453 - Exam 2 Flashcards
Exam 2
Oct. 3 on
ch. 6, 7, 11, 12
Bond
any fin. arrangement involving the current transfer of resources from a lender to a borrower, with a transfer back at time in the future
- -car loans, home mortgages, credit card balances (all have loan from fin. intermediary to an individual making a purchase)
- -when companies need to finance operations - sell bonds
- -when gov. needs o borrower - sells onds
After the crisis…
coroporations wanted to decrease debt, but in 2012 US bonds outstanding was more than $10 T and increasing
- -byt 2016 gov. had more than $22T in debt
- -1500s - monarchs (spain) borrowed internationally and defaultes = increase int. rates
- -Dutch 1st invented modern bonds to finance the war
- -Hamilton brings to U.S. - He consolidated all debt remaining from revolutionary war in 1789 - result was 1st US. gov. bonds
3 Important things with bonds
- inverse relationship btwn bond prices and int. rates
- S&D in bond market determine bond prices
- why bonds are risky
Bond prices - 1. zero cpn. bonds
How much to be willing to pay depends on bond’s characteristics
- zero-cpn bonds - single future pmt. (US treasury bill)
- -T bill - promise from US gov. to pau $100 at fixed future date…also called “pure discount bonds” - bc PV much < FV
- -ex. pv = $96, then the $4 is interest (pmt. for making the loan)
T-bills always < 1 yr. to maturity
–shoter = more willing to pay for it now
bond prices - 2. fied pmt. loans, 3. CPN bonds, 4. Consols (perpetuities)
pg. 136 - regular mortgage vs. ARMs
2. fixed pmt. loans
- -car loans/mortgages (fixed regular pmts.)
- -amortized - borrower pays off principal + interest over life
VA fixed = sum of PV of all future pmts.
- coupon bonds
–series of cpn. pmts. + principal @ maturity
VAcb = sum of PV of all cpn. pmts. + the PV of the FV at maturity - consols (perpetuities) - only int. pmts. to infinity
–British gov. sold consols in 2015…US gov. did in 1900 - not today
P = ann. coupon pmt. / int. rate
Bond yields
yield = measure of cost of borrowing and reward for lending
–YTM - yield to bondholders if hold to maturity
P = FV then CPN = YTM
P > FV then CPN > YTM
P < FV then CPN < YTM
capital gain - rise in value (if price below FV, return is above CPN)
–capital loss - (YTM < CPN, PV > FV)
current yield = ANN CPN / Price paid (PV) - measures return solely from cpn. pmts. (ignored cap. gain/loss) estimate of YTM
–if P decreases the CY incraese, and P=FV then CY = CPN
PFV — CPN > CY > YTM
Holding period return
some ex. too simple bc assumes investor holds to maturity - usually buy, hold, then sell
– have to account for change in price over the period you held it for
ex. p = $100, 6% CPN, FV = 100, n = 10
- -buy 10 year bond and later sell 1 yr. later – becomes a 9 year bond
- -over one year int. rate falls from 6% to 5%
1 yr. HPR = (6/100) + (107.11 - 100)/100 = (13.11/100) = .1311
Or if YTM inc. to 7%, then P falls
(6/100) + (93.48 - 100)/100 = -.52/100 = -.0052
HPR = (ann cpn./price paid) + change in P of bond / price paid
HPR = current yield + capital gains
when bond price changes always is cap. gains or loss - int. rate change and bond price change create risk
–higher n means more risk
- Bond mkt. an determination of interest rates (READ PG. 142-143 “Tools of trade”
- -bond supply curve
if assume investor plans to buy 1 yr. bond and hold to maturity - incestor has a 1 yr. investment horizon – then HPR = YTM (both are determined from Price)
P = 100 / (1 + i) —–> i = 100 - P / P
bond prices are determined by S & D
bond supply curve = relatioship btw D & Q of bonds ppl are willing to sell
- -Inc. bond price = inc. quantity supplied
- -investores – inc. P = Inc. desire to sell what they hold, comp. inc. price - inc. funding they desire
upward slope – P = $90 and P = $95, more supplied at $95
bond demand curve
relationship btwn price and Q of bonds investors demand
–dec. P = reward of holding bond increases so D increases
P = $90, $95 - more demand at $90
–when D increases the yields inc. (bc decreases price and Price and Y inversely related)
–if P is too high, S > D so excess supply (means suppliers can’t sell bonds they want to at current price) so puts downward pressure on P
–P too low, D > S - ppl who want to buy bonds cannot get all the want - upward pressure on P
IMP!!!!
When QD and QS shift because change in P = MOVING ALONG CURVE
–but at given P, still change = shifts entire curve and changes the yield
Factors that shift supply
PAGE 146-147 show charts with shifts of S and D
- change in gov. borrowing
- -change in tax policy and adjustments in spending – lead to change in gov. need to borow
- -inc. gov. borrowing = inc. # bonds and S curve shifts RIGHT
- -D = constant – S increases and P decreases so int. rates increase - change in general business conditions
- -if bus. is good = firms want to invest and borrow to do it = debt increases and quantity of bonds inc. - as business conditions improve S curve shifts RIGHT, p dec. and int rates increase
- -also shows why weak economy leads to price increases and lower int. rates - change in EXPECTED inflation
- -(REAL cost of borrowing)
- -at nominal int. rate constant – inc. inflation and dec. REAL interest rate
- -dec. int. rate leads to fewer real resources required to make pmts. promised by bonds
- -expeced inflation increases, cost of borrowing decreases and desire to borrow increases
- -INC. in expected inflation – S curve shifts RIGHT = Inflation inc. and price dec. and inc. rate inc. - change in corporate taxation - req. gov. legislation (not often)
- -tax income – but gov. creatse tax subsidies that make corp. investments less costly – so inc. supply shift RIGHT and dec. Price and inc. int. rates
Factors that shift demand
LOOK AT PAGE146-147!!!!!!!!
- wealth – econ. grow and inc. wealth = inc. investment
- -wealth INC. so D inc. and shifts RIGHT – P inc. and int. rates fall
- -economic expansion
- -in recession, wealth dec., D dec., P decreases, and raise int. rates - expected inflation
- -affect inv. willingness to buy bonds
- -dec. expected inflation means pmts. promised by bond issuer have more value than buyers thought so bonds are more attractive
- -exp. inflation FALLS then D increases and shifts RIGHT
- -P inc. and int rates fall - Expected returns and expected int. rates
- -E[r] INC. relative to other alternative investments, D inc. and shifts RIGHT
- -conclude bond prices are connecte dto stock mkt. – P inc. and int. rates fall
- -also when int. rates expected to change, bond prices adjust immediately
- -HPR = cpn. pmt. + cap gains/loss
- -int. rates dec., P expected to Inc. so expect cap. gain = bonds attractive
- -exp. int. rates dec. = D inc. = P inc. and int. rates fall (cap. gains expect) - risk relative to alternatives
- -risk requires compensation – less risky = higher price willing to pay for it
- -if bond is less risky relative to alernatives, D inc. and shifts RIGHT - P inc. and int. rates fall - liquidity relative to alternatives
- -liquid can sell without large loss in value - more liquid = inc. D and shift RIGHT
Change in equilibrium
change in expected inflation affects both S and D
- -inc. expected inflation = S shifts RIGHT bc decreases real cost of borrowing
- -BUT D shifts left because dec. real return to investors
- -equilibrium - dec. P and inc. int. rates (in case of inflation)
if both shift same direction, P can rise or fall (difficult to predict)
- -change in business conditions also impacts both - bus. cycle downturn dec. inestment opportunity so S curve shifts left and dec. wealth so D also LEFT
- -in this case i think P inc. and int. rate falls
why bonds are risky
- default risk - issuer may not make promised pmts. on time
- inflation risk - inflation higher than expected = dec. real return on holding the bond
- int. rate risk - int. rates may inc. btwn time bond is purchased and time sold = dec. bond price (cap. loss)
risk arises from fact that an investment has many possible payoffs during horizon for which it is held
- -to assess risk look at possible payoffs and likelihood of occurring
- -look at impact of risk on bond’s return relative to rf rate
- default risk
ignore with T-bonds (gov. issued - can print money)
- -list all the possibilties and payoffs that might occur with their probabilities
- -then calculate expected value of promised pmts. - then can find bond’s price and yield
ex. rf = 5%, n = 1 yr. FV = $100 - promise to pay $105 in one year
price = (if risk free and pmt. was certain) = 100 + 5/1.05 = 100
–but what if 10% possibility that company goes bankrupt before pmt. and if defaul investor gets nothing – means 2 possibile payoffs
possibiltiies = full pmt., payoff = $105, probability 90% —> payoff times probability = $105 * ,9 = $94.50
–or 2. default, payoff = $0, probability = 10% —> payoff times probability = 0 * .1 = 0
so expected value of pmt. of bond is $94.50 —> but if pmt. made it is one year from now so need to find P willing to pay today - use risk free rate
P = 94.50 / 1.05 = $90
what is YTM? bond sells for $90 and promised pmt. is $105
i = 105/90 -1 = .1667
default risk premium = promised YTM - rate
–16.67 - 5 = 11.67%
shows investore receives compensation for risk
–inc. default risk = inc. probability bondholders do not receive pmt. = dec. expected value = dec. P and inc. Int. rate
- inflation risk
bondholders interested in REAL intereat rate - not just nominal - and don’t know inflation
–int. rate has 3 components: real int. rates, expected inflation, and compensation for inflation risk
ex. real int. rate = 3%, but not sure on inflation
- -expected inflation = 2% with st. dev. of 1%
- –means nominal int. rate = 3% real interest + 2% expected inflation + compensation for inflation risk
- -inc. inflation risk = inc. compensation
LOOK AT CHART EXAMPLE - cases of expected inflation
–if has higher standard deviation = more risk = more compensation
- interest rate risk
arises fromfact that investors don’t know HPR for long-term bonds
- -int. rates change = bond prices change —> longer term of bond = larger PRICE change for every given change in real int. rate (duration)
- -when there is mismatch btwn inv. horizon and bonds maturity, there is int. rate risk
ex. 2016 i = 8/75%, t-bond that matures 2020 - traded at $132.16 (FV = 100) - when issued in 1990, P = 98.74
- -person who bought and sold 26 years later earned cap. gain of 24%
- -but inv. bought 2.75% cpn 30 yrear bond at 100.69 when issued in 2012 and sold 3 years later in 2016 for 98.31 had cap. loss of 2%
Ch. 7 - interest rate spreads
range of inc. and dec. int. rates - change has huge effect on borrowing costs to corporation
- -ex. Ford and GM - 2009 –> closer to bankruptcy, inc. risk = dec. price ppl willing to pay –led to inc. in interest rates and inc. cost of auto comp. to borrow
- -the bonds we study (gov. and corp) differ in 2 respects: 1. identity of issuer and 2. time to maturity
- default risk - can’t avoid, but mitigate by credit rating
- -used to be NRSROs (national recognized stat. rating organizations) – in 2010 after Dodd Frank wall st. reform and consumer protection act…change to reduce reliance on agencies
Moody’s and standard and poors
2 best bond rating services
- -earn high rates with 1. low levels of debt, 2. high profitability, 3. sizeable arm of cash assets
- -both systems based on letters - AAA highest
- -AAA - BBB inv. grade, BB-B (speculative), CCC-D (highly speculative)
inv. grade = low default risk - usually gov. or stable company
dec. inv. grade = JUNK BONDS - “igh yield bonds” - reminder to get high yields take on lost of risk
- -two types of junk bonds
- -1. fallen angels - were once inv. grade butissuers fell hard (can be corp. or soveriegn (gov.))
- -2. when little is known about issuer
ratings downgrade (upgrade) - dec. rating when business or country is having problems
CP rating char (pg. 169)
1. inv. or prime grade – Moodys (P1-P3)/ S&P (A+1, A-3) - Coca cola, general electric, proctor and gamble
- speculative, elow prime grade = no moody, S&P (B-C)
- defaulted - no moody, S&P (D)
commercial paper
is a short term version of a bond (both corp. and gov.)
- -unsecured bc no collateral (only most credit worthy issuers can use)
- -BaML and Goldman use majority of it
- -issued at DISCOUNT (like T-bill) - zero cpn. with no cpn. pmts.
- -usually mature < 270 days
- -1/3 of all commercial paper held by money-mkt. mutual funds (req. short term assets with immediate liquidity
- -sometimes 5-45 days = short term financing
impact of ratings on yields
bond ratings designed to reflect default risk = inc. P (compensation for risk)
–inc. risk = dec. D = shift left = INC. YIELD
Benchmark bonds - US treasury bc little default risk so use to COMPARE
–yields on other bonds are measured in terms of “spread over treasuries” (risk is measured relative to a benchmark - use US treasury bonds for bonds)
bond yield = US treasury yield + default risk premium
bond yield = risk spread
looked at structure of int. rate groups (pg. 171) shows inc. rates inc. and so did Aaa Baa yields
when a comp. bond rating decreases, the cost of funds goes up - impairing the comp. ability to finance new ventures (bc inc. int. rates - more expensive to borrowers but cheaper bond price to lenders) (pg. 171)
- taxes
bondholders pay income tax from income received from privately issued bonds - TAXABLE BONDS
–But cpn. pmts. on bonds issued by state/local gov. are tax exempt (municipal or tax-exempt bonds)
RULE: interest income on bonds issued by one gov. is not taxed by another gov.
–fed usually taxes for US treasury (but state and local do not)
investors use the AFTER-TAX YIELD to base decisions
tax-exempt bond yield = taxable bond yield (1-tax rate)
inc. tax rate = inc. gap btwn yields on tax and tax-exempt bonds
- maturity term structure of int. rates
term structure of int. rates = relationship among bonds of same risk characteristics but diff. maturities
pg. 174 - compare 3 mo. (blue line) to at year (green) and make conclusions on treasury yields
- int. rates of diff. maturities tend to move together
- yields on short term bonds are more volatile than yields on long term bonds
- long term yields tend to be higher than short term yields
2 reasons to explain
reason 1 - expectations hypothesis
certainty means bonds of diff. maturities are perfect substitutes for each other - so bc bond yield is rf rate + D.R.P. (CAPM) - we have certainty on rf it will return the same whether 1 or 2 yr. (indifferent)
so when int. rates are EXPECTED to inc. in future, long term int. rates are higher than short term – so YIELD CURVE will slope up
- -int. rates expected to fall, yield curve decreases
- -expected to be the same - yield curve = flat
the three graphs with x axis time to maturity and y axis YTM
- -if int. rates expected to rise, upward slope
- -expected to stay same = flat line
- -int. rates expected to fall = downward slope
review this part again - the int. rate formula
if indifferent between A and B (one 2 yr. bond or 2 one yr. bonds)
find ave. int. rate by taking the average of the current and the expected
- int. rates of diff. maturities move together (if int. rate on year changes, all yields at higher maturities change with it)
- yields short term more volatile than long (bc long term are just a sequence of average future short term rates) - if 3 year change, small impact on 10 year
- cannot explain why long-term yields are > short term
- -does not explain why YIELD CURVE slopes upward
- -bc ignores risk and assumes short and long are perfect substitutes
- -know long termare riskier than short term (bc liquidity problem)
reason 2. Liquidity problem
liquidity premium thoery - even if default-free bonds are risky bc of uncertainty with inflation and future int. rates
- -risk explains #3 in prev. card —> the UPWARD SLOPE
- -long term int. rates > short term bc long term is risker (read all about this again ch. 7)
real return
inv. want to know REAL return - to determine as maturity drawn out bc do not know future inflation
- -uncertainty about inflation = uncertainty about bond’s real return = risky investment
- -INFLATION RISK on bond increases as time to maturity INCREASES
liquidity premium theory of term structure
(long formula again…re learn)
—expected hypothesis explains the risk free part and the liquidity premium theory explains the second part of the equation
rp = risk premium, >risk = > risk premium
- -estimate rp by looking at the average slope on long timer period
- -bc risk premium inc. with time to maturity, explains why yield curve usually slopes upward
risk term structure of int. rates
valuable info. about economic conditions
- -econ. dec. = strains bus./comp. – unable to meet fin. obligations
- –in recession, inc. risk premium on privately issued bonds (but not change risk of holding gov. bonds)
- -impact on high bond rated comp. = small (spread btwn US treasuries and AAA not likely to move much)
- -but decrease. initial rate of bond, more default risk premium INC. as general econ conditions fall spread btwn US treaury and junk bonds widens the most
STAR yield curve and info. on term structure
info. on term structure (slope of yield curve) helps us forecast economic conditions
- -expected hypothesis - long term int. rates contain info. about expected short term int. rates and liquidity theory says yield curve usually slopes upward
- -on RARE occasions, the short term int. rates > long term yields = INVERTED and yield curve slopes downward
INVERTED YIELD CURVE = helps predict an economic dowturn bc it signals an EXPECTED fall in short-term int. rates
–often monetary policy makers adjust short term rates to influence real economic growth and inflation
ch. 11 the economics of fin. intermediation (fin. institutions purpose)
fin. crisis 07-09 - alerted everyone that general economic well-being is closely tied to the health of fin. institutions
- -fin. institutions intermediate btwn savers and borrowers so A & L are fin. instruments
category = banks, brokerage firms, investment comp., insurance comp. pension and mutual funds
–pool funs from ppl/firms who save and lend to ppl/firms who need to borrow –> put surplus of savers $ in mortgages, business loans, and investments
involved in DIRECT FINANCE - borrowers can sell DIRECTLY to lenders
–and INDIRECT FINANCE - 3rd party issues claims to fund providers and acquirers claims those who use them
= inc. inv. opp. and economic growth while decreasing inv. risk and economic volatility
role of financial intermediaries
look at chart on pg. 2272!!!! and table 11.1
- -US loans to securities (by anks) = total loans/stock + debt = .79 — D& E fin. > loans
- -but in other countries > 1 (loans/fin. institutions very IMP)
IMP because intermediaries lend (banks) but also determine who has accesss to the stock and bond markets
–fin. institutions imp. bc INFORMATION - don’t have to worry about 1. transaction costs or 2. info costs (Checking credit worthiness) bc bank does it for us
5 main functions financial institutions perform
–can do all 5 bc specialization - helps banks provide service and decrease costs of providing them
- pooling the resources of small investors
- providing safekeeping and accounting servies and access to pmts. system
- supply liquidity - by converting savers balance directly to a means of pmt. when needed
- provide ways to diversify risk
- collect and process information in ways that decrease info. costs
fin. institutions functions 1. pooling the resources of small investors
- -of many small savers - accept small deposits to empower them to make large loans
- -so have to show savers their funds are safe - large safes or today reputation and gov. guarantees
fin. institutions functions 2. providing safekeeping and accounting services and access to pmts. system
- -store wealth in bank for safety
- -offer internet/mobile access, ATM, credit/debit cards, checks, mo. bank stmts. – access to pmts. system (network that transfers funds from one account to another) - also dec. transaction costs
COMPARABLE ADVANTAGE
- -specialize in what you do best andn most efficiently and where opp. cost is lowest
- -leads to inc. trading — inc. fin. transactions – keeps transactions cheap
accounting
- -helps us manage our finances - note all our various transactions
- -banks use ECONOMIES OF SCALE - in writing legal contracts and standardizing them – ave. cost of producing good falls as quantity increases (bc have costly lawyers but standard for al customers an echeaper than if indiv. lawyer hired for each person)
fin. institutions functions 3. Supply liquidity - by converting savers balance directly to a means of pmt. when needed
high liquidity bc have ability to transform assets to cash at low cost (ATMs) - efficient and beneficial
- -keep enough Short term fin. instruments on hand but lend out the rest
- -offer a LINE OF CREDIT - pre approved loan that can be drawn on whenever a customer needs funds
- -home equity lines of credit, credit card cash advances, and business lines of credit —> allow access to liquidity in emergency
fin. institutions functions 4. provides ways to diversify risk
- -banks take deposits from thousands of individuals and make 1000s of loans with them - very small share in each of the 10,000 loans so diversify risk
- -so in ex. each indiv. deposit really only contributes 10 cents to a loan (but bc have SO amny can do that) and dec. risk
- -ex. mutual fund offers small investors a low-cost way to purchase diversified portfolio of stocks and dec. risk and bc SPECIALIZATION costs remain low
fin. institutions functions 5. collect and process information in ways that decrease info. costs
we indiv. do not have time or skill to collect info. and decide which borrowers are trustworthy
- -info. asymmetry problem (borrowers have info. that lenders do not)
- -fin. institutions screen applicants and monitor them
info. asymmetries and info. costs
- -hinders operation of fin. mkts. bc borrowers (firms) know more about bus. prospects than lenders or investors (buyers)
- -Ebay ex. - quality? picture? real? - solved by insurance policy for those who don’t receive packages and feedback forum to RATE
- -asymmettric info. poses 2 obstacles to smooth flow (adverse selection and moral hazard)
- adverse selection
arises BEFORE transaction occurs
- -used car market
- -used car - grandma selling care in good condition bc barelt drove it and wants $20,000 - teenager drove recklessly and would sell for $8000 but bc buyers do not know diff. — settle in middle for 15,000
- -grandma wants 20,000 so she taks good care and leaves market (peach = good car)
- -so only the worst care (LEMONS) are left in the market
- -info. asymmetry brings down the entire used car mkt. as a whole
can solve by CARFAX service - provide detailed history of accidents - also car dealer reputation, pay for mechanic to check condition
–same in fin. markets - borrowers know more about the projects they wish to finance than their lenders
2 companies - one good and one bad - can’t tell diff. btwn so willing to pay ave. price
- -good firm feels their stock is undervalued to they choose not to issue stock (leave market)
- -only leaves bad prospects in market
Same in bond market - risk req. compensation - inc. risk. = inc. premium - so more risky the borrower = higher cost to borrow
- -can’t tell who is good or bad, so lender takes average
- -good credit risk comp. do not want to pay so high (bc know they are low risk) so leave market
- -means company will pass up good investments
solve adverse selection
- create more info. for investors - public comp. (sEC filings and fin. stmts)
- –but hard bc can have unethical accountans who distort info. on fin. stmts. - provide guarantees in fin. contracts os owners suffer with investors if firm does poorly
free rider problem - someone who doesn’t pay info. costs but gets the benefit - free riding the stock market
–ex. follow a friend’s lead - she subscribes to WSJ and ges info. but friend just follows
can also solve by making lenders compensated even if borrowers default (collateral) (unsecured loan if no collateral)
- -back or secure
- -or NET WORTH - owners stake in the firm (A-L) if defaults can make a claim against owners net worth
- moral hazard problem
insurance comp. realized insurnace changed the BEHAVIOR of the person insured (auto insurance –> reckless driving)
–working hard? even though get paycheck regardless
moral hazard is AFTER transaction
- -when we cannot observe ppl’s actions and so cannot judge whether a poor outcome was intentional or just bad luck
- -hidden actions
- -ex. inv. in stock - don’t know if company who issued you wil use invested funds in a way that is best for you
- -leads to PRINCIPAL-AGENT problem (manager benefits > stockholders)