6) HRA Enforcement Flashcards
What does Section 6(2) of the HRA 1998 state regarding public authorities?
A public authority will not breach the obligation imposed by s. 6(1) if its actions are required by primary legislation or acting in a way that gives effect to primary or subordinate legislation.
Thereby preserves parliamentary sovereignty.
What is the duty of the court under Section 3(1) of the HRA 1998?
To read primary and subordinate legislation ‘so far as it is possible to do so’ in a Convention-compatible way.
What power does Section 4 of the HRA 1998 grant to the courts?
The power to make ‘declarations of incompatibility’ where UK legislation is incompatible with Convention rights.
What does Section 10 of the HRA 1998 provide?
Powers to government ministers to take expedited ‘remedial action’ where a s. 4 declaration is made.
What does Section 8 of the HRA 1998 govern?
Remedies where a public authority has breached its duty in s. 6(1).
What is the ‘statutory defence’ in relation to s. 6(2) of the HRA?
A public authority may claim it acted lawfully if:
1) The act was required by primary legislation, the authority could not have acted differently
2) or primary legislation that cannot be read in a way compatible with the Convention, the authority was acting to give effect to those provisions.
= Statutory defence that the public authority may be able to rely up
In R v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, ex parte Hooper, what did Lord Hope state about the statutory defence?
s6(2) was designed to ensure parliamentary sovereignty was not undermine
“Defence is provided to prevent legislation from being rendered unenforceable”
How does the court’s duty under Section 3 affect a public authority’s reliance on the statutory defence?
The court must as far as possible read legislation in a way that is compatible with Convention rights
If the court interprets legislation compatibly, the public authority’s s. 6(2) defence may disappear, leading to liability under s. 6(1).
= remedy for the applicant
Does section 3 apply to future legislation as well?
- Yes
s3 = duty to read compatibly
What is the effect of Court’s use of s3 interpretation on the s6(2) defence?
- Effectively removes the statutory defence from the defendant. (s6(2))
What is the significance of the case R v A (Complainant’s Sexual History)?
- Restricted questioning re: prior sexual history
- The House of Lords held that s. 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 was incompatible with the right to a fair trial.
- Considered s3 obligations - strive to find interpretive obliations
- read an implied provision in the act - finding sexual history admissable
Section 3 - strong interpretative duty
What did Lord Steyn advocate regarding the interpretative obligation under s. 3 of the HRA?
R v A (Complainant’s Sexual History)
‘It applies even if there is no ambiguity in the language… it will sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained.’
- Bold approach - striving to find compatibility.
- Read an implied provision into s42- that evidence required for a fair trial should be admissible
- Incompatibility = last resort
R v A (Complainant’s Sexual History)
What was Lord Hope’s caution regarding the use of s. 3 interpretation?
R v A (Complainant’s Sexual History)
- ‘The rule is only a rule of interpretation. It does not entitle the judges to act as legislators.’
- Felt that cannot read in the implied provision, but can read down
Cautious as to over-extension
What did the House of Lords decide in the case of Bellinger v Bellinger?
It was not possible to interpret ‘male and female’ to include those who had undergone gender reassignment under s. 3.
S3 - limits to interpretative duty
Re S (Children) and Re W(Care Orders)
(Re S and Re W)
- Radical reinterpretation of provisions of the Children Act 1989 concerning Care Plans for children
- Reversed by HoL - outer limit
If the interpretative power of s3 would bring about a major change in the law with far reaching consequences, they are less willing to use it - Particularly when there may be practical repercussions not evaluated by the courts
Amendment of statutes is for parliaments
s3 - interpretative limits
Bellinger v Bellinger
Case
- Person born male, underwent gender reassingment.
- Married to a man
- Issue was whether marriage certificate was valid?
What were the three reasons Lord Nicholls provided for the decision in Bellinger v Bellinger?
Was it possible to reinterpret “male and female” in the act?
- Criteria for legal recognition of gender reassignment are unclear - court did not have medical expertise
- Recognition cannot be isolated from broader gender policy - definitions of male and female have far reaching implications
- Marriage is a culturally embedded institution that requires comprehensive review
ECtHR held in Goodwin v UK in violation of art8 and art12 for not recognising gender reassignment for purpose of marraiges
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza
- Majority felt able to use s3 powers to read the statutory provisions in a Convention Compatible way.
- Defendant had lived stable-gay relationship with the protected tenant of a flat.
- Judge found protected tenancy could not transfer as not a spousseunder Rent Act 1977
- Using R v A HoL used s3 of the HRA to read additional words to say “as if wife or husband”
- Courts should take a broad approach to interpreting under s3
What mattered was the substance of the legislative provision, rather than phraseology
R v A as authority
In Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, what was the court’s approach to using s. 3 powers?
The court felt able to read the statutory provision in a Convention-compatible way.
* Lived in a stable gay relationship with the tenant of a flat.
* Protected proceedings brought by the claimant on the tenant’s death
Read in the additional words
What guidelines did the House of Lords set in Ghaidan regarding the use of s. 3?
- A broad approach to interpretation applies
- Courts can interpret language restrictively or expansively, can read inwords
- Should not go too far
- Courts should not change the substance of provisions completely, should not run “against the grain” of the original meaning
What can interpretation not do?
- Change substance of provisions completely
- Run counter to the grain of the original legislation
- Contradicted provisions of the legisltaion
- Repealed or delete the language used in the legislation
- Make decisions for which it is not equipped
Go too far
Ghaidan
What did Lord Hoffmann state in R (Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue Commissioners about statutory interpretation?
‘Statutes were construed against the background of human rights subsisting at common law.’
- Intention of Parliament has a broader meaning = interpretation that a reasonable reader would give read against its background including the assumption it was not intended to be incompatible with Convention Rights.
What is the strong presumption arising from the Convention rights?
The question is still one of interpretation
This indicates that while there is a presumption, each case must still be interpreted individually.
What does the ‘intention of Parliament’ encompass according to Lord Hoffmann?
The interpretation which the reasonable reader would give to the statute read against its background, this includes an assumption that the statute is compatible with Convention rights.
R(Wilkinson) v IRC