ADMIN UNDAS Flashcards
“What was the purpose of Administrative Order No. 223 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on June 13, 1991, and how did it contribute to the National Centennial Celebration in 1998?”
Laurel v. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 “constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998.” The Committee was mandated “to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
“How was the Commission funded, and what was Expocorp’s role?”
Laurel v. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of Tourism and the president’s Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created.[4] Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
The law grants the Ombudsman comprehensive powers to ensure accountability among public officials, covering Malfeasance, Misfeasance and nonfeasance. Explain Malfeasance, Misfeasance and nonfeasance
Laurel v. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48
covering malfeasance (wrongdoing), misfeasance (improper performance of duties), and nonfeasance (failure to act).
“According to Mechem, what is the key characteristic that determines whether a position qualifies as a public office?
Laurel v. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as “The most important characteristic” in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
Town Fiesta v NCC
Laurel v. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a “vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity,” an opportunity to “showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values.” The significance of the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who remarked during the hearing:
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love for freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
What is a public office?
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as “[t]he most important characteristic” in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.
Sovereign functions refer to the essential duties and powers that a government exercises as a ruling authority. These functions are crucial for maintaining law, order, and governance in a state.
· Veterans Federation of the Phils. v. Reyes, 483 SCRA 526
The definition of public office
Petitioner thus filed this Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for the following reliefs:
For this Court to issue a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction to enjoin respondent Secretary and all those acting under his discretion and authority from: (a) implementing DND Department Circular No. 04; and (b) continuing with the ongoing management audit of petitioner’s books of account;
After hearing the issues on notice –
Declare DND Department Circular No. 04 as null and void for being ultra vires;
Convert the writ of prohibition, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction into a permanent one.[6]
And now to answer petitioner’s reasons for insisting that it is a private corporation:
Petitioner claims that the VFP does not possess the elements which would qualify it as a public office, particularly the possession/delegation of a portion of sovereign power of government to be exercised for the benefit of the public;
ISSUE:The issue, therefore, is whether the VFA’s officers have been delegated some portion of the sovereignty of the country, to be exercised for the public benefit. Whether or not the VFP is a private corporation,
HELD: As regards the promotion of social justice as a sovereign function, we held in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO),27 that the compelling urgency with which the Constitution speaks of social justice does not leave any doubt that land reform is not an optional but a compulsory function of sovereignty. The same reason was used in our declaration that socialized housing is likewise a sovereign function.28 Highly significant here is the observation of former Chief Justice Querube Makalintal:
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government [into constituent and ministrant functions] quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only “because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,” continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here[,] as almost everywhere else[,] the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here, of course, this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
It was, on the other hand, the fact that the National Centennial Celebrations was calculated to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country that it was considered as a sovereign function in Laurel v. Desierto.30 In Laurel, the Court then took its cue from a similar case in the United States involving a Fourth of July fireworks display. The holding of the Centennial Celebrations was held to be an executive function, as it was intended to enforce Article XIV of the Constitution which provides for the conservation, promotion and popularization of the nation’s historical and cultural heritage and resources, and artistic relations.
**In the case at bar, the functions of petitioner corporation enshrined in Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 264031 should most certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The protection of the interests of war veterans is not only meant to promote social justice, but is also intended to reward patriotism. **All of the functions in Section 4 concern the well-being of war veterans, our countrymen who risked their lives and lost their limbs in fighting for and defending our nation. It would be injustice of catastrophic proportions to say that it is beyond sovereignty’s power to reward the people who defended her.
Like the holding of the National Centennial Celebrations, the functions of the VFP are executive functions, designed to implement not just the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640, but also, and more importantly, the Constitutional mandate for the State to provide immediate and adequate care, benefits and other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans
In sum, the assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 does not supplant nor modify and is, on the contrary, perfectly in consonance with Rep. Act No. 2640. Petitioner VFP is a public corporation. As such, it can be placed under the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense, who consequently has the power to conduct an extensive management audit of petitioner corporation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The validity of the Department of National Defense Department Circular No. 04 is AFFIRMED.
Santos vs Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848 ((SALARY DIFERENTIAL, HEIRS TRANSFER)
The characteristics of public office
Segundo Santos was, for a number of years, employed as Labor Conciliator I (Regional Office No. 4) of the Department of Labor. His monthly pay was P259 per month, or P3,108 per annum. On August 24, 1960, he was extended an appointment (promotion) as Labor Conciliator II (Regional Office No. 3, Manila) with compensation per annum of P3,493, vice Juan Mendoza, Jr., resigned. This appointment, effective September 1, 1960, was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962, and released to the Department of Labor on May 25, 1962.
In June of 1962, respondent Secretary of Labor appointed Ricardo Tiongco, one of the respondents, to the same position of Labor Conciliator II. 1
Petitioner's demand for the revocation of respondent Tionco's appointment and payment to him (Santos) of salary differentials was rejected by respondent Secretary of Labor.
From the foregoing events stemmed the present petition for mandamus filed on August 20, 1962 three days before Santos actually retired from the service which was an August 23, 1962. 2 The petition prays, inter alia, that respondents be commanded to nullify the appointment of Tiongco, and to uphold as legal and existing petitioner's appointment, as Labor Conciliator II, from September 1, 1960; and that the salary differentials aforesaid be paid petitioner. Respondents seasonably answered the petition.
Before the case could be tried on the merits that is, on February 14, 1963, Santos died. A motion to substitute the "Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased." represented by Rodolfo Santos, one of the heirs, was filed. This triggered a move on respondents' part to seek dismissal of the case.
The court, on April 10, 1963, dismissed the petition without costs. Hence, this appeal on purely questions of law.
1. The threshold question is this: May the Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased, be substituted in place of petitioner herein?
Public office is a public trust. 3 It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee thereto. In this sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. None of the heirs may replace him in that position. It is in this context that we say that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may not press Santos' claim that he be allowed to continue holding office as Labor Conciliator II. Actio personalis moritur cum persona.
But jurisdiction of the court had attached before the death of Santos. That jurisdiction continues until the termination of the suit. It is true that what is left is a money claim for salary differentials. But death will not dislodge jurisdiction on that money claim — it subsists. Resolution of this question depends upon the right of Segundo Santos to the position of Labor Conciliator II.
· Abeja v. Tanada 236 SCRA 60 (On June 13, 1993, private respondent Rosauro Radovan died. He was substituted by Vice-Mayor Conrado de Rama and, surprisingly, by his surviving spouse, Ediltrudes Radovan.)
We also find as erroneous the substitution of the deceased Rosauro Radovan’s widow, Ediltrudes Radovan, on the ground that private respondent had a counter-claim for damages. “Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs” (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848 [1968]; De la Victoria vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA 561 [1991]). The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee’s counter-claim for damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contested office (Dela Victoria, supra).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of respondent judge as well as the results of the revision of the 11 ballot boxes subject of the counter-protest are SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is further ordered to DISMISS the counter-protest in Election Case No. 92-1 and to resolve the “Motion to Determine Votes, to Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office” filed by petitioner conformably with this decision within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent Ediltrudes Radovan.
SO ORDERED.
· National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
v. CSC, 221 SCRA 145 (Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein)
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether or not membership in the bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order.
Certainly! Let’s delve deeper into the distinction between abolition and removal in the context of government positions.
Abolition vs. Removal – Key Differences
1. Abolition of a Position
- When a position is abolished, the entire office ceases to exist, meaning there is no job to hold anymore.
- It’s a structural change usually resulting from a government reorganization, policy shift, or new law that eliminates the position altogether.
- Because the position no longer exists, security of tenure does not apply, as there is no office for an employee to return to.
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Removal from a Position
- Removal, on the other hand, means an individual is separated from their job, but the position itself remains and may be filled by someone else.
- Removal can happen due to disciplinary action, termination, resignation, retirement, or redundancy.
- In cases of removal, an employee might challenge their dismissal based on rights such as security of tenure, procedural due process, or wrongful termination claims.
Practical Example
Imagine a government agency undergoes a major restructuring:
- If the law abolishes a department, all positions within it automatically disappear, and employees are not entitled to keep their jobs because there are no positions left to occupy.
- If an employee is removed, but the department continues to operate, their role may be filled by another person.
Why Security of Tenure Doesn’t Apply to Abolition
- Security of tenure protects government employees from being unjustly removed from existing positions.
- However, if the position itself is legally abolished, then there is nothing left to protect—an employee cannot claim tenure for a non-existent office.
Would you like more real-world examples or a breakdown of the legal principles governing tenure and abolition? I’d be happy to refine this further!
This passage discusses the abolition of existing positions in the Land Registration Commission (LRC) under Executive Order No. 649 and the legal implications of the government’s reorganization efforts.
Key Points:
1. Abolition of LRC Positions
- EO 649 ordered the restructuring of LRC into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA).
- All positions within LRC ceased to exist once the implementing order was issued by the President.
- The functions, appropriations, records, and property of LRC were transferred to newly created offices within NALTDRA.
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Abolition vs. Removal
- Abolition of a position means that the office itself no longer exists, rather than an individual being removed from a continuing role.
- Since the position no longer exists, there is no occupant, and therefore, no security of tenure to be protected.
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Legal Standards for Abolition
- The law allows a legitimate body (such as the government) to abolish positions, as long as it is done in good faith.
- Courts have ruled that a reorganization is valid if the newly created offices have distinct functions or if positions are eliminated for economic efficiency.
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Impact on Garcia’s Case
- EO 649 introduced a new requirement that key positions in NALTDRA must be held by members of the Philippine Bar.
- Since Garcia was not a lawyer, she did not meet the qualifications for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II in the reorganized system.
- The Civil Service Commission attempted to reinstate Garcia, but the court ruled that she had no vested right to reclaim her former position, as it had already been abolished.
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Final Court Ruling
- The petition was granted, and the Civil Service Commission’s resolution reinstating Garcia was set aside.
- Garcia could not be reinstated to her former role because the position no longer existed under the new structure, and she did not meet the updated qualifications.
Legal Implications:
- Government reorganizations must be conducted in good faith, ensuring they serve legitimate purposes like efficiency or economic necessity.
- Employees do not have an absolute right to retain positions in a reorganized agency, especially if the legal requirements for employment change.
- Once a position is abolished, there is no legal basis for reinstatement, unless specific constitutional protections apply.
Would you like me to expand on any specific aspects, such as security of tenure, reorganization laws, or vested rights? Let me know how I can refine this further!
