8. Metaphysics 2: The Mind-Body Problem

Question 1

What does Plato think about the Soul?

Answer 1

The soul is indivisible and souls never die.

Question 2

What does Aristotle think of the soul?

Answer 2

– the soul is what animates each living thing in a way that is proper to its own existence. Souls don’t “depart” rather souls die.

Question 3

Parts of the Soul (from Plato’s work “Phaedo”

Answer 3

1. The Rational Part (logos): located in the head region, related to reason, desire for wisdom, justice
2. The Spirited Part (thymos): located in the heart region, related to anger/self-protection, desire for honour/self-respect.
3. The Appetitive Part (eros): located in the midsection as is related to desire of food, drink, sex.

Question 4

Dualism (Rene Descrates)

Answer 4

We are made of two distinct types of substances:

1. res cogitans (thinking thing)
2. res extensa (extended thing).

Question 5

The mind is never extended, and…

Answer 5

extension never thinks.

Question 6

Biggest objection/question for Dualists

Answer 6

how do these things interact?

If you believe the mind and body are separate from one another, you need to give an account of how they act.

Question 7

According to substance dualism, mental stuff (soul) has no…

Answer 7

primary qualities.

Question 8

For the Dualists, Mental States are located where?

Answer 8

located in the brain but they aren’t identical to what’s going on in the brain because brain activity is extended.

Question 9

Interactionalism (under Dualism)

Answer 9

mental stuff and physical stuff DO interact but we can’t explain how they do interact, but obviously they do.
(no explanation for HOW)

Question 10

Occasionalism (under Dualism)

Answer 10

God uses physical interacts as occasions to speak to our soul and give us a sensation (Nicholas Malebranche)

Question 11

While interactionalism gives no explanation of the “how”, occasionalism gives full credit to the only sufficient explanation:

Answer 11

the supernatural.

Question 12

Physicalism

Answer 12

humans are wholly physical beings with no “immaterial soul/mind”

the mental is somehow in the activity of the brain. (so many different explanations about HOW)

Question 13

Physicalists’ rebuttals on dualism

Answer 13

Only non-physical things think? Even brains don’t think?

How are you presuming to understand that thinking comes from non-physical things? We don’t have the slightest idea how consciousness works.

Question 14

Physicalism view on death

Answer 14

all mental states are functions of the brain, and when someone dies, their brain dies. When the brain does, they are no longer.

Question 15

Physicalism view on afterlife

Answer 15

If physicalists believe in the afterlife, they would see their soul (thinking stuff) as splitting instead of departing.

Both views need the supernatural to explain life after death, but physicalists believe it will happen without some “mystical” vehicle of the soul.

Question 16

The biggest difference between views on physicalism can be found over the concept of…

(3Q)

Answer 16

“reduction”

Questions:
What are mental states composed of?
What causes mental states?
Are mental states and physical states the same?

Question 17

Mind-Brain Identity Theorist

Answer 17

Emphasizes causation and composition and less on “properties.”

every brain state has an identical mental state

L fibres = feeling love
C fibre = feeling pain

believes we can have AIs but they can’t ever have the same internal - experiences

Question 18

Property Dualist
(non-reductive)

Answer 18

Mental states are caused by physical (brain) states BUT the property of being conscious is different from the physical property of the brain state.

For example, “water molecules” does not equal liquidity but water molecules can cause liquidity. Liquidity cannot be reduced to the individual water molecule. In the same way, consciousness does not equal brain activity but an accumulation of brain activity can cause consciousness. However this consciousness cannot be reduced to the lower-level reference of brain activity.

Question 19

Double-Aspect Theory
(non-reductive)
Thomas Nagel

Answer 19

There is something that is like to be a creature from the inside. Subjective realities are irreducible, non-eliminative, and innately private!

Question 20

Functionalist (reductive)

Answer 20

“mind” is reducible to what they do. A real heart is anything that pumps blood, so the mind is whatever certain regions of the brain accomplish: perception, cognition, memory storage. (defenders of AI)

Question 21

Eliminative Materialism (reductive)

Answer 21

Get rid of “folk talk” regarding mental states (phobias, beliefs)!
Mental states ARE an appropriate arrangement of brain states.

Brains are a part of a governed world and we act like how we are determined to act (whether by nature/God)

Question 22

Would the Eliminative Materialist be merciful to people who commit crimes because of mental disorders?

Answer 22

Yes.

The Eliminatist would link these actions to the brain, not some morality or deprivation of the soul. They give biological, chemical, and hormonal explanations.

Question 23

The Christian Debate
1. Alvin Plantinga: Dualist

Answer 23

• Mental properties are impossible to comprehend in materialist terms.
• If one can enter the mind, as if to enter a mill, one would only find pieces working upon one another but never would one find anything to explain perception.
• There is nothing in the same ballpark as the synapses firing in people’s brain as their consciousness.

Question 24

The Christian Debate
2. Peter Van Inwagen: Physicalist

Answer 24

• There is no evidence that God made humans to the in-material soul
• Dualism faces the exact same mystery that Plantinga proposes. Why does it make sense that a non-physical thing can think but a physical thing doesn’t?

Question 25

The Christian Debate
3. Alvin Plantinga’s defense: Dualist

Answer 25

• “how” is not the problem. There are lots of things we don’t understand.

A physical thing is a square and consciousness is a circle. Can #5 equal 7 pounds? What kind of question is that? They are in different categories.

Question 26

The Christian Debate
4. Peter Van Inwagen’s defense: Physicalist (5)

Answer 26

1. The interaction problem: how can an inmaterial thing interact with a material thing?
2. Argument of common speech. We say “I buckled myself in.” NOT “I buckled by body in”
3. The Remote-Control Argument: dualism makes the wrong kind of predictions. If one is in control of a car or airplane, they won’t be aware if it crashes around the corner, but we’re instantly aware of harm when it happens to our bodies.
4. When someone is drunk/high – not sober minded, they should be able to do mental math because the body and mind are separate. Our minds and bodies are on thing and they would both be disabled with a physical digestion.
5. Would a duplicated human machine produce a dead human being, a zombie, or an identical?