7 - Directors' Duties Flashcards
Is the s. 172 duty subjective or objective?
Section 172(1) provides that a director must act in a way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company.
These words indicate that the duty is subjective, meaning that ‘the question is whether the director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the interests of the company’ (REGENTCREST PLC v COHEN (2001). A subjective approach is, however, only of use if directors actually consider whether their actions promoted the success of the company. If a director did not even consider this, then the approach determining if s. 172 has been breached will cease to be subjective and an objective approach will then be used.
Can the directors prioritise the interests of the company over the interests of its members?
The courts have held that where the interests of the company conflict with the interests of part of the company’s membership, then the directors will not breach s. 172 if they favour the company’s interests (MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO OF NEW YORK v RANK ORGANISATION LTD (1985)). No authority exists on whether the directors can prioritise the interests of the company over all of its members.
Identify the six factors listed in s. 172(1) that the directors must have regard to.
- The likely consequences of any decision in the long term;
- The interests of the company’s employees;
- The need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others;
- The impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment;
- The desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct; and
- The need to act fairly as between members of the company.
What are the remedies for a breach of the s. 172 duty?
An agreement in breach of the s. 172 duty is voidable at the company’s instance. If a breach of the s. 172 duty causes the company loss, the director in breach may be required to compensate the company (EXTRASURE TRAVEL INSURANCES LTD v SCATTERGOOD (2003)).
How does the standard of care in s. 174 differ from its common law predecessor?
Under the common law, the standard of care was subjective, and was based on the skill and knowledge that the director actually had. Under s. 174, the standard of care has an objective and a subjective component, and is based on:
- the general knowledge, skill and experience that may be reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company; and
- the general knowledge, skill and experience of the director.
When will the subjective element of the s. 174 duty apply?
Section 174(2)(a) imposes a subjective standard based on the actual knowledge, skill and experience of the director. It will only apply where the director has some skill, qualification or experience that merits raising the standard expected of him (e.g. financial director would be expected to have s higher degree of skill and knowledge in relation to financial matters).
If a director delegates one of his functions to another person, and that person does not perform with the requisite skill and care, will the director be in breach of the s. 174 duty?
Generally, a director will not breach s. 174 if they delegate a function to another person and that person performs that function unlawfully or with a lack of skill and care (DOVEY v COREY (1901)). This is subject to several exceptions:
- the directors must exercise reasonable skill and acre when deciding to whom their functions are delegated. If they fail to do so, and the delegated functions are performed unlawfully or without due skill and care, the directors could be in breach of the s. 174 duty.
- the directors are required to supervise those persons to whom they have delegated their powers. A failure to supervise such persons can result in a breach of the s. 174 duty.
What is the remedy for a breach of the s. 174 duty?
Directors will be required to compensate the company for any loss it sustains due to their breach of the s. 174 duty.
What types of situation do not amount to a conflict under s. 175?
The s. 175 duty will not apply in relation to a transaction or arrangement with the company itself (s. 175(3)), or where the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest (s. 175(4)(a)).
Are directors able to sit on the boards of competing companies?
There is no rigid rule preventing a director from sitting on the board of a rival company, and so a director is generally free to sit on the board of a rival company (LONDON AND MASHONALAND EXPLORATION CO LTD v NEW MASHONALAND EXPLORATION CO LTD (1891)), unless prohibited form doing so (e.g. by its articles or service contract). However, whether sitting on the board of a rival company is a breach of duty will depend strongly on the facts of the case.
Does the s. 175 duty apply to former directors of a company?
Section 175 can apply to a former director of the company where the former director exploits any property, information or opportunity of which he became aware at a time when he was a director of the company (s. 170(2)(a)).
When will a director in a position of conflict not be in breach of the s. 175 duty?
The s. 175 duty will not be infringed where the conflict has been authorised by the company (s. 180(4)(a)) or by the directors (s. 175(4)(b)).
Can directors authorise a s. 175 conflict?
The directors’ ability to authorise a s. 175 conflict is as follows:
- the director cannot authorise a conflict where statute requires member approval to be provided (e.g. a third-party benefit under s. 176).
- in the case of a private company, the directors may authorise the conflict providing that the company’s constitution does not invalidate such authorisation (s. 175)(5)(a)). The model articles for private companies do not invalidate the directors’ ability to authorise a conflict.
- in the case of a public company, the directors may only authorise a conflict if there is a provision in the articles enabling them to do so (s. 175(5)(b)). The model articles for public companies do not contain such a provision.
Explain the various differences between the duties in ss. 177 and 182.
- the s. 177 duty applies to proposed transactions or arrangements, whereas s. 182 applies to transactions or arrangements that the company has entered into.
- under s. 177, the declaration must be made before the transaction/arrangement is entered into. Under s. 182, the declaration must be made as soon as is reasonably practicable (s. 182(4)).
- a breach of s. 177 results in civil consequences only. Conversely, a breach of s. 182 is a criminal offence (s. 183).
How can a director with an interest in a proposed transaction with the company avoid a breach of the s. 177 duty?
A director will need to declare the nature and extent of their interest to the other directors before the transaction or arrangement is entered into (s. 177(4)). Obviously, this will not apply where the company only has one director.