5. Mergers and Acquisitions Flashcards

1
Q

Explain ‘statutory merger’.

A

In a statutory merger, the acquiring company acquires all of the target’s assets and liabilities. As a result, the target company ceases to exist as a separate entity.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Explain ‘subsidiary merger’.

A

The target company becomes a subsidiary of the puerchaser. Most subsidiary mergers typically occur when the target has a well-known brand that the acquirer wants to retain.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Explain ‘consolidation’.

A

Both companies cease to exist in their prior form, and they come together to form a completely new company. Consolidations are common in mergers when both companies are of a similar size.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Explain a ‘forward integration’ and ‘backward integration’.

A

Forward integration: where the acquirer moving up the supply chgain toward the ultimate consumer. An ice cream manufacturer decides to acquire a restaurant chain.

Backward Integration: the acquirer moves down the supply chain toward the raw material inputs. The same ice cream manufacturer decides acquire a farm.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Explain ‘bootstrapping’.

A

Bootsrapping is a way of packaging the combined earnings from two companies after a merger so that the merger generates an increase in the EPS of the acquirer, even when no real economic gains have been achieved.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Explain ‘poison pill’ in the context of pre-offer defense mechanisms.

A

Poison pills are extremely effective anti-takeover devices and were the subject of many legal battles in their infancy. In its most basic form, a poison pill gives current shareholders the right to purchase additional shares of stock at extremely attractive prices (i.e. at a discount to current market value), which causes dilution and effectively increases the cost to the potential acquirer. The pills are usually triggered when a shareholder’s equity stake exceeds some threeshold level (e.g. 10%).

Specific forms of a poison pill are a flip-in pill, where the target company’s shareholders have the right to buy the target’s shares at a discountm, and a flip-over pill, where the tarhet’s shareholders have the right to buy the acquirer’s shares at a discount. In case of a friendly merger offer, most poison pill plans give the board of directors the right to redeem the pill prior to a triggering event.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Explain ‘poison put’ in the context of pre-offer defense mechanisms.

A

This anti-takeover device is different from the others, as it focuses on bondholders. These puts give bondholders the option to demand immediate repayment of their bonds if there is a hostile takeover. This additional cash burden may fend off a would-be acquirer.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Explain ‘restrictive takeover laws’ in the context of pre-offer defense mechanisms.

A

Companies in the US are incorporated in specific states, and the rules of that state apply to the corporation. Some states are more target friendly than others when it comes to having rules to protect against hostile takeover attempts. Companies that want to avoid a potential hostile merger offer may seek to reincorporate in a stete that has enacted strict anti-takeover laws.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Explain ‘staggered board’ in the context of pre-offer defense mechanisms.

A

In this strategy, the board of directors is split into roughky three equal-sized groups. Each group is elected for a 3-year term in a staggered system: in the first year the first group is elected, the following year the next group is elected, and in the final year the third group is elected. The implications are straight-forward. In any particular year, a bidder can win at nost one-third of the board seats, It would take a potential acquirer at least two years yo gain majority control of the board since the terms are overlapping for the remaining board members. This usually longer than a bidder would want to wait and can deter a potential acquirer.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Explain ‘restricted voting rights’ in the context of pre-offer defense mechanisms.

A

Equity ownership above some threshold level (e.g., 15% or 20%) triggers a loss of voting rights unless approved by the board of directors. This greatly reduces the effectiveness of a tender offer and forces the bidder to negotiate with the board of directors directly.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Explain ‘supermajority voting provision for mergers’ in the context of pre-offer defense mechanisms.

A

A supermajority provision in the corporate charter requires shareholder support in excess of a simple majority. For example, a supermajority provision may require 66,7%, 75% or 80% of votes in favor of a merger. Therefore, a simple majority shareholder vote of 51% would still fail under these supermajority limits.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Explain ‘fair price amendment’ in the context of pre-offer defense mechanisms.

A

A fair price amendment restricts a merger offer unless a fair price is offered to current shareholders. This fair price is usually determined by some formula or independent appraisal.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Explain ‘golden parachutes’ in the context of pre-offer defense mechanisms.

A

Golden parachutes are compensation agreements between the target and its senior management that give the managers lucrative cash payouts if they leave the target company after a merger. In practice, payouts to managers are generally not big enough to stop a large merger deal, but they do ease the target management’s concern about losing their jobs.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Explain ‘just say no defense’ in the context of post-offer defense mechanisms.

A

The first step in avoiding a hostile takeover offer is to simply say no. If the potential acquirer goes directly to shareholders with a tender offer or a proxy fight, the target can make a public case to the shareholders concerning why the acquirer’s offer is not in the shareholder’s best interests.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Explain ‘litigation’ in the context of post-offer defense mechanisms.

A

The basic idea is to file a lawsuit against the acquirer that will require expensive and time-consuming legal efforts to fight. The typical process is to attack the merger on anti-trust grounds or for some violation of securities law. The courts may disallow the merger or provide a temporary injunction delaying the merger, giving managers more time to load up their defense or seek a friendly offer from a white knight.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Explain ‘greenmail’ in the context of post-offer defense mechanisms.

A

Essentially, greenmail is a payoff to the potential acquirer to terminate the hostile takeover attempt. Greenmail is an agreement that allows the target to repurchase its shares from the acquiring company at a premium to the market price. The agreement is usually accompanied by a second agreement that the acquirer will not make another takeover attempt for a defined period time. Greenmail used to be popular in the US in the 1980s, but it has been rarely used after 1986 change in tax laws added a 50% tax on profits realized by acquirers through greenmail.

17
Q

Explain ‘share repurchase’ in the context of post-offer defense mechanisms.

A

The target company can submit a tender offer for its own shares. This forces the acquirer to raise its bid in order to stay competitive with the target’s offer and alse increases the use of leverage in the target’s capital structure (less equity increase the D/E ratio), which can make the target a less attractive takeover candidate.

18
Q

Explain ‘leveraged recapitalization’ in the context of post-offer defense mechanisms.

A

In a leveraged recapitalization, the target assumes a large amount of debt that is used to finance share repurchases. Like the share repurchase, the effect is to create a significant change in capital structure that makes the target less attractive while delivering value to shareholders.

19
Q

Explain ‘crown jewel recapitalization’ in the context of post-offer defense mechanisms.

A

After a hostile takeover offer, a target may decide to sell a subsidiary or major asset to a neutral third party. If the hostile acquirer views this asset as essential to the deal (i.e., a crown jewel), then it may abandon the takeover attempt. The risk here is that courts may declare the strategy illegal if a significant asset sale is made after the hostile bid announced.

20
Q

Explain ‘pac-man defense’ in the context of post-offer defense mechanisms.

A

In the video game Pac-man, electronic ghosts would try to eat the main character, but after eating a power pill, Pac-Man would turn around and try to eat the ghosts. The analogy applies here. After a hostile takeover offer, the target can defend itself by making a counteroffer to acquire the acquirer, In practice, the Pac-Man defense is rarely used because it means a smaller company would have to acquire a larger company, and the target may also lose the use of other defense tactics as a result of its counteroffer.

21
Q

Explain ‘white knight defense’ in the context of post-offer defense mechanisms.

A

A white knight is a friendly third party that comes to the rescue of the target company. The target will usually seek out a third party with a good strategic fit with the target that can justify a higher price than the hostile acquirer. In many cases, the white knight defense can start a bidding war between the hostile acquirer and the third party, resulting in the target receiving a very good price when a deal is ultimatelty completed. This tendency for the winner to overpay in a competitive bidding situation is called the winner’s curse.

22
Q

Explain ‘white squire defense’ in the context of post-offer defense mechanisms.

A

In medieval times, a squire was a junior knight. In today’s M&A world, the squire analogy means that the target seeks a friendly third party that buys a minority stake in the target without buying the entire company. The idea is for the minority stake to be big enough to block the hostile acquirer from gaining enogh shares to complete the merger. In practice, the white squire defense involves a high risk of litigation, depending on the details of the transaction, especially if the third party acquires shares directly from the company and the target’s shareholders do not receive any compensation.

23
Q

Explain Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). HHI replaced market share as the key measure of market power for determining potential antitrust violations.

A

The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares for all firms within an industry.

HHI = SOMA(i=1 a i=n) (MarketShare of firm i x 100)^2

Regulator focus on what the HHI would be after the merger takes place.

If the post-merger HHI is less than 1.000, the industry is considered competitive and an antitrust challenge is unlikely.

A post-merger HHI value between 1.000 and 1.800 will place the industry in the moderately concentraded category. In this case, regulators will compare the pre-merger and post-merger HHI. If the change is greater than 100 points, the merger is likely to be challenged on antitrust grounds.

A post-merger HHI value greater than 1.800 implies a highly concentrated industry. Regulators will again compare the pre-merger and post-merger HHI calculations, but in this case, if the change is greater than 50, the merger is likely to be challenged.

24
Q

How to calculate FCFF under Corporate Finance lessons and under Equity lessons?

A
  • Corporate Finance
Net Income
\+ Net Interest After Taxes
= Unlevered Net Income
\+/- Change in Deferred Taxes
= NOPLAT (Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes)
\+ Net Non-Cash Charges
- Change in Net Working Capital
- CAPEX
= FCFF

Equity

EBIT
- EBIT*(1-t)
= NOPAT
\+ Net Non-Cash Charges
- Change in Net Working Capital
- CAPEX
= FCFF
25
Q

How to calculate the post-merger value of the combined company (acquirer+target), V(AT)?

A

V(AT) = V(A)+V(T)+S-C

S = synergies created by the merger

C = cash paid to target shareholders

26
Q

How to calculate gains accrued to the target?

A

Gain(T) = Take Over Premium (TP) = P(T) - V(T)

P(T) = price paid for target

V(T) = pre-merger value of target

27
Q

How to calculate gains accrued to the acquirer?

A

Gain(A) = S - TP = S - (P(T) - V(T)

S = synergies created by the merger

TP = take over premium

P(T) = price paid for target

V(T) = pre-merger value of target

28
Q

Explain ‘equity carve-outs’.

A

Equity carve-outs create a new, independent company by giving an equity interest in a subsidiary to outside shareholders. Shares of the subsidiary are issued in a public offering stock, and the subsidiary becomes a new legal entity whose management team and operations are separate from the parent company.

29
Q

Explain ‘spin-offs’.

A

Spin-offs are like carve-outs in that they create a new independent company that is distinct from the parent company. The primary difference is that shares are not issued to the public, but are instead distributed proportionately to the parent company’s shareholders. This means that the shareholders base of the spin-off will be the same as that of the parent company, but the management team and operations are completely separate. Since shares of the new company are simply distributed to existing shareholders, the parent company does not receive any cash in the transaction.

30
Q

Explain ‘split-offs’.

A

Split-offs allow shareholders to receive new shares of a division of the parent company IN EXCHANGE for a portion of their shares in the parent company. The key here is that shareholders are giving up a portion of their ownership in the parent company to receive the new shares of stock in the division.

31
Q

How to calculate ‘Economic Profit’ from EBIT?

A

Economic Profit = NOPAT - $WACC