Auction Theory Flashcards

1
Q

List the 5 types of auction

A
  1. English / ascending-bid
  2. Dutch / descending-bid
  3. First-price sealed-bid
  4. Second-price sealed-bid
  5. All-pay
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

What is an English / ascending-bid auction? What is it used to sell?

A

Start at reserve price and raise until a winner is left
Eg. art, antiques

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

What is a Dutch / descending-bid auction? What is it used to sell?

A

Start high and cut until somebody bids
Eg. flowers

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

What is a first-price sealed-bid auction? What is it used to sell?

A

One bid per bidder
Eg. government contracts

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

What is a second-price sealed-bid auction? What is it used to sell?

A

Highest bidder wins and pays second highest bid
Eg. postage stamps

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

What is an all-pay auction? What is it used to sell?

A

Everyone pays at every round until one remaining bidder gets the goods
Eg. war litigation

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Which 2 pairs of auction types are strategically equivalent? Why? How should you behave in each?

A
  1. Dutch and first-price sealed-bid
    Auctions give same result - highest bidder gets the goods at his reservation price. Should bid low if you think your valuation is much higher than everybody else’s
  2. English and second-price sealed-bid
    Should bid truthfully
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

What is strategic equivalence?

A

Equivalence in who will win

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

What is revenue equivalence?

A

Equivalence in how much money on average

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

What is the Revenue Equivalence Theorem?

A

You get the same revenue from any well-behaved auction under ideal conditions

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Give 3 ideal conditions needed for the Revenue Equivalence Theorem to hold

A
  1. No collusion
  2. Pareto efficiency (highest value bidder gets the goods)
  3. Independent valuations
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

What is a private-value auction?

A

Each bidder’s value vi is exogenous. In a second-price auction, everything you buy is a bargain

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

What is a public-value auction?

A

Each item has a true price which bidders estimate at v + ei. Winner’s curse: the buyer is whoever overestimated the most

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Which two extremes do most real auctions lie between?

A

Private-value and public-value

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

What is a bidding ring?

A

Bidders collude to buy low, have a private auction later, split the proceeds

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

List all 10 things that can go wrong in an auction

A
  1. Bargain in private-value second-price auction
  2. Winner’s curse in public-value auction
  3. Bidding rings
  4. Rigging of second-price auctions
  5. Entry detection/deterrence
  6. Predation
  7. Risk aversion
  8. Signalling games
  9. Budget constraints
  10. Externalities between bidders (eg. arms sales)
17
Q

Are first-price or second-price auctions harder to rig?

A

First-price

18
Q

Give an example of entry deterrence

A

An auction required bidders to draw up a detailed programming plan

19
Q

Give an example of entry detection

A

If a bidder knows they have no competition they can bid as low as they like

20
Q

What is predation?

A

We’ll top any other bid

21
Q

What are the effects risk aversion in auctions?

A

If you prefer a certain profit of £1 to a 50% chance of £2, you’ll bid higher at a first-price auction

22
Q

How can signalling games be applied in an auction?

A

Showing aggression by a price hike

23
Q

How do budget constraints effect auctions?

A

If bidders are cash-limited, all-pay auctions are more profitable

24
Q

What is a combinatorial auction?

A

Externalities lead to preferences for particular bundles of goods. Eg. bid an amount for A+B+C

25
Q

What is the mechanism of an ad auction?

A

Second-price auction mechanism but tweaked to optimise platform revenue

26
Q

Explain how ad auctions work

A

Bidders bid price pi
Platform estimates ad quality ei (relevance x clickthrough rate)
Ad rank = pi x ei
Ads are then ranked by ad rank
Cost per click (that advertiser has to pay) = (pi x competitor ad rank) / own ad rank

27
Q

What are the ethical aspects of ad auctions

A

Translated to social media, ad quality can easily segue into virality. So if your ads are good clickbait you pay less. Many sites tend to serve ever more provocative and extreme content