Actus Reus and Mens Rea Flashcards
Factual ‘But for’ causation
R v White
D’s act did not have causal connection to the death so not guilty of murder
Unforeseeable naturally occurring subsequent events may break the chain of causation.
Contracting an infection was not considered a novus actus interveniens
Gowans
Third Party interventions will act as a novus actus interveniens if it renders D’s conduct no longer a substantial cause
Medical negligence will usually not be considered sufficient to remove liability - policy reasons.
R v Cheshire
R v Mellor
‘a reasonable act performed for the purpose of self-preservation’ cannot be a novus actus interveniens
R v Pagett
Drug administration cases and self injection. Jury and CA held D liable (constructive manslaughter) for supplying syringe that V self injected which killed him.
HL held D not liable if V is a fully informed adult making a voluntary decision who self injects
Kennedy (2005 - CA) and (2007 - HL)
Victim escape cases
D will be liable if V reacts to a well grounded and justified apprehension of immediate violence
Was V’s act something that could have been reasonably foreseen as a consequence of what D was doing?
Was V’s reaction within the expected range of responses given the situation - jury should consider V’s characteristics and that V may not have thought clearly given the stressful situation
R v Pitts
R v Roberts
R v Williams
Victim Intervention cases
‘Thin skull rule’
R v Blaue
Was result a direct and immediate result of D’s act? If yes, D liable
R v Mitchell
Was the result accelerated (death) by the injuries inflicted?
R v Dyson
D will be liable if he was a substantial cause of the result - manslaughter in this case
Benge
Contractual duty to act - will be liable for omissions if you have a contractual duty to protect against something
R v Pittwood
Duty due to public office - deliberate failure/ wilful neglect to carry out duty leads to liability
R v Dytham
Voluntary undertaking/ assumption of responsibility
A moral obligation to care for someone –> a legal duty to do so. Wilful negligence that leads to result –> D’s liability
Indifferent to an obvious risk or a determination to run said risk–> recklessness and liability despite making an attempt to care
R v Instan
R v Gibbins & Proctor
R v Stone & Dobinson
Creation of a dangerous situation:
- duty/ responsibility theory
- Continuous act theory,
- then there can be liability ( duty theory was preferred by HL)
R v Miller
Creation of a dangerous situation:
Assumed responsibility in a mother daughter relationship.
With sibling relationship - look for creation of dangerous situation
CA - duty arises when D realises or ought to have realised danger
Evans
Automatism - no knowledge of acting/ no consciousness of doing the action
Bratty v A.G for N Ireland
If there is a temporary loss of consciousness arising accidentally - safe to acquit (policy??)
Hill v Baxter
Total automatism required for it to be successful
Jury acquitted here for driving without awareness but it was held that driving without awareness did not involve total destruction of voluntary control - can still react to stimuli
A-G’s reference (no 2 of 1992)
general rule should be that the judge leaves it to the jury’s ‘good sense’ to decide whether there is intention
Maloney
Intention for murder can be found where:
There was an intention to cause death or
There was an intention to cause GBH or
Where D knew it was probable that grievous harm would result
DPP v Hyam
Intention for murder can be found where:
There was an intention to cause death or
There was an intention to cause GBH or
Where:
Death was a natural consequence of D’s voluntary act and
D foresaw that consequence as being a natural consequence of his act
Moloney
Jury might misunderstand term ‘natural consequence’ - there was too much emphasis on creating a direction for intention to be used in all cases.
Probability of a consequence is an important issue in deciding intention
Hancock and Shankland
Murder - intention can be inferred where death or serious bodily harm was a ‘virtual certainty’ of D’s actions - inference of intention may be ‘irresistible’
Nedrick
Open to jury to find intention if they are satisfied D knew what they were doing and there was a substantial risk of serious injury - but this blurred lines between intention and recklessness
Conclusion - intention if:
the result is a virtually certain consequence of that act (barring some unforeseen intervention); and
D knows that it is a virtually certain consequence
(The current law on indirect intention)
Woollin
Significance of Woollin intention
No actual definition of intend in terms of virtual certainty
‘…it will be a rare case where the simple direction as to intent is not enough
Matthews and Alleyne
R v Hayles
Transferred Intention
Mens rea transferable to different recipient if same offence (2)
Mens rea cannot be transferred to a different offence that coincidentally happens
Intention to murder cannot be transferred to unborn child after attack on the mother - foetus not human. Could be constructive manslaughter
R v Latimer
R v Mitchell
R v Pembliton
A-G’s Reference (no.3 of 1994)
‘malicious’ does not just mean wicked
Cunningham
D was reckless if:
He took an unjustified risk AND
He was aware of the existence of that unjustified risk
(subjective recklessness)
Cunningham
reckless = knowingly performing an act with a risk of damage (subjective)
R v Briggs
Test should be entirely subjective so D should not be convicted (did not foresee risk due to mental illness)
R v Stephenson
D was if:
He did an act creating an obvious risk either
Without giving thought to that risk or
Whilst recognising the obvious risk involved
(objective recklessness)
Caldwell
Objective recklessness can be unfair due to ‘reasonable person’ test
Elliott v C (A minor)
G and Another
‘It was established that a defendant could not be culpable under the criminal law of doing something involving a risk of injury to another or damage to property if he genuinely did not perceive the risk.’
Established in G and Another
Quote from AG’s Reference (no.3 of 2003)
Jury was asked to consider whether risk of injury was ‘obvious and serious’
- not a necessary direction (wider application)
Brady
