Attitudes following CMC Flashcards
CMC, Hot line, Moscow Test Ban and NPT treaty
What were the attitudes of Khrushchev and JFK following CMC?
- While Khrushchev was interested in concept of peaceful coexistence, he had to show a strong anti-Western position to maintain dominance over China and Communist world.
- After Cuban Missile crisis – both were interested in engagement and discussions.
Who was General Leon Johnson and what he the director of?
- He was the director of the National Security Council’s Net evaluation Subcommittee
- Committee was a top secret part of NSC which prepared annual reports to consider impact that nuclear war would have
What was the estimation of the report given to JFK in Summer 1963?
- Estimated that in the event of nuclear war in 1963 or 1964, the two counties would have a combined 93 million casualties.
- Acknowledged USSR also aware of consequenced
What was MAD?
This in itself was a deterrent to use them and a reason to maintain a large stockpile of these weapons
- Understanding that the use of weapons would be mutually destructive for each power
Who in 1963 had weapons and JFK opinion/action to this?
USA, USSR, UK and France
- JFK began negotiations with other nuclear powers with hope of preventing their further use
- Wanted these powers to remain the only ones with nuclear ability
Overview of Krushchev’s attitudes post CMC
- Presented withdrawal from Cuba as a triumph
- Open for US-Soviet relations based on mutual restraint rather than brinkmanship
- Conciliation also important considering Sino-Soviet split.
- Limiting nuclear weapons agreed with JFK
Why did JFK and Khrushchev’s plans to reduce arms not go ahead?
JFK assignation on November 22 1963
Khrushchev ousted from power in October 1964
When was the Washington - Moscow Hotline set up?
June 1963
What was the aim of the hotline?
Avoid delays that had occurred in communication between Kennedy and Krushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis
What was communication prior to the hot line?
Government leaders had to wait for phone calls to go through a series of exchanges before the two could converse
How often could they use the hotline?
7 days a week/ 24 hours a day
Was the hotline instant/how did it work?
One leader would draft a message that would be encrypted and then transmitted and although not instant it was much faster than prior communication
What did the hotline symbolize?
Symbolised a new spirit of cooperation although on a limited scale
How frequently was the hotline used? - Johnson’s’ use?
Neither Kennedy or Khrushchev used the hotline
- Johnson used the first connection when he alerted the Soviets that the US were considering sending air support to Israel in the Six-Day War 1967
When was the Moscow Test Ban Treaty signed?
August 1963
Who initially proposed the idea for the Test Ban Treaty and who?
Soviets in 1950’s
Why was their opposition to the Test Ban Treaty in the US and USSR?
Following the CMC the public did not want to be seen as weak to the other superpower
- However the threat of nuclear weaponry and fears regarding this supported government efforts to limit the use of any nuclear weapons.
Why was the Test Ban Treaty limited in reducing nuclear armament?
Did not include the use of underground tests
What was prohibited in the Test Ban Treaty?
- Above ground testing
- Underwater testing
- Outer space testing
Who signed and who did not sign the Test Ban Treaty?
- US, USSR and UK signed the treaty
- France and China refused to sign the agreement
What did the Test Ban Treaty signify?
- Understanding the dangers of nuclear war and willingness to limit usage
- First collective agreement to establish limitations
- Commitment to begin to ease tensions associated with Cold War
- Show of trust between the powers
- Step towards further agreements such as Salt I etc
What did Kennedy do following the Test Ban Treaty?
Continued producing ICBM’s and SLBM’s
What did the USA overestimated by 1963?
The strength of the Soviet nuclear threat
Why did ABMs represent a major threat to MAD?
One side could potentially, should they gain the upper hand in ABMs, prevent an effective retaliation to a potential nuclear attack, removing their incentive not to implement a first-strike policy
