8: Legislative Decision

Question 1

What is a problem with distributive bargaining?

Answer 1

Majority rule by itself may not produce a stable outcome

Question 2

What is a structure induced equilibrium in distributive bargaining?

Answer 2

An equilibrium reached because the domain and content of legislative exchange are constraint

Question 3

What are the results of Baron and Ferejohns model ‘Bargaining in Legislatures’

Footnote
division of exefonous buget
members discount delayed decision
q of n members are required to pass

Answer 3

The person choosing has to offer the expected utility of the next round to (q-1) people

Question 4

What are the results of Miller and Vanbergs experiments on distributive bargaining?

Answer 4

• Proposals are more likely to fail with larger groups
• proposals are more likely to fail under unamity then majority
• unamity rules produce more equal results

Question 5

What types of logrolls are there?

Answer 5

Constructive (pass a bundle of projects)
Destructive (block a bundle of projects)
Mixed (pass some block some)

Question 6

When does logrolling produce better results

Answer 6

the bigger the number of projects are, the bigger should the q-majority requirement be