A Flashcards
Accessory Gearbox Failure
Accessory gearbox failure may be indicated by any abnormal noise. If any abnormal noise is heard, check all
instruments and electrically operated equipment for adverse indications. Systems that operate from the accessory gearbox may also give adverse indications. If indications of accessory gearbox failure are noted, do this:
- Instruments and caution lights — Check.
- Landing gear — Extend.
- Land as soon as possible.
Accessory Gearbox Chip Locator Light
- Instruments and caution lights — Check.
- If malfunction verified or chip locator light does not extinguish — Land as soon as possible.
- If chip locator light extinguishes — Continue mission and monitor closely.
NOTE
Accessory gearbox failure will result in the loss of second stage, utility, and
engine start pumps, AFCS and other associated systems, and the No. 1 and
No. 3 generators.
Accessory Gearbox Oil Failure
Loss of accessory gearbox lubricationwill be indicated by the accessory gearbox oil temperature and pressure caution lights. If loss of accessory gearbox lubrication is indicated, do this:
- Instruments and caution lights — Check.
- Landing gear — Extend.
- Land as soon as possible.
AFCS Computer Malfunction
A malfunction in the AFCS computer can cause low to high random inputs into the main rotor or tail rotor controls, possibly resulting in helicopter vibration. The CMPTR POWER pushbutton on the AFCS CONTROL panel should be turned off if the following happens:
1. An increase in aircraft motion, vibration, or tip path plane movement accompanied by the AFCS
DEGRADED advisory light and all FAIL ADVISORY lights except DESEN and SAS indicates a single
computer (SIMPLEX) failure and the AFCS is only partially functional. If this happens, secure trim and
AFCS, then recycle computer power.
2. An increase in aircraft motion, vibration, or tip path plane movement accompanied by the AFCS
CAUTION
light indicates a dual-computer (DUPLEX) failure and no AFCS functions are available. If this happens,
recycle computer power OFF and then ON.
An AFCS caution light means both computers are off and no AFCS functions are being performed. If recycling computer power OFF and then ON does not make the AFCS caution light go out, do the following:
*1. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) — Land as soon as possible.
2. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) — Land as soon as practical.
Desensitizer Failure
Any of the following conditions may indicate an inoperative desensitizer:
- DSEN fail advisory light on the AFCS control panel is lit.
- AFCS is off.
- AFCS duplex failure.
- FAS shearpin is sheared.
WARNING
Loss of a control desensitizer will, under certain circumstances, allow the pilot to interact with the fuselage bending modes to create a pilot-induced
oscillation (PIO). This interaction can result in divergent helicopter oscillations. Delayed pilot response in eliminating these oscillations may
result in helicopter damage and/or uncontrolled flight. If this happens, releasing the flight controls for several seconds should eliminate the
condition. During external cargo operations, if PIO/PAO happens and cannot be controlled, immediately jettison the load.
If a desensitizer failure happens, do the following:
1. MODE RESET pushbutton — Reset.
If the desensitizer failure does not clear after mode reset, the following precautions must be taken:
- Avoid abrupt control inputs.
- Minimize hover time.
- Do not pickup an external load. If flying with an external load, continue to the destination and gently set the load down. Do not attempt to relift the load.
AFCS Malfunction
An automatic flight control system (AFCS) malfunction could happen as a result of a stability augmentation system (inner loop, SAS) failure, autopilot (outer loop, trim) failure, or an AFCS servo hardover. The cues are distinctly different for each failure mode. An inner loop failure will be noted by an unusual uncommanded attitude change with no associated movement in the flight controls. Due to the limited authority (about 10 percent) of the inner loop functions of the AFCS, this failure mode is generally benign and easily controlled by the pilot.
An autopilot failure, on the other hand, is characterized by an uncommandedmovement of the flight control. The rate of movement of the flight control is limited to 10 percent per second, which gives the pilot adequate time to control
the autopilot failure (trim drive). Recovery is made by pressing the trim release of the flight control in question and manually repositioning the control.
AFCS Servo Hardover
An AFCS servo hardover is an uncommanded movement of the flight controls which cannot be easily overridden
by the pilot. The rate at which the control moves may vary from a relatively slow rate (about 1 inch per second) to full travel in less than one second (100 percent per second). When potentially high rates of control change are
experienced, and pressing the trim release does not override the drive, suspect an AFCS servo hardover. A rapid response to this emergency will be required to retain control. If a hardover is experienced, do the following:
*1. Transfer to other AFCS servo.
High control forces may change to normal at AFCS servo changeover.
*2. If servo hardover condition continues — Secure AFCS servos.
*3. If IMC — Land as soon as possible.
4. If VMC — Land as soon as practical.
5. If servo hardover condition goes away — Proceed and land as soon as practical.
APP or Cabin Heater Fire
A fire in either the APP or cabin heater will be indicated by the fire warning master lights and the fire warning lights in the APP emergency T-handle. Whenever the APP and cabin heater fire warning light is on, do this:
- APP emergency T-handle — Pull aft (to discharge fire extinguisher and shut off APP and heater fuel).
- If fire persists — Land immediately.
- APP circuit breaker control switch — Off (if APP operating).
- Cabin heater rheostat control — Off (if cabin heater operating).
- Alert groundcrew (if on the ground).
- If fire persists — Land immediately.
Autorotative Landing
Autorotative rpm will vary with different ambient temperatures, airspeeds, pressure altitudes, G-load factors, and gross weights. Optimum rotor speed (Nr), in the descent, is 95 percent to 100 percent. For autorotative descent,
select an autorotative glide airspeed as required (Figure 12-10). Perform landing checklist with landing gear as desired (gear up for water landings). The recommended entry airspeed for the cyclic flare should be no less than the
minimum rate of descent airspeed as determined by Figure 12-10. At or above 150 feet AGL (avoiding continuous flight in the shaded area of the height-velocity diagram, Figure 26-1), initiate a smooth, progressive flare by adjusting nose-up pitch attitude as necessary to reduce ground speed and rate of descent. At an altitude of about 50 to 75 feet AGL, lower the nose to the landing attitude (8° nose-up maximum) and raise the collective to cushion the landing.
WARNING
• Allowing airspeed to decrease below 40 KIAS will cause a rapid increase in rate of descent.
• Nr will decay rapidly when collective is applied to recover. Allowing Nr to decay prematurely may result in insufficient lift for recovery.
Auxiliary Fuel Tank Jettison
External auxiliary fuel tank jettison may be required in case of single-or dual-engine operation. If tank jettison is to be done, do this:
- Airspeed — 0 to 150 knots. (Maximum airspeed in descent: 120 knots.)
- Rate of descent — Less than 1,500 feet per minute.
- Bank angle — 0°.
- Area — Cleared if possible.
- Place desired AUX TANK JTSN switch — ON.
BEARING MONITOR PANEL VIB/Detect Status Light (SP-1 and/or SP-2, DISC)
A VIB status light on the BMP indicates that the BMS has sensed bearing vibration levels which are higher than
normal. If the VIB DETECT bearing status light illuminates:
1. Aircrew — Alert.
a. Record sensor location and time of occurrence.
2. Perform BMS reset procedure.
3. If VIB DETECT bearing status light returns during the same flight — Land as soon as practical.
4. If light does not come on again, resume routine monitoring.
NOTE
• Should a VIB Detect occur on SP-1 and/or SP-2 and the system is reset, a Subsequent VIB Detect on DISC is unrelated and another system reset may
be performed. The same applies to an initial VIB Detect on DISC with a subsequent VIB Detect on SP-1 and/or SP-2. Do not reset the BMP if a
second VIB Detect occurs at the same location (swashplate or disconnect).
• For purposes of this procedure, a flight is defined as the period between rotor engagement and rotor shutdown.
A/P23P-14A(V) and A/P22P-14(V)1 Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Protective
Respirator Assemblies
Either the A/P23P-14A(V) (Helo Upgrade) Respirator Assembly (Figure 12-11) or A/P22P-14(V)1 Aircrew CBR
Respirator Assembly (Non-Oxygen Variant) (Figure 12-12) is authorized to be worn by CH-53E crew for protection
against the elements of CBR warfare. For general information, donning and doffing, and routine usage, refer to
Aviation Crew Systems Manual, NAVAIR 13-1-6.10, Special Mission Aircrew Equipment.
WARNING
• Thorough familiarization with procedures and operation during emergency
situations is essential. Exposure to harmful elements may result from
improper use.
• Suffocation may result if the CBR protective assembly is exposed to smoke
or direct flames. The CBR mask will afford some protection against fire
and fumes although the mask is made of a combustible material and will not
provide oxygen in an oxygen deficient environment.