Actus Reus Flashcards
Kennedy (No.2) [2007]
HL
Kennedysupplied class A drugs to the victim, V asked for drugs. The victim voluntarily self-administered the drugs and died as a result. Held: Whilst the supply of drugs was an unlawful act which was a crime, it had not caused death. The death was caused by the voluntary act of the victim, who it is assumed acted under free will, to ‘help him sleep’. Lord Bingham said where there is a “full informed and responsible adult” there can never be liability.
“in the case of a fully-informed and responsible adult, never.” Kennedy(2) (per Lord Bingham at [25])
NB Kennedy (2) does not preclude a conviction based on a negligent performance of a duty to rectify a dangerous situation (see eg Evans (above))
Hughes [2013] UKSC
The Road Traffic Act 1988, section 3ZB makes it an offence of strict liability to cause death while in control of car without a valid driving licence or uninsured. Hughes was driving faultlessly, but was doing so deliberately without insurance. The victim, a driver whose ability to drive safely was severely impaired through his self-administration of drugs, collided with Hughes. Hughes could have done nothing to prevent the resulting death of the victim. Supreme court geld: not liable for death. It must follow from the use of the expression “causes…death…by driving” that section 3ZB requires at least some act or omission in the control of the car, which involves some element of fault, whether amounting to careless/inconsiderate driving or not, and which contributes in some more than minimal way to the death. It is not necessary that such act or omission be the principal cause of the death.
LORD HUGHES AND LORD TOULSON giving judgement set out precedence that: There must be “at least some act or omission in the control of the car, which involves some element of fault, whether amounting to careless/inconsiderate driving or not, and which contributes in some more than minimal way to the death”.
Cheshire [1991]
D shot V. V underwent an operation where he needed a breathing tube. Two months after the shooting, the wounds had healed but he died of an infection caused by the tube, it should have been spotted. Held” although immediate cause of death was the infection that does not exclude the accused unless:
“even though negligence in the treatment of the victim was the immediate cause of his death, the jury should not regard it as excluding the responsibility of the accused unless the negligent treatment was so independent of his acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that they regard the contribution made by his acts as insignificant” (Beldam LJ)
Blaue [1975]
D stabbed V. V needed a blood transfusion but refused because she was a Jehovah’s witness, refused on religious beliefs. She was told if she did not have transfusion that she would die. She then died.
Held: As a matter of policy the assailant should not be allowed to say that victims religious beliefs were unreasonable.D had to take his victims how they found him.
Caldwell
House of Lords PRECEDENCE : Held that D could also be judged reckless where he took a risk that was ‘obvious’ to the reasonable person (whether he realised it or not)
NOW OVERTURNED
R v G [2004]
Held: removed Caldwell and went for the narrow meaning of recklessness, unless they saw and the deliberately took the risk.
Williams
D was driving without a licence or insurance, when a pedestrian stepped in front of his car. the accident was entirely the fault of the pedestrian. Nevertheless, the trial judge ruled that fault was not an element of the offence, and the defendant was convicted. His ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
Taylor [2016] UKSC
A man took a truck from a friend, the friend alleges that he did not know about this. Taylor then collided with another car on a bend in a country lane, V was killed. T was uninsured and had alcohol in the blood. Held: although he had alcohol in blood, he is guilty of drunk driving, but not that this circumstance had anything to do with the accident. Held: not liable.
Empress Car Co v National Rivers Authority (1999) HOL
River pollution is strict liability offence.
The defendants left an unguarded tap on a large diesel tank next to a river. An unknown vandal trespassed on the property of the defendants and opened the tap, allowing the diesel to discharge into the river. HO Held: D is liable, they only will not be liable if the action of third party was “abnormal or extraordinary”.
The strict liability rule imposes a duty upon the defendant to defend against the deliberate acts against the third party.
Pagett (1983)
D used the girl as a shield as he came out of the flat. The police could not see who it was. The appellant fired shots at the police and the police returned fire. The police shot the girl who died. Held: police not liable because it was an instinctive/reasonable act performed for the purposes of self-preservation.
Miller [1983] HOL
D, a squatter, was smoking in bed when he fell asleep. He awoke and saw that the cigarette had started a small fire. . He went into another room to sleep and the fire took hold. The house was seriously damaged.
HOL PRECEDENCE Diplock Held: said that you can look at the whole course of conduct. Where you accidentally create a dangerous state of affairs, that conduct can include failing to take reasonable steps to counter the danger. The defendant had created a dangerous situation and owed a duty to call the fire brigade upon becoming aware of the fire. He was therefore liable for his omission to do so.
Duty “to take measures that lie within one’s power to counteract a danger that one has oneself created”.. (per Lord Diplock)
Created a subjective test requiring defendants themselves to have realised
that they had created a dangerous situation before imposing a duty to act.
Evans created an objective test.
Actus reus
1) Conduct
2) Circumstances
3) Results
There is 4 types of conduct
1) Act
2) Omission
3) Possession
4) State of affairs
Yuen Kun-Yea v A-G of Hong Kong
Per Lord keith
there is no liability in negligence where one person sees another about to walk off a cliff, even where he shouts a warning. The law is only willing to impose liability for omissions in special cases where the reasons in favour are strong enough to override that aversion.
Evans [2009] EWCA.
adult children do not owe such duties to their half-sisters, even if living in the same house and where the half-sister is a minor:
the Court of Appeal laid down an objective test which
would be satisfied if defendants ought to have realised that they had created a dangerous
situation.
: R v Hood:
D omitted to summon held for three weeks after his wife fell and suffered broken bones. She died as a result. D was charged with manslaughter on the basis of his omission and his familial duty to assist.
Curtis
: Duties imposed on persons assuming a particular responsibility (Contractual responsibility)
Relationship between doctor and patent:
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland
A doctor may withdraw care, with judicial approval from a patient in a PVS
Ordinarily patient/doctor duty to act : curtis
But this was an exception.
Dytham COA
D, a police officer, failed to intervene in an incident where V was killed to death by a nightclub bouncer 30 yards away. Held: guilty of misconduct in public office.
Pittwood
D had been employed by a railway company to keep the gate at a level crossing. He went to lunch forgetting to close the gate. A haycart subsequently entered the crossing and was struck by a train. D was convicted of manslaughter.
Nicholls
D, V’s grandmother, agreed to take care of V after the death of V’s mother. V was neglected by D and died. D was charged with gross negligence manslaughter based on the duty rising from assumption of care.
Instan
D, V’s niece, moved into V’s house. V became extremely unwell and was unable to look after herself. However, although D continued to live in the house and eat V’s food, she did not care for V or summon help. V died, D was charged with gross negligence manslaughter based on the duty arising from an implicit assumption of care.
Stone and Dobinson
D tried ineffectively to assist V before her death, suggests that an assumption of care can arise even where D’s initial attempts to help V are relatively minor and of little affect.
The courts did not properly address the question of whether the test was what was reasonable for the subjective person or what was reasonable for a competent person? In this case, The defendants were held liable for gross negligence manslaughter even though they were of low IQ, suggesting that the test is one of what a reasonable person would do. However, in a problem question similar, highlight the fact that the issue was not directly addressed by the courts and that the unfairness it entails will lead to a future court to adopt a different approach.
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commission
accidently drove on foot, he then refused to move the car. He was convicted of assault on the basis that his refusal to move the car amounted to a positive act of battery and was not a mere omission. Hence, it could satisfy the actus reus requirement.
Evans
D, V’s half-sister, supplied her with heroin which she self-administered. Realizing V showed symptoms of her overdose, D stayed with V but did not get help.
Held: step sister created the dangerous situation through the heroin she needed only call the ambulance.
Instead of miller subjective test, the Court of Appeal laid down an objective test which
would be satisfied if defendants ought to have realised that they had created a dangerous
situation.
Extended the principle.
Hensler
D sent V a letter begging for money misrepresenting his need. V was not deceived but nevertheless sent money. Held: D could not be convicted of obtaining by false pretenses, because the false pretense did not cause D to send the money.
White
D put poison in his mother’s (V) drink intending to kill her. V drank some of the poison and died. However, medical evidence demonstrated that V died due to a heart condition, not because of the poison. Held: Court of Criminal Appeal held that D was not guilty of murder but was guilty of attempted murder.
In White, D had completed acts capable of causing death (conduct element), death came about (result) but liability for murder failed because of the lack of causation linking D’s conduct with the result. D was not the factual cause of death.
1) Accelerated the result: As long as D’s conduct caused the result to come about when it did, she is the factual cause; it is irrelevant if it would have come about later without D’s involvement. This rule holds logic, particularly in homicide cases: as we all die at some point, D can never do more than speed up the process.
2) More than one cause: As long as the result would not have happened but for D’s conduct, it is not necessary to show that D was the only cause.
a. Benge: D misread a train timetable when taking up sections of a track. A train arrived and V was killed. D contended that death could have been avoided if his flagman had placed themselves at the proper distance from the worksite, and also if the train driver had kept a look out. Held: guilt of gross negligence.
b. In Benge, it may have been that other actors were also but for causes of V’s death, and may have been independently liable for it, but this does not undermine the fact that D was a But For cause as well.
Dolloway
– D was driving a horse and cart on the highway, whilst negligently allowing the reins to lie on the horse’s back rather than keeping control of them. V ran into the road and was killed. Even if D had control of the reigns, he could not have stopped in time to save V. Held: not guilty of gross negligence manslaughter.
In this case, D’s conduct was blameworthy, he was the factual cause of the death. However, his blameworthy conduct was not the cause of the death. V would have died either way.
Hughes (Supreme Court) –
D (Driving without insurance and a full license) was involved in a fatal collision with V. V was entirely responsible for the accident, veering onto the wrong side of the road whilst under influence of drugs. Held: Offence requires more than minimal fault/blameworthiness causing the result.
Hart COA
D assaulted V, leaving her lying unconscious on the beach below the high watermark. V was subsequently drowned by the incoming tide. Held: COA held that D was the cause of the death of the victim.
D would not have killed her if there was a freak wave that arrived.
Master COA
a. D inflicted a number of stab wounds upon V, aggravating an existing condition. V then died. D was convicted of murder.
Roberts
– D, driving V home after a party, began making unwanted sexual advances towards her, threatening her. V jumped out of the moving car and suffered actual bodily harm. D was found guilty of offences against the person act. COA.
