Abortion

Question 1

State what the fundamental question on the morality of abortion is often thought to be, and be able to explain why this question is thought to be fundamental.

Answer 1

Many philosophers think that the fundamental question on the morality of abortion is when, if ever, does the fetus acquire its humanity and a moral right to life? This is because it is generally believed that it is almost always morally wrong to kill a being with a right to life. But, if the fetus does not have a right to life, then it seems that abortion is almost always prima facie morally permissible, since it seems that a woman should have the moral right to decide what happens in and to her body, provided that she is not violating anyone else’s moral rights. Therefore, it seems crucial that we determine when the fetus (if ever) becomes a being with the moral right to life.

John Noonan is correct in saying that “the fundamental question in the long history of abortion is, ‘How do you determine the humanity of a being?’“

Question 2

Explain and thoroughly critique Noonan’s principal argument for his view that human life begins at conception.

Answer 2

• Principal argument: Premise (1), which states that any being with human genetic code is a human.
• Rebuttal of Noonan’s principal argument:
  
  • Non-humans can have human genetic code. Cattle are sometimes injected with human genetic code to make their milk more digestible, but the mere fact that they have this genetic code does not make them human. Likewise, pigs are sometimes injected with human DNA so they can grow tissue that can be transplanted to humans, yet we would not call these pigs human.
• Charitable rebuttal of Noonan’s argument:
  
  • Some human cells have all, and only, human DNA, but we do not consider human cells to be human beings.
  • It is implausible to think that the mere possession of all and only human DNA is sufficient for being human. To see this, consider some analogies: Think of an acorn. It has the DNA of an oak tree, yet no one would consider an acorn to be an oak tree, merely in virtue of the fact that they share the same DNA. Likewise, imagine you come over for breakfast and I serve you an omelet. You say that the eggs are delicious. I, however, correct you. I point out that the eggs you’re eating were fertilized. Thus, what you are eating are (three) chickens! Surely this would strike you as absurd. Similarly, it seems absurd to suggest that a one-celled organism could be a human being, merely because it happened to contain all and only human DNA. At best, such an organism has the potential to become a human being, but it is not one yet!

Question 3

Explain and critically assess Noonan’s supporting argument for his view that human life begins at conception

Answer 3

John Noonan maintains that abortion is almost always seriously immoral. He suggests that the only time that abortion is not wrong is when it is necessary to save the pregnant woman’s life. The reason he thinks abortion is almost always seriously immoral is because he thinks that human life begins at conception. His principal argument for this position is as follows:

(1) A being with human genetic code (human DNA) is human;
(2) The new being receives its human genetic code at conception (when the sperm fertilizes the ovum).

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(3) Therefore, one is human at conception.

Noonan then assumes that if one is human, one has the right to life, and so may not be killed, except for reasons of extreme necessity (such as self-defense).

(Warren) “On the Definition of ‘Human’ One reason why this vital second question is so frequently over looked in the debate over the moral status of abortion is that the term ‘human’ has two distinct, but not often distinguished, senses. This fact results in a slide of meaning, which serves to conceal the fallaciousness of the traditional argument that since ( 1 ) it is wrong to kill innocent human beings, and (2) fetuses are innocent human beings, then (3) it is wrong to kill fetuses. For if ‘human’ is used in the same sense in both ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) then, whichever of the two senses is meant, one of these premises is question-begging. And if it is used in two different senses then of course the conclusion doesn’t follow.”

Question 4

State Noonan’s argument against the moral permissibility of abortion.

Answer 4

(1) Any being with human genetic code is a human.
(2) Fetuses receive human genetic code at conception.
(3) Therefore, fetuses are human at conception.
(4) Being human (i.e., having the right genetic code) is sufficient for having moral rights, including a right to life.
(5) So, fetuses have moral rights from conception.
(6) It is, presumptively, seriously immoral to kill a being that has moral rights.

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(7) Therefore, abortion is, presumptively, seriously immoral from conception.

Question 5

What is the principle of charity?

Answer 5

This principle instructs us to interpret an author’s claims and arguments in the best possible light. The general aim is to arrive at a fair and sympathetic understanding of the author’s position in order to critically evaluate it.

Question 6

Critique premise 4 of Noonan’s argument.

Answer 6

Doran: “Premise (4) says that being human is sufficient for having rights. This is dubious because if we really think that human DNA is sufficient to make one human as is claimed in premise (1), then we would also have to say that having human DNA is sufficient for having rights.

But that seems much too strong. As Warren noted previously, many human cells have all and only human DNA, but we do not grant individual human cells human rights. Similarly, the process of IVF (in vitro fertilization) requires the creation and subsequent loss of many human fertilized ova, but it seems to be mistaken to regard this process as one that involves mass manslaughter.”

Question 7

Define abortion.

Answer 7

Abortion may be defined as the termination of pregnancy with the intent and result of ending the life of the prenatal organism.

Question 8

How may the prenatal organism be described?

Answer 8

The prenatal organism is referred to by a variety of technical terms, depending on its level of development. At the very beginning stages (24-72 hours after sex), fertilization of the ovum occurs, and the new organism is referred to as a zygote or conceptus.

The zygote then begins a process of cellular division as it moves through the fallopian tubes and begins a process of implantation into the uterine wall. At approximately 2 weeks, (once implantation is complete) until about 8 weeks, the organism is referred to as an embryo.

At approximately 8 weeks, when brain activity is detectable, through birth at approximately 40 weeks, the organism is referred to as a fetus.

The prenatal organism develops continuously through pregnancy. At approximately 24 weeks, the fetus’ organs are sufficiently developed that it is viable if born.

At some point near viability, the fetus’ brain is sufficiently developed that the fetus is probably sentient insofar as it is capable of feeling pleasure and pain.

Question 9

What is Noonan’s Sharp Shift in Probabilities argument?

Answer 9

(1) Human life must begin at some point.
(2) In deciding when human life begins, we should pay attention to probabilities.
(3) There is a sharp shift in the probability of development at conception.

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(4) Therefore, it is reasonable to think human life begins at this point, i. e. conception.

It seems to me (Doran) that the principal problem with this argument is that the premises, even if true, do not make the conclusion probably true. Just because the probabilities of development go up at a certain point, gives no reason to think that humanity begins at that point. For consider an analogous case, once I have made a non-refundable down payment on the car you are selling, the probabilities that I will come to own the car have gone up greatly, but this gives no evidence for the claim I own the car now. Likewise, it is very hard to see why we should think a zygote is a human being merely in virtue of the fact that it will likely develop and become a human being in the future.

Question 10

What is the fallacy of equivocation?

Answer 10

The Fallacy of Equivocation occurs when an equivocal word or phrase is used to make an unsound argument appear sound. An equivocal word or phrase is a word or phrase which has more than one meaning.

Question 11

Describe Mary Anne Warren’s rebuttal of John Noonan’s argument against abortion.

Answer 11

Mary Anne Warren points out that Noonan’s standard conservative argument, once disambiguated, fails. It fails either because it is logically invalid, or because it contains a weak premise. Her objection to this argument is that it fails because it commits the fallacy of equivocation.

This is most clearly seen if the original argument is rewritten, with the ambiguous term “human” replaced.

(1) All persons(or members of the moral community) have a right to life.
(2) The fetus, from conception, is genetically human.

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(3) Therefore the fetus has a right to life from conception.

So stated, the argument’s premises look true, but the conclusion of the argument is not proved.

Of course, the argument could be reinterpreted so that one meaning of human being is used throughout. This would render the argument logically valid, but would have the problem that one of its premises would be weak. To see this, consider the argument with the moral meaning of the term human throughout the argument.

(1) All persons (or members of the moral community) have a right to life.
(2) The fetus, from conception, is a person (a member of the moral community).

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(3) Therefore the fetus has a right to life from conception.

But clearly premise 2 of this argument is much too controversial to just assume as a premise.

Finally, we could rewrite the argument using the genetic meaning of the term human throughout.

(1) All genetic humans have a right to life.
(2) The fetus, from conception, is genetically human.

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(3) Therefore the fetus has a right to life from conception.

But now, clearly premise 1 of the argument begs the question, and cannot merely be assumed as a premise.

Question 12

Explain and evaluate the relationship between potentiality and rights

Answer 12

One might argue that even if a fetus is not a human being with rights at conception, it is a potential human being with potential rights at conception. This observation could then be the basis of an argument of the following sort:

(1) A fetus is a potential rights holder from conception.
(2) If something is a potential rights holder it should get rights now.

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(3) Therefore, a fetus has rights from conception.

Doran: “ If one cannot plausibly maintain that mere potential gives one rights now, one might argue that potential gives the fetus value. The idea is that infants are valuable and fetuses are potential infants, and so should get value too.

Here are some more thought-experiments that suggest a similar conclusion - one’s kidneys have value in virtue of their potential to save someone’s life; one’s sperm or ova have value in virtue of their potential to provide someone with a child; one’s uterus has value insofar as it could carry a child to term - but it does not seem that the fact that these things has value is sufficient to restrict a person’s rights to control what happens to them. That is, even if your sperm or eggs have value insofar as they could be used to make a baby - it does not seem that that fact is sufficient to limit your right to control what happens to them. Analogously, if the fetus has value insofar as others value it, or insofar as it can become a child, it is unclear why this is sufficient to limit your rights to control what happens to it.”

Question 13

Distinguish between instrumental and non-instrumental value

Answer 13

In moral philosophy, instrumental and intrinsic (non-instrumental) value are the distinction between what is a means to an end and what is as an end in itself.

Things are deemed to have instrumental value if they help one achieve a particular end.

Intrinsic values, by contrast, are understood to be desirable in and of themselves.

A tool or appliance, such as a hammer or washing machine, has instrumental value because it helps you pound in a nail or cleans your clothes.

Happiness and pleasure are typically considered to have intrinsic value insofar as asking why someone would want them makes little sense: they are desirable for their own sake irrespective of their possible instrumental value.

Question 14

Explore the connection between the claim that a fetus has value in virtue of its potential, and it is wrong for a woman to obtain an abortion.

Answer 14

Evaluation of the View that Potential gives Value (Doran)

If it is admitted that the fetus has value even if it is not valued by the parents, is this enough to show that abortion is wrong? It must be remembered that a woman has a right to control what happens in and to her body - and wouldn’t this ordinarily mean she has the right to destroy something even if it is valuable, provided that she violates no one else’s rights?

Imagine you have an old computer that you no longer want. Others might value that computer, but you no longer value it. Of course, it would be permissible if you sold your computer, and it would be generous if you donated that computer to those who wanted it, but would you be within your rights to just scrap/recycle the computer?

It seems to me that it would be within your rights not to donate your computer, even though it has value. Here are some more thought-experiments that suggest a similar conclusion - one’s kidneys have value in virtue of their potential to save someone’s life; one’s sperm or ova have value in virtue of their potential to provide someone with a child; one’s uterus has value insofar as it could carry a child to term - but it does not seem that the fact that these things has value is sufficient to restrict a person’s rights to control what happens to them. That is, even if your sperm or eggs have value insofar as they could be used to make a baby - it does not seem that that fact is sufficient to limit your right to control what happens to them. Analogously, if the fetus has value insofar as others value it, or insofar as it can become a child, it is unclear why this is sufficient to limit your rights to control what happens to it.

Question 15

Explain Mary Anne Warren’s criteria of personhood

Answer 15

(1) consciousness (of objects and events external and/or in ternal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain;
(2) reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems) ;
(3) self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control) ;
(4) the capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics;
(5) the presence of self-concepts, self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both.

Question 16

Explain Mary Anne Warren’s argument for her criteria of personhood

Answer 16

Criteria:

• Consciousness
• Rationality
• Emotionality
• The capacity to communicate
• Self-awareness
• Moral Agency

(Doran) She does not claim that someone must have all these traits to be a rights-holder, but she does think that some of these traits are needed, and so someone that had none of these traits would not be a rights-holder. Moreover, she suggests that the more of these traits one has the clearer one’s claim to being a person, and that consciousness and perhaps rationality may well be necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person.

She then argues as follows:

(1) The capacities for consciousness and rationality are necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person.
(2) Fetuses are never capable of both consciousness and rationality.

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(3) Therefore, a fetus is never a person.
(4) A woman may permissibly abort her pregnancy if the fetus is not a person.

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(5) So, a woman may permissibly choose to abort her pregnancy.

Question 17

Critically evaluate Mary Anne Warren’s criteria of personhood

Answer 17

Also, one could question her claim that a merely conscious being does not have rights of sufficient strength to override a woman’s right to obtain an abortion. Do you think merely conscious beings have strong moral rights to life? If so, are they as strong as the moral rights of a full-fledged person, or just stronger than the moral rights suggested by Warren?

Question 18

Critically evaluate Mary Anne Warren’s argument for personhood

Answer 18

(Doran) She does not claim that someone must have all these traits to be a rights-holder, but she does think that some of these traits are needed, and so someone that had none of these traits would not be a rights-holder. Moreover, she suggests that the more of these traits one has the clearer one’s claim to being a person, and that consciousness and perhaps rationality may well be necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person.

She then argues as follows:

(1) The capacities for consciousness and rationality are necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person.
(2) Fetuses are never capable of both consciousness and rationality.

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(3) Therefore, a fetus is never a person.
(4) A woman may permissibly abort her pregnancy if the fetus is not a person.

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(5) So, a woman may permissibly choose to abort her pregnancy.

Also, one could question her claim that a merely conscious being does not have rights of sufficient strength to override a woman’s right to obtain an abortion. Do you think merely conscious beings have strong moral rights to life? If so, are they as strong as the moral rights of a full-fledged person, or just stronger than the moral rights suggested by Warren?

First, the question of which properties are essential for personhood is a non-empirical question. No experiments will uncover these properties. The only way to get at them is to try to understand, a priori, what the property of being a person is, and that is an ongoing chore for philosophy. The second problem is that, even if we have a list of properties essential for a thing to be a person, they tend not to be empirically testable. Perhaps, then, there is a problem with our conception of personhood?

Question 19

Explain Thomson’s violinist analogy

Answer 19

From wikipedia:

In “A Defense of Abortion”, Thomson grants for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life, but defends the permissibility of abortion by appealing to a thought experiment:

You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. [If he is unplugged from you now, he will die; but] in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.

Thomson argues that one can now permissibly unplug themself from the violinist even though this will cause his death: this is due to limits on the right to life, which does not include the right to use another person’s body, and so by unplugging the violinist, one does not violate his right to life but merely deprives him of something—the use of someone else’s body—to which he has no right. “[I]f you do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due.”

For the same reason, Thomson says, abortion does not violate the fetus’s legitimate right to life, but merely deprives the fetus of something—the non-consensual use of the pregnant woman’s body and life-supporting functions—to which it has no right. Thus, by choosing to terminate her pregnancy, Thomson concludes that a pregnant woman does not normally violate the fetus’s right to life, but merely withdraws its use of her own body, which usually causes the fetus to die.

Question 20

Discuss difficulties with Thomson’s violinist analogy, and how it might be improved

Answer 20

“the Thomson analogy cannot help us produce a clear and persuasive proof of the moral permissibility of abort” (Warren)

(Doran)

The Case of the Violinist is meant to be analogous with pregnancy due to rape, where it is assumed the fetus is a person. You are analogous to the pregnant woman who was raped; the unconscious violinist is analogous to the fetus (on the assumption that the fetus is a person), and the Society of Music Lovers is analogous to the rapist. If this analogy is strong, and if it is the case that it is morally permissible for you to remove yourself from the violinist, then it follows that it is morally permissible for a woman to obtain an abortion in cases of rape, even if it is granted that the fetus is a person. This argument by analogy can be written as follows:

(1) It is morally permissible for you to remove the violinist thereby causing his death.
(2) The violinist case is analogous to the case of pregnancy due to rape (where it is assumed the fetus is a human being with a right to life).

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(3) Therefore, it is morally permissible for the woman to abort the fetus in cases of rape.

There are 2 ways to criticize an analogy. One way is to say that the two cases being compared are relevantly different. The other way to criticize an argument by analogy is to disagree with the claim being made about the analogous case. In other words, one could criticize Thomson’s argument by analogy by pointing either to a relevant difference between the violinist case and the case of abortion due to rape, or by claiming that the premise that it is permissible to kill the violinist is, in fact, false.

It seems to me that premise 1 is true. But the strength of the analogy (premise 2) can be questioned. A relevant difference may point to the physical differences between the violinist scenario and abortion - in the violinist case you are going to be attached to a grown person for 9 months, and this will mean you are bedridden, whereas in pregnancy you are not typically bedridden. This may make it easier to justify removing the violinist than it would be to justify removing the fetus (if the fetus is a rights holder).

How might one fix the analogy so as to deal with this objection? Perhaps we can imagine you wake up and find the violinist’s kidneys attached to you. They need to stay attached to you for 9 months, at which time they will be purified, and can be put back into the violinist who is waiting unconscious, connected to a dialysis machine.

If the analogy is fixed, so that you are not bedridden, then do you still think it is permissible to bring about the violinist’s death? Or is it morally required for you to stay hooked up to his kidneys for nine months to keep the violinist from dying? (Remember we are not talking about what should be legally permitted, but what is morally permissible.)

Another relevant difference between the violinist analogy and abortion concerns third parties - even if it is morally permissible for you to remove the violinist, one might still claim that the argument fails to prove that abortion is morally permissible. To show that abortion is morally permissible one needs to show that it is morally permissible for a third party to provide the abortion. Accordingly, to make the violinist case analogous to abortion, it needs to be proved that it is morally permissible for a doctor or nurse or other health care professional to remove the violinist. But is that so? Would it be permissible for a doctor to remove the violinist from you, bringing about his death, if he knew that if he did not do this, the violinist could survive?

It is not clear to me whether a health care professional may do this, and so it is not clear to me that her analogy proves that a woman may receive an abortion in cases of rape, if the fetus is a rights holder. What do you think? (Note: if you think abortion is clearly permissible in the case of rape, perhaps this is because you do not, in fact, think the fetus is a rights holder.)

Question 21

Explain and evaluate Thomson’s tiny house analogy

Answer 21

From Wikipedia:

Thomson criticizes the common method of deducing a woman’s right to abort from the permissibility of a third party committing the abortion. In most instances, a woman’s right to abortion may hinge on the doctor’s willingness to perform it. If the doctor refuses, then the woman is denied her right. To base the woman’s right on the accordance or refusal of a doctor, she argues, is to ignore the mother’s full personhood, and subsequently, her right to her body. Thomson presents the hypothetical example of the ‘expanding child’:

Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny house, and a rapidly growing child—you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you’ll be crushed to death. The child on the other hand won’t be crushed to death; if nothing is done to stop him from growing he’ll be hurt, but in the end he’ll simply burst open the house and walk out a free man.

Thomson concedes that a third party indeed cannot make the choice to kill either the person being crushed or the child. However, this does not mean that the person being crushed cannot act in self-defense and attack the child to save his or her own life. To liken this to pregnancy, the mother can be thought to be the house, the fetus the growing-child. In such a case, the mother’s life is being threatened, and the fetus is the one who threatens it. Because for no reason should the mother’s life be threatened, and also for no reason is the fetus threatening it, both are innocent, and thus no third party can intervene. But, Thomson asserts, the person threatened can intervene, by which justification a mother can rightfully abort.

Continuing, Thomson returns to the ‘expanding child’ example and points out:

For what we have to keep in mind is that the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house, which has, by unfortunate mistake, been rented to both: the mother owns the house. The fact that she does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it does more than this: it casts a bright light on the supposition that third parties can do nothing.

If we say that no one may help the mother obtain an abortion, we fail to acknowledge the mother’s right over her body (or property). Thomson says that we are not personally obligated to help the mother, though this does not rule out the possibility that someone else may act. As Thomson reminds, the house belongs to the mother; similarly, the body which holds a fetus also belongs to the mother.

Question 22

Analyze the Thomson’s analogy of Smith and Jones

Answer 22

Thomson’s thought experiment involving Smith’s coat is intended to show that a person has a “right” to the use of that which he owns.

Question 23

Explain Thomson’s point that a right to life does not always entail a right not to be killed

Answer 23

“The difficulty I point to here is not peculiar to the right to life. It reappears in connection with all the other natural rights; and it is something which an adequate account of rights must deal with. For present purposes it is enough just to draw attention to it. But I would stress that I am not arguing that people do not have a right to life- quite to the contrary, it seems to me that the primary control we must place on the acceptability of an account of rights is that it should turn out in that account to be a truth that all persons have a right to life. I am arguing only that having a right to life does not guarantee hav- ing either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed con- tinued use of another person’s body-even if one needs it for life itself. So the right to life will not serve the opponents of abortion in the very simple and clear way in which they seem to have thought it would” (Thomson)

“the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly. But if this emendation is accepted, the gap in the argument against abortion stares us plainly in the face: it is by no means enough to show that the fetus is a person, and to remind us that all persons have a right to life-we need to be shown also that killing the fetus violates its right to life, i.e., that abortion is unjust killing. And is it?” (Thomson)

(Doran) Thomson’s discussion of the abortion issue is interesting and important, for it shows that it is one thing to claim the fetus has a right to life, but another thing to prove that abortion violates that right. The opponent of abortion should be reminded, then, that he or she must take this extra step and explain not only why the fetus has rights, but why abortion violates those rights.

Question 24

Explain Sumner’s specifications for an adequate view of the moral status of the fetus

Answer 24

He thinks that an adequate view of the moral status of the fetus should be

• Developmental;
• Gradual;and
• Differential

By this he means that an adequate view of the moral status of the fetus should reflect the fact that the prenatal organism is continuously developing throughout pregnancy, from a one-celled organism, to a blastocyst, to an embryo, to an early fetus, and finally to a viable fetus that is similar in physiology and complexity to a new born infant. Further, moral status should reflect the reality that this development is gradual, and that there is a large difference between the zygote and early embryo, on the one hand, and the mature fetus on the other. Sumner suggests that an adequate view of the moral status of the fetus should mirror these features. That is, rather than thinking of moral status as all or nothing, we should think that it comes on gradually, in a way that is sensitive to how the fetus develops, and which sees the moral status between the zygote, embryo and early fetus as different from that of the more developed fetus.

Question 25

Explain why Sumner rejects the life criterion and the rationality criterion of moral standing

Question 26

Explain why Sumner accepts a sentience-based criterion of moral standing

Answer 26

Sumner argues that the standard views of the moral status of the fetus fail to meet the conditions of a satisfactory criterion of moral standing. The criterion that one is human at conception ignores the development of the fetus, is not developmental, and is not differential. The same can be said of views that regard rationality as essential to moral status. A rationality based view ignores totally the development of the fetus, and cannot account for the great differences that exist between the zygote and the mature fetus.

Sumner instead argues that moral standing should be based on sentience, specifically the capacity to experience pleasure and pain. Such a view does take into account the 3 specifications of an adequate view of moral standing. It is developmental, recognizing moral status as the fetus develops certain psychological capacities, it is gradual insofar as it is likely that sentience comes on gradually and develops over time, and it is differential viewing a late fetus as having full or nearly full moral standing, a mid-term fetus as having possibly some moral standing in virtue of it being minimally sentient, and an early fetus/embryo/zygote as having no moral standing.

Further, a sentience-based view is motivated by a plausible rationale - something that is sentient has interests. They can be injured or benefited in ways that matter to it - sentient beings can have lives that are better or worse for them. Morality, it might plausibly be thought, should be concerned (at least partially, if not entirely) with promoting well-being and preventing harm, and if that is so, it makes sense that the interests of all sentient beings should be given moral significance.

Question 27

Apply Sumner’s criterion of moral standing to the fetus, and to the proper moral and legal status of abortion

Question 28

Understand some of the principal difficulties with Sumner’s sentience based view

Answer 28

An objection to my (Doran) view (and Sumner’s) is that it implies that human infants and the mentally challenged also lack a full right to life. This is a serious objection to my view. My reply is to bite the bullet and admit that such individuals lack full rights to life. I argue, however, that there are other moral reasons that make killing such individuals seriously immoral. You should consult the debate to see my arguments on this point. A related objection is that an implication of my weak-sentience view is that some animals would have stronger rights to life than some humans, since some animals are more sentient than some (very young or cognitively impaired) humans. And this is counter-intuitive. I have to accept this minimally sentient, and that external reasons (like affects on others) may help further protect disabled humans.

An objection to the strong sentience based view is that it views the killing of sentient non-humans as a violation of someone’s full moral right to life. The killing of a fish is, on this view, as gross a violation of the moral right to life as the killing of a 20-year old college student. To many people this seems wrong. I agree with this objection and argue that it seems wrong to view them as equally serious violations of the moral right to life since the loss to the college student of her life seems to be so much greater than the loss to the fish of its life.

An objection to all sentient based views is that it seems odd to grant the right to life on the basis of the presence of the capacity to feel pleasure and pain. That one can feel pleasure and pain gives one a reason not to inflict suffering or to give pleasure, but why does it give one a right to life?

My answer is that we need to think that something like sentience is sufficient for a right to life if we are going to think that non-rational humans have such a right. Moreover, I claim that once one is sentient, an individual exists who can be benefited or harmed. This individual is the subject of certain claims, including a claim not to suffer and a claim not to be killed, for such acts would equally harm the sentient individual.

Question 29

Discern between weak and strong sentience based views.

Answer 29

(Doran) A strong sentience based view would say that anything that is sentient has a full moral right to life.

A weak sentience based view claims that anything that is sentient has at least some (though not necessarily a full) moral right to life.

A strong sentience based view would imply that fetuses, once sentient have a full moral right to life, and so abortion would be morally wrong in almost all cases, once the fetus is sentient. A weak sentience based view would claim that once the fetus is sentient it has some moral right to life and so killing it would be prima facie wrong, though it would allow for aborting a mature fetuses in more situations than would the strong sentience based view.

Sentience based views imply that (sentient) non-rational humans have moral rights. They also imply that sentient non-human animals have moral rights. A strong sentience based view implies that sentient non-humans and non-rational sentient humans have a full moral right to life. A weak sentience based view implies that sentient non-humans and non-rational sentient humans have some (but perhaps not a full) moral right to life.

Like Sumner, I defend a weak sentience based view in the text. I believe that the fact that something can feel pleasure and pain gives that being moral standing in the sense of giving it some right to life. I believe that to have a full right to life, greater psychological capacities are required, like rationality, self-awareness, emotions, creativity, etc. This means that non-human animals and mature fetuses have some moral right to life, but that killing them is not morally as serious as killing a full fledged rights holder, e.g., you or me.

A weak sentience view implies that early abortions are not wrong, since the early fetus is not sentient and so lacks a right to life. A weak sentience view implies that late abortions may be wrong, since the fetus may be sentient and so may have some right to life. Thus, in order to be morally permissible, a late abortion requires a fairly strong justification – such as maternal health or perhaps fetal abnormality.

Question 30

Explain Marquis’ Future Like Ours Argument against the morality of abortion

Answer 30

(Doran)

Marquis sees the debate on the moral rights of the fetus as inconclusive; so, instead, he asks a different question. He asks, “Why is it wrong to kill you or me?” Although many answers to this question are possible, Marquis thinks the best answer is that it is primarily wrong to kill you or me because it causes you or me the loss of our valuable future.

Marquis then applies this view of why killing is wrong to the issue of abortion. He suggests that in standard cases of abortion, abortion causes the fetus the loss of its valuable future. This is the same reason that primarily makes killing you or me seriously immoral, in standard cases. Therefore abortion, in standard cases, is seriously immoral.

Marquis’ argument can be written:

(1) Killing you or me is prima facie seriously immoral because it causes you or me the loss of a future of value.

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(2) Therefore, it is prima facie seriously wrong to cause anything the loss of its future of value (a future like ours).
(3) Abortion, in standard cases, causes the fetus the loss of a future of value (a future like ours.)

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(4) Therefore, in standard cases, abortion is prima facie seriously immoral.

(Clarification: by a standard case of abortion, Marquis means cases where we have an identifiable individual (that is, once twinning is no longer possible), that the pregnancy is not due to rape, nor a danger to the woman’s life, and where there is not severe fetal abnormality.)

Evaluation of Marquis’ Argument

Do unwanted fetuses have a future of value?

One could question the truth of premise 3. That is, one could claim that unwanted fetuses are unlikely to become persons with valuable futures.

Although Marquis may admit that in extreme cases, some fetuses won’t have valuable futures, Marquis would likely reply that, often, even unwanted fetuses can still have futures of value. Think of children in foster care, or who are given up for adoption - almost always we think they have lives full that are full of value for them.

The Contraception Objection to premise 2

Some may argue that Marquis’ premise 2 - it is wrong to cause anything the loss of a future of value or a future like ours - is false. For if this is true then contraception would also be wrong, because contraception deprives the combination of sperm and ovum a future of value (a future like ours). But, of course contraception is not wrong, so premise 2 must be false.

More formally the objection can be written:

(1) In standard cases, contraception deprives the combination of sperm and ovum a future of value, a future like ours.
(2) If premise 2 (that it is prima facie seriously immoral to cause anything the loss of a future of value or a future like ours) is true, then contraception would be prima facie seriously immoral.

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(3) But contraception is not prima facie seriously immoral, so premise 2 must be false.

Marquis’ reply to this objection is to deny premise 1. He says that his view is that it is wrong to cause individuals the loss of a future like ours, but in the case of a successful contraception, there was no individual that was deprived the loss of a future. Successful contraception prevents the existence of individuals, it does not prevent individuals from having futures like ours.

Question 31

Explain and evaluate the Contraception Objection to this argument

Answer 31

(Doran)

The Contraception Objection to premise 2

Some may argue that Marquis’ premise 2 - it is wrong to cause anything the loss of a future of value or a future like ours - is false. For if this is true then contraception would also be wrong, because contraception deprives the combination of sperm and ovum a future of value (a future like ours). But, of course contraception is not wrong, so premise 2 must be false.

More formally the objection can be written:

(1) In standard cases, contraception deprives the combination of sperm and ovum a future of value, a future like ours.
(2) If premise 2 (that it is prima facieseriously immoral to cause anything the loss of a future of value or a future like ours) is true, then contraception would be prima facieseriously immoral.

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(3) But contraception is not prima facieseriously immoral, so premise 2 must be false.

Marquis’ reply to this objection is to deny premise 1. He says that his view is that it is wrong to cause individuals the loss of a future like ours, but in the case of a successful contraception, there was no individual that was deprived the loss of a future. Successful contraception prevents the existence of individuals, it does not prevent individuals from having futures like ours.

Question 32

Explain and evaluate the objection that Marquis’ argument is unsound because it commits the fallacy of equivocation

Answer 32

(Doran)

Perhaps the most important objection to Marquis’ argument is that it is guilty of fallacious reasoning. Specifically, it commits the fallacy of equivocation.

Marquis’ argument can be summarized as

(1) It is prima facie seriously wrong to cause an individual the loss of a future of value.
(2) Abortion, in standard cases, causes an individual the loss of a future of value.

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(3) Therefore, in standard cases, abortion is prima facie seriously wrong.

The objection is that the phrase “cause the loss” is ambiguous, and once we bring this ambiguity to light, we see that Marquis’ argument fails. To see this ambiguity consider some examples:

Case 1: D beats P in a race by running faster than P, thereby causing P the loss of the trophy.

Case 2: D beats P in a race because D stole one of P’s running shoes, thereby causing P the loss of the trophy.

In both cases 1 and 2, D causes P a loss. However, clearly there is a big moral difference between cases 1 and 2. In the first case, the loss caused is not morally wrong. In the second case, the loss caused is morally wrong. Presumably, the wrong in Case 2 consists in D causing P a loss by doing something that he had no right to do - namely by violating one of P’s rights by stealing his shoe.

The first kind of loss - the kind that is morally neutral - we can call Neutral Losses. The second kind of loss - the kind it is morally wrong to do - we can call Moral Losses. With this distinction in mind, we can now turn to Marquis’ anti-abortion argument.

Clearly, in premise 1, the kind of loss referred to is a moral loss. It is wrong to cause an individual like you or me the loss of our futures because, normally speaking, one has no right to end another person’s life. Now, in premise 2, Marquis could either mean a neutral loss or a moral loss. If a neutral loss is all he intends, then the conclusion that abortion is immoral would no longer logically follow from the premise. So, Marquis must intend a moral loss. He must assume that abortion causes the moral loss of a future of value. But he can only make this assumption if he further assumes the fetus has a right to its future that abortion violates. But Marquis cannot legitimately make this assumption - for the very point of his article is to try to prove that abortion is immoral without taking a stance on whether the fetus has rights.

This objection can be summarized as follows:

• If Marquis’ anti-abortion argument is read as using the moral sense of “cause the loss” throughout, then premise 2 is unpersuasive, for Marquis never demonstrates that fetuses have rights to their future.
• If Marquis’ anti-abortion argument is read as using the neutral sense of “cause the loss” throughout, then the conclusion that abortion is immoral would not follow logically.
• If Marquis’ anti-abortion argument is read as using the moral sense in premise one and the neutral sense in premise 2, then his argument again fails to prove its conclusion.

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Thus once we clarify the meaning of the phrase “cause the loss,” we see that Marquis’ anti-abortion argument is unsound. For this argument will either be logically invalid or will have a premise that begs the question.

It is unclear how Marquis can respond to this objection. I take it he would have to take the extra step and delve into a topic he had hoped to avoid, namely, whether fetuses have rights. It would be a good philosophical exercise for you to consider how Marquis could make the case that the fetus is caused a moral loss of its future like ours when it is aborted.

Question 33

Explain the argument that Marissa’s abortion was wrong because it was discriminatory.

Answer 33

(Doran)

One objection to Marissa’s abortion is that it was wrong because it was discriminatory. The basic argument is clear.

(1) Discrimination is wrong.
(2) Marissa and Don aborted because their fetus had Down’s syndrome.
(3) Aborting on the basis of Down’s syndrome is discriminatory.

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(4) So their abortion was wrong.

This argument has intuitive appeal. It’s premises look to be true, and the argument looks to be logically valid. Yet, there are parts of this argument that might be reasonably resisted.

For one thing, it seems like some forms of discrimination are not wrong. Refusing to hire a blind person or a toddler to drive the school bus may be discriminatory against blind people or toddlers but does not seem to be wrong, since there are good reasons to discriminate against these groups for this sort of job. If this is right, then premise 1 of the above argument needs to be revised so that it reads, “Discrimination, absent a good reason, is wrong.” But once this change to the argument is made, premise 3 needs to be revised so as to read, “Aborting on the basis of Down’s syndrome is discrimination, absent a good reason.” And once we make this change, it is no longer obvious that premise 3 is true. For arguably, Marissa and Don had good reasons not to have a child with Down’s syndrome.

Having said that, however, there does seem to be something right about the discrimination argument. We don’t for instance, think that abortion on the ground of sex is morally permissible, nor do we think infanticide on grounds of Down’s syndrome is morally permissible, so perhaps a case can be made that Marissa’s abortion was wrong as well?

Question 34

Explain why the textbook authors don’t think the discrimination argument is sound

Question 35

Explain Patrick’s argument for why he thinks Marissa’s abortion was morally permissible even if her fetus had a right to life.

Answer 35

Patrick: From my virtue ethics perspective, questions of right and wrong are settled by considering how the virtuous person would see things.11 And this question directs us to consider whether an individual’s actions in a given situation are consistent with the virtues. So, in the present case, we need to consider whether abortion is consistent with the virtues. When abortion is done to protect and promote other central and worthwhile goods in one’s life, then abortion may be permissible. I don’t accept any general rules about when abortion is or is not permissible, however. Each case has to be decided on its own merits. In Marissa and Don’s case, the particular case under discussion, I believe, somewhat tentatively, that abortion is permissible. One way of putting my argument is like this:

(1) It would be wrong for Marissa to have an abortion in this situation if and only if virtuous persons would see Marissa’s having an abortion as wrong.
(2) Virtuous persons would not see Marissa’s having an abortion in this situation as wrong.

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(3) Hence, it is not wrong for Marissa to have an abortion in this situation.

Patrick: The first premise follows from my view that an act is morally wrong (or prohibited) if and only if virtuous persons would perceive the action as morally wrong (or prohibited). Put briefly and roughly, perceiving an action as wrong is a matter of seeing the action as vicious (that is, as exhibiting vices), all things consid- ered. So, the idea is that Marissa’s having an abortion is wrong if and only if virtuous persons would see her action as vicious, all things considered.

On premise 2: We need to consider what virtues and vices Marissa and Don would be manifesting in choosing to abort in this situation. All things considered, they do not seem to be acting viciously. Marissa’s reasons for having an abortion do not reveal her to be selfish, shallow, greedy, callous, and so on. Rather, her aborting in this situation arguably shows a reasonable concern to preserve and protect very important and worthwhile goods in her and Don’s life. If she has the child, it will likely destroy their marriage and the business they’ve built together. In short, the life Marissa and Don have worked hard to build would likely be ruined.

(Doran)

Evaluation of Patrick’s Argument

The crucial claim in Patrick’s argument is whether a virtuous person would see Marissa’s abortion as virtuous. There is some reason to think that this is false, especially given Patrick’s willingness to grant that the fetus has a right to life. For if the fetus has a right to life, then it seems that a virtuous person would view abortion as unjust.

Normally speaking, virtuous people do not put existing relationships over others’ right to life. Justice would forbid infanticide, for instance, even if keeping the infant would be detrimental to one’s existing relationships and one’s business. And so, it is hard to see how a virtuous person would be okay with abortion if the fetus also has a right to life. On the other hand, if the fetus does not have a right to life, then perhaps a virtuous person would prioritize existing relationships.

Question 36

Explain how virtue theorists approach the morality of abortion.

Answer 36

Virtue theorists determine whether an act is morally permissible by asking if it is consistent with what a virtuous person would do. Typically then, for a virtue theorist, whether abortion is morally permissible or not will vary from circumstance to circumstance. Patrick argues that Marissa’s abortion is consistent with what a virtuous person would do.