Trust) where occupier has adopted the nuisance i.e. made use of it or continued it I eat failed to take reasonable steps to end the nuisance (Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan).
736
Private Nuisance > Who can be sued? > The LANDLORD
Generally, it is the tenant that is liable, but the landlord is liable for nuisances that: a) he has impliedly/expressly authorised through letting out the premises (Tetley v Chitty) b) Existed at the start of tenancy that he ought to reasonably have known about c) He has promised to repair but fails to repair (Payne v Rogers)
737
Private Nuisance > Defences > Effective
(a) Prescription (b) Statutory Authority (c) Contributory Negligence (d) Consent (e) Act of God/Nature
738
Private Nuisance > Defences > Effective > (a) Prescription > Sturges v Bridgman
Provided the actual nuisance has been continued against the claimant for at least 20 years and therefore the right to commit the nuisance has been acquired.
739
Private Nuisance > Defences > Effective > (a) Prescription > Provided the actual nuisance has been continued against the claimant for at least 20 years and therefore the right to commit the nuisance has been acquired.
Sturges v Bridgman
740
Private Nuisance > Defences > Effective > (b) Statutory Authority > Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd
Provided the defendant can show nuisance was inevitable consequence of doing what the statute authorised.
741
Private Nuisance > Defences > Effective > (b) Statutory Authority > Provided the defendant can show nuisance was inevitable consequence of doing what the statute authorised.
Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd
742
Private Nuisance > Defences > Effective > (e) Act of God/Nature > Wringe v Cohen
Provided that the defendant has not adopted or continued the nuisance.
743
Private Nuisance > Defences > Effective > (e) Act of God/Nature > Provided that the defendant has not adopted or continued the nuisance.
Wringe v Cohen
744
Private Nuisance > Defences > Effective > (e) Act of God/Nature > Provided that the defendant has not adopted or continued the nuisance.
Wringe v Cohen
745
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective
(a) The claimant came to the nuisance (b) Public Benefit (c) Contributory actions of others (d) Planning permission
746
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (a) The claimant came to the nuisance > Miller v Jackson
• Even if the nuisance existed before the claimant, for example, built his house on the polluted land, the claimant can still sue.
747
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (a) The claimant came to the nuisance > • Even if the nuisance existed before the claimant, for example, built his house on the polluted land, the claimant can still sue.
Miller v Jackson
748
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (a) The claimant came to the nuisance > Coventry v Lawrence
• Provided a claimant in private nuisance uses his or her property for essentially the same purpose as his/her predecessors before the nuisance started, the defendant cannot rely on the excuse that the claimant, ‘came to the nuisance.’
749
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (a) The claimant came to the nuisance > Provided a claimant in private nuisance uses his or her property for essentially the same purpose as his/her predecessors before the nuisance started, the defendant cannot rely on the excuse that the claimant, ‘came to the nuisance.’
Coventry v Lawrence
750
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (b) Public Benefit > Miller v Jackson; Kennaway v Thomson
The claimant may be deprived of an injunction where the public benefit in question is considered to prevail over the claimant’s private interests.
751
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (b) Public Benefit > The claimant may be deprived of an injunction where the public benefit in question is considered to prevail over the claimant’s private interests.
Miller v Jackson; Kennaway v Thomson
752
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (d) Planning permission > Wheeler v Saunders
i. Will not legitimise a nuisance
753
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (d) Planning permission > i. Will not legitimise a nuisance
Wheeler v Saunders
754
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (d) Planning permission > Gillingham BC v Medway Docks Co Ltd
ii. May operate to change character of neighbourhood
755
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (d) Planning permission > ii. May operate to change character of neighbourhood
Gillingham BC v Medway Docks Co Ltd
756
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (d) Planning permission > Coventry v Lawrence
iii. Where planning permission stipulates limits as to the frequency and intensity of noise, then such conditions within a planning permission may be relevant in assisting the claimant’s action in private nuisance
757
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > (d) Planning permission > iii. Where planning permission stipulates limits as to the frequency and intensity of noise, then such conditions within a planning permission may be relevant in assisting the claimant’s action in private nuisance
Coventry v Lawrence
758
Private Nuisance > Defences > Ineffective > Apply to facts
Ineffective defences will not enable the defendant to escape liability, but will be considered when considering the type of remedy.
759
Private Nuisance > Remedies
Distinguish between past and future nuisances. For example, if the claimant has put up with the nuisance for (1) two weeks, but anticipates the nuisance lasting (2) two years, there are two claims in question. First, he may want to claim damages for the past nuisance in negligence. Secondly, he may want an injunction to prevent the future nuisance. N.B. negligence claims always relate to past nuisances and so there is no scope for an injunction only damages.
760
Private Nuisance > Remedies > Damages for:
a) Physical damage to the claimant’s land – damages to reflect cost of repair, or if not possible, loss in value of land. b) Personal discomfort – difficult to assess, might be based on loss of amenity value of the land. (Hunter v Canary Wharf)
761
Private Nuisance > Remedies > Injunction
Court order regulating the defendants future conduct. Will not be awarded where damages are an adequate remedy; will be awarded where a claimant seeks to prevent future breaches.
762
Private Nuisance > Remedies > Types of Injunction
a) Prohibitory Injunction: forbids the defendant from continuing a nusiance b) Mandatory Injunction: the defendant is required to take positive steps to rectify consequences of actions c) A ‘quia timet’ injunction: i.e. before the nuisance has been committed, in anticipation of it. Unusual Remedy. Conditions: 1. Claimant is almost certain to incur damage without injunction 2. such damage is imminent; and 3. the defendant will not stop his course of conduct without court order
763
Private Nuisance > Remedies > Damages in Lieu of Injunction
Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co: Appropriate where: a) Case is suitable for an injunction in the first place; b) injury to the claimants legal right’s/damage - • is small; • can be estimated in money; • can be adequately compensated by a small payment, and c) would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction
764
Private Nuisance > Remedies > Damages in Lieu of Injunction > Authority
Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co
765
Private Nuisance > Remedies > Public Benefit and Injunctions > Miller v Jackson
* Injunction refused because it was considered appropriate that the public interest should prevail over the private interest of the claimants. * Court also found that the claimant ‘came to the nuisance’ and deciding that damages were an adequate remedy.
766
Private Nuisance > Remedies > Public Benefit and Injunctions > Kennaway v Thomson
* The public benefit of power boat racing was not sufficient to deprive the claimant of an injunction * Granted a prohibitory injunction to restrict the defendant’s activities and the noise level
767
Private Nuisance > Remedies > Abatement
a) the removal of the interference by the victim b) normally victim has to give prior notice to the defendant accept an emergency or nuisance can be removed without entering the wrongdoers land (Lemmon v Webb) c) the interference must be returned to the defendant (Mills v Brooker)