Altruism Flashcards

1
Q

trivers 1971

A

I will scratch your back if you scratch mine

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2
Q

I will scratch your back if you scratch mine

A

trivers 1971

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3
Q

Gurven 2004

A

food giving among Kiwi and ache families is based on reciprocity

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4
Q

food giving among Kiwi and ache families is based on reciprocity

A

Gurven 2004

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5
Q

Conditions for reciprocal altruism

A

1 the cost must be less than the benefit received later
2 species must be highly sociable to be capable of RA
3 species must have the correct cognitive abilities

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6
Q

Robert Axelrod 1981

A

organised a tournament where different strategies were employed a played against each other. Tit for tat couldn’t be beaten by other strategies. Evolutionary stable strategy.

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7
Q

organised a tournament where different strategies were employed a played against each other. Tit for tat couldn’t be beaten by other strategies. Evolutionary stable strategy.

A

Robert Axelrod 1981

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8
Q

Solncik & Schweitzer 1999

A

attractive people are cooperated with more and more is expected from them

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9
Q

attractive people are cooperated with more and more is expected from them

A

Solncik & Schweitzer 1999

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10
Q

Wilson and eckel 2006

A

showed they were viewed as being more trustworthy and punished more when they are not

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11
Q

showed they were viewed as being more trustworthy and punished more when they are not

A

Wilson and eckel 2006

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12
Q

CIALDINI ET AL 1982

A

Negative state relief model helps alleviate temporary sadness – mood management hypothesis

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13
Q

Negative state relief model helps alleviate temporary sadness – mood management hypothesis

A

CIALDINI ET AL 1982

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14
Q

Eisenegger et al 2009

A

gave participants testosterone or a placebo
Then played ultimatum game – had 10 to share a proposed b accept or rejects
Testosterone lead to being more cooperative

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15
Q

gave participants testosterone or a placebo
Then played ultimatum game – had 10 to share a proposed b accept or rejects
Testosterone lead to being more cooperative

A

Eisenegger et al 2009

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16
Q

Fehr + gachter 2002

A

cooperation was evolved as non-cooperation was punished, If cheated in PGG
-proximate explanation is negative emotion

17
Q

cooperation was evolved as non-cooperation was punished, If cheated in PGG
- proximate explanation is negative emotion

A

Fehr + gachter 2002

18
Q

Price 2005

A

showed shaur hunter-horticulturalists were the same as western culture

19
Q

showed shaur hunter-horticulturalists were the same as western culture

A

Price 2005

20
Q

Sylwester + Roberts 2010

A

people who gave more in pgg were often selected for as desired partners and received more partners

21
Q

people who gave more in pgg were often selected for as desired partners and received more partners

A

Sylwester + Roberts 2010

22
Q

Gintis et al 2001

A

Cooperation is an honest signal of good quality
For a signal to be honest
1 directly linked to the quality of the trait

23
Q

Cooperation is an honest signal of good quality
For a signal to be honest
1 directly linked to the quality of the trait

A

Gintis et al 2001

24
Q

2 handicap

A

ZAHAVI 1975

25
ZAHAVI 1975
2 handicap
26
Smith and bleige bird 2000
Also effectively broadcast, beneficial a reliable indicator and costly to produce
27
Also effectively broadcast, beneficial a reliable indicator and costly to produce
Smith and bleige bird 2000
28
Roberts 1998
Individuals compete for mates by being altruistic
29
Individuals compete for mates by being altruistic
Roberts 1998
30
Belige bird et al 2001
skilled turtle hunters among the Meriam share the catch with the group, gain social recognition
31
skilled turtle hunters among the Meriam share the catch with the group gain social recognition
Belige bird et al 2001
32
Farrelly 2011
showed there was no preference for altruistic behaviour when at high fertile stages
33
showed there was no preference for altruistic behaviour when at high fertile stages
Farrelly 2011
34
Farrelly et al 2016
altruism > attractiveness in long term relationships for women
35
altruism > attractiveness in long term relationships for women
Farrelly et al 2016