Adverse Possession Flashcards
Adverse possession, why should I care?
Adverse means wrong. So how can you wrongly possess something and eventually become the legitimate legal owner? This is possible by sitting out certain time limits and demonstrating your possession of property. You can therefore gain rights thorough their long use of someone else’s land whether this was innocent or deliberate. Possession of land implies actual occupation of the land and receiving some economic gain from the land e.g. rent (if relevant).
Time limits: Statute of Limitations 1957 (SOL)
In the absence of fraud, mistake or disability, a right of action for the recovery of land is barred following adverse possession by another for the duration of the statutory period.
SOL Section 11
Limitation of actions of contract and tort and certain other actions. 6 years.
SOL Section 12
Limitations of actions to recover land.
30 land for a state authority.
60 years for foreshore by a state authority.
SOL Section 13
No action to recover land can be taken at the end of a period of 12 years, unless there was established fraud, mistake, or disability.
SOL Section 14
30 years if the land is state owned.
SOL Section 18
Right of action not to accrue unless there is adverse possession.
How to establish Adverse Possession (AP)
cases
Battelle v Pinemeadows Dundalk UDC v Conway Feehan v Leamy Murphy v Murphy Leigh v Jack Durack v Considine Cork Co Co v Lynch: Doyle v O’Neill: Hamilton v ACC Loan Management Thorpe v Frank:
Battelle v Pinemeadows.
• The true land owner must not have given permission to the squatter:
Dundalk UDC v Conway
• For there to be possession, the land in question must be capable of being enjoyed
Feehan v Leamy
possession was not discontinued as p sought and obtained interlocutory relief against d. P did not farm livestock but instead was known to park his car at the gate and look out at the field. This was interpreted as continuing to possess the land and as such, ct held that he had not been dispossessed. This contrasts with JA Pye (Oxford) where presence in an entrance way did not amount to an intention to possess the land.
Murphy v Murphy
Intention to possess (animus possidendi): for possession to be adverse it has to involve the intention by the occupier to exclude the owner from the enjoyment of the estate or interest. It was also noted that AP may occur without either party realising it.
Feehan v Leamy: referred to Leigh v Jack
ct noted that d’s acts were those of a man who did not intend to be a trespasser or infringe others rights i.e. a squatter cannot dispossess a true owner unless the squatter’s use of the land is inconsistent with the true owner’s purpose for it.
Feehan followed this case. On the balance of probabilities,
Leamy found that d assessed the ongoing litigation in relation to the land as dragging on while the land lay idle and ungrazed. When asked who owned the lands, he said “a man in America”, ct interpreted this as a lack of animus possidendi i.e. an intention to preclude the true owner and all other persons from enjoyment of the estate or interest being acquired.
Therefore the test is:
(i) possession: that the owner has been dispossessed; and
(ii) adverse: that the applicant had the necessary intention to preclude the owner.
Feehan is therefore authority that to stop the time of dispossession from running, this can be done by issuing proceedings or obtaining written acknowledgement from the person in possession or obtaining payment or part payment.
Durack v Considine
involved the intention to build a factory on the land. One factory built and the other was left vacant and cattle were grazed by the d in that field. P claimed not adverse as grazing cattle not contrary to intention. Ct said that the only relevant factor was the intention of the squatter. Cts pointed out that the squatter wanted land for himself and AP was upheld. This was a retreat from Jack, but was not subsequently followed in Feehan or Cork (too broad an interpretation of ‘intention’ of adverse possessor).
Cork Co Co v Lynch:
principle in Jack still applies, despite the view taken in Durack. Here, p acquired land to develop in the future which adjoined a garage. D’s parked car on p’s land, erected a chain fence and tarmacked it and used it to the exclusion of all others. No AP as not contrary to specific sue for which p had intended to put the land in the future).