A - Decision Making Flashcards
Classical theories of decision making
normative - how people should make decisions
e.g. expected utility theory, subjective expected utility theory
descriptive - how humans actually make decisions
e.g. prospect theory
Expected utility theory
Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947
people attribute values to options and calculate probability of occurrence
people are maximisers and so decision making is based on the principle that people want to maximise the expected value
choices are made by comparing expected utility values
EU = utility value of outcome added to respective probability
Challenge to EUT
Simon, 1957
people are actually satisficers not maximisers
people do not weigh up the options or look at all the available information
people use heuristics to take shortcuts in judgements
Subjective expected utility theory
an extension of EUT
emphasis is on humans as rational thinkers wanting to maximise outcomes
you do this by choosing the option with the highest expected utility
the expected utility of each gamble is equal to the probability of winning x the amount that can be won
Support for SEUT
Lynch and Cohen, 1978
Results suggest that a product averaging and a differential-weighted product averaging provide more accurate descriptive models
This has implications for our understanding of human
helping behaviour
Prospect theory
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979
for more simple prospects with monetary outcomes
do not weigh up option based on the final outcome
instead look at the weighting of gains and losses - uses heuristics
two stages - editing and evaluating
50% people would not place a bet that involved equal chance of winning £200 or losing £100
the pain of loss is greater than the pleasure of winning
with gain people should be risk-averse
with loss people should be risk-taking
decreasing impact of gains and losses as they build up
Support for prospect theory
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979
participants assessed in two situations
1) choice of win £10 or win £50 OR get £30 for certain
2) choice of lose £10 or lose £50 OR lose £30 for certain
people more likely to choose gambles 2 or 3
show risk-aversion in situation A (gains)
but show risk-seeking in B (losses)
Support for prospect theory 2
de Haan and van Daal, 1994
looked at risk attitudes towards years of life
increase in expected value of gamble resulted in shift from risk-seeking to risk-averse attitude
data is consistent with prospect theory
Criticism of prospect theory
from psychologists
- there is no psychological explanation for this theory
- it also ignores factors such as emotion which do have an influence on decision making (also other biases in decision making)
How does the brain compute value?
Knutson et al., 2005
- certain brain areas may be involved in calculating expected utility
- MPFC activation correlates with probability estimates
Tobler et al., 2006
- fMRI found higher expected values activated distinct regions of the striatum
- higher uncertainty elicited activation in lateral orbitofrontal regions
- suggests distinct coding in key reward structures of decision making parameters
Biases that affect decisions and judgements
decision weights
framing effects
heuristics
bounded rationality
Decision weights
humans have a general tendency to over-weight small probabilities and under-weight large probabilities
Lichtenstein et al., 1978
- pps asked to estimate likelihood of various deaths
- over-rating of rare events i.e. death by earthquake
- under-rating of common events i.e. death by heart disease
- under/over-weighting affects how we make decisions in particular of life choices
Framing effects
Framing effects consistently highlighted to be one of the strongest biases in decision making - in particular they get stronger as one ages
minor cues have significant influence on decisions made
- these may not even be noticeable
- for example choices may be worded in certain ways that highlight the positive or negative of the same decision - i.e. as a loss or a gain (prospect theory highlights losses as more significant - technique was developed as part of prospect theory)
Levin et al., 1998 - different types of framing
- risky choice framing
- attribute framing
- goal framing
Framing effects - Tversky and Kahneman, 1981
two groups - each with different scenario containing two options
positive options were chosen by 72% of pps in condition one (200/600 people will be saved)
dropped to 22% for condition two where same result would occur but had a negative frame (400/600 will die)
Framing effects - Tourangeau et al., 2000
- pps asked one of two questions
- to what extent do you ‘support’ the president’s plan?
- to what extent do you ‘oppose’ the president’s plan?
- found different estimates of support
- highlights that the stance of the choice to be made affects decision