aa_torts_20230208184416 Flashcards

1
Q

<p>Range of torts</p>

A

<p></p>

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2
Q

<p>To establish PFC for any <strong>intentional tort</strong></p>

A

<ol><li><strong>Act</strong> by a defendant</li><li><strong>Intent </strong>by a defendant</li><li><strong>Causation </strong>of the result to the P from the D</li></ol>

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3
Q

<p>You are acting intentionally if:</p>

A

<p>you are acting on purpose</p>

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4
Q

<p>3 basic guidelines for intentional torts</p>

A

<ol><li>Hypersensitivity of P is ignored</li><li>No incapacity defenses</li><li>Liable under transferred intent</li></ol>

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5
Q

<p>The act required is a</p>

A

<p><strong>volitional movement </strong>by the D</p>

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6
Q

<p>Transferred intent doctrine applies when</p>

A

<p>D intends to commit a tort against one person but</p>

<ol><li>Commits a <strong>different tort </strong>against the intended person</li><li>Commits the same tort against a <strong>different person</strong>, <strong>-OR-</strong></li><li>Commits a <strong>different tort</strong> against a <strong>different person</strong></li></ol>

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7
Q

<p>Transferred intent applies only if:</p>

A

<p>Intended tort + tort that results is "ABFLC"</p>

<p><i>assault, battery, FI, trespass to land, trespass to chattel</i></p>

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8
Q

<p>Causation is satisfied if:</p>

A

<p>D's conduct was a <strong>substantial factor </strong>in bringing about P's injury</p>

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9
Q

<p>What is a tort</p>

A

<p>civil wrong which causes injury to a <strong>person </strong>or their <strong>property </strong>and results in legal liability.</p>

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10
Q

<p>Types of torts</p>

A

<ol><li>intentional</li><li>based on carelessness</li><li>damaging someone's reputation</li><li>strict liability (liability based on <strong>nature of action </strong>instead of fault)</li></ol>

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11
Q

<p>What are the Intentional Torts to the Person</p>

A

<ol><li>Battery</li><li>Assault</li><li>False Imprisonment</li><li>IIED</li></ol>

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12
Q

<p>PFC for battery</p>

<p></p>

A

<ol><li><strong>ACT - direct or indirect - </strong>by the D that will bring about <strong>harmful </strong>or <strong>offensive contact </strong>to the P <strong>- </strong><i>direct or indirect</i><ol><li>Contact is with <strong>P's person </strong>- <i>anything <strong>connected </strong>to P …purse, clothing, body</i></li></ol></li><li><strong>INTENT </strong>of D to bring about the harmful or offensive contact to P's person</li><li><strong>CAUSATION</strong></li></ol>

<p><span><i>It is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to cause injury or harm by that contact. The contact need not be brought about by a direct application of force. It is sufficient if the defendant sets something in motion which ultimately produces unpermitted touching, such as putting poison or other deleterious ingredients in the plaintiff’s food.</i></span></p>

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13
Q

<p>What damages can be recovered for battery</p>

A

<ol><li>actual - <i>not necessary to show</i></li><li>nominal - <i>if actual arent recovered</i></li><li>punitive - <i>for malicious conduct</i></li></ol>

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14
Q

<p>PFC for assault</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>ACT: </strong>D's act creates <strong><u>reasonable</u> apprehension </strong>in P of <strong><u>immediate</u> battery </strong><i><strong>(harmful </strong>or <strong>offensive contact)</strong> </i>to P's person<ol><li><i>aka fear is something that a reasonable person would foresee as being harmful to them</i></li></ol></li><li><strong>INTENT</strong> to bring about this reasonable apprehension in P of an immediate battery</li><li><strong>Causation</strong></li></ol>

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15
Q

<p>fear in regards to assault:</p>

A

<p>not required, P just needs to be aware that touch is imminent</p>

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16
Q

<p>What is needed to show apprehension for assault</p>

A

<p>P aware that touch is imminent</p>

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17
Q

<p>Is fear of imminent assault enough to establish a reasonable apprehension in P (and thus charge someone with assault)?</p>

A

<p><strong>YES!</strong></p>

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18
Q

<p>Are words enough to commit assault?</p>

A

<p><strong>NO! </strong>need words + conduct!</p>

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19
Q

<p>What can words defeat in terms of assault</p>

A

<p>reasonable apprehension/immediacy on part of the D</p>

<p><i>ie D says I will hit you tomorrow defeats P's apprehension because act not immediate</i></p>

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20
Q

<p>What damages can P recover for assault</p>

A

<ol><li>actual - <i>not necessary to show</i></li><li>nominal - <i>if actual arent recovered</i></li><li>punitive - <i>for malicious conduct</i></li></ol>

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21
Q

<p>PFC for False Imprisonment</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>ACT: </strong>D commits an act of <strong>constraint </strong>or <strong>refinement</strong> of P and P confined to <strong>bounded area </strong>- <i>P aware of confinement or harmed by it</i></li><li><strong>Intent </strong>to confine</li><li><strong>Causation</strong></li></ol>

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22
Q

<p>Sufficient acts of restraint for FI include:</p>

A

<ol><li>Physical barriers</li><li>Physical force against P, immediate fam, or personal property (<i>ie bag</i>)</li><li>Direct threats of force</li><li>Indirect</li><li>Indirect or implied threats of force</li><li>Failure to release the P when under legal duty to do so</li><li>Invalid use of legal authority (<i>ie false arrest</i>)</li></ol>

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23
Q

<p>The act of restraints only counts for which type of intentional tort</p>

A

<p>False Imprisonment</p>

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24
Q

<p><strong>Insufficient</strong> acts of restraints for FI include</p>

A

<ol><li>moral pressure</li><li>future threats</li></ol>

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25
Q

<p>What is not considered a reasonable way out</p>

A

<ol><li>Dangerous</li><li>Disgusting</li><li>Humiliating</li><li>Hidden</li></ol>

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26
Q

<p>What damages are available for false imprisonment</p>

A

<ol><li>actual, <i>not necessary to show</i></li><li>nominal<i>, when cant get actual</i></li><li>punitive, <i>malice</i></li></ol>

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27
Q

<p>PFC for IIED</p>

A

<ol><li>Act by D amounting to <strong>extreme</strong> and <strong>outrageous conduct </strong><i>- only a tort if the conduct is extremely outrageous</i></li><li><strong>Intent - </strong>D <strong>intentionally</strong> (purposeful or knowledgeable) or <strong>recklessly</strong> (reckless disregard of the risk causing P the IIED) causes P <i><strong><u>severe</u></strong></i><strong> </strong>emotional distress</li><li><strong>Causation</strong></li><li><strong>Damages</strong> - <i>severe emotional distress</i></li></ol>

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28
Q

<p>Conduct is outrageous when</p>

A

<p>“exceeds all bounds of decency tolerated in a civilized society”</p>

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29
Q

<p>Conduct becomes outrageous when:</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>Continuous </strong>in nature</li><li>Committed by a <strong>certain type of D </strong>(<i>ie common carriers, innkeepers may be liable even for <strong>mere gross insults</strong></i></li><li>Directed towards a certain type of<strong> P</strong> (<i>kids, elderly, pregnant, supersensitive adults )</i><ol><li><i>have to know person is pregnant</i></li><li><i><strong>doesnt matter if D</strong> knows person is supersensitive</i></li></ol></li></ol>

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30
Q

<p>What intent is needed for IIED</p>

A

<p>reckless is enough</p>

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31
Q

<p>What types of damages can be collected for IIED</p>

A

<p>actual damages <strong>are required</strong></p>

<p><strong>physical injury NOT </strong>required<strong> </strong><i><strong>severe emotional distress </strong></i>is enough</p>

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32
Q

<p>PFC for bystander in IIED</p>

A

<ol><li>meet PFC for IIED -<strong>OR-</strong></li><li>present when injury occurred</li><li>distress resulted in bodily harm to <strong><u>bystander</u></strong> OR<strong> P is close <u>relative</u> of bystander; </strong>and</li><li>D knew these facts</li></ol>

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33
Q

<p><span>A private person may make an arrest without a warrant if</span></p>

A

<p><span>a felony has been committed and he reasonably believes that the person confined is the felon.</span></p>

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34
Q

<p><span>A father enrolled his seven-year-old son in an older level baseball league by falsifying his son’s age. During a ball game, the father was infuriated when his son was called out on strikes and shouted in a loud voice, “Kill the ump!” The son, who was still holding his bat, swung it at the umpire and hit him in the arm.</span><br></br><br></br><span>In an action by the umpire against the father for battery, will the umpire prevail?</span></p>

A

<p>No, because the father did not intend to commit a battery against the umpire.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><br></br></p>

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35
Q

<p><span>A private citizen may make a felony arrest without a warrant:</span></p>

A

<p>Only if a felony has in fact been committed a<span>nd the citizen has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed it.</span></p>

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36
Q

<p>Which of the following constitutes <strong>sufficient</strong> confinement for false imprisonment?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A - A threat of future harm against the plaintiff’s family</p>

<p></p>

<p>B -Reasonable restraint of a suspected shoplifter</p>

<p></p>

<p>C- An indirect threat of force against the plaintiff’s property</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

A

<p>C- An indirect threat of force against the plaintiff’s property</p>

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37
Q

<p><span>A prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires</span></p>

A

<p><span>proof of extreme and outrageous conduct.</span></p>

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38
Q

<p><span>For a prima facie case of assault, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ will satisfy the element of apprehension.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p>A - Threat of future contact</p>

<p>B - An apparent ability to act</p>

<p>C - Words alone</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

A

<p><span>An apparent ability to act will satisfy the element of apprehension in a prima facie case of assault. To establish a prima facie case of assault, the plaintiff must prove there was an act by the defendant that created a reasonable apprehension in the plaintiff of immediate harmful or offensive contact</span></p>

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39
Q

<p><span>For an intentional tort, the intent element may be satisfied:</span></p>

A

<p><br></br>If the actor’s goal is to bring about certain consequences or the actor knows with substantial certainty that certain consequences will result</p>

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40
Q

<p><span>A prima facie case for assault requires \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_:</span></p>

A

<p>Awareness of the force set in motion by the defendant’s act</p>

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41
Q

<p><span>A prima facie case for intentional tort liability requires proof of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.</span></p>

A

<p>a volitional act</p>

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42
Q

<p>The defense of consent is not available if:</p>

<p>A The plaintiff consented due to threats of legal action.</p>

<p>B The plaintiff’s consent was induced by fraud as to a collateral matter.</p>

<p>C The plaintiff consented due to a mistake induced by the defendant.</p>

<p>D The plaintiff is not capable of consent because she is unconscious.</p>

A

<p><br></br>The plaintiff consented due to a mistake induced by the defendant.</p>

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43
Q

<p>A golfer and her instructor were playing golf in a foursome when the golfer became very annoyed with critical comments made by the instructor. To show the other golfers in the group how annoyed she was with her instructor, the golfer stood a few yards behind him while the instructor was teeing off and swung a club at him. The instructor, who was focusing on his shot, was not within range of the club but unfortunately the club slipped out of the golfer's hands and struck the instructor in the head, injuring him.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the instructor brings a battery action against the golfer, will he recover?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the golfer acted intentionally and caused harmful contact to her instructor.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B Yes, because the golfer intended to cause the instructor reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful contact.</p>

<p><br></br>C No, because the golfer did not intend to cause harmful or offensive contact.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D No, unless the golfer acted unreasonably in swinging the club at her instructor.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

A

<p>C No, because the golfer did not intend to cause harmful or offensive contact.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The golfer will not be liable because she did not intend to cause harmful or offensive contact. The prima facie case for battery has the following elements: (i) an act by the defendant that brings about harmful or offensive contact to the plaintiff's person; (ii) intent on the part of the defendant to bring about harmful or offensive contact to the plaintiff's person; and (iii) causation. Here, the golfer did not have the<strong> <u>intent</u> to cause harmful or offensive contact.</strong></span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is incorrect because even though the golfer had the intent to swing the club, she did not have the intent required for battery-to cause harmful or offensive contact to another.</span></p>

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44
Q

<p>doctrine of transferred intent</p>

A

<p>when D sets in motion the action which brings about the subsequent damage/harm they can be liable for the intentional tort</p>

<p></p>

<p><i>for ex: D can be liable for battery even if initial intent was assault if D sets in motion the force to bring about the assault which then rises to a battery</i></p>

<p></p>

<p>i.e. motorcyclist saw his classmate walking and wanted to scare her by driving the motorcycle towards her and then swerve away. As motorcyclist attempts to swerve, his tire blows and he ends up falling with his motorcycle on the classmate. Classmates sues for battery. Is the suit valid?</p>

<p>Yes because the motorcyclists intended to <strong>scare </strong>the classmate (assault). So here, the intent to <strong>assault </strong><i><strong>transfers </strong></i>and becomes a battery for which the classmate can sue</p>

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45
Q

<p>Can a P recover humiliation damages under FI?</p>

A

<p>yes!</p>

<p>humiliation is an actual damage that P can recover for</p>

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46
Q

<p>PFC for trespass to land</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>ACT</strong> of <strong>physical invasion </strong>by a person or object of P's <strong>real</strong><i> </i><strong>property</strong><i> </i>by D</li><li>intent to <strong>enter</strong> … <i>dont need to know land belonged to another</i></li><li>causation</li></ol>

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47
Q

<p>the physical invasion onto a P's land must be by what type of act?</p>

A

<p>a deliberate act</p>

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48
Q

<p>If an intangible matters enters one's property (<i>ie vibrations or odor</i>), is it a trespass?</p>

A

<p><strong>NO. </strong>but it could be a case for nuisance</p>

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49
Q

<p>The trespass claim belongs to the person with the right to?</p>

<p></p>

A

<p>right to <strong>possess </strong>the property</p>

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50
Q

<p>What type of intent is needed for trespass to property</p>

A

<p>D only need to <strong>intend</strong> to <strong>enter </strong>do not need to know that land belong to another</p>

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51
Q

<p>What kind of damages for trespass to land</p>

A

<p>P can recover <strong>without showing </strong>actual injury to land</p>

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52
Q

<p>PFC for trespass to chattels</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>ACT</strong> by D that <strong>interferes </strong>with <strong>P's right of possession</strong> in a chattel</li><li><strong>INTENT </strong>Intentional <strong>act</strong> that interferes with P's <strong>personal property</strong></li><li>Causation</li><li>Damages</li></ol>

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53
Q

<p>What types of <strong>"interference"</strong> can be done D that are considered to affect P's right of possession in the chattel</p>

A

<ol><li>D <strong>directly</strong> <strong>damaging</strong> P's chattel -<strong>OR-</strong></li><li>D deprives P of their <strong>lawful</strong> right to <strong>possession</strong> of chattel</li></ol>

<p><strong>THEREFORE, </strong>A plaintiff can recover for loss of use of the chattel <strong>without</strong> proof of <strong>actual</strong> harm (eg, damage to the chatte</p>

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54
Q

<p>What type of intent is needed for trespass to chattels</p>

A

<p>Intent to do <strong>act</strong> that brings the interference</p>

<p></p>

<p><strong>NOTE: </strong>a <strong>mistake of law or fact</strong>, that he/she was privileged to act is <strong>no defense</strong> to a trespass-to-chattels action<strong>even if</strong> the mistake was <strong>reasonable</strong>.</p>

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55
Q

<p>What kind of <strong>damages</strong> for trespass to chattels</p>

A

<p></p>

<p>A plaintiff can recover for loss of use of the chattel without proof of actual harm (eg, damage to the chatte</p>

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56
Q

<p>PFC for conversion</p>

A

<ol><li>Act by D that <strong>interferes SO seriously with P's right of possession </strong>that D has to pay P full chattel's value</li><li>Intent to do act that brings about interference w P's right of possession</li><li>Causation</li><li>Damages</li></ol>

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57
Q

<p><span>For conversion, the defendant must have the intent to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ with the plaintiff’s right of possession.</span></p>

A

<p>Perform the <strong><u>act</u></strong> that interferes with P's right of possession.</p>

<p></p>

<p>iow: t<span>he intent involved refers to the <strong>physical</strong> <strong>act</strong> that results in the conversion, <i><strong>not</strong></i> to the defendant's <i><strong>desires</strong></i> regarding the ultimate disposition of the property.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><strong>NOTE: </strong>good-faith is irrelevant in a conversion action (<i>i.e. D took a boardgame that he, in good-faith, believed was his)</i></span></p>

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58
Q

<p>Small harm? think -</p>

<p>big harm? think -</p>

A

<p>chattels - <i>smaller because 8 letter</i></p>

<p>conversion - <i>bigger because 10 letters</i></p>

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59
Q

<p>conversion vs. chattel - <strong>think of <u>conversion</u> as being</strong><i><strong> more than</strong></i><strong> a 50% damage to the property</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p>A college student borrowed his roommate's notebook computer without permission because he needed to write a term paper that was due the next day. While the computer was sitting open on the student's desk overnight, a water pipe in the ceiling began leaking and water dripped down on the computer, rendering it inoperable. A computer repair service estimated that it would cost $500 to repair all the damaged components. At the time it was damaged, the computer was worth $700.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the roommate sues the student for the damage caused to the computer, what will be the extent of his recovery?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Nothing, because the damage occurred through no fault of the student.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B Loss of use damages for the time it was in the student's possession.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C $500 in damages.$500 in damages.</p>

<p><br></br>D $700 in damages.</p>

<p></p>

A

<p><br></br>D $700 in damages.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Here, the student interfered with the roommate's right of possession in the computer by taking it without permission, and it sustained damages of <strong>over 70% of its value </strong>while in the student's possession. Hence, the student has committed a conversion.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p>Value of computer - $700 (half of that is $350)</p>

<p>Value of repair - $500 (which is <i>greater than </i>the 50% value of the computer, which is $350)</p>

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60
Q

<p>What remedy for conversion</p>

A

<p>fair market value at time of conversion</p>

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61
Q

<p>What remedy for chattels</p>

A

<p>cost of repair</p>

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62
Q

<p><span>When a chattel is located on the land an<strong> innocent party,</strong> the owner is privileged to</span></p>

A

<p><span>Enter the land and reclaim chattel at a</span></p>

<ol><li><span><strong>reasonable</strong> <strong>time</strong> and</span></li><li><span><strong>peaceful manner</strong></span></li><li><span><i><strong>when </strong>landowner has been given <strong>notice</strong></i> <i>of the presence of the chattel and <strong>refuses</strong> to return it</i></span></li></ol>

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63
Q

<p><span>When a chattel is located on the land of a <strong>wrongdoer</strong>, the owner is privileged to</span></p>

A

<p><span>Enter the land and reclaim chattel at a</span></p>

<ol><li><span><strong>reasonable time</strong> and</span></li><li><span>in a<strong> reasonable manner</strong></span></li><li><span><i>usually need to demand return of the chattel from the wrongdoer before entering land</i></span></li></ol>

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64
Q

<p><span>When a chattel is located on the land of <strong>another through the owner's fault</strong>, the owner</span></p>

A

<p>has <strong>NO </strong>privilege to enter upon the land and can only recover chattel through <strong>legal process</strong></p>

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65
Q

<p>Does the owner owe damages that result from entry on to a <strong>innocent party's </strong>land?</p>

<p>What type of damages?</p>

A

<p><strong>YES, </strong>the owner will be liable for <strong>actual damages </strong>that are caused by entry onto the innocent party's land when the owner enters the land to reclaim his respective chattel</p>

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66
Q

<p>is it a defense to trespass if:</p>

<p>D <strong>mistakenly </strong>believes that their entry upon a piece of land was <strong>lawful</strong></p>

A

<p><strong>No, </strong>it is <strong>not a defense </strong>as long as the D <strong>intended </strong>to enter upon that piece of land.</p>

<p></p>

<p><strong>REMEMBER: </strong>the intent sufficient enough to find a claim for trespass is <strong>intent to <u>enter</u></strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><i>Example: Farmer relies on boundary markers placed by a reputable land surveyor. Farmer clears land for cultivation which he believes is his. In fact, he is <strong>mistaken</strong>, and he clears land that belongs to his neighbor. Farmer is <strong>liable </strong>to Neighbor <strong>for trespass</strong></i></p>

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67
Q

<p><span>What is the key difference between trespass to chattels and conversion?</span></p>

A

<p><br></br>The seriousness of the interference with the plaintiff’s possession.</p>

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68
Q

<p><span>With regard to a trespass to <strong>chattels</strong>, <strong>intermeddling</strong> is defined specifically as conduct that:</span></p>

A

<p>Directly damages a plaintiff’s chattel</p>

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69
Q

<p>Why do we have defenses to intentional torts</p>

A

<p><span>When faced with a civil action involving a tort, a D may assert various defenses to escape liability.</span></p>

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70
Q

<p>What are the main defenses</p>

A

<ol><li>Consent</li><li>Privileges</li><li>Necessity</li></ol>

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71
Q

<p>what are the consent defenses</p>

A

<ol><li>express/actual consent</li><li>implied consent</li></ol>

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72
Q

<p>what is the consent defense</p>

A

<p>the person affected by the tort (P) gave consent to the tortfeasor (D) to engage in the otherwise wrongful conduct</p>

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73
Q

<p>Two questions to ask about consent</p>

A

<ol><li>was there valid consent</li><li>did D stay within boundaries of consent</li></ol>

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74
Q

<p>express consent</p>

A

<p>P expressly consents to D's conduct</p>

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75
Q

<p>Types of express consent</p>

A

<ol><li>mistake</li><li>fraud</li><li>duress</li></ol>

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76
Q

<p>consent by mistake</p>

A

<p>P expressly consents <strong>by</strong> <strong>mistake</strong> to D's conduct</p>

<p><strong><u>UNLESS</u></strong></p>

<p>D caused mistake or knows of mistake and takes advantage, then defense won't apply</p>

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77
Q

<p>consent by fraud</p>

A

<ol><li>Defense <span><strong>applies</strong></span> - expressly given consent induced by fraud as to a <span><strong>collateral</strong></span><strong> </strong>matter</li><li>Defense <span><strong>does not apply</strong></span> - expressly given consent induced by fraud as to an <span><strong>essential</strong></span><strong> </strong>matter</li></ol>

<p></p>

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78
Q

<p>consent by duress</p>

A

<p>Consent obtained by duress <span><strong>invalid</strong></span> <strong>unless </strong>duress is for a:</p>

<ol><li>future action</li><li>future economic deprivation, <i>in which case it does not constitute legal duress sufficient enough to </i><span><i><strong>invalidate</strong></i><strong> </strong></span><i>express consent</i></li></ol>

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79
Q

<p>Types of implied consent</p>

A

<ol><li>apparent consent</li><li>consent implied by law</li></ol>

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80
Q

<p>Apparent consent</p>

A

<p>Consent which a reasonable person would infer from the P's conduct</p>

<p><i>example: reasonable body language consent, P extends hand and says “nice to meet you”</i></p>

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81
Q

<p>apparent consent inferred from social custom and usage</p>

A

<p>Example: tackling someone in football is implied consent</p>

<p></p>

<p><strong>BUT NOTE: </strong>that such consent cannot exceed what is customary. So, in a football game, there is implied consent for tackling but no implied consent for violence clearly outside the scope of the game even if it is during the game. One player shooting another player during the football game would be outside the implied consent for violence in a football game and so, implied consent would not be a defense for such an action</p>

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82
Q

<p>Consent implied by law</p>

A

<p></p>

<p>Arises when action necessary to save person's life or property interest</p>

<p></p>

<p><i>Example: firefighters enter your land to extinguish fire without consent but not trespassing on to your land because entering to save your house</i></p>

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83
Q

<p>Exceptions to express or implied consent</p>

A

<ol><li>Individuals <strong>without</strong> capacity <span><strong>cannot</strong></span> <strong>consent</strong><ol><li>incompetents, infancy, inebriation (<i>I3</i>)<ol><li><i><strong>NOTE</strong>: being part of the I3 <strong>is NOT </strong>a defense to <u>committing</u> a tort</i></li></ol></li></ol></li><li>Individuals with <strong>limited</strong> capacity <span><strong>can</strong></span><i><strong> </strong></i><strong>consent</strong> but only to things within their capacity</li><li><strong>Criminal acts</strong><ol><li>Majority - <span><strong>cannot</strong></span> <strong>consent</strong>, so <span><strong>no</strong></span><strong> </strong>defense</li><li>Minority + Restatement - defense <span><strong>valid</strong></span><ol><li><span><i>consent to an act that is a breach of the peace is not effective, meaning that the defendant cannot avoid liability. </i></span></li><li><span><i>acts that are not a breach of the peace, consent is effective, meaning the defendant could avoid liablity</i></span></li></ol></li></ol></li></ol>

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84
Q

<p>What happens if D exceeds the scope of consent given by P by committing a more intrusive invasion or intruding a different interest?</p>

<p></p>

<p><i>example: instead of preforming a tonsillectomy, doctor performs an appendectomy</i></p>

A

<p>D is <strong>liable</strong></p>

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85
Q

<p>When D is responding to a <strong>perceived </strong>threat from P consider:</p>

<p><i>(Defenses for D)</i></p>

<p></p>

A

<ol><li>Did D have <strong>proper</strong> <strong>timing</strong>?<ol><li>was threat imminent, in progress, or about to happen?</li></ol></li><li>Does D have a <strong>reasonable belief </strong>that threat from P is genuine?</li><li>Did D use the <strong>proper</strong> <strong>amount of force?</strong></li></ol>

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86
Q

<p>When can a person use <strong>self-defenses </strong>as a defense?</p>

A

<p>person <strong>reasonably believes </strong>that they are being attacked <strong>OR </strong>about to be attacked</p>

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87
Q

<p>when is <strong>self</strong>-<strong>defense</strong> available as a defense?</p>

A

<ol><li>Reasonable belief of attack</li><li>Retaliation not allowed when there is no longer threat of injury</li><li>Retreat not necessary</li><li>Not available to initial aggressor <strong>unless </strong>other party uses deadly force</li></ol>

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88
Q

<p>Duty to retreat for self-defense?</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>Majority rule: </strong>no duty</li><li><strong>Modern trend: </strong>duty to retreat before using <strong>deadly </strong>force if retreat can be done safely <strong>UNLESS </strong>actor is in their home</li></ol>

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89
Q

<p>When can the <strong>initial aggressor </strong>defend themselves</p>

A

<p><span>If the other party <strong>uses</strong> <strong>deadly</strong> <strong>force</strong> against initial aggressor who had <strong>only used nondeadly force</strong>, then initial aggressor <strong>CAN</strong> defend himself with deadly force against the other party's deadly force.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><i>Remember: Usually, the initial aggressor may not defend himself against the other party’s reasonable use of force in self-defense.</i></span></p>

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90
Q

<p>How much force can be used?</p>

A

<p>only amount of force reasonably necessary to <strong>prevent harm.</strong></p>

<p><i>cannot use deadly force unless reasonable belief of danger of serious bodily injury</i></p>

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91
Q

<p>In the course of reasonably defending himself, one <strong>accidentally </strong>injuries a third party/bystander.</p>

<p>Is defense applicable?</p>

<p><i>(iow: not liable for injury to third party)</i></p>

A

<p><strong>yes, </strong>defense applicable if injury was <strong>accidental.</strong></p>

<p>if injury to bystander was <strong>deliberate</strong> then defense likely won't apply</p>

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92
Q

<p>is mistake allowed for the defense of self-defense</p>

A

<p>yes - reasonable mistake as to the existence of the danger</p>

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93
Q

<p>While practicing their target shooting at the firing range, a man and woman got into an argument that almost erupted into physical combat, except that they were restrained and separated by bystanders. Later, in the parking lot of the range, the man shot the woman in the shoulder. Bystanders who rushed to the scene immediately after hearing the man's shot found the woman on the pavement with a black flashlight in her hand. The woman's pistol was in her locker at the firing range. At the trial of the woman's civil action for battery against the man, the woman established that the man intentionally shot her. In defense, the man testified that the woman approached him, saying, "We'll settle this once and for all, right now," and raised an object toward the man. He testified that he feared that the woman was about to shoot him with a pistol, so he fired in self-defense.</p>

<p></p>

<p>Assuming that the jury decides that the man is telling the truth, what else must the jury find for him to prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p>A No additional facts.</p>

<p><br></br>B That a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have believed that the woman was about to shoot.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C That the woman was at fault in raising a black object toward the man while threatening him.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D That the woman was the original aggressor.</p>

A

<p>B That a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have believed that the woman was about to shoot.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>If the man prevails, it will be because the jury determined that he acted reasonably under the circumstances.</span></p>

<p><span>One may act in self-defense not only where there is real danger but also where there is a <strong>reasonable appearance</strong> of danger.</span></p>

<p><span>An honest but mistaken belief that the woman was about to shoot<strong> would justify </strong>the use of deadly force by the man if a reasonable person would have acted similarly under those circumstances.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><strong>The test is an objective one-an honest belief alone is not sufficient.</strong></span></p>

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94
Q

<p><span>Defense of others is available as a defense if the defender:</span></p>

A

<p>Has a reasonable belief that the person being aided has the right of self-defense</p>

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95
Q

<p><span>For defense of others, can D use deadly force when aiding another person?</span></p>

A

<p><strong>Yes, </strong>The defender may be able to use deadly force</p>

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96
Q

<p>Is mistake allowed in defense of others</p>

A

<p>yes is reasonable mistake</p>

<p>meaning that even if the person the D aides did not have the right of force/self-defense <i>(i.e. they were the initial aggressor)</i>, D will not be liable as long as he <strong>reasonably believed, EVEN MISTAKENLY</strong>, that the other person could have used force to defend themselves</p>

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97
Q

<p>When is defense of property available?</p>

A

<p>to <strong>prevent</strong> commission of tort to ones property…should try to desist or leave first unless futile or dangerous</p>

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98
Q

<p>When is the defense of a property unavailable</p>

A

<p>when tort has been committed* <strong>unless </strong>in hot pursuit</p>

<p><span><i>*remember - defense of property is only to <strong>prevent</strong> the commission of a tort</i></span></p>

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99
Q

<p>Shopkeeper's privilege applies when</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>Reasonable belief </strong>that theft has been committed</li><li>Detention committed in a <strong>reasonable manner</strong></li><li>Only <strong>nondeadly force </strong>can be used</li><li>Detention only for a <strong>reasonable period of time</strong></li><li>Detention only for purpose of making an <strong>investigation</strong></li></ol>

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100
Q

<p>What is the defense of necessity</p>

A

<p>A person can be/use/interfere with another person's property when necessary to avoid injury from natural force or other forces</p>

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101
Q

<p>What are the types of necessity defenses</p>

A

<ol><li>private necessity</li><li>public necessity</li></ol>

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102
Q

<p>When is public necessity raised</p>

A

<p>D acts to protect the public</p>

<p><i>ex: D sees a fire, breaks into a Acme Fire Extinguisher Co → Acme sues for trespass → D can use defense</i></p>

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103
Q

<p>When can D use private necessity</p>

A

<p>When used to prevent serious harm to them, a limited group of ppl, or property from serious harm</p>

<p></p>

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104
Q

<p>What is <strong>right of sanctuary</strong></p>

A

<p>Type of private necessity</p>

<p><i>ex #1: D enters house b/c snowstorm outside. If P kicks out D, D could sue for frostbite. P has to let D stay to prevent serious harm</i></p>

<p><i>ex #2: D ties up boat to P' s dock during storm. If P kicks out D, P pays damages to D. However, D could be liable pay damages if boat ruins P's dock even though it was a necessity to tie it up.</i></p>

105
Q

<p><span>Defenses to <strong>intentional</strong> <strong>torts</strong> generally permit the use of reasonable force except for \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.</span></p>

A

<p><span>regaining possession of land</span></p>

106
Q

<p></p>

<p>For the defense of reentry onto land, which of the following is true?</p>

<p>A One can use force to regain possession only if she acts promptly</p>

<p>B One who has been dispossessed by fraud or force may use force to regain possession</p>

<p>C Force may never be used to regain possession</p>

A

<p>C Force may never be used to regain possession</p>

107
Q

<p>While practicing their target shooting at the firing range, a man and woman got into an argument that almost erupted into physical combat, except that they were restrained and separated by bystanders. Later, in the parking lot of the range, the man shot the woman in the shoulder. Bystanders who rushed to the scene immediately after hearing the man's shot found the woman on the pavement with a black flashlight in her hand. The woman's pistol was in her locker at the firing range. At the trial of the woman's civil action for battery against the man, the woman established that the man intentionally shot her. In defense, the man testified that the woman approached him, saying, "We'll settle this once and for all, right now," and raised an object toward the man. He testified that he feared that the woman was about to shoot him with a pistol, so he fired in self-defense.</p>

<p></p>

<p>Assuming that the jury decides that the man is telling the truth, what else must the jury find for him to prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p>A No additional facts.</p>

<p><br></br>B That a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have believed that the woman was about to shoot.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C That the woman was at fault in raising a black object toward the man while threatening him.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D That the woman was the original aggressor.</p>

A

<p>B That a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have believed that the woman was about to shoot.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>If the man prevails, it will be because the jury determined that he acted reasonably under the circumstances.</span></p>

<p><span>One may act in self-defense not only where there is real danger but also where there is a <strong>reasonable appearance</strong> of danger.</span></p>

<p><span>An honest but mistaken belief that the woman was about to shoot<strong> would justify </strong>the use of deadly force by the man if a reasonable person would have acted similarly under those circumstances.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><strong>The test is an objective one-an honest belief alone is not sufficient.</strong></span></p>

108
Q

<p>What is duty</p>

A

<p>a legal obligation to take risk-reducing precautions in ones activities to avoid injuring other ppl <strong>and </strong>the<strong> </strong>duty to use such reasonable care is owed to all foreseeable plaintiffs</p>

109
Q

<p>Duties required by children</p>

<p></p>

A

<p><strong>under 5: </strong>no standard</p>

<p><strong>ages 5-18</strong>: subjective standard (which is pro defendant)</p>

<p>children engaging in <strong>adult</strong> <strong>like</strong> <strong>behavior</strong> held to an<strong> adult standard </strong><i>(usually operating a motorized vehicle even farm craft, boats, RVs, jet skis etc)</i></p>

110
Q

<p>Duties required by professionals</p>

A

<p>required to possess the knowledge and skill of an <strong><u>average</u> </strong>member of that profession</p>

111
Q

<p>What duty is owed to unknown trespassers</p>

A

<p>no duty</p>

112
Q

<p>what duty is owed to known trespassers <i>(discovered or anticipated trespasser)</i></p>

A

<p>Land possessor must warn or make safe any conditions that are:</p>

<ol><li><strong>Artificial </strong>- constructed by people (<i>no duty owed to natural conditions i.e. ice on front steps)</i></li><li><strong>Highly dangerous </strong>involving risk of death or serious bodily harm</li><li><strong>Concealed - AND -</strong></li><li><strong>Known </strong>- <i>last known condition</i></li></ol>

113
Q

<p>What duty is owed to liscences</p>

A

<p>Duty to <strong>warn </strong>or make <strong>safe </strong>conditions that are:</p>

<ol><li>Concealed<ol><li>Condition <strong>does NOT</strong>have to be likely to cause death or serious bodily injury</li></ol></li><li><strong>Known </strong>to land possessor in advance</li></ol>

114
Q

<p>What duty is owed to invitees</p>

A

<p>Duty to <strong>inspect</strong> and <strong>warn </strong>or make <strong>safe </strong>conditions that are:</p>

<ol><li>Concealed</li><li><strong>Known </strong>to land possessor in advance <strong>OR </strong>could have been discovered through <strong>inspection</strong></li></ol>

115
Q

<p>How can hazardous conditions be eliminated</p>

A

<ol><li>Repair</li><li>Replace</li><li>Remove</li></ol>

116
Q

<p>What is the attractive nuisance doctrine</p>

A

<p>Duty imposed on landowners to eliminate reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to children</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, a child trespasser who is injured by a dangerous artificial condition <strong>need</strong> <strong>not</strong> have been attracted onto the property by the condition.</span></p>

<p></p>

117
Q

<p>How is attractive nuisance doctrine established</p>

A

<ol><li>dangerous condition on land that owner <strong>is </strong>or <strong>should be </strong>aware of</li><li>owner <strong>knows </strong>or <strong>should know</strong> that kids might trespass on land</li><li>condition likely to cause <strong>injury</strong></li><li>expense of remedy <strong>slight</strong> in comparison to magnitude of risk</li></ol>

118
Q

<p>Criminal statute to establish standard of care/negligence per se can be used if:</p>

A

<ol><li>P is within <strong>protected class</strong></li><li>Statute designed to <strong>prevent </strong>they type of harm <strong>suffered </strong>by P</li></ol>

119
Q

<p>What does negligence per se mean</p>

A

<p>negligence in it of itself</p>

120
Q

<p>When can statutes be violated</p>

A

<ol><li>Compliance with statutes is more dangerous</li><li>Compliance is impossible</li></ol>

121
Q

<p>A landowner owned several dozen acres of mountain land near a national forest. A plaintiff who was injured by a condition on the owner's land brought an action for personal injury against the landowner.</p>

<p></p>

<p>In a jurisdiction that applies the traditional rules for landowners and possessors of land, which of the following plaintiffs is most likely to win?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A A 10-year-old trespasser who was swept onto some rocks while attempting to cross a swiftly flowing river.</p>

<p><br></br>B A five-year-old trespasser who fell into a mineshaft from which the owner had removed all warning signs, but the plaintiff was not attracted onto the owner's land because of the mineshaft.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C A five-year-old trespasser who inadvertently stepped into a badger hole that was obscured in the undergrowth.</p>

<p><br></br>D A 10-year-old niece visiting the landowner who stepped into a badger hole that the landowner did not know was present but that could have been discovered by inspection.</p>

A

<p>B A five-year-old trespasser who fell into a mineshaft from which the owner had removed all warning signs, but the plaintiff was not attracted onto the owner's land because of the mineshaft.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, a child trespasser who is injured by a dangerous artificial condition need not have been attracted onto the property by the condition.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is wrong because generally there is no obligation for a landowner to warn trespassers, whether they are children or adults, of dangerous </span><i><strong>natural</strong></i><span> conditions.</span></p>

<p><span>(C) is wrong for the same reason.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(D) is wrong because, as a <strong>licensee</strong>, the plaintiff need only be warned of dangerous <strong>natural</strong> conditions of which the landowner is <strong>in fact aware</strong> and which are unknown to the licensee or unlikely to be discovered by her, and here the landowner did not know of the hole.</span></p>

122
Q

<p>What types of NIED</p>

A

<ol><li>Near miss</li><li>Bystander</li><li>Special relationship btwn P and D <i>(ie business/commercial relationship)</i></li></ol>

123
Q

<p>Requirements for near miss cases</p>

A

<ol><li>P is within <strong>zone of danger</strong></li><li>P must suffer <strong>physical symptoms </strong>from the distress <i>(ie heart attack after almost being run over)</i></li></ol>

124
Q

<p>Requirements for bystander cases</p>

A

<ol><li>P and person injured are <strong>closely related</strong> <i>(spouse, parent, child)</i></li><li>P <strong>present at scene </strong>and <strong>personally saw or perceived </strong>event</li></ol>

125
Q

<p>Requirements for special relationships</p>

A

<p>P has a <strong>business or commercial</strong> <strong>relationship</strong> with the D that <strong>creates a high risk </strong>of <strong>emotional</strong> <strong>distress</strong> if D acts <strong>negligently</strong></p>

126
Q

<p><span>While a high school soccer game was in progress, members of one of the teams rolled three extra balls onto the field as a prank to distract opposing players. The referee ran over and angrily kicked the balls over to the sideline. He kicked the third ball with extreme force and it went into the bleachers and hit the mother of one of the players in the head, breaking her nose and knocking her off the bleachers.</span><br></br><br></br><span>Standing with friends behind the bleachers, her teenage daughter saw what happened and rushed to her mother’s aid. Paramedics were called to treat the woman and transfer her to a local hospital for treatment of possible spinal cord injuries. The incident caused the daughter to suffer shock to her nervous system that required treatment by a psychologist. The mother, on behalf of her daughter, brought an action against the referee for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The referee moved to dismiss the action, claiming there was no basis for recovery.</span><br></br><br></br><span>Which party will likely prevail?</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>A The referee, because the daughter did not suffer any physical harm.</span></p>

<p><span>B The referee, because the daughter was not a foreseeable plaintiff.</span></p>

<p><span>C The daughter, because she personally observed the injury to her mother.</span></p>

<p><span>D The daughter, because the referee’s negligence posed a direct threat of harm to her.</span></p>

A

<p><span>C The daughter, because she personally observed the injury to her mother.</span></p>

127
Q

<p>Types of breach</p>

A

<ol><li>custom or usage</li><li>NPS: violation of statute</li><li>Res ipsa loquitur</li></ol>

128
Q

<p>What does Res Ipsa Loquitur stand for</p>

A

<p>the thing that speaks for itself</p>

129
Q

<p>What does P need to show for RIL</p>

A

<ol><li>Accident would not normally occur <strong>unless </strong>someone was negligent</li><li>Negligence is probably <strong>attributable to D</strong></li></ol>

130
Q

<p>P usually moves for what under RIL?</p>

A

<p>directed verdcit</p>

131
Q

<p>What should be done with P's motion for DV</p>

A

<p>always deny <strong>except </strong>where P has established NPS through statute violation <strong>AND </strong>no issues of proximate cause <i>aka chain not broken</i></p>

132
Q

<p>For causation, need to establish</p>

A

<p>actual + proximate</p>

133
Q

<p>what tests are used for actual causation?</p>

A

<ol><li>but for test</li><li>substantial factor test - <i>aka cause in fact test</i></li><li>unknown cause test</li></ol>

134
Q

<p>what is the but for test</p>

A

<p>P's injury would <strong>NOT </strong>have occurred but for the D's act or omission</p>

135
Q

<p>How can D rebut P's “but for”</p>

A

<p>“even if”</p>

<p>P would have still been injured “even if” D's act or omission did not occur</p>

136
Q

<p>what is the substantial factor test</p>

A

<p>If D's negligent conduct was a <strong>substantial factor</strong>in causing the harm, its deemed an actual cause of the harm</p>

137
Q

<p>when is substantial factor test used</p>

A

<p>Two or more defendants who's actions combine to harm the P but each D's <i>individual</i>action alone could have caused the P's injury</p>

138
Q

<p>What is unknown cause test</p>

A

<p>BOP on the defendants to prove that they were not the cause for the P's injuries</p>

<p>and if <strong>cannot </strong>prove then <strong>both </strong>are jointly and severally liable<strong></strong></p>

139
Q

<p>What is proximate causation</p>

A

<p>an event sufficiently related to an injury that the courts deem the event to be the cause of that injury</p>

140
Q

<p>How is proximate cause proven</p>

A

<p>P has to prove that it is <strong><u>fair</u> </strong>to hold the D liable because such injuries were a <strong>foreseeable</strong> <strong>consequence</strong> of the breach;</p>

<p>There is a causal connection btwn D's initial negligent act and P's ultimate injury such that the act set of a chain of events that end in P's injury.</p>

141
Q

<p>What type of test is proximate causation</p>

A

<p>foreseeability test</p>

142
Q

<p>"P can recover if</p>

A

<p>jury finds this was a foreseeable risk of … "</p>

143
Q

<p>A state statute required that any freight train operating within the city limits be able to stop within 200 yards of applying its brakes. No fixed speed limit was established or particular type of braking mechanism required, but through either lowered speed or braking power, the 200-yard limit was required of all trains. Another statute prohibited vehicles from being within the railroad crossing when the lights on the warning signs are flashing or when the gates are lowered. One day, as a freight train was entering the city limits, the engineer saw a car stalled at a street crossing ahead. He immediately applied full braking power, but was unable to stop the train before it had hit and demolished the car. The driver of the car had gotten clear before the impact, but brought suit against the freight line for property damage to the $25,000 car. At trial, the parties stipulated that the car was stalled within the crossing while the warning lights were flashing. Evidence at trial established that the distance from the point at which the engineer applied the train's brakes to the point of impact was 150 yards, and from the braking point to the point at which the train finally stopped was 225 yards. No other evidence of negligence was presented by the driver. At the end of the driver's case, the freight line moved for a directed verdict.</p>

<p></p>

<p>Should the court grant the motion?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A No, because the freight line was negligent per se.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B No, because the freight line was strictly liable for its violation of the braking statute.</p>

<p><br></br>C Yes, because the driver's car was on the freight line's tracks in violation of the crossing statute.</p>

<p><br></br>D Yes, because the freight line's violation of the braking statute was not the cause in fact of the accident.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

A

<p>D Yes, because the freight line's violation of the braking statute was not the cause in fact of the accident.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The court should grant the motion because the <strong>driver did not </strong>establish the cause-in-fact element of his prima facie case against the freight line.</span></p>

<p><span>The primary test for cause in fact (actual cause) is the "<strong>but</strong> <strong>for</strong>" test: An act is the cause in fact of an injury when the injury would not have occurred </span><i><strong>but for</strong></i><span> the act.</span></p>

<p><span>Even though the freight line had a duty created by the statute to be able to stop its train within 200 yards of first braking, and breached that duty (establishing the first two elements of the driver's prima facie case), <strong>it must still be shown that the collision would not have occurred in the absence of the breach</strong>. Because the <strong>car was only 150 yards</strong> from the point of braking, <strong>even a train in compliance with the statute would have struck it</strong>. Since no other evidence of negligence has been presented, the motion should be granted.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(C) is not correct because the court will not reach the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence in this case because the prima facie case for the defendant's negligence <strong>has not been established.</strong></span></p>

<p><span>Furthermore, establishing the plaintiff's contributory negligence by violation of a statute <strong>uses the same rules that govern whether a statute can establish the defendant's negligence</strong>.</span></p>

<p><span>Hence, the driver's violation of the crossing statute <strong>may be excused</strong> if the trier of fact determines that compliance was beyond his control because his car stalled.</span></p>

144
Q

<p>What is the egg-shell skull plaintiff rule</p>

A

<p>D takes P <strong>as they are</strong> meaning that D is liable for <strong>all </strong>damages including aggravation of an <strong>existing condition <u>even if</u> </strong>unforeseeable</p>

145
Q

<p>Egg-shell skull plaintiff rule applies when</p>

A

<p>When P has established all other element of the claim (duty, breach, causation)</p>

<p>and P can also use ESP rule for other torts outside of negligence like battery, assault etc., just need to establish the elements of those torts first and then use ESP rule</p>

146
Q

<p>What damages are available for breach of negligence</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>Economic</strong></li><li><strong>Noneconomic</strong><ol><li><span><i>Include emotional distress</i></span></li></ol></li><li><strong>Damages to property</strong><ol><li><span><i>But no recovery for emotional distress</i></span></li></ol></li></ol>

<p><u>NOTES:</u></p>

<ol><li>If D is liable to P, then D liable for <strong>full</strong> <strong>extent</strong> of P's harm</li><li><strong>Punitive damages</strong> - generally cannot recover in negligence cases<ol><li><span><i>Punitive damages are awarded to P to punish D</i></span></li><li><span><i>Can <strong>only </strong>recover if D's conduct was "wanton and willful", “reckless", or malicious</i></span></li><li><span><i>Can only recover under intentional torts (BAFL2 iied)</i></span></li></ol></li></ol>

147
Q

<p>What defenses can D use for P's claim of breach of negligence?</p>

A

<ol><li>Affirmative defense</li><li>Contributory Negligence</li><li>Comparative Negligence</li></ol>

148
Q

<p>What are affirmative defenses</p>

<p></p>

A

<p>D isn't challenging whether P can meet duty, breach, causation, or damages but <strong>rather introducingNEW evidence</strong> that if believed by fact-finder either absolve D of liability<strong> OR</strong> mitigate damages</p>

149
Q

<p>What is comparative negligence</p>

A

<p>When P fails to use relevant standards of care to protect self against foreseeable risks of harm</p>

150
Q

<p>Damages under contributory negligence</p>

A

<p>CL barred P's right to recovery</p>

151
Q

<p>Comparative Negligence</p>

A

<p>Court will <strong>compare</strong> the amount of negligence from each side to determine damages</p>

152
Q

<p>Types of comparative negligence</p>

A

<ol><li>Partial comparative negligence</li><li>Pure comparative negligence</li></ol>

153
Q

<p>Recovery under partial comparative negligence</p>

A

<ol><li>P cant recover if atMOREfault than D (and D can recover)</li><li>P can recover if atLESSfault than D<ol><li>Recovery is reduced by percentage of fault</li></ol></li></ol>

154
Q

<p>Recovery under pure comparative negligence</p>

A

<p>P can recover against D no matter percentage of fault (even if 99% responsible)<strong>BUT</strong>recovery will be <strong>reduced</strong> by percentage of fault (so 99% reduction in recovery)</p>

<p></p>

155
Q

<p>Implied assumption of risk</p>

A

<p>P knew of a risk of injury and voluntarily assumed it</p>

156
Q

<p>recovery under implied AOR</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>No duty to protect - </strong>D does not owe duty to protect P because P assumed risk</li><li><strong>Contributory negligence</strong> - P unreasonably encountered a known risk, which reduces or bars damages P can get</li></ol>

157
Q

<p>What is the last clear chance doctrine</p>

<p>ADD TABLE</p>

A

<p><span>The doctrine </span>considers which party had the last opportunity to avoid the accident that caused the harm<span>.</span></p>

<p><span>Therefore, a negligent plaintiff may recover damages if they can show that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident…but P's negligence regarding intentional torts is <strong>NOT </strong>a defense D can use to limit his liability</span></p>

158
Q

<p>Which defense(s) is negated by last clear chance doctrine?</p>

A

<p>Contributory negligence</p>

159
Q

<p>Which defense apply to wanton or reckless tortious conduct</p>

A

<ol><li>Implied AOR</li><li>Pure comp neg</li><li>Partial comp neg</li></ol>

160
Q

<p><span>The doctrine of <strong>mitigation</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>damages</strong> requires</span></p>

A

<p><span>a plaintiff to take <strong>reasonable</strong> <strong>steps</strong> to mitigate damages.</span></p>

<p><span>In personal injury cases this means seeking appropriate treatment to effect a cure or healing and to prevent aggravation</span></p>

161
Q

<p>A worker who missed his ride home because he was working late walked across the street to a tavern to get a drink. He chatted with a patron of the tavern and discovered that he lived only a short distance from the patron. The patron offered to give the worker a ride home. Although he knew the patron was probably too drunk to drive, the worker reluctantly agreed. On the way home, the patron, driving in a dangerous manner, was involved in a collision with another car, whose driver was also driving negligently, and the worker was injured.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the worker sues the patron to recover for his injuries and the above facts are established at trial, will the worker's recovery be reduced?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the worker knew that the patron was drunk.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B Yes, because the other driver involved in the collision was also negligent.</p>

<p><br></br><br></br>C No, because the negligence of the patron and the other driver were the proximate causes of the accident.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D No, as long as the worker joins the other driver in his lawsuit.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

A

<p>A Yes, because the worker knew that the patron was drunk.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The worker impliedly assumed the risk of injury when he voluntarily allowed the patron to drive him home knowing that the patron was drunk. In jurisdictions applying pure comparative negligence, implied assumption of risk is usually treated as a variant of contributory negligence.</span></p>

<p><span>If the plaintiff <strong>unreasonably</strong> assumed the risk of injury, as the facts indicate here, he will be considered contributorily negligent and his damages will be reduced.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(C) is incorrect. While the patron and the other driver were both proximate causes of the accident, the worker's fault in accepting a ride from an intoxicated driver also contributed to the injuries he suffered, and the jury will reduce his recovery accordingly.</span></p>

162
Q

<p>When does SL apply for domestic animals</p>

A

<p>Owner has knowledge of animal's dangerous propensities that are <strong>NOT </strong>common to the species <i>(ie a golden retriever being a dog that likes eating humans)</i></p>

163
Q

<p>When does SL apply for trespassing animals</p>

A

<p>When owner's animals trespass onto another's property and <strong>trespass</strong> <strong><u>and</u> damage</strong> were <strong>reasonably foreseeable</strong></p>

164
Q

<p>An owner of <strong>wild animals </strong>is SL to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ for injuries caused by wild animals (even those animals kept as pets) while those \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ are on the owner's land</p>

A

<p>licensees and invitees</p>

165
Q

<p>Does SL apply for trespassers who are injured by a wild animal</p>

A

<p><strong>NO </strong>unless trespassers proves owner's negligence</p>

166
Q

<p>What are the requirements for an activity to be deemed abnormally dangerous</p>

A

<ol><li>activity creates <strong>foreseeable </strong>risk of <strong>serious harm</strong> even when <strong>reasonable care </strong>is exercised by <strong>all </strong>actors to eliminate risk</li><li>the activity is <strong>NOT one of common usage </strong>in the community (common usage =common activity that is used by the community to achieve a goal)</li></ol>

<p><i>common examples: blasting, manufacturing explosives, storing or transporting dangerous or biological chemicals, anything involving radiation or nuclear energy</i></p>

167
Q

<p>Who does D's liability extend to under abnormally dangerous activities?</p>

A

<p><strong>foreseeable</strong> Plaintiffs </p>

168
Q

<p>From what type of harm does SL in abnormally dangerous activities or animals arise?</p>

A

<p>harm resulted from danger that was <strong>anticipated </strong>from the activity or animal <i>includes harm cause by fleeing from perceived danger</i></p>

169
Q

<p>If the D exercises reasonable care will s/he be relieved of SL?</p>

A

<p><strong>NO! </strong>will still be strictly liable</p>

170
Q

<p>What theories of liability can P use under products liability claim</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>Intent</strong></li><li><strong>Negligence</strong></li><li><strong>IWM</strong> - <i>implied warranty of merchantability</i></li><li><strong>IWF</strong> - <i>implied warranty for fitness for a particular purpose</i></li><li><strong>Representation theories</strong> - <i>misrepresentation of fact and express warranty</i></li><li><strong>Strict</strong> <strong>Liability</strong></li></ol>

171
Q

<p>If a question does not indicate what theory of liability the P is using, apply:</p>

A

<p>Strict liability</p>

172
Q

<p>To find liability thru SL theory for product liability, P must show:</p>

A

<ol><li>D is a <strong>merchant</strong></li><li>Product is <strong>defective</strong></li><li>Product was <strong>not substantially altered</strong> since leaving D's control, <strong>and</strong></li><li>P was making <strong>foreseeable use </strong>of product at time of injury</li></ol>

173
Q

<p>What types of merchants does SL extend to</p>

A

<ol><li>commercial lessors</li><li>commercial suppliers in the distribution chain</li></ol>

174
Q

<p>What types of merchants are <strong>NOT </strong>liable under SL</p>

A

<ol><li>casual sellers</li><li>service providers</li></ol>

175
Q

<p>Is a contractual relationship btwn P and merchant needed to recover under SL theory</p>

A

<p><strong>NO!!</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p>and a yes answer (yes K relationship required) is a fav <strong>wrong </strong>answer</p>

176
Q

<p>Types of product liability defects under SL theory</p>

A

<ol><li>Manufacturing defects</li><li>Design defects</li><li>Information defects</li></ol>

177
Q

<p>For manufacturing defects P must show</p>

A

<p>product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect</p>

<p><strong>USE: “products departs from its intended design”</strong></p>

178
Q

<p>For design defects P must show</p>

A

<ol><li>dif. design would have made it <strong>safer</strong></li><li>dif. design would have been <strong>practical</strong></li><li>dif. design would have been <strong>economically</strong> <strong>feasible</strong></li></ol>

179
Q

<p>For information defects P must show</p>

A

<p>lack of adequate warnings for user or “learned intermediaries” (<i>ie prescribing physician)</i></p>

180
Q

<p>Misuse of product must have been</p>

A

<p><strong>foreseeable</strong></p>

181
Q

<p>Is contributory negligence a defense to SL?</p>

A

<ul><li>P <span><strong>fails</strong></span><strong> </strong>to realize danger or guard against it - <span><strong>NO CN DEFENSE</strong></span><strong> </strong>for D to use</li><li>P <span><strong>knew</strong></span> of danger and unreasonable conduct was cause of harm - <span><strong>CN DEFENSE APPLIES</strong></span><strong> </strong>for D to use</li></ul>

182
Q

<p><span>PFC in products liability based on strict liability in tort</span></p>

A

<ol><li><span>D is a <strong>commercial</strong> <strong>supplier</strong></span></li><li><span>D produced or sold a product that was <strong>defective</strong> when it <strong>left</strong> the D's control</span></li><li><span>product <strong>actually</strong> and <strong>proximately</strong> caused damage to the <strong>P's person or property.</strong></span></li></ol>

183
Q

<p>Depending on the circumstances, strict liability may be imposed on the owners of what type of animals?</p>

<p><br></br>A Wild animals only</p>

<p></p>

<p>B Wild animals and domestic animals, but not trespassing animals</p>

<p></p>

<p>C Wild animals and trespassing animals, but not domestic animals</p>

<p></p>

<p>D Wild animals, domestic animals, and trespassing animals</p>

A

<p>D Wild animals, domestic animals, and trespassing animals</p>

184
Q

<p>The owner of an animal is strictly liable for damage caused by the animal if it \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.</p>

<p></p>

<p>A attacks a trespasser</p>

<p>B is a farm animal with dangerous propensities typical for that species</p>

<p>C commits an unforeseeable trespass</p>

<p>D is a dog with known dangerous propensities</p>

A

<p>D is a dog with known dangerous propensities.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The owner of a dog or other family pet with known dangerous propensities will be held strictly liable for damage caused by the animal. Normally, the owner of a domestic animal is not strictly liable for injuries it causes. Strict liability will attach, however, if the owner knows of the domestic animal's dangerous propensities, i.e., propensities more dangerous than normal for that species. This rule applies even if the animal has never injured anyone.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>If an animal commits an unforeseeable trespass, the owner of the animal will not be held strictly liable for damage caused by the animal. The owner is strictly liable for damage caused by the trespass of her animal only if it was <i><strong>reasonably <u>foreseeable</u>.</strong></i></span></p>

185
Q

<p>Remedies available for nuisance</p>

A

<ol><li>damages</li><li>injunctive relief</li><li>self-help available for <strong>private nuisance</strong></li></ol>

186
Q

<p><span>A private nuisance action requires a showing that</span></p>

A

<p><span>the defendant <strong>substantially</strong> and <strong>unreasonably</strong> interfered with the <u>use</u> and <u>enjoyment</u> of the plaintiff’s <i><strong>real</strong></i> property.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><strong>NOTE: </strong>the P must <strong>own </strong>or <strong>rent </strong>the property in order to pursue a private nuisance claim</span></p>

187
Q

<p><span>Under a private nuisance action, for a D's interference with P's use and enjoyment of P's property to be characterized as unreasonable,</span></p>

A

<p><span>the severity of the inflicted injury must outweigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct</span></p>

188
Q

<p>A public nuisance is</p>

A

<p>an interference with the right of the <strong>community</strong> at <strong>large</strong></p>

189
Q

<p>Who are the tortfeasors (TFs) who will be sued under VL</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>Active</strong> <strong>TF </strong>- party whose affirmative conduct <strong>caused </strong>the harm</li><li><strong>Passive</strong> <strong>TF</strong> - party held vicariously liable based on relationship to <i><strong>active</strong></i> TF</li></ol>

190
Q

<p>what is the doctrine of respondeat superior</p>

A

<p>another way of saying that employer will be held liable for tortious actions of employee who's tort occurs during scope of employment</p>

191
Q

<p>Is employer liable if employee makes a <strong>minor ("detour") </strong>deviation from scope of employment</p>

<p><i>inapplicable to independent contractors</i></p>

A

<p>YES</p>

192
Q

<p>Is employer liable if employee makes a <strong>major ("frolic") </strong>deviation from scope of employment</p>

<p><i>inapplicable to independent contractors</i></p>

A

<p>NO</p>

193
Q

<p>Frolic vs. detour</p>

A

<p><span><strong>FROLIC</strong></span><strong> - </strong><span><strong>MAJOR</strong></span> deviation</p>

<p></p>

<p><span><strong>detour</strong></span><strong> - </strong><span>minor</span> deviation;</p>

194
Q

<p>Intentional torts by employees are <strong>not </strong>within scope of employment <strong>UNLESS</strong></p>

A

<ol><li>Employee <strong>furthering </strong>business of employer</li><li><strong>Force authorized </strong>- <i>ie a bouncer</i></li><li><strong>Friction part of employment </strong>- <i>ie a bill collector</i></li></ol>

195
Q

<p><span>An agent is likely to be an independent contractor if</span></p>

A

<ol><li><span>engaged in a distinct business of their <strong>own</strong>;</span></li><li><span><strong>controls</strong> the manner and method by which they perform their tasks;</span></li><li><span>is hired to do a <strong>particular</strong> job;</span></li><li><span>supplies <strong>own</strong> <strong>tools</strong> and <strong>materials</strong>;</span></li><li><span>is paid a <strong>given</strong> amount for the job; and</span></li><li><span>is hired to do a <strong>short</strong>-term, <strong>specific</strong> job.</span></li></ol>

196
Q

<p><span>A principal can be held liable for the tortious acts of an independent contractor if:</span></p>

A

<ol><li><span>The independent contractor is engaged in <strong>inherently</strong> <strong>dangerous</strong> <strong>activities</strong>; <strong>-OR-</strong></span></li><li><span>The principal has a duty that is <strong>nondelegable</strong> on public policy grounds <i>(e.g., a land occupier’s duty to keep his land safe for business invitees).</i></span></li></ol>

<p></p>

<p><span><i><strong>NOTE: </strong></i>a principal can be held liable for his own negligence in selecting an incompetent independent contractor.</span></p>

197
Q

<p>Regarding vicarious liability, which of the following statements is true?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A - A defendant is not vicariously liable for the torts of an independent contractor unless the defendant was negligent in selecting the contractor</p>

<p></p>

<p>B - Respondeat superior is not a type of vicarious liability</p>

<p></p>

<p>C - Because of the special relationship between them, an employer is always vicariously liable for her employee's torts</p>

<p></p>

<p>D - A defendant may be both vicariously liable and directly liable in the same action</p>

A

<p>D - A defendant may be both vicariously liable and directly liable in the same action</p>

198
Q

<p>Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer:</p>

<p><br></br>A May be liable for negligently supervising an employee</p>

<p></p>

<p>B Is liable for the tortious frolic of an employee</p>

<p></p>

<p>C Is liable for all tortious acts committed by his employees</p>

<p></p>

<p>DMay be liable for an intentional tortious act committed by an employee</p>

A

<p>DMay be liable for an intentional tortious act committed by an employee</p>

199
Q

<p>A principal will be vicariously liable for the tortious acts of her independent contractor \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.</p>

<p></p>

<p>A if the principal negligently supervised the independent contractor</p>

<p></p>

<p>B if the principal negligently selected the independent contractor</p>

<p></p>

<p>Cif the independent contractor is engaged in inherently dangerous activities</p>

<p></p>

<p>Dunder the doctrine of respondeat superior</p>

<p></p>

A

<p>Cif the independent contractor is engaged in inherently dangerous activities</p>

200
Q

<p>Which of the following circumstances has no bearing on whether an employer will be vicariously liable for an employee's intentional tort?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A The employee was furthering the business of the employer.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B Friction was generated by the employment.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C Force was authorized in the employment.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D The employee was negligently supervised by the employer.</p>

A

<p>D The employee was negligently supervised by the employer.</p>

201
Q

<p>A landlord employed his friend as the on-site manager of one of his apartment buildings despite being aware that he had previously been arrested for criminal battery, disorderly conduct, and driving while intoxicated. The manager did a good job dealing with the general maintenance of the apartment building, although the landlord was aware that he continued to drink heavily.</p>

<p></p>

<p>One night the manager, who was extremely intoxicated, attempted to swat an insect on the ceiling of his apartment and could not do so after several attempts. Enraged, he took a pistol from his drawer and shot at the insect. The bullet missed the insect and passed through the ceiling of his apartment into the apartment above, lodging in the leg of a tenant's social guest.</p>

<p></p>

<p>Does the guest have a viable cause of action against the landlord?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the guest had been invited onto the property by the tenant.</p>

<p>B Yes, because the landlord was aware of the manager's habitual drunkenness and propensity for violence.</p>

<p>C No, because the landlord cannot be held liable for the manager's intentional torts.</p>

<p>D No, because shooting an insect was outside the scope of the manager's employment.</p>

A

<p>B Yes, because the landlord was aware of the manager's habitual drunkenness and propensity for violence.</p>

202
Q

<p>A housecleaning agency was given a key to a customer's house so that the agency could have its employees clean while the homeowner was away. After a maid sent by the agency had finished and left the homeowner's house, she went back because she had forgotten her cigarettes. She neglected to lock the door when she left the second time because she was already late for the next job. When the homeowner returned after a few days away, she discovered that her house had been ransacked and several items of jewelry stolen. The front door was open, and there were no signs of forced entry.</p>

<p>If the homeowner brings an action against the agency that employed the maid, what is the likely result?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A She will not prevail, because she is limited to claims for breach of contract based on her agreement with the agency.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B She will not prevail, because the act of the burglar was a superseding cause of the homeowner's loss.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C She will prevail, because the maid's failure to lock the door created the risk that someone might enter and take the homeowner's valuables.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D She will prevail, because when the maid returned after having completed her work, she was technically a trespasser, making the agency vicariously liable for any damage she caused to the premises.</p>

A

<p>C She will prevail, because the maid's failure to lock the door created the risk that someone might enter and take the homeowner's valuables.</p>

203
Q

<p>A shopper was in a large department store that was remodeling its menswear department and had hired a contractor to do the work. A carpenter employed by the contractor was working on the remodeling job. When the carpenter left the store to take a break, she left a carpenter's level projecting out into one of the aisles, unbeknownst to any store employees. Shortly before she returned 15 minutes later, the shopper came down that aisle and tripped over the level. He fell and struck his head on the sharp corner of a display case. The shopper required hospitalization and sued the store for his injuries.</p>

<p></p>

<p>Will the shopper prevail in his suit against the store?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the contractor's employee left the level in the aisle.</p>

<p>B Yes, because the store's employees had a reasonable time to discover the level before the shopper fell.</p>

<p>C No, because the store's employees did not leave the level in the aisle.</p>

<p>D No, because the store's employees were unaware that the level was in the aisle.</p>

A

<p>A Yes, because the contractor's employee left the level in the aisle.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(B) is wrong. As part of the duty owed to customers, the store employees have a duty to make reasonable inspections of their premises to discover unsafe conditions (such as if a customer had spilled something slippery in an aisle). However, <strong>regardless</strong> of whether they had a reasonable time to discover the level, the store is <strong>liable</strong> because it is responsible for the carpenter's conduct</span></p>

204
Q

<p>A developer constructed several small stores in a commercial district. She received a bid from a contractor to install awnings on the front windows of the stores. The developer had heard that the contractor did shoddy work, but the price was right and the contractor expressly assumed all of the risk of any liability. The developer subsequently sold one of the stores to a barber. A few months later, an awning collapsed without warning, injuring a customer who was about to enter the barbershop.</p>

<p>An investigation by the building inspector revealed that the awning collapsed because the brackets used by the contractor were cheaper and weaker than the required brackets, although they looked the same. The developer and the contractor are now both bankrupt.</p>

<p>If the customer sues the barber for his injuries, is the customer likely to prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the barber had a nondelegable duty to keep the premises safe for customers and those passing by.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B Yes, because the developer did not exercise reasonable care in hiring the contractor to install the awnings.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C No, because the contractor assumed all of the risks from his work.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D No, because the barber had no opportunity to oversee the contractor's actions.</p>

A

<p>D No, because the barber had no opportunity to oversee the contractor's actions.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The customer is not likely to prevail because the barber had no opportunity to oversee the contractor's work. A property owner owes a duty to those adjacent to the premises to take due precautions to protect them from dangerous conditions, and a business owes its customers a duty to make reasonable inspections to discover and make safe any dangerous conditions. Further, that duty cannot be delegated to an independent contractor; the owner remains vicariously liable. However, nothing in the facts establishes that the barber breached his duty to the customer. There was nothing wrong with the brackets evident from a reasonable inspection, and the awning collapsed without warning. Further, the barber was not involved in hiring or supervising the contractor and would not be responsible for the contractor's negligence. Hence, because no facts point to negligence by the barber, the customer is not likely to prevail.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(C) is incorrect because it is irrelevant. Had the barber hired the contractor, the fact that the contractor contractually assumed all of the risks of liability would not preclude the customer from recovering against the barber.</span></p>

<p></p>

205
Q

<p>Elements of defamation</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>Defamatory statement </strong>the <strong>specifically identifies </strong>the P</li><li><strong>Published </strong>to the 3rd party</li><li><strong>Damage </strong>to P's reputation</li><li><strong>Falsity </strong>of defamatory language - <i>true/false test</i></li><li><strong>Fault </strong>of part of D</li></ol>

206
Q

<p>What does “fault of D's part" mean in regards to defamatory statements</p>

A

<p>how aware was D (person who made statement) that statement was false</p>

<p><strong>good-faith </strong>belief it was a true statement - <strong>NO </strong>fault</p>

207
Q

<p>What needs to be proven for defamation of public figures</p>

A

<p>actual malice</p>

208
Q

<p>what are the elements for proving actual malice</p>

A

<ol><li><strong>Knowledge </strong>that statement was false <strong>-OR-</strong></li><li><strong>Reckless disregard</strong> as to whether statement was false</li></ol>

209
Q

<p>What needs to be proven for defamation of private figures</p>

A

<p>only <strong>negligence</strong></p>

210
Q

<p>What are the 4 privacy torts</p>

<p>“CLIP”</p>

A

<ol><li>C: commercial appropriation</li><li>L: false light</li><li>I: intrusion into ones seclusion or solitude</li><li>P: public disclosure of private facts</li></ol>

211
Q

<p>The sales representative of a hot dog company gave the proprietor of a corner hot dog stand a poster of an actress endorsing those hot dogs, which the proprietor put in the window. Sales picked up, but the actress filed suit against the proprietor for invasion of privacy because, in fact, she was a spokesperson for a rival hot dog company.<br></br><br></br>Will the actress prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A No, because the actress is a public figure.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B No, because the proprietor was reasonably justified in believing the poster was authorized.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C Yes, because the actress had not given her permission to use the poster.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D Yes, because the proprietor gained profit from using the poster.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

A

<p>C Yes, because the actress had not given her permission to use the poster.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The proprietor has used the actress’s picture to promote the sale of hot dogs. The actress did not in any way consent to this use by the proprietor of her picture. Therefore, the “CLIP” elements that the actress needs to prove are present, and she will prevail.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(D) is wrong because there is no requirement that the defendant have actually profited from using the picture. The proprietor is liable for this tort simply because he used the actress’s picture without her permission to promote and advertise the hot dogs.</span></p>

212
Q

<p>A wife who maintained a joint checking account with her husband was surprised by an alert from her bank that their account was overdrawn. When she called the bank for an explanation, the bank representative told her that the transaction records showed a large amount of funds withdrawn from the account through a debit card for local escort services, which according to media reports were being investigated by the authorities for prostitution offenses. The wife told the bank representative that the bank must have made a mistake, but he insisted that the records were accurate. After the call, the wife confirmed that her debit card was in her purse and that her husband’s was in his wallet. She went out to her husband’s car and smashed the headlights with a baseball bat and carved her name in the leather seats. She then accused her husband of infidelity and threatened a divorce. He denied being responsible for the charges and claimed that the bank must have made an error. Because the bank had just closed for a holiday weekend, the husband endured a couple of days of strained relations with his wife before he could go to the bank and have the transaction records reviewed. On further review, the bank discovered that the charges were erroneous and should have been charged to another account.</p>

<p>Can the husband recover damages from the bank for defamation?</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p>A No, because the bank representative made no defamatory statement about the husband.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B No, because the bank representative made the statements for the wife’s benefit.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C Yes, because the husband can show pecuniary harm to him from the bank representative’s statements.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D Yes, because the bank representative’s statements constituted slander per se.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

A

<p>B No, because the bank representative made the statements for the wife’s benefit.</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>the bank representative’s statements were made under a qualified privilege. To prove defamation, the husband must show: (i) defamatory language by the defendant (ii) of or concerning the plaintiff (iii) published to a third person (iv) that causes damage to reputation, (v) falsity of the defamatory language, and (vi) fault on the defendant’s part.</span></p>

213
Q

<p>A man working at a clothing store discovered that his girlfriend, a coworker, had been taking money from the cash register. Not wanting to be a party to the situation, he ended the relationship and found another job. Not long after this, the man's new boss, who knew why the man had quit, came into the clothing store. He asked the girlfriend if she missed her boyfriend working with her at the store. She replied, "Yes, but when we found that he was stealing from the cash register, we had no choice but to let him go."</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the man sues his former girlfriend for defamation, the fact that the new boss knew the truth of why the man had left his job at the store will have what result?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A It will act as a complete defense to an action for defamation.</p>

<p>B It will establish that the man has not suffered any actual injury.</p>

<p>C It may diminish the damages that the man would be entitled to recover.</p>

<p>D It proves that the girlfriend had no reasonable ground for believing that the man was fired for dishonesty.</p>

A

<p>C It may diminish the damages that the man would be entitled to recover.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The girlfriend is liable for defamation because she made a defamatory statement about the man to a third person. As long as it is understood in its defamatory sense, an accusation need not be believed to be actionable. Because the statement that he was stealing at his job constituted s<strong>lander per se, damages are presumed,</strong> completing the prima facie case. Nevertheless, the stated fact will diminish the amount of damages that the man will recover because his reputation was <strong>not likely harmed in the eyes of his boss.</strong></span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(D) is wrong because the fact that the new boss did not believe the statement does not prove lack of basis for the girlfriend to have made it.</span></p>

214
Q

<p>A salesman in a highly visible and competitive field went to the police station to post bond for his son, who had been arrested for possession of a small quantity of narcotics. A photographer for the local newspaper who was at the police station took a picture of the salesman flanked by two bulky police officers. The photo, which looked like the pictures of alleged criminals being taken into custody, ran on a quarter of the front page because it was a slow news day. The photo was accompanied by a very small caption giving the salesman's name and stating that his son had been arrested for possession of narcotics. The salesman's boss was hypersensitive about the reputation of his company and fired the salesman after he saw the picture in the newspaper.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the salesman brings an invasion of privacy action against the newspaper, what is the most likely basis?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Intrusion upon seclusion.</p>

<p><br></br></p>

<p><br></br>C Public disclosure of private facts.</p>

<p>D Appropriation of plaintiff's picture for commercial purposes.</p>

A

<p>B False light publicity.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>To establish a prima facie case for invasion of privacy based on publication by defendant of facts placing plaintiff in a false light, the following elements must be proved:</span></p>

<ol><li><span>publication of facts about plaintiff by defendant placing plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and</span></li><li><span>the "false light" must be something that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person under the circumstances.</span></li></ol>

<p></p>

<p><span>The large picture of the salesman flanked by two bulky police officers could suggest that the salesman committed a crime because it looked like pictures that newspapers often print of alleged criminals being taken into custody. This "false light" would be highly offensive to a reasonable person under the circumstance</span></p>

215
Q

<p><span>Commercial appropriation</span></p>

A

<p><span>must be for the promotion or advertisement of a product or service</span></p>

216
Q

<p><span>PFC for false light</span></p>

A

<ol><li><span>publication of facts about plaintiff by defendant placing plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; <strong>and</strong></span></li><li><span>the "false light" must be something that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person under the circumstances</span></li></ol>

217
Q

<p><span>PFC for Intrusion upon plaintiff's affairs or seclusion</span></p>

A

<ol><li><span>an act of prying or intruding on the affairs or seclusion of plaintiff by defendant</span></li><li><span>the intrusion must be something that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; <strong>and</strong></span></li><li><span>the thing to which there is an intrusion or prying must be "private."</span></li></ol>

218
Q

<p><span>PFC Public disclosure of private facts</span></p>

A

<ol><li><span>publication or public disclosure of private information about the plaintiff, <strong>and</strong></span></li><li><span>the matter made public is such that its disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.</span></li></ol>

219
Q

PFC in a products liability action based on strict liability, the plaintiff need show only

A
  1. the defendant is a commercial supplier, 2. the defendant produced or sold a product that was defective when it left the defendant’s control,3. the defective product was an actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and 4. the plaintiff suffered damages to person or property.
220
Q

A manufacturer is liable for a defective product even if the consumer (P) misuses it as long as the misuse

A

was foreseeable

221
Q

Who decides whether the consumer’s misuse was foreseeable?

A

the jury

222
Q

In contrast to products liability cases based on negligence, those based on strict liability do NOT:A Impose liability when an intermediary negligently failed to discover the defect.B Prohibit recovery of solely economic losses.C Require that suppliers have an opportunity to inspect.D Require an injured bystander to be foreseeable.

A

C Require that suppliers have an opportunity to inspect.

223
Q

Which of the following may prevent establishing causation against a manufacturer in a strict products liability action?A The retailer’s labeling of the product as its ownB The destruction of the product because of its dangerous defectC The failure of a retailer to take action after discovering a dangerous defectD The negligent failure of a retailer to discover a dangerous defect

A

C The failure of a retailer to take action after discovering a dangerous defectWhen the intermediary’s conduct becomes something more than ordinary foreseeable negligence, it becomes a superseding cause. Hence, the conduct of a retailer who discovered a dangerous defect and then took no action *(such as alerting the manufacturer, warning the consumer, or removing the product from sale) *constitutes more than ordinary foreseeable negligence and may cut off the manufacturer’s liability.

224
Q

Which of the following statements of law does NOT relate to proving actual cause in a strict products liability case?A The defendant cannot avoid liability by showing negligent failure of an intermediary to discover the defect.B If the defect is difficult to trace, the plaintiff may rely on an inference that such a product failure ordinarily would occur only as a result of a defect.C If the defect has inadequate warnings, the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that an adequate warning would have been read and heeded.D The defect in the product must have existed when the product left the defendant’s control.

A

A The defendant cannot avoid liability by showing negligent failure of an intermediary to discover the defect.

225
Q

Which of the following is relevant for the defendant in defending a strict products liability claim?A It was impossible for the defendant retailer to inspect the product because it was in a sealed container.B The defendant retailer made a reasonable inspection of the product before selling it but did not discover the defect.C The retailer of the defendant manufacturer’s product discovered the defect during the course of an inspection but failed to warn the buyer.D The retailer of the defendant manufacturer’s product could have discovered the defect during a reasonable inspection but failed to make an inspection.

A

C The retailer of the defendant manufacturer’s product discovered the defect during the course of an inspection but failed to warn the buyer.

226
Q

A motorist driving his new sports car was stopped at a red light when he was struck from behind by a truck. The truck was driven by a driver who had negligently failed to stop. On impact, the door on the driver’s side of the car flew open because of a latent defect in the latch that could not have been detected by the car manufacturer during the ordinary assembly process. The motorist, who was not wearing a seat belt, fell out of the open door and was injured. The jurisdiction retains traditional contributory negligence rules; however, evidence of nonuse of a seat belt is not admissible in a civil action to show contributory negligence.If the motorist asserts a claim against the car manufacturer, will the motorist prevail?A Yes, because the motorist could not reasonably have discovered the defect.B Yes, because the car he was driving was dangerously defective. C No, because the truck driver’s negligent driving was the cause of the motorist’s injuries.D No, because the car manufacturer did not know or have reason to know of the defect.

A

B Yes, because the car he was driving was dangerously defective.

227
Q

A man purchased a new power boat with an inboard engine from a boating supply store. The boating supply store properly inspected the boat before delivery, but did not detect a virtually invisible manufacturing defect in the boat’s steering mechanism. Later that summer, the man was entertaining some friends on his boat on a lake near a dam. There were some warning pylons near the dam, warning boaters to stay clear. The man decided to show off for his friends by weaving his boat in and out of the warning pylons. As he rounded the last of them, the steering mechanism of his boat jammed, and the boat crashed into the dam. The man was severely injured. The man brings an action for damages against the boating supply store on a theory of strict liability in tort in a jurisdiction that does not apply its comparative fault rules to strict liability actions.Who will prevail?A The boating supply store, because it properly inspected the boat before selling it to the man.B The boating supply store, because the man was negligent in weaving in and out of the pylons.C The man, because the steering failed due to a defect present when the boat left the manufacturer.D The man, because the steering mechanism failed while he was operating the boat.

A

C The man, because the steering failed due to a defect present when the boat left the manufacturer.

228
Q

A consumer purchased a grass trimmer from a hardware store. He took it out of the sealed box and assembled it according to the instructions. He noticed that there were bolts and screws left over and some joints that could have accepted additional fasteners, but he just disposed of the extra hardware. As he was using the trimmer, the housing came apart and a hard piece of plastic flew off. His neighbor, who was standing nearby, was struck in the eye by the piece of plastic and suffered permanent injuries.The neighbor sued the hardware store and the manufacturer of the trimmer in a strict liability action. Through discovery, it was determined that the instructions omitted a critical step in the assembly process that would have used the extra hardware, which is why the housing came apart, and that the manufacturer had received some complaints about the instructions previously.The hardware store had no knowledge of any complaints regarding any of the manufacturer’s products. As to the hardware store, the neighbor will:A Recover, because the manufacturer had reason to know that the design was defective because of faulty instructions.B Recover, because the consumer’s failure to recognize the improper assembly does not cut off the store’s liability.C Not recover, because the neighbor is not a consumer and can only recover against the manufacturer of the product.D Not recover, because the hardware store had no opportunity to inspect the product and no reason to anticipate that the instructions were faulty.

A

B Recover, because the consumer’s failure to recognize the improper assembly does not cut off the store’s liability.

229
Q

A homeowner purchased a ladder from a home supply retailer. While he was using the ladder, an improperly installed bolt fastening one of the rungs gave way, causing him to fall and break his leg. The homeowner sued the manufacturer of the ladder to recover damages for his injury.If it is established at trial that the home supply retailer could have discovered the defectively installed bolt if it had conducted a reasonable inspection of the ladder, what is the effect of the retailer’s failure to inspect?A It has no legal effect on the manufacturer’s liability.It has no legal effect on the manufacturer’s liability.B It is a superseding cause that relieves the manufacturer of liability to the homeowner.C It is attributable to the manufacturer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.D It will allow the manufacturer to bring an action for indemnity against the home supply retailer if the manufacturer is found liable to the homeowner.

A

A It has no legal effect on the manufacturer’s liability.It has no legal effect on the manufacturer’s liability.

230
Q

<p>What are the 4 privacy torts</p>

<p>“CLIP”</p>

A

<ol><li>C: commercial appropriation</li><li>L: false light</li><li>I: intrusion into ones seclusion or solitude</li><li>P: public disclosure of private facts</li></ol>

231
Q

<p>best defense to privacy torts</p>

A

<p>consent</p>

232
Q

<p>A company that owned a tract of land believed to be rich in mineral deposits contracted with a licensed excavator for the removal of soil from the property and delivery of the soil to the company's laboratories. While one of the excavator's trucks was on the way to the laboratory, the rear gate broke loose, dumping three tons of soil onto the highway. A motorist who was driving a short but safe distance behind the truck was unable to stop in time and collided with the soil, causing her serious injury. The rear gate had been negligently secured by one of the excavator's employees.</p>

<p>If the motorist sues the company for his injuries and does not prevail, what is the most likely reason?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A The rear gate was secured by the excavator's employee.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B The excavator had a license to transport soil on the highway.</p>

<p><br></br>C The company's duty in respect to the movement of its soil on the highway was delegable.</p>

<p><br></br>D The transportation of soil on the highways was a common practice in the area where the accident occurred.</p>

A

<p>C The company's duty in respect to the movement of its soil on the highway was delegable.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The general rule is that a principal will not be liable for tortious acts of its agent if the agent is an independent contractor. However, a broad exception will impose liability on the principal if the duty is nondelegable because of public policy considerations. As long as the company was not subject to a nondelegable duty, it would not be liable for the negligence of the excavator's employee in the transportation of its soil.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is not as good an answer as (C) because the fact that the accident was caused by the negligence of the independent contractor's employee does not necessarily excuse the company from liability.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><strong>(C) supplies the additional factor that enables the company to avoid liability.</strong></span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(B) is incorrect because the possession of a license by the excavator would not excuse the company from liability.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(D) is incorrect because the fact that the transportation of soil was common to the area is<strong> relevant only for a strict liability</strong> action for abnormally dangerous activities, and the<strong> transport of soil by truck is not such an activity.</strong></span></p>

233
Q

<p><span>As a <strong>motorist</strong> was driving on a road, a <u>driver</u> on an intersecting road failed to see a stop sign at the intersection and crossed into the <strong>motorist’s</strong> path. The <strong>motorist</strong> would have had time to avoid the <u>driver’s</u> vehicle except that <strong>he</strong> was making a call on his cell phone. <strong>He</strong> slammed on the brakes as soon as he saw the <u>driver</u>, so the impact occurred at a low speed. The <u>driver’s</u> car sustained only minor damage, but the <strong>motorist’s</strong> car sustained such heavy damage that it was a total loss.</span><br></br><br></br><span>If the <strong>motorist</strong> sues the <u>driver</u> in a jurisdiction following traditional contributory negligence and assumption of the risk rules, what is the <u>driver’s</u> best defense?</span></p>

<p></p>

<p>A The driver’s running the stop sign was unintentional.</p>

<p>B The motorist was negligent in purchasing a car that would suffer heavy damage when struck at low speed.</p>

<p>C The motorist was contributorily negligent.</p>

<p>D The motorist had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.</p>

A

<p>C The motorist was contributorily negligent.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Because the motorist was not driving attentively, the motorist was contributorily negligent. <strong>Under traditional rules, plaintiff’s contributory negligence is a complete defense to negligence</strong>;<i> i.e., it completely bars plaintiff’s right to recover.</i></span></p>

<p><span>Here the motorist is contributorily negligent because he was not paying attention to his driving. If he had been paying attention, the facts indicate that he would have had adequate time to either stop his car or swerve to avoid the driver’s vehicle.</span></p>

234
Q

<p><span>A plaintiff purchased a new car manufactured by an automotive corporation. While the plaintiff was driving home from the local dealership, she stopped at a stop sign. She was struck from behind by a jeep driven by a driver who had negligently failed to stop. On impact, the plaintiff was injured when she hit her head on the front windshield. The car’s airbag should have prevented this, but the airbag was defective and failed to inflate. Assume that a state law requires all automobiles to be equipped with airbags that will prevent drivers from hitting their heads on windshields on impact.</span><br></br><br></br><span>If the plaintiff asserts a claim against the driver, will the plaintiff prevail?</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>A Yes, unless the corporation was negligent in the manufacture of the car that the plaintiff was driving.</span></p>

<p><span>B Yes, because the driver’s negligent driving was a cause in fact of the collision.</span></p>

<p><span>C No, because the airbag in the plaintiff’s car violated a state law.</span></p>

<p><span>D No, because the plaintiff would not have been injured but for the failure of the airbag.</span></p>

A

<p><span>B Yes, because the driver’s negligent driving was a cause in fact of the collision.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The plaintiff will prevail because the driver’s negligence was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. But for the driver’s negligent act of colliding with the plaintiff’s car, the plaintiff would not have been injured, regardless of the fact that the airbag was defective. Note that there can be more than one cause in fact of an injury. (A) is incorrect because the corporation’s negligence would not qualify as an intervening act, because it occurred earlier in time than the driver’s. An intervening force comes into motion after the time of the defendant’s negligent act and combines with it to cause injury to the plaintiff. (C) is incorrect because the fact that the defective airbag violated a statute may establish a breach of duty by the corporation, but it does not relieve the driver from liability for negligence. (D) is incorrect because the “but for” test is used to establish liability in concurrent cause cases, not limit another’s liability. As stated above, there may be more than one cause in fact of an injury.</span></p>

235
Q

<p><span>During an action for breach of contract, the defendant testified in court that she withheld shipment of the goods because the plaintiff defrauded her. The plaintiff now wishes to sue the defendant for defamation because he can establish that this testimony was false.</span><br></br><br></br><span>May the plaintiff do so?</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>A Yes, if he can show that the defendant acted out of malice towards the plaintiff.</span></p>

<p><span>B Yes, if he can show that the defendant did not believe the allegation to be true.</span></p>

<p><span>C No, because the accusation is absolutely privileged.</span></p>

<p><span>D No, if the defendant prevailed in the original action, because of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.</span></p>

A

<p><span>C No, because the accusation is absolutely privileged.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The plaintiff cannot sue the defendant in a defamation action because the accusation is absolutely privileged. All statements made by the judge, jurors, counsel, witnesses, or parties in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. Absolute privileges are not affected by a showing of malice, abuse, or excessive publication, unlike qualified privileges. Because the defendant was testifying in court regarding the plaintiff’s conduct, the statement is absolutely privileged regardless of its truth or falsity. It also does not matter whether the defendant was lying or testifying out of malice towards the plaintiff</span></p>

236
Q

<p><span>Under a Dramshop Act, a tavernkeeper \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ liable to third parties who are injured by an intoxicated vendee.</span></p>

A

<p>May be vicariously</p>

237
Q

<p><span>To establish a prima facie case for<strong> interference with business relations</strong>, the following elements must be proved:</span></p>

A

<ol><li><span><strong>Existence</strong> of a valid contractual <strong>relationship</strong> btwn P and a 3rd party or a valid business <strong>expectancy</strong> of plaintiff</span></li><li><span>D's <strong>knowledge</strong> of the relationship or expectancy</span></li><li><span><strong>Intentional</strong> <strong>interference</strong> by defendant that induces a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and</span></li><li><span><strong>Damage</strong> to plaintiff.</span></li></ol>

238
Q

<p>A landowner who had owned and operated a small airport notified the electric company that he was discontinuing operations and that it should shut down the electrical current that had supplied his communications equipment. The equipment had been surrounded by a fence and signs warning of high voltage. Because the electric company had maintained a transformer next to the landowner's communications equipment that contained many valuable and reusable parts, it decided to leave the power on to prevent theft until it could schedule removal of the transformer. Three days later, a trespasser who knew that the airport had closed went onto the property looking for something to steal. He could find nothing of value except the transformer. He noticed the signs warning of the high voltage but believed that the power had since been turned off. He scaled the fence with the intent to dismantle the transformer. As soon as he touched the transformer, he was seriously injured by the electric current.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the trespasser asserts a claim against the electric company to recover damages for his injuries, will he prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the electric company was not the owner of the land on which the trespasser trespassed.</p>

<p><br></br>B Yes, because the electric company used unreasonable force to protect its property.</p>

<p><br></br>C No, because the trespasser was a trespasser on the landowner's land.</p>

<p><br></br>D No, because the trespasser intended to steal the electric company's transformer.<br></br></p>

<p></p>

A

<p><span>The trespasser was threatening<strong> only t</strong>he property interest of the <strong>electric</strong> <strong>company</strong>, so the use of deadly force was not be privileged.</span></p>

<p><span>By leaving the power (after landowner had discontinued operations on the land) on to prevent theft, the electric company was using indirect deadly force to defend its property where such force could not lawfully be directly used. Hence, it will be liable to the trespasser for his injuries.</span></p>

239
Q

<p>A motorist was driving to a luncheon in a car that he knew did not have operating headlights. On the way there he was rear-ended by another driver who had been driving 20 m.p.h. over the speed limit posted on that stretch of road. He suffered personal injuries and his car was extensively damaged. The jurisdiction makes it a misdemeanor to drive a vehicle that does not have operating headlights.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the motorist brings an action against the other driver and the above facts are established, will he prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the other driver violated the speeding statute, but the motorist's damages will be reduced because of his violation of the headlight statute.</p>

<p><br></br>B Yes, because the other driver violated the speeding statute, and the motorist's damages will not be reduced despite his violation of the headlight statute.</p>

<p><br></br>C No, because the motorist's violation of the headlight statute constitutes negligence per se.</p>

<p><br></br>D No, because the motorist has not established that driving 20 m.p.h. over the speed limit created an unreasonable risk of injury to others.</p>

A

<p>B Yes, because the other driver violated the speeding statute, and the motorist's damages will not be reduced despite his violation of the headlight statute.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>No excuse for violating the <strong>speeding</strong> <strong>statute</strong> is present in the facts; thus, violation of the statute establishes negligence per se.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is incorrect because, while an applicable statute may establish plaintiff's contributory negligence, the <strong>headlight statute</strong> <strong>does</strong> <strong>not</strong> apply here. Even though the statute was intended to protect drivers against cars being driven without headlights, it would be very difficult to show that it was designed to prevent rear-end collisions during the day, or that violation of the statute was a cause of the motorist's injury.</span></p>

240
Q

<p>After leaving ceremonies at which the chief justice of a state supreme court had been named distinguished jurist of the year, an associate justice was interviewed by the press. The associate justice told a reporter that the chief justice "is a senile imbecile who lets his clerks write all his opinions. He hasn't had a lucid thought in decades, and he became a judge by being on the payroll of the mob." Enraged, the chief justice brought an action for defamation against the associate justice.</p>

<p></p>

<p>Which of the following, if established by the chief justice in his defamation action, would permit recovery against the associate justice?</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p>A The associate justice negligently made the statements, which were false, and caused the chief justice actual injury.</p>

<p><br></br>B The associate justice made the statements knowing they were false.</p>

<p><br></br>C The associate justice made the statements because he hated the chief justice and wished to destroy his reputation in the legal community.</p>

<p><br></br>D The associate justice made the statements in order to ensure that the chief justice's political career was nipped in the bud.</p>

A

<p>B The associate justice made the statements knowing they were false.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(C) is incorrect because, even if the associate justice hated the chief justice and wanted to harm him, he would not be liable for defamation if the statements were true, since a public official such as the chief justice must prove that the statement was false. Thus, it would not be enough merely to show that the associate justice had bad motives.</span></p>

<p><span>(D) is essentially the same answer as (C)</span></p>

241
Q

<p>A farmer kept a pet bear at his farm. The bear was very old and had no teeth, no claws, and very little energy, but people liked to see the bear when they visited the farmer because no one else in the region had a pet bear. When the farmer first obtained the bear many years ago, he had a large steel cage constructed to house the animal. The cage had an electronic lock that only opened with a security code. Even though the bear was now old and harmless, it was always kept locked in the cage. One night during a severe storm while the farmer was out of town, a bolt of lightning hit the cage and the door opened. The bear left the cage and wandered off. The next morning, a 10-year-old girl was waiting on a rural road for her school bus. The bear emerged from a wooded area about 100 feet from where the girl was standing and headed towards her. She screamed and turned to run, tripping on the road and breaking her arm when she fell.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the girl sues the farmer on a theory of strict liability for her bodily harm, will she prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p>A No, because the bear was in fact a nondangerous animal.</p>

<p><br></br>B No, because the damage she suffered was not the type of damage that a bear would normally cause.</p>

<p><br></br>C Yes, because the bear is a wild animal.</p>

<p><br></br>D Yes, because pet bears were not commonly kept in the community.</p>

A

<p>C Yes, because the bear is a wild animal.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>An owner of a wild (i.e., nondomestic) animal, even one kept as a pet, will be strictly liable for the damage caused by the animal. A bear, even a very tame one, will be classified as a wild animal.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(B) is wrong because the injury the girl suffered was within the "normal dangerous propensity" of the animal. Strict liability for wild animals includes liability for the harm that results <strong>when a person is attempting to flee </strong>from what is perceived to be a dangerous animal</span></p>

242
Q

<p><span>A backpacker came upon another hiker who had been bitten by a rattlesnake. The backpacker carried the bitten hiker back to his vehicle and drove him toward the nearest hospital. On the way there, while exceeding the posted speed limit, the backpacker lost control of his vehicle and crashed into a tree by the side of the road. He was uninjured, but the snakebitten hiker's leg was broken. An ambulance soon arrived and took the hiker to the hospital. The emergency room physician committed malpractice that resulted in the loss of the hiker's leg. The hiker is now suing the backpacker.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Which of the following is the most likely reason why the backpacker will be held liable for the hiker's injuries?</span></p>

<p></p>

<p>A Having undertaken to rescue the hiker, the backpacker is strictly liable for injuries resulting from the rescue.</p>

<p><br></br>B The emergency room physician's malpractice is a foreseeable intervening cause that does not relieve the backpacker of liability.</p>

<p><br></br>C The backpacker did not conduct himself as a reasonably prudent person in carrying out the rescue of the hiker.</p>

<p><br></br>D The backpacker committed negligence per se when he exceeded the posted speed limit.<br></br></p>

A

<p>C The backpacker did not conduct himself as a reasonably prudent person in carrying out the rescue of the hiker.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is an incorrect statement of the law - a rescuer is <i><strong>not</strong></i><strong> strictly liable </strong>for a victim's injuries, but rather is liable only for <strong><u>negligent</u></strong> acts. (Here, the backpacker was negligent in his driving.)</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(B) is an accurate statement of the law but does not take into account that the backpacker <strong>must be</strong> <strong>negligent</strong> to be liable at all.</span></p>

243
Q

<p>A patient was scheduled to undergo nonemergency surgery for the removal of her appendix by her family doctor. The day of the surgery, the doctor was called out of town because of a family illness. Even though the surgery could be postponed, the doctor asked the surgeon on call, who was an expert in appendectomies, to take his place. The patient was not informed of the switch in doctors.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the patient sues the surgeon on a battery theory, who will prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A The patient, as long as she establishes damages at trial.</p>

<p><br></br>B The patient, regardless of whether she establishes damages at trial.</p>

<p><br></br>C The surgeon, because he was at least as qualified as the doctor.</p>

<p><br></br>D The surgeon, because the doctor requested that the surgeon take his place.</p>

A

<p><strong>B The patient, regardless of whether she establishes damages at trial.</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The patient can establish a prima facie case for battery regardless of whether she establishes damages at trial.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Here, the surgeon's performing the operation would be <strong>offensive contact</strong> because it was <strong>unconsented to:</strong> The patient had selected her doctor to perform the operation and did not consent to the surgeon's participating in the procedure.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is incorrect because damages is not an element of the prima facie case for battery. Even if the patient cannot establish damages, she can obtain a judgment in her favor and at least nominal damages.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><i>This question differs from card 17 because here there was a <strong>lack of consent </strong>to the different physician performing the procedure whereas in the other question on card 17, there <strong>was consent </strong>of to the surgery and the use of local anesthetic</i></span></p>

<p></p>

244
Q

<p>A dentist filling a child's cavities used a newly developed local anesthetic that was more effective than Novocain. However, it carried a 1% risk of causing a serious seizure when administered to children, which the dentist did not mention to the child's mother or note in the consent forms, which stated only that a local anesthetic would be used. The child's dental work was completed without any problem, but the mother looked up the anesthetic on the Internet and learned about the risk. She complained to the dentist that she would not have consented to use of the anesthetic had she known of the risk, but the dentist argued that using the new anesthetic was justified in the child's case because otherwise he would not have been willing to sit still for the dental work.</p>

<p></p>

<p>Does the mother have a cause of action on behalf of the child against the dentist?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because a reasonable person would have considered information about the risk important.</p>

<p><br></br>B Yes, because the mother would not have consented to the use of the anesthetic if she had known of the risk of seizure.</p>

<p><br></br>C No, because the dentist used his best judgment in deciding that the benefits of using the anesthetic outweighed the risk.</p>

<p><br></br>D No, because the child suffered no harm from use of the anesthetic.</p>

A

<p><strong>D No, because the child suffered no harm from use of the anesthetic.</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>One of the duties that doctors, dentists, and other health professionals owe their patients is the duty to provide a patient with enough information about the risks of a proposed course of treatment or surgical procedure to enable the patient to make an <strong>"informed consent" </strong>to the treatment.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>If an undisclosed risk was serious enough that a reasonable person in the patient's position would have withheld consent to the treatment, the health care professional has breached this duty. However, breach of duty is only one element of a cause of action for negligence. The plaintiff must also establish actual and proximate cause and some damage to plaintiff's person or property. Damage means actual harm or injury</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Here, the mother consented to the surgery and use of a local anesthetic, so battery is not applicable. Further, the child's dental work was completed without any problem and no other injury is apparent from the facts; the mother's possible distress at not being informed of the risk is not, standing alone, a compensable injury.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><i>This Q is different from card 16 because here there was <strong>consent </strong>to the dentistry vs the app'y surgery where there was <strong>no consent </strong>for a different doctor. While both questions are the same in the fact that <strong>neither </strong>patient <strong>suffered actual harm, </strong>the difference is the <strong>lack of consent </strong>which creates a claim for battery. There was an <strong>offensive contact </strong>which was <strong>NOT </strong>consented to.</i></span></p>

245
Q

<p><span>A company manufactured parachutes that it sold exclusively to the United States Army. To meet the standards required by the Army, each parachute was subjected to a 15-point inspection by the company before it could be approved for sale. When a parachute did not pass inspection, it was stored in another section of the company's plant. At a later time, a further inspection of the defective parachute would be made to determine whether the defects could be corrected or whether the parachute should be destroyed.</span></p>

<p><span>One night, the plant was burglarized through no fault of the company and a large number of parachutes, including the defective ones, were stolen. The defective parachutes eventually were sold on the black market to a member of a skydiving club who made purchases for the club. One week later, the member was using one of the parachutes when it failed to open, causing his death.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>If the member's estate brings a wrongful death action against the company on a theory of strict liability, which of the following is the company's best defense?</span></p>

<p><br></br>A The company acted reasonably in storing the defective parachutes.</p>

<p><br></br>B The company did not sell or place into the stream of commerce the defective parachute.</p>

<p><br></br>C The member did not purchase the parachute from the company.</p>

<p><br></br>D The member was negligent when he purchased the parachute on the black market.</p>

A

<p><strong>B The company did not sell or place into the stream of commerce the defective parachute.</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>To establish liability in a strict liability action based on a defective product, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant is a commercial supplier of the product in question and that the <strong>product is expected to be supplied </strong>to the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is supplied.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Here, the company produced the defective parachutes <strong>but did not place them into the stream of commerce</strong> and did not intend to do so. Thus, it is not liable to the member with regard to the defective parachutes.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(D) is incorrect. There is no indication that the member knew that the parachutes might be defective just because they were sold on the black market. Even in jurisdictions that apply their comparative negligence rules to strict products liability actions, the member's conduct, if considered negligent, would at most reduce the estate's recovery by a small amount.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(B) is a better choice because it totally negates the company's liability.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

246
Q

<p>An engineer licensed by the state was the principal design engineer for a wastewater treatment plant's aeration system. Detailed recommendations for designing aeration systems for this type of plant had been published by a panel of engineers after lengthy study. The engineer fully complied with the recommendations in his design. Nevertheless, the treatment plant's aeration system suffered a major failure, causing the release of bacteria-laden water into a river that damaged a fish hatchery run by the plaintiff.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the plaintiff sues the engineer and prevails, what is the likely explanation?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A The engineer knew of a better design that he could have used that would have prevented the failure.</p>

<p><br></br>B The engineer had neglected to renew his license in a timely manner, so he did some of the design work while his license was expired, in violation of a state statute.</p>

<p><br></br>C The engineer was involved in an abnormally dangerous activity.</p>

<p><br></br>D The engineer was a member of the panel that developed the design standards.</p>

A

<p><strong>A The engineer knew of a better design that he could have used that would have prevented the failure.</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(C) is incorrect. An activity is characterized as abnormally dangerous <strong>only if </strong>it involves a <strong>substantial risk of serious harm</strong> to persons or property, even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors, and the<strong> activity is not a matter of common usage</strong> in the community. Designing an aeration system for a wastewater treatment plant would not constitute an abnormally dangerous activity under this test</span></p>

247
Q

<p>A resort maintained an outside bar adjacent to its pool. When the bar was closed, it was secured by a metal gate that reached up towards the roof of the bar, but which left about a three-foot gap between the top of the gate and the roof. The resort had installed motion detectors inside the bar linked to an alarm system because of several previous thefts of liquor by persons climbing over the gate. Late one night, an intoxicated guest of the resort who wanted to keep partying after hours began to climb over the gate to get into the bar through the gap at the top, intending to take some bottles of wine.</p>

<p>The brackets attaching the gate to the walls, which had been gradually deteriorating and pulling away from the walls for some time, suddenly gave way as he reached the top. The gate collapsed, causing him to fall back onto the concrete patio. He sustained a severe concussion and other serious injuries. The resort is located in a jurisdiction that applies the traditional liability rules for landowners and possessors of land.</p>

<p></p>

<p>If the guest sues the resort for his injuries, is he likely to prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A No, because the guest did not have invitee status when he was climbing over the gate.</p>

<p><br></br>B No, because the guest intended to steal alcohol belonging to the resort.</p>

<p><br></br>C Yes, because the resort operators were aware that persons had climbed over the gate in the past.</p>

<p><br></br>D Yes, because the brackets attaching the gate to the walls were in a weakened condition that could have been detected by a routine inspection.</p>

A

<p><strong>A No, because the guest did not have invitee status when he was climbing over the gate.</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>In jurisdictions following the traditional landowner liability rules, the duty owed by an owner or occupier of land to those on the land depends on whether the person on the land is characterized as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>An <strong>invitee</strong> is one who enters onto the premises<strong><u> in response to</u></strong> an express or implied invitation from the landowner. A person <strong>loses</strong> his status as an invitee if he <strong>exceeds</strong> the scope of the invitation.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Here, the guest was an invitee while on the grounds of the resort, but he lost invitee status when he began climbing over the gate to get into the closed bar. He became a <strong>trespasser</strong> because he clearly did not have express or implied permission to climb into the bar, and a landowner owes <strong>no duty</strong> to an <strong><u>undiscovered</u></strong> trespasser.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Here, while the guest can argue that he was an anticipated trespasser because others had climbed over the gate in the past, there is no evidence that the resort knew of the dangerous condition of the brackets, so the resort has breached no duty to the guest under these facts.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(C) is incorrect because, as discussed above, the resort's awareness of previous thefts from the bar may make the guest an <strong>anticipated</strong> trespasser rather than an undiscovered trespasser, but it does not make the resort liable to the guest under these circumstances.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(D) is incorrect because the failure to inspect or discover the dangerous condition does not make the resort liable here. The guest could argue that the resort operators should have known of the dangerous condition of the gate, but that would not establish liability here. The landowner must </span><i><strong>know</strong></i><span> of a highly dangerous artificial condition to be liable to trespassers, and nothing indicates that any resort employee knew that the gate would collapse.</span></p>

248
Q

<p><span>A strawberry farmer held his farm open to the public to pick strawberries for a fee. The farmer knew that many patrons would eat as many strawberries out in the field as they would bring home with them, so he advertised that no chemical pesticides or fertilizers were used on his strawberries. The owner of the land adjacent to the farm began operating a soap factory, a use allowed by the zoning code. Flakes of an unavoidable chemical byproduct of the soap-making process would drift over onto the farm whenever the wind was blowing in that direction and settle onto the strawberry plants. The flakes caused no harm to the plants themselves but detracted from the appearance of the strawberries as well as their taste if eaten right off the plant; consequently, the farmer's business declined. On several occasions, the farmer complained to the factory owner, but the owner did nothing, in part because a visit to the county recorder of deeds office had convinced him that he was the true owner of a large part of the strawberry farm, although in fact it was just a recording error.</span></p>

<p><span>Can the farmer recover damages for the harm caused to his business from the factory owner?</span></p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the discharge from the owner's factory entered the farmer's land.</p>

<p><br></br>B Yes, because the factory owner intended to conduct the activities that caused the particles to fall on the farmer's land.</p>

<p><br></br>C No, because the factory owner had no intent to cause harm to the farmer's property.</p>

<p><br></br>D No, because the factory owner's belief that he owned the property, although erroneous, was reasonable.</p>

<p><br></br></p>

A

<p>B Yes, because the factory owner intended to conduct the activities that caused the particles to fall on the farmer's land.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Here, note that the farmer <strong>had complained to the </strong>factory owner. The factory owner continued his activity <strong>knowing </strong></span><i><strong>with substantial certainty</strong></i><span> that the flakes would continue to fall on the farm whenever the wind was right. Thus, it can be found that the factory owner intended to bring about the trespass.</span></p>

249
Q

<p>A plaintiff was injured when the steering mechanism of a <i><strong>snowmobile</strong></i> failed. He <strong>brought a </strong><i><strong><u>negligence</u></strong></i><strong> action</strong> against the <i><strong>snowmobile</strong></i> manufacturer. The steering mechanism was designed and manufactured by a <u>component</u> manufacturer; the <i><strong>snowmobile</strong></i> manufacturer merely assembled the snowmobile, branded it, and distributed it directly to retailers.</p>

<p></p>

<p>To prevail against the <i><strong>snowmobile</strong></i> manufacturer, what will the plaintiff need to prove?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A That the steering mechanism was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users.</p>

<p><br></br>B That the steering mechanism was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users, and the plaintiff was the purchaser of the snowmobile, a member of the purchaser's family, or a guest of the purchaser.</p>

<p><br></br>C That the steering mechanism was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users, and the defect could have been discovered and corrected if the <u>component</u> manufacturer had exercised reasonable care in its quality control process.</p>

<p><br></br>D That the steering mechanism was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users, and the <i><strong>snowmobile</strong></i> manufacturer failed to inspect the mechanism before assembly of the snowmobile.</p>

A

<p><strong>C That the steering mechanism was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users, and the defect could have been discovered and corrected if the component manufacturer had exercised reasonable care in its quality control process.</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>PFC of negligence in a products liability case, the plaintiff must show: (i) the existence of a legal duty owed by the defendant to that particular plaintiff; (ii) breach of that duty; (iii) actual and proximate cause; and (iv) damages.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The duty of care arises when the defendant acts as a commercial supplier of products. A <strong>commercial supplier</strong> who assembles a product from components manufactured by others is subject to the same liability as the manufacturer of the defective component. To <strong>prove breach of dut</strong>y, the plaintiff must show (i) negligent conduct by the defendant that leads to (ii) the supplying of a defective product.</span></p>

<p><span>Here, because the <strong>snowmobile manufacturer <u>assembled</u></strong> the snowmobile from component parts, including the steering mechanism manufactured by the component manufacturer, and <strong><u>sold</u> the snowmobile as its <u>own produc</u></strong><u>t</u>, it will be liable for the negligence of the component manufacturer.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) <strong><u>would</u></strong> be correct if the plaintiff were suing the snowmobile manufacturer on a s<strong>trict liability theory</strong>, <strong><u>BUT</u></strong> the facts of the question indicate that the plaintiff is suing in negligence. </span><i><strong>In products liability actions, always make sure you are applying the appropriate theory of liability.</strong></i><span></span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(D) is incorrect even though the snowmobile manufacturer may have had a duty to inspect the steering mechanism before assembly. Nothing in (D) indicates that <strong>either</strong> the <strong>component</strong> <strong>manufacturer</strong> <strong><u>or</u></strong> the <strong>snowmobile</strong> <strong>manufacturer</strong> <strong>was</strong> <i><strong>negligent</strong></i>.</span></p>

<p><span>The <strong><u>existence</u> of a defect does <u>NOT</u> by itself establish <u>negligence</u></strong>, and the snowmobile manufacturer's<strong> failure to inspect </strong>the mechanism <strong>before</strong> assembly <strong>is not actionable <u>negligence</u> </strong>if the defect <strong>would <u>not</u></strong> have been discovered even with a reasonably careful inspection. It becomes actionable <strong><u>negligence</u></strong>, however, due to the existence of the defect, the failure of the <u>component</u> manufacture to exercise reasonable care, the snowmobile's failure to inspect, and most importantly, the fact that <strong>BOTH</strong> snowmobile <strong>AND</strong> component manufacturer are <strong>BOTH</strong> in the chain of commerce thus, making the snowmobile manufacturer liable for the component manufacturer's negligence.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><i>IOW: cannot claim <strong>negligence</strong> if even reasonable inspection would <strong>NOT </strong>have revealed the defect…because <strong>inspection</strong> would probably negate the claim of negligence (because someone took the time to reasonably inspect so, they would not be negligent). Have to show that defect was discoverable. Therefore, </i>(C) is a better choice because it <strong>supplies the negligence element</strong>, which (D) does not.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

250
Q

<p><span>A testing lab purchased a wind tunnel as a complete unit from a machinery company. The machinery company used an electronics company for the design and installation of the unit's electronic control systems, which regulated air speed and triggered the emergency shut-off devices.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>A technician was installing a scale model of a prototype aircraft that was to be tested in the wind tunnel when the electronic control system of the tunnel malfunctioned, causing the huge fans that created the air flow to start up. The powerful air flow pinned the technician against the grating covering the intake ducts, asphyxiating him before he was discovered and the fans could be shut off.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>In an action by the technician's survivors against the electronics company, proof that the machinery company failed to inspect the wind tunnel has which of the following legal effects?</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>A If the electronics company is held liable to the plaintiffs, it may bring an action for indemnity against the machinery company based on the failure to inspect.</span></p>

<p><br></br><span>B The failure of the machinery company to inspect the tunnel is a superseding cause that relieves the electronics company of liability to the plaintiffs.</span></p>

<p><br></br><span>C The failure of the machinery company to inspect the tunnel is attributable to the electronics company under the doctrine of respondeat superior.</span></p>

<p><br></br><span>D The failure of the machinery company to inspect the tunnel has no legal effect on the electronics company's liability.</span></p>

<p><br></br></p>

A

<p><span><strong>D The failure of the machinery company to inspect the tunnel has no legal effect on the electronics company's liability.</strong></span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Even if an inspection would have disclosed the defect, the<strong> machinery company's</strong> failure to do so would have no legal effect on the <i><strong><u>electronics company's </u></strong></i>liability.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span><strong>Regardless</strong> of whether the technician's survivors are using a <strong>negligence</strong> <strong>theory</strong> or a <strong>strict liability theory </strong>(<i>both theories must be considered because the call of the question does not supply the theory of liability</i>), <strong>an intermediary's negligent failure to discover a defect is </strong><i><strong><u>NOT a superseding cause,</u></strong></i><strong> and the defendant who supplied the defective product will be held liable <u>along with the intermediary</u>. </strong>Thus, even if the machinery company's failure to inspect were negligent, it would not relieve the electronics company of liability.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is incorrect because it is a reversal of one of the situations in which indemnity is available. Where strict liability rules apply, <strong>each supplier</strong> of a defective product i<strong>s liable</strong> to an injured person, but each s<strong>upplier has a right of indemnification </strong>against<strong> all </strong></span><i><strong>previous</strong></i><span><strong> suppliers</strong> of the defective product in the distribution chain.</span></p>

<p><span>Here, <strong>both</strong> the machinery company and the electronics company would be <strong>liable</strong> in a strict liability action <strong>as</strong> <strong>suppliers</strong> if they supplied a defective product. <strong>However</strong>, the <strong>electronics</strong> <strong>company</strong>, as the previous supplier in the chain, <strong>would be liable</strong> <i><strong><u>to</u></strong></i> the machinery company for indemnity, rather than the machinery company being liable to the electronics company for indemnity.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

251
Q

<p>A truck transporting explosives went out of control when a tire suddenly blew. The truck struck a motorist's car as it was waiting at a stoplight, seriously injuring the motorist. The area around the accident was immediately evacuated, but fortunately the explosives were not detonated.</p>

<p></p>

<p>In an action alleging strict liability against the freight carrier that owned the truck, the motorist established the above facts and presented evidence of her injuries. The carrier presented evidence that the blowout was caused by a hidden defect in the tire that could not be detected by routine inspection. The tires were manufactured by the carrier's regular supplier and had not previously caused any problems. The carrier also presented evidence that the local authorities were supposed to restrict access to roads along the truck's route but had failed to do so.</p>

<p></p>

<p>In this action, is the motorist likely to prevail?</p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the tire was in a defective condition that made it unreasonably dangerous.</p>

<p><br></br>B Yes, because the freight carrier was engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity.</p>

<p><br></br>C No, because the injury did not arise from the dangerous aspect of the activity.</p>

<p><br></br>D No, because the negligence of the local authorities in failing to restrict access to roads along the truck's route was a superseding cause of the motorist's injuries.</p>

A

<p><strong>C No, because the injury did not arise from the dangerous aspect of the activity.</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The motorist is not likely to prevail </span><i><strong>in a strict liability action</strong></i><span> because her injury did not arise from the abnormally dangerous aspect of the freight carrier's activity.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Strict liability does not apply to harms that were <strong>not</strong> caused by the normally dangerous aspect or propensity of the activity. The scope of liability extends only to the dangers that would be <strong><u>anticipated</u></strong> from the activity involved.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Here, the carrier's activity is subject to strict liability because of the<strong> danger of explosion</strong> from the <strong>truck's cargo</strong>, <strong><u>but not from a crash</u></strong> by itself. Because the motorist's injuries were not caused by an explosion from the <strong><u>explosives</u></strong> in the truck, strict liability <strong>does not</strong> apply.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The carrier would be liable for the injuries from the crash only if the motorist established <strong>negligence</strong>…but here the question asks about <strong><u>strict liability.</u></strong></span></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(D) is incorrect. It is questionable whether the negligence by the local authorities could be considered an intervening force, which must come into play </span><i><strong><u>after</u></strong></i><span> the culpable conduct by the defendant. Even if it were an intervening force, it likely would not be considered<strong> so extraordinary</strong> as to be an <strong>unforeseeable</strong> <strong><u>intervening</u></strong> force. Hence, it would not constitute a superseding force that would break the causal connection between the motorist's injury and the carrier's actions.</span></p>

252
Q

<p>A valet parking attendant at a restaurant negligently left the keys of a car in the ignition when she parked it on a side street some distance from the restaurant, which was located in a high crime area. While dining, the car's owner received a text message from the security company that operated his car's anti-theft system that his key was in his ignition for over 30 minutes without the car running. The owner started to get up to check with the valet service but then his meal arrived and he promptly forgot about the car. About 20 minutes later, a teen saw the key in the ignition of the unlocked car and drove off with the car. By the time it was discovered that the car had been stolen, the car had been wrecked and the teen had fled. The owner sued the parking company that employed the attendant for the loss of his car.</p>

<p></p>

<p>Is the owner likely to recover?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A Yes, because the owner's negligent failure to respond to the security company's alert contributed the least to his loss.</p>

<p><br></br>B Yes, because the negligence of the parking attendant created the opportunity for the theft.</p>

<p><br></br>C No, because the teen committed a criminal act that was a superseding cause of the loss.</p>

<p><br></br>D No, because the owner's negligent failure to respond to the security company's alert was a superseding cause of his loss.</p>

A

<p><strong>B Yes, because the negligence of the parking attendant created the opportunity for the theft.</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The general rule of proximate cause is that the defendant is liable for all harmful results that are the normal incidents of and within the increased risk caused by his acts.</span></p>

<p><span>In indirect cause cases, an independent intervening force may be foreseeable where the defendant's negligence increased the risk that these forces would cause harm to the plaintiff.</span></p>

<p><span><strong>Even a criminal act by a third party will not cut off the defendant's liability </strong>if the defendant's negligence created a foreseeable risk that a third person would commit the crime.</span></p>

<p><span>Here, the parking company's employee negligently left the key in the ignition when she parked the owner's car on a side street away from the restaurant, creating a foreseeable risk that the car would be stolen. But for that negligence, the car would not have been stolen.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is incorrect because, under pure comparative negligence rules, the car owner <i><strong>could</strong></i> recover some of his damages even if his negligence was deemed to be greater than the defendant's.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(D) is incorrect because superseding cause analysis does not apply to the plaintiff's negligence. Rather, it is an issue of contributory negligence.</span></p>

<p><span></span></p>

253
Q

<p><span>Force may not be used by \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.</span></p>

A

<p><span>a landowner to regain real property after being tortiously dispossessed</span></p>

254
Q

<p>A man purchased a large flat screen television and decided to mount it on the ceiling over his bed. The manual that came with the product included detailed instructions and illustrations on how to mount the television on different types of walls, along with all the required hardware, but contained neither instructions nor warnings regarding mounting on the ceiling. The man carefully followed the wall-mounting instructions and was satisfied that it would hold. In fact, however, the mounting was not appropriate for ceilings. The next night, a woman who was the man's overnight guest was seriously injured when the television came loose and fell on the bed.</p>

<p></p>

<p>Will the woman prevail in a suit against the company that manufactured the television?</p>

<p></p>

<p><br></br>A Yes, because the manufacturer had a duty to include warnings for all potential placements of its product.</p>

<p><br></br>B Yes, if the manufacturer knew that its television was sometimes mounted on ceilings rather than walls.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C No, if the manufacturer's manual had all of the customary warnings for this type of product.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D No, because the man was negligent in mounting the television on the ceiling.</p>

A

<p>B Yes, if the manufacturer knew that its television was sometimes mounted on ceilings rather than walls.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Courts in a <strong>strict</strong> <strong>liability</strong> case require a commercial supplier to <strong>anticipate</strong> <strong>reasonably</strong> <strong>foreseeable</strong> <strong>uses</strong> even if they are misuses of the product. If the manufacturer knew that members of the public were sometimes mounting the television on the ceiling, marketing the product without including either warnings against the practice or appropriate hardware and instructions on how to safely do so made the product so defective as to be unreasonably dangerous if it were improperly mounted. Under a strict liability theory, the manufacturer is liable for supplying a defective product. As a guest of a purchaser of the product,<strong> the woman is a foreseeable plaintiff</strong>; thus, the manufacturer may be liable to her. The defective product actually and proximately caused the woman to suffer serious injuries. Therefore, the manufacturer is liable to the woman in a strict products liability action.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is incorrect because the facts do not establish that the manufacturer was under a duty to include the warnings in its manual. Such a duty would exist if the manufacturer knew (as (B) states) or should have known that the television was being mounted on ceilings.</span></p>

<p></p>

255
Q

<p>In support of a charity fundraising luncheon, three volunteers independently brought to the event a casserole dish made with ground beef. Each of them had prepared her dish in her own kitchen. Another volunteer combined the dishes onto one large serving platter, from which guests at the luncheon served themselves. One of the guests became seriously ill with what the health department later determined to be a bacterial infection from undercooked beef that was in the combined casserole. The guest brought an action against the three volunteers who made the casserole dishes, alleging negligent preparation of the ground beef.</p>

<p><br></br>Assuming that the guest can establish only the above facts and his injuries, who is likely to prevail in the action?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A The guest, because, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, he has established an inference of negligence.</p>

<p><br></br>B The guest, because he can require each of the volunteers to prove that she was not the actual cause of the injury.</p>

<p><br></br>C The volunteers, because the guest cannot establish which of the volunteers breached her duty of care.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D The volunteers, because they all were donating their time and food to the event.</p>

A

<p><strong>C The volunteers, because the guest cannot establish which of the volunteers breached her duty of care.The volunteers, because the guest cannot establish which of the volunteers breached her duty of care.</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>Here, the volunteers each owed a duty of care to anyone consuming the food they prepared, including the guest. The facts indicate that at least one of the volunteers breached that duty by improperly preparing or cooking the ground beef. That breach of duty caused the guest to become seriously ill. However, he cannot establish which of the volunteers breached the duty of care and was a factual cause of his injury. Absent additional evidence, the guest will not prevail.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(B) is incorrect. The alternative liability or unascertainable cause approach of </span><i>Summers v. Tice</i><span> applies when two or more persons have been negligent but it cannot be determined which one caused the plaintiff's injury. The court will shift the burden of proof to each of the negligent defendants to show that his negligence was not a factual cause of the injury. Here, however, there is no evidence that all of the volunteers were negligent; most likely, just one of them was. Hence, the volunteers will not be required to prove that they did not cause the guest's injury.</span></p>

256
Q

<p>A tenant's apartment was without hot water for over a week because of a broken water heater, even though the landlord had been notified right away and the lease provided that the landlord would make repairs promptly. The tenant heated a large pot of water on the stove and started to carry it to the bathroom so she could warm up her bath. Her young nephew, who was visiting for a few days, came around the corner suddenly and collided with her. The hot water spilled on the nephew, burning him. Because the nephew had a rare blood disorder, the burns resulted in several of the nephew's toes requiring amputation. The nephew's guardian brought a negligence action against the landlord in a jurisdiction that follows the traditional rules for landowner liability.</p>

<p><br></br>If the jury finds in favor of the landlord, what is the most likely reason?</p>

<p><br></br>A The nephew, as a social guest of the tenant, was not owed a duty by the landlord.</p>

<p></p>

<p>B The tenant's conduct was the actual cause of the nephew's injuries.</p>

<p><br></br>C The landlord's conduct was not the proximate cause of the nephew's injuries.</p>

<p></p>

<p>D The nephew's injuries were not foreseeable.</p>

A

<p>C The landlord's conduct was not the proximate cause of the nephew's injuries.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>To establish proximate cause in indirect cause cases, where an intervening force combines with the defendant's conduct to cause the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's negligence caused a foreseeable harm or caused a foreseeable reaction from a foreseeable intervening force. Intervening forces that produce a harm outside of the scope of what would normally be anticipated from the defendant's negligence are generally deemed unforeseeable and superseding. Such a superseding event will break the chain of causation and relieve the defendant of liability. Here, it is ultimately a question for the jury whether the landlord's failure to fix the water heater was a proximate cause of the nephew's injury. However, the jury could very well find that the landlord's failure to do so, even if negligent, is not a proximate cause of the nephew's burn injuries because the conduct of the nephew and the tenant are superseding forces.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is incorrect. Not only the tenant but also the landlord owes a duty to the tenant's nephew. The landlord's duty to maintain hot water in the tenant's apartment extends to guests of the tenant as well.</span></p>

<p><span>(B) is incorrect. The tenant's conduct was not the only actual cause of the nephew's injuries under the "but for" test for actual cause. The landlord's failure to repair the water heater promptly was also an actual cause, because but for his failure to do so, the tenant would not have been carrying a pot of hot water to the bathroom.</span></p>

<p><span>(D) is incorrect. Under the rule that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him, it is irrelevant that the extent or severity of the plaintiff's injuries was unforeseeable. If the landlord were liable to the nephew, he would be liable for all of his injuries even though some were not foreseeable.</span></p>

257
Q

<p>The plaintiff was driving inattentively when she had to swerve to avoid two other negligently driven vehicles at a busy intersection, and her car struck a light pole. The plaintiff, who was the only driver injured, sued one of the other drivers to recover damages in a jurisdiction that has adopted pure comparative negligence. The jury determined that she suffered injuries of $100,000 and was 50% at fault.</p>

<p>If the plaintiff is awarded a recovery of only $25,000 from the defendant, what will be the most likely reason?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A The defendant's fault was less serious than that of the other tortfeasor.</p>

<p><br></br>B The plaintiff's fault was as great as the total negligence of the other two drivers combined.</p>

<p></p>

<p>C The jurisdiction applies contribution based on a pro rata approach rather than proportional fault.</p>

<p><br></br>D The jurisdiction has abolished joint and several liability.</p>

A

<p><br></br>D The jurisdiction has abolished joint and several liability.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>If the plaintiff recovers only $25,000, it will be because the jurisdiction has abolished joint and several liability. <strong>Under joint and several liability, when two or more tortious acts combine to proximately cause an indivisible injury to a plaintiff, <u>each tortfeasor is liable to the plaintiff for the entire damage incurred.</u> </strong>Hence, the plaintiff could recover $50,000 from the defendant if joint and several liability applied (her total damages reduced by the amount of her own fault that contributed to her injury). The facts do not state what percent of fault was assigned to the defendant, but given that the other choices are incorrect, the defendant's fault must have been determined to be 25%, so that $25,000 would be the plaintiff's recovery in the absence of joint and several liability.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(A) is incorrect regardless of whether joint and several liability applies. If the defendant's fault were less serious than that of the other tortfeasor, he would be liable to the plaintiff for less than $25,000 in the absence of joint and several liability. If joint and several liability did apply, he would be liable to the plaintiff for $50,000-the full amount of her damages.</span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(B) is incorrect because the fact that the plaintiff's fault equals the combined fault of the other two tortfeasors is relevant <strong>only in a partial comparative negligence jurisdiction.</strong> It is <i><strong>irrelevant</strong></i> in a <i><strong>pure comparative negligence jurisdiction.</strong></i></span></p>

<p></p>

<p><span>(C) is incorrect because the rule of contribution, regardless of whether it is based on a pro rata approach or a proportional fault approach, does not affect how much the plaintiff receives from a defendant. Rather, it enables a defendant who has paid more than his share of damages to the plaintiff under joint and several liability to seek recovery against any other joint tortfeasor for the excess paid.</span></p>

258
Q

<p>A pedestrian crossed the street at a crosswalk without looking for oncoming traffic. He was struck first by a car and then by a truck. The pedestrian sued both the driver of the car and the driver of the truck for negligence. The jury determined that the pedestrian was 60% at fault, the driver of the car 30%, and the truck driver 10%. The jury also determined that the pedestrian suffered damages of</p>

<p>$100,000. The driver of the car is insolvent.</p>

<p>In a pure comparative negligence jurisdiction retaining traditional joint liability rules, how much can the pedestrian collect from the driver of the truck?</p>

<p></p>

<p>A) Nothing.<br></br>B) $10,000.<br></br>C) $40,000.</p>

<p>D) $100,000.</p>

A

<p>C) $40,000.</p>

<p></p>

<p><span>The pedestrian can collect $40,000 from the driver. In a pure comparative negligence jurisdiction, the plaintiff can recover even if he was over 50% at fault.</span></p>

<p><span>Thus, (A) is wrong. The recovery will be limited to the percentage of damage attributed to the defendant(s), in this case 40%.</span></p>

<p><span>The jurisdiction <strong>retains</strong> the rule on joint and several liability. Therefore, each defendant is responsible for the combined liability of all defendants. (C) is therefore correct and (B) is wrong.</span></p>

<p><span>(D) is wrong because, in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced due to his negligence.</span></p>

259
Q

Kidnapping is:

A
  • the intentional and unlawful confinement of another* against that person’s will (eg, by force, threat, or fraud)* coupled with either moving or hiding that person.A perpetrator need only move the victim a short distance—even a few feet—to satisfy the movement (ie, asportation) element of kidnapping. However, for a kidnapping to occur incident to the commission of another offense, the movement of the victim must be more than is necessary to complete the other offense.* Otherwise, the perpetrator cannot be convicted of kidnapping.