Act or rule utilitarianism Flashcards
How does Mill discuss lying?
‘does that much towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion’.
‘Yet even this rule, as sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions… the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact…would save an individual… from great and unmeritable evil.’
This fits with his multi-level view. There are good utilitarian reasons for telling the truth, however there are exceptions where the first principle must be referred back to.
How does Mill deal with the objection that we do not have time for calculating and weighing the effects of every action on the general happiness?
‘There has been ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human species. During all that time, mankind have been learning by experience the tendency of actions’
Mill goes on to recognise that we have much more to understand about the tendency of actions on the general happiness e.g. the subjection of women. But in the meantime, we should use what we have learnt so far, while we wait for philosophical reflection to yield further insight.
What is the statement that Mill makes about secondary principles?
It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones.
What analogies does Mill employ to illustrate the meaning of ‘secondary principles’?
A traveller using landmarks and direction posts on the way.
Using the Nautical Almanack to aid navigation when out at sea.
Mill writes of laying down a road to the goal of happiness.
What does Mill write in 5.14?
The above is, I think, a true account, as far as it goes, of the origin and progressive growth of the idea of justice. But we must observe, that it contains, as yet, nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral obligation in general. For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency. It is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfill it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it might be exacted from him, we do not call it his duty. Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other people, may militate against actually exacting it; but the person himself, it is clearly understood, would not be entitled to complain. There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment. How we come by these ideas of deserving and not deserving punishment, will appear, perhaps, in the sequel; but I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong; that we call any conduct wrong, or employ, instead, some other term of dislike or disparagement, according as we think that the person ought, or ought not, to be punished for it; and we say that it would be right to do so and so, or merely that it would be desirable and laudable, according as we would wish to see the person whom it concerns, compelled, or only persuaded and exhorted, to act in that manner.
Are there more than one right action on Mill’s account?
The morally best action is the right action. Any other action is wrong, however there are gradations in how wrong an action can be, as there are gradations in the different balances of pleasure over pain.
What is actualism versus probabilism?
Actualism: the right action in any circumstance is the one which actually produces the greatest possible balance of pleasure over pain.
Probabilism: the right action is the action which is expected to produce the greatest balance of pleasure over pain.
How does Sidgwick’s distinction between objective and subjective rightness solve the actualism vs probabilism debate?
Objective rightness consists in the maximisation of overall happiness.
Subjective rightness consists in the maximisation of expected overall happiness.
We can accept actualism at the objective level, and probabilism at the subjective level.
Using the example of the rash doctor is helpful here.
What is the distinction between the criterion of right action and decision procedures?
The criterion of right action details what makes an act right or wrong.
The decision procedures give guidance on how to achieve the criterion of right action.
Act utilitarianism is only a theory about the criterion of right action.
What are different decision procedures that an act utilitarian could adopt? (other than multi-level)
Single level- we should consciously try to maximise welfare at every opportunity.
Self effacing- we should never consult the act utilitarian theory in our decision procedures.
What are concerns about a single-level view?
It is hard to imagine a society which does not rest upon partialities between individuals. It might not be psychologically possible to be impartial. Ought implies can. This is ultimately an empirical matter.
However, the biggest concern is that partiality between people is a crucial source of their welfare, so that it might be the case that it is not in fact the best way to maximise happiness. The time that is spent calculating consequences of actions would also harm welfare.
What is Mill’s multi-level view?
There are three levels that Mill operates on.
1. The non-act utilitarian level of customary morality.
2. The act utilitarian level of customary morality, deciding when two principles conflict
3. the philosophical act utilitarian level
When must we consult the act utilitarian principle?
‘only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to.’
What is Crisp’s interpretation of 5.14?
Mill is engaging in meta-ethical discussion. He is considering what happens when people make ethical judgements, he is not making any ethical judgements himself.
Mill argues that when we call an action wrong, we mean to imply that it ought to be punished by law, opinion or conscience.
What has Mill committed himself to by 2.2 and 5.14?
- An action is wrong if and only if it fails to maximise happiness.
- Any wrong action ought to be punished by law, opinion, or conscience.
- Actions which fail to maximise happiness ought therefore to be punished by law, opinion or conscience.
What are some peculiar implications of the view that Mill has established by considering 2.2 and 5.14?
What will Mill say about a case in which a certain act fails to maximise utility and yet punishment of it would also fail to maximise utility?
There might be cases where something ought to be the case and yet someone should not act to bring it about. Imagine that you could, by reminding a certain agent of what they have done, bring about the reproaches of the conscience which they ought to feel, but which would not maximise welfare. Because you would therefore be failing to maximise welfare, you should not remind them. Indeed, there may even be cases where you should prevent a punishment by conscience even if it is something that ought to happen, if this prevention will maximise utility.
Mill ultimately runs into an open question argument which falsifies his suggestion. According to Mill, when I say ‘a is wrong’ I mean that ‘a is such that its performance ought to be punished by law, opinion or conscience’. But this is certainly mistaken, when I say that a is wrong, I can leave it an open question whether a should be punished.
What is Lyons’ interpretation of Mill’s criterion of right?
An act ‘a’ is wrong if and only if a coercive social rule against doing acts of kind ‘a’ would be justified by increasing overall welfare.
How does Urmson (1953) interpret ‘tendency’?
‘Note that strictly one can say that a certain action tends to produce a certain result only if one is speaking of type rather than token actions. Drinking alcohol may tend to promote exhilaration but my drinking this particular glass either does or does not produce it. It seems, then, that Mill can well be interpreted here as regarding moral rules as forbidding or enjoining types of action, in fact as saying that the right moral rules are the ones which promote the ultimate end.’
How does Crisp criticise Urmson’s interpretation of tendency?
It was standard in the utilitarian tradition to refer to the tendencies of individual acts.
Bentham wrote the following: ‘By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have… to promote or oppose that happiness.
It might be said that Bentham means every ‘type of action’ here. But this is not the most natural interpretation. Bentham also speaks of events as having tendencies, it would make little sense to talk of ‘types of events’.
A tendency can be a property of a specific act.
If my drinking alcohol now promotes my happiness, then to that extent it has a tendency to promote my happiness. And to the extent that it promotes unhappiness, through providing me with a splitting headache hours later, it has a tendency to promote unhappiness. Its overall tendency will be the balance of happiness or unhappiness, or vice versa.
Mill is merely taking over the usage of tendency from previous generations of utilitarians, it plays no special role in his definition of utilitarianism. His claim that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness is equivalent to the claim that they are right to the extent that they promote happiness.
What is an example where a rule utilitarian might be accused of rule worship?
A town in the Wild West has been plagued by a series of violent crimes. The sheriff is confronted by a deputation led by the mayor. The deputation tells him that, unless he hangs the vagrant he has in jail, whom the whole town believes to be the criminal, there will without doubt be a terrible riot, in which many people will almost certainly be killed or maimed. This vagrant has no friends or family. The sheriff knows he is innocent.
How does JL Mackie put the objection that rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism?
Suppose that the two methods are not extensionally equivalent, and consider some case where there is a discrepancy between them. That is, some individual act A would in itself have a higher utility than any alternative, but it is forbidden by a utility-based rule R, because it is of a sort S- the sort which R forbids- the general performance of which would diminish the general happiness. Since the general performance of acts of sort S are harmful, whereas the performance of A would be beneficial, there must be something distinctive about A or its circumstances which explains this contrast. Let this causally relevant difference be D; then all acts that are not only of sort S but also have this difference D (SD acts) will be beneficial although the other acts of sort S (S non-D acts) are generally harmful. There is a possible rule R’ which forbid S non-D acts but enjoins SD ones, and R’ will serve utility better than R, since it will still forbid everything harmful that R forbids, while enjoining the beneficial acts that R forbids. Hence a consistently worked out rule utilitarianism, basing its rules on utility, will incorporate R’ instead of R, and so will agree with act utilitarianism in prescribing A. Any apparent discrepancy between the two methods can be similarly resolved.
How does Mackie think it might be possible for a rule utilitarian to respond to the collapse objection?
The [collapse] argument may fail if the rules are to be social realities, rules more or less consciously accepted, followed, appealed to in criticism of violations, backed by public opinion, explicitly taught or unobtrusively passed on from one generation to another- that is, if they are to form what Hume called ‘a general scheme or system of action’ that has ‘the concurrence of mankind’. To flourish in this way a rule does not need to be absolutely simple and inflexible, it may not even be neatly formulable in words, but still there are limits to the complexities and qualifications in can incorporate. It may well be that R meets these requirements but that R’ required to instantiate the proof of equivalence does not.
