578.5 Flashcards

1
Q

Axiom / PlugX interesting attributes

A

Originally a Chinese-based piece of malware that then propagated to other threat groups.

  • More complex malware against harder targets
  • Victim-specific C2 servers from compromised domains
  • Wide variety of malware / tools
  • Unique C2 naming convention
  • Different teams and “hands off”
  • Many of the victims could be mapped back to China’s 12th Five Year Plan
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2
Q

Know the audience

A

Different audiences have different intel needs

Different audiences require data in different formats.

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3
Q

YARA

A

pattern-matching tool used to create signatures.

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4
Q

Types of strings in YARA

A

Text => double quotes
Hex => curly brackets
Reg Ex

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5
Q

Validating Signatures and IOCs

A
  1. IOCs require tailoring to avoid false psitives
  2. Sec teams also must collect the right type of data to use IOCs against
  3. Properly validated IOCs contribute to fast and effective response.
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6
Q

Hacking Team

A

Italian security firm HackingTeam specialized in providing surveillance and exploitation services for governments and law enforcement.

  1. Zero Day in embedded system
  2. Unsecured Backups
  3. Admin Passwords
  4. GitHub Password
  5. Source Code
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7
Q

Operational Threat Intelligence

A

Is the focus for operational level audience members. Members that serve as the bridge between the strategic and tactical personnel. It should help identify knowledge gaps and foster partner sharing to minimize these gaps.

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8
Q

Partners and Collaboration

A

The best producers of threat intelligence have great access to collecting data from outside their own networks and sources.

Key sources to consider:

  • Government-private sharing
  • Groups and email distributions
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9
Q

Carnegie Mellon CERT

A

List of National CERTs

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10
Q

STIX / TAXII, CybOX

A

Structured Threat Information eXpression. Describes threat information.

Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information. Transport mechanism for STIX.

Cyber Observable eXpression. Descrives observables (IOCs).

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11
Q

What are the three TAXII Implementations

A
  • Source / Subscriber (Only Pull)
  • Peer to Peer
  • Hub and Spoke (Pull & Push)
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12
Q

STIX Relationship Objects

A

Relationship and Sighting

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13
Q

OASIS

A

OASIS is a technical committee taking input and governing STIX 2.1

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14
Q

Steps of Sharing: Best practices

A
  • Ensure authentication and logging
  • Include references and appendixes
  • Strip out all unneeded data
  • Use standards that make sense for your organization
  • Interfaces to share in common standards
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15
Q

Metric types

A
  • Organizational (Operational efficiency, Workload)

- Risk (Threat)

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16
Q

Organizational Heat Maps

A

Use tools such as the MITRE ATT&CK Navigator to articulate where you have mitigations and detections.

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17
Q

Mitigation Scorecard

A

The mitigation scorecard is one way to measure the utility of passive and mitigating courses of action.

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18
Q

Analytical Completeness

A

The analytical completeness metric illustrates, over the four intrusion attempts against an organization from the previous week, the completeness of intelligence collection at each phase of the Kill Chain and Diamond Model.

19
Q

Strategic Threat Intelligence

A

Strategic threat intelligence is generally presented to executives with a focus on policy outcomes. Threat intelligence presented at this level should be the most polished and complete intelligence product possible.

20
Q

Making the Business Case for Security

A

Identify the technical needs and match them to the organization’s mission + Translate everything into your audience’s language = Understood, appreciated, and supported security efforts

21
Q

Expectations - Board of Directors

A

Understand the impact of threats to the organization.

22
Q

Expectations - C-Suite Personnel

A

Understand and validate resource investments for better security.

23
Q

Expectations - Cyber Threat Intel Analysts

A

The board of directors should be able to name the last APT campaign encountered.

24
Q

Reports

A

Should combine various sources of threat intelligence to present an overall and easily consumable narrative.

25
Q

Estimative Language

A
  • Words that communicate (un)certainty
  • Using estimative language
  • Measured versus assessed uncertainty
  • Avoid convoluting measured and subjective uncertainty
26
Q

Diamond model and analytic findings

A

Adversary - ASSESSMENT
Infrastructure - FACT
Capability - FACT
Victim - FACT

27
Q

Confidence Assessments

A

High confidence
Moderate confidence
Low confidence

28
Q

Four parts of an Assessment

A

Confidence + Analysis + Evidence + Sources

29
Q

Cloud Hopper

A

The focus of Operation Cloud Hopper was IT managed service providers (MSP). Targeting MSPs to get access to their clients.

30
Q

Observation types for CTI analysts

A

Communicating Broadly
Human Fingerprints
Timelines
Closing Thoughts

31
Q

Four types of attribution

A
  • Actors
  • Criminal
  • Activity Groups
  • States (direct / indirect)
32
Q

Four approaches to “true” attribution

A
  • Adversary Admission
  • Leaks
  • Direct Access
  • Intrusion Analysis
33
Q

Deriving Intent

A

Impact != Intent

Intent and impact are not always the same thing.

34
Q

The Basics of State Attribution

A

Understand the state deeply (History, Culture, Language, etc.)

35
Q

Categorize by threat definition

A
  • Intent
  • Opportunity
  • Capability
36
Q

Categorize evidence using threat definition

A
  • Identify evidence
  • Categorize by threat definition
  • Fill in categories where evidence is missing
  • Cautiously leverage others’ assessments
  • If missing category of evidence, assessment will be low confidence AT BEST
37
Q

Be Prepared for Information to Change

A

Understand and document the key evidence that went into the intelligence requirements you satisfied. Over time sometimes key evidence or our understanding of it changes.

38
Q

False Flag

A

False flags are a very specific type of operation where the purpose of the operation is redirecting the blame of the attack onto a third party.

Obfuscation, distractions, anti-forensic techniques, etc. are not false flags.

39
Q

What is Hitkit?

A

Piece of malware.

  • Rootkit functionality
  • Client tools for RAT functionality
  • Kernel driver to monitor traffic

Seen as having state-related use cases.

40
Q

What is meant with “true attribution”?

A

Actually identifying the person or team behind the intrusion.

41
Q

What are technical opportunities?

A
  • Email systems
  • Zero-day with no patch
  • Private registrars
  • Access to protected network
42
Q

What are political opportunities?

A
  • Legal authority
  • Willful LE inaction
  • Failed states
43
Q

What are logistical opportunities?

A
  • Delayed CIRT action

- Organizations merger