articles Flashcards
Black, Deborah L. (1993). “Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 32.2 (1993): 219–258.
Black, Deborah L. (1998). “Beauty.” In “Aesthetics in Islamic Philosophy.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, edited by Edward Craig. Taylor and Francis. Available online at https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/aesthetics-in-islamic-philosophy/v-1/sections/beauty. Accessed on 3 February 2018.
According to al-Farabi, beauty in all things is primarily ontological: the more any being attains its final perfection, the more beautiful it is.
God is the most perfect and therefore the most beautiful, and his beauty is essential, not accidental.
In applying these principles, Ibn Sina argues that there is an innate aesthetic sense implanted in every intellectual being (al-‘āqil) which kindles in it a passionate desire for what is beautiful to behold (al-manzar al-husn).
Black, Deborah L., trans. (2009) “Avicenna: Shifā’ (Healing), Al-Nafs (Psychology), Book 4.”, by Avicenna. Unpublished translation by Deborah L. Black. Available online at http://individual.utoronto.ca/dlblack/WebTranslations/shifanafs41-3.pdf.
Fackenheim, Emil L., trans. (1945). “A Treatise on Love by Ibn Sina (Translated by Emil L. Fackenheim).” Mediaeval Studies 7.1 (1945): 208–228.
Janssens, Jules (1986). “Le Dānesh-Nāmeh d’Ibn Sīnā: un texte à revoir?” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 28 (1986): 163–177.
It begins with what was probably the first draft of the metaphysical part of Dânesh-Nâmeh, made by Ibn Sînâ himself, or at least the fragments which
have been preserved. This ‘draft’ was written by him in the Arabic language, and and is found in
Taclîtqât [2] Glossees (concerning metaphysics and aristotlian psychology). Secondly, we believe
we can affirm the Maqâsid Al-falâsifa [3], a text unquestionably attributed to Al-Ghazzâlî, does not
contain anywhere a summary by him on the great philosophical topics developed before him - like
the majority of the commontators believe up to today [4] – but simply a translation, even by hand,
in Arabic of that same Dânesh-Nâmeh by Ibn-Sînâ
As a consequence, it should
read: the perfection of being (there isn’t an equivalent to the Arabic tâmm). Moreover, Morewedge
has badly understood the entire context, instead clearly following a more intellectualist train of
thought than what was expressed (at least in this passage) by Ibn Sînâ.
Meier, Fritz (1999). “The Dervish Dance.” In Essays on Islamic Piety and Mysticism, translated by John O’Kane, 23–48. Leiden: Brill.
Omar, Sara (2012). “From Semantics to Normative Law: Perceptions of Liwāṭ (Sodomy) and Siḥāq (Tribadism) in Islamic Jurisprudence (8th–15th Century CE).” Islamic Law and Society 19 (2012): 222–256.
Purjavādi, Nasrollāh (1370/1991). “Masʾale-ye taʿrif-e alfāz-e ramzi dar sheʿr-e ʿāsheqāneye fārsi.” Maʿāref 24 (1370/1991): 240–277.
Pourjavady [Purjavādi], Nasrollah (2005). “Stories of Aḥmad al-Ghazālī ‘Playing the Witness’ in Tabrīz (Shams-i Tabrīzī’s Interest in shāhid-bāzī).” Translated by Scott Kugle, in Reason and Inspiration in Islam: Theology, Philosophy, and Mysticism in muslim Thought, edited by Todd Lawson, 200–220, London: I.B. Tauris.
Sebti, Meryem (2005). “Le statut ontologique de l’image dans la doctrine avicennienne de la perception.” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15.1 (2005): 109–140.
D. Gutas, “AVICENNA v. Mysticism,” Encyclopædia Iranica, III/1, pp. 79-83, available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/avicenna-v (accessed on 4 September 2024).
If, as Galen taught, the faculties or powers of the soul follow the humoral temperament of the body, then clearly the more balanced temperaments would have a greater predisposition for hitting upon the middle terms. One should therefore strive to acquire a balanced temperament, or, in religious terminology, a pure soul.
In order for those at the lower end of the scale of ḥads to gain any of this knowledge, it is obvious that their only recourse is to acquire a balanced temperament (a pure soul) in anticipation of a later or posthumous understanding, and to learn something about this knowledge in terms familiar to them. This is the function of religious life in all its manifestations. The prophet communicates the knowledge of the intelligible world in symbols and in language accessible to the masses because syllogistic discourse, the medium in which he himself received this knowledge, is unintelligible to them; and he lays down legislation whose purpose is to purify their souls. This is the reason for the efficacy of religious prescriptions like fasting and ritual prayer, of popular religious practices such as the visitation of saints’ tombs, and of the ascetic practices of the Sufis. Needless to say, these practices are beneficial not only to the dull masses but also to philosophers when they are faced with a difficulty and can not find a middle term.
The ʿāref mentioned in the final chapters of the Ešārāt, for example, refers to the person whose rational soul has reached the stage of the acquired intellect.
