ADA, Emotional Harm & Worker's Comp Flashcards
Bragdon v. Abbott*
USSC 1998. ADA Sect. 302 & Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (def. of disability) HIV positive woman sued her dentist for refusing to fill her cavity in his office due to her HIV and his office policy. He offered to fill cavity at hospital, but pt would be responsible for the additional cost. Pt sued alleging discrimination under the ADA. District court granted summary judgment to the woman and 1st Circ. COA affirmed. USSC agreed mostly with lower courts. USSC held that asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability under ADA. Under ADA, a disability is a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of a person’s major life activities (in this case, the ability to reproduce and have children). USSC remanded the case for full exploration via the adversarial process regarding the issue of risk of infection and public health considerations.
Penn. Dept of Corrections v. Yeskey*
USSC 1998. Title II of the ADA. Prisoner could attend boot camp and shorten his sentence. He was denied acceptance into boot camp because of hypertension. Prisoner sues under ADA. District Court dismisses for failure to state a claim. 3rd Cir. COA reverses. USSC affirms 3rdCCOA’s ruling and holds that prisons fall squarely within ADA’s Title II’s statutory definition of “public entity,” which includes “any instrumentality of the state or local government.”
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring*
USSC 1999. Title II of the ADA. Patient voluntarily admitted herself for inpt hospitalization. Treatment team suggests she could do well in a community-based program. State fails to place her into a program due to limited resources and money. Patient sues (and another pt joins her) under Title II. The goal of residential-based treatment is to reintegrate her into mainstream society. District Court gave partial summary judgment to the patients concluding that failure of the state to place the patients amounted to per se discrimination which cannot be justified by lack of funding. 11thCCOA affirmed the District Court’s judgment, but remanded for reassessment of the State’s cost-based defense. USSC agreed with lower courts, but also, it remanded the case back for further consideration of the appropriate relief given the state’s lack of resources.
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Patricia Garrett*
USSC 2000. ADA, 11th Amendment. State employees in Alabama attempted to sue their state in Federal Court claiming damages under ADA. District Court granted summary judgment to Alabama under the state’s 11th amendment immunity in Federal Court. 11thCCOA reversed and believed that the ADA abrogated the state’s 11th amendment immunity. USSC in a 5-4 decision held that state employees claiming discrimination on the job because of disabilities may not sue their employers in federal court because of the 11th amendment.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams*
USSC 2002. ADA. Worker with carpal tunnel syndrome is eventually fired from her job. She sues under ADA. District Court dismisses her case via summary judgment in favor of the employer. 6thCCOA reversed believing that the worker’s impairment substantially limited her in the “major life activity” of performing manual tasks. USSC in a 9-0 decision disagreed with Appellate Court and reversed and remanded the case. Case was remanded because the appellate court failed to ask whether her impairments prevented her from performing tasks that are of central importance to most people’s lives. In other words, in order to be “disabled” under ADA, one would need to show that they are impaired in all areas of life (and not only at work).
Carter v. General Motors*
Michigan Supreme Court 1960. Workmen’s Compensation Act. A worker begins to have problems performing his job at work. He develops schizophrenia and requires treatment. A psychiatrist at his Workers Comp. Board hearing testifies that due to his stress at work, he developed paranoid schizophrenia. A “referee” grants the worker an award for lost wages, medical expenses, and continuing disability. The award is affirmed by the Workers Comp. Appeal Board. Employer sues up to the Michigan Supreme Court. MiSC held that under the WCA, emotional disabilities are compensable regardless of whether the cause of such emotional disability is a direct physical injury, a mental shock, or sustained pressure. MiSC upheld the worker’s award, but also said that the worker was not entitled to compensation after the point his psychotic symptoms stopped.
Dillon v. Legg*
SC of California 1968. Forseeability Rule replaced the Zone of Danger standard. From Hooper: “Legg killed 2 year old daughter of Dillon with car. She saw and sued for wrongful death, but also for pain & suffering for herself. The trial court said mom was outside ‘Zone of Danger’, CA Supreme Court reversed, said Zone of Danger doesn’t cover tort case. Causation & foreseeability apply -this is a breech of duty- driver has a duty to pedestrians & those with them. This became a new cause of action. The Court said emotional trauma was limited to (1) close relative who (2) actually saw injury prior cases had ruled that plaintiff must be in physical danger.”
Thing v. LaChusa
SC of California 1989. From Hooper: “Ms. Thing’s son was injured by car driven by La Chusa; she did not see or hear the accident, but came up shortly after and saw her son, thought he was dead; sued for negligent infliction of emotional damage. Court said requires plaintiff to observe injury when injured is (1) closely related, (2) present and knows injury is occurring, (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress. Said ‘Dillon’ decision was hopelessly arbitrary, that most states use ‘Zone of Danger’ anyway. Issue remains cloudy.”
