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evolution > Altruism > Flashcards

Altruism Flashcards

1
Q

trivers 1971

A

I will scratch your back if you scratch mine

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2
Q

I will scratch your back if you scratch mine

A

trivers 1971

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3
Q

Gurven 2004

A

food giving among Kiwi and ache families is based on reciprocity

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4
Q

food giving among Kiwi and ache families is based on reciprocity

A

Gurven 2004

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5
Q

Conditions for reciprocal altruism

A

1 the cost must be less than the benefit received later
2 species must be highly sociable to be capable of RA
3 species must have the correct cognitive abilities

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6
Q

Robert Axelrod 1981

A

organised a tournament where different strategies were employed a played against each other. Tit for tat couldn’t be beaten by other strategies. Evolutionary stable strategy.

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7
Q

organised a tournament where different strategies were employed a played against each other. Tit for tat couldn’t be beaten by other strategies. Evolutionary stable strategy.

A

Robert Axelrod 1981

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8
Q

Solncik & Schweitzer 1999

A

attractive people are cooperated with more and more is expected from them

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9
Q

attractive people are cooperated with more and more is expected from them

A

Solncik & Schweitzer 1999

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10
Q

Wilson and eckel 2006

A

showed they were viewed as being more trustworthy and punished more when they are not

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11
Q

showed they were viewed as being more trustworthy and punished more when they are not

A

Wilson and eckel 2006

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12
Q

CIALDINI ET AL 1982

A

Negative state relief model helps alleviate temporary sadness – mood management hypothesis

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13
Q

Negative state relief model helps alleviate temporary sadness – mood management hypothesis

A

CIALDINI ET AL 1982

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14
Q

Eisenegger et al 2009

A

gave participants testosterone or a placebo
Then played ultimatum game – had 10 to share a proposed b accept or rejects
Testosterone lead to being more cooperative

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15
Q

gave participants testosterone or a placebo
Then played ultimatum game – had 10 to share a proposed b accept or rejects
Testosterone lead to being more cooperative

A

Eisenegger et al 2009

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16
Q

Fehr + gachter 2002

A

cooperation was evolved as non-cooperation was punished, If cheated in PGG
-proximate explanation is negative emotion

17
Q

cooperation was evolved as non-cooperation was punished, If cheated in PGG
- proximate explanation is negative emotion

A

Fehr + gachter 2002

18
Q

Price 2005

A

showed shaur hunter-horticulturalists were the same as western culture

19
Q

showed shaur hunter-horticulturalists were the same as western culture

A

Price 2005

20
Q

Sylwester + Roberts 2010

A

people who gave more in pgg were often selected for as desired partners and received more partners

21
Q

people who gave more in pgg were often selected for as desired partners and received more partners

A

Sylwester + Roberts 2010

22
Q

Gintis et al 2001

A

Cooperation is an honest signal of good quality
For a signal to be honest
1 directly linked to the quality of the trait

23
Q

Cooperation is an honest signal of good quality
For a signal to be honest
1 directly linked to the quality of the trait

A

Gintis et al 2001

24
Q

2 handicap

A

ZAHAVI 1975

25
Q

ZAHAVI 1975

A

2 handicap

26
Q

Smith and bleige bird 2000

A

Also effectively broadcast, beneficial a reliable indicator and costly to produce

27
Q

Also effectively broadcast, beneficial a reliable indicator and costly to produce

A

Smith and bleige bird 2000

28
Q

Roberts 1998

A

Individuals compete for mates by being altruistic

29
Q

Individuals compete for mates by being altruistic

A

Roberts 1998

30
Q

Belige bird et al 2001

A

skilled turtle hunters among the Meriam share the catch with the group, gain social recognition

31
Q

skilled turtle hunters among the Meriam share the catch with the group gain social recognition

A

Belige bird et al 2001

32
Q

Farrelly 2011

A

showed there was no preference for altruistic behaviour when at high fertile stages

33
Q

showed there was no preference for altruistic behaviour when at high fertile stages

A

Farrelly 2011

34
Q

Farrelly et al 2016

A

altruism > attractiveness in long term relationships for women

35
Q

altruism > attractiveness in long term relationships for women

A

Farrelly et al 2016

evolution (2 decks)

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