6) Refugees and Migrants Flashcards
How does the principle of non-refoulement apply to the EU’s external border policies, and how is it challenged by Frontex’s operations?
(Hint: Refer to Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the work of Oudejans, Rijken, and Pijnenburg.)
Answer:
Non-refoulement prohibits the return of individuals to territories where they face persecution or harm. Frontex’s operations at the EU’s external borders, including pushbacks, often undermine this principle, raising accountability concerns.
Text of Article 33(1), 1951 Refugee Convention:
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened.”
Connection:
Oudejans et al. critique Frontex’s role in circumventing non-refoulement obligations by outsourcing border management to third countries, as seen in the EU-Turkey and Italy-Libya agreements.
What are extraterritorial obligations (ETOs), and how are they relevant to the Human Rights Committee’s decision in AS and Others v. Italy?
(Hint: Refer to ICCPR Articles 6 and 7 and the concept of jurisdiction.)
Answer:
ETOs require states to respect human rights beyond their borders, especially when exercising control over migrants. In AS and Others v. Italy, the Human Rights Committee ruled that Italy’s coordination of Libyan coastguards made it responsible for violations of ICCPR Articles 6 and 7.
Texts of ICCPR Articles 6 and 7:
Article 6: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Article 7: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
Connection:
The decision illustrates how ETOs apply to maritime operations where states exercise de facto control over migrant interdiction.
How does the concept of securitization explain the role of Frontex in EU migration governance?
(Hint: Refer to the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory and Léonard and Kaunert’s analysis.)
Answer:
Securitization involves framing migration as a security threat to justify extraordinary measures. Frontex exemplifies this by reifying the link between border management, migration control, and state security, shifting focus from humanitarian concerns.
Connection:
Léonard and Kaunert argue that Frontex operationalizes securitization by adopting surveillance and interdiction measures, transforming migrants into perceived threats rather than rights-holders.
What challenges exist in holding Frontex accountable for human rights violations?
(Hint: Refer to Melanie Fink’s analysis and the concept of blame-shifting.)
Answer:
Frontex’s accountability is hindered by blame-shifting mechanisms, where responsibilities are distributed across member states and third countries, complicating liability. Its outdated remedies system lacks clear oversight for addressing violations.
Connection:
Fink critiques the fragmentation of accountability, emphasizing the need for legal reforms to hold Frontex responsible for actions that breach human rights law.
What is the “humanitarian-security nexus,” and how does it manifest in EU border policies?
(Hint: Refer to Moreno-Lax’s critique of the “rescue-through-interdiction” paradigm.)
Answer:
The humanitarian-security nexus combines humanitarian objectives, such as rescuing migrants at sea, with security goals, such as border control. Moreno-Lax critiques the “rescue-through-interdiction” model for prioritizing security over meaningful protection, undermining human rights.
Connection:
This nexus shifts the focus from rescuing migrants to deterring their movement, as seen in the EU’s partnerships with third countries.
What are the legal obligations of states under UNCLOS Article 98 concerning search and rescue operations at sea?
(Hint: Refer to Guilfoyle’s discussion on jurisdiction at sea.)
Answer:
UNCLOS Article 98 obligates states to render assistance to individuals in distress at sea, irrespective of their nationality or legal status. This provision is central to debates on migrant interdiction.
Text of UNCLOS Article 98(1):
“Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers, to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost.”
Connection:
Guilfoyle highlights how states often circumvent these obligations by delegating operations to third countries or private actors, complicating accountability.
How does the EU-Turkey Deal challenge the framework of international refugee law?
(Hint: Refer to Chillaud’s critique of externalized migration management.)
Answer:
The EU-Turkey Deal externalizes migration control, outsourcing responsibilities to a third country. This undermines the protection framework established by international refugee law, particularly the principle of non-refoulement.
Connection:
Chillaud argues that such agreements prioritize containment over rights, contributing to the erosion of refugee protections.
What is the principle of “effective control,” and how does it apply to state obligations in maritime migration operations?
(Hint: Refer to the Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence and Guilfoyle’s analysis.)
Answer:
Effective control determines whether a state’s actions or omissions in a specific context create jurisdiction under international human rights law. In maritime operations, states coordinating interdictions, even indirectly, are held responsible for resulting rights violations.
Connection:
Guilfoyle and the Human Rights Committee emphasize that states exercising effective control over maritime zones or third-party actors cannot evade human rights obligations.
