410 consciousness Flashcards
1
Q
experimental tractability
A
- wanting to study something objectively from a third-person POV
- when something is experimentally tractable, it affords itself to objectivity (studying memory for faces vs. words = use recall to study this objectively)
- when something is not experimentally tractable, we reduce it to something we can study or find domain-adjacent realms
2
Q
is consciousness experimentally tractable?
A
- it is inherently subjective and cannot be known by another person (first-person)
- to study it scientifically, we reduce it to something else (certain aspects of consciousness are more amenable to scientific study) or find consciousness-adjacents concepts to be studied
3
Q
definition of consciousness
A
- vast and multifaceted area of investigation (cognitive scientists, physicists, neuroscientists, philosophers, etc.)
- little theoretical unity in understanding within and across fields (physicists study it differently than neuroscientists) which contributes to multifaceted and complex nature of the phenomenon
- unity of the concept remains at an intuitive level
- despite tractability problems, understanding human consciousness remains one of the end goals of science (biological bases of consciousness)
4
Q
two approaches to studying consciousness (in terms of cognition)
A
- unity of consciousness: refers to a unity of experience that most humans experience on a daily basis (low experimental tractability, this approach is theoretical)
- divide & conquer: study aspects/functions of conscious behaviours—consciousness is seen as an umbrella term that includes executive functions, metacognitive processes, awareness and self-awareness, and unconscious processes (higher experimental tractability, mostly used by cognitive scientists)
5
Q
problem with divide & conquer approach to consciousness
A
- once you’ve broken consciousness into parts, have you lost the unity of the concept?
6
Q
Block (1995) division of consciousness
A
- Access: cognitive aspects of consciousness and its representational content
- Phenomenal: qualitative experience of consciousness (that may not be reducible to aspects, it’s more of a feeling)
7
Q
Access consciousness
A
- conscious information is available for report, reasoning, and behaviour (we can name something, reason about it, act on something)
1. implicit: affects our behaviour without us necessarily knowing about it or being able to talk about it
2. explicit: verbalization, declarative, being able to talk about it
8
Q
Phenomenal consciousness
A
- raw experience of sensations, forms, feelings
- this is subjective—we can’t understand how other people experience rain, sound, colour
- people experience the world differently; people who are colour-blind don’t experience the world in terms of colour and may not know their experience is different
- consciousness is irreducible to mechanistic, physiological, physical explanations
9
Q
implicit access consciousness
A
- no verbal or declarative output
- example: priming, split-brain (RH/LH cannot report on the other hemisphere’s knowledge), blindsight
10
Q
explicit access consciousness
A
- verbal or declarative output is available
- examples: conscious identification of stimuli, ability to report mental content
11
Q
priming levels
A
- perceptual priming: presentation of a perceptually degraded image facilitates recognition later on (based on sensory form)
- semantic priming: priming meaning (doctor-nurse, bread-butter, table-chair)
- conceptual priming: prime with context, bias, stereotype
12
Q
perceptual priming example
A
- word-stem completion task (more likely to complete a word with an unusual ending if you are primed with it rather than an everyday word)
13
Q
conceptual priming example
A
- voter behaviour (Berger et al., 2008): assigned polling locations (church, school, etc.) influence how people vote
- school = supporting school-funding initiative
- even when controlling for voters’ political views, demographics, unobservable characteristics of individuals living near schools
- priming occurring outside conscious awareness affecting behaviour
14
Q
qualia
A
- phenomenal consciousness: feeling of experience
- experience, experiential properties
- p-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste, have pains
- totality of experiential properties of a state are “what it is like” to have it
- fully depends on subjective reports, may be irreducible to brain functions
15
Q
linking access and phenomenal consciousness
A
- the problem of integrating first-person & third-person data (Chalmers article)
- easy and hard problems of consciousness
- will an accumulation of first-person data lead to emergence of an understanding of consciousness? sum of parts = whole?
16
Q
measures of consciousness
A
consciousness remains mostly assessed using subjective verbal reports (first-person data)
17
Q
examples of first-person data
A
- necker cube bistable image—participants tell us when they experience the image ‘flips’
* fundamental different experiences of reality, measure how many spontaneous flips each person experiences
* perhaps supplement this first-person report with objective measures like MRI data, participants’ response time, or accuracy (which may converge or diverge) - mental imagery
18
Q
problems with subjective reports
A
- cannot assess consciousness in non-verbal populations (infants, animals)
- subjective reports are subjective—even if we’re measuring it in an objective way, it’s still subjective and may or may not be true
- subjective reports may influence objective measurements
19
Q
third-person data
A
- experimental tasks often used to assess consciousness
- continuous flash suppression, binocular rivalry
- these two methods afford experimental manipulation and control of conscious awareness by capitalizing on well-known properties of the visual processing system
- rendering things visible or invisible—see how long it takes for things to become visible or invisible to participants
- measure access consciousness mostly
20
Q
continuous flash suppression
A
- exploits retinotopic mapping in the visual cortex to experimentally render stimulus consciously reportable
- flash a competing stimulus on the exact same retinotopic location but on the other side of the brain = the person will report the flashing stimulus and stop reporting the stimulus that they initially saw (flashing stimulus replacing conscious perception of the static stimulus in the other visual field)
- but both stimuli are represented in the brain/visual areas
- how long does something have to flash? what happens with the other stimulus? what parameters does the flashing have to use for the effect to occur?
21
Q
binocular rivalry
A
- percepts alternate between two different images presented to each eye simultaneously
- images gets fused or unfused based on how they are presented to the eyes, then eventually the images alternate in our conscious perception (even though the stimuli stay the same)
22
Q
attention and consciousness
A
- links between attention and consciousness are intuitive (explicit attention and access consciousness)
- attending to a stimulus most often leads to a conscious perception of that stimulus (but not always)–change blindness
- are the two processes dissociable? if not, which process is superordinate—attention or consciousness?
- to dissociate: one would need to demonstrate attention without consciousness AND consciousness without attention
23
Q
Does attention exist without consciousness?
A
- yes—habitual tasks without paying effortful attention to them, attention gets pulled without conscious effort (bottom-up)
- example: blindsight patients (Kentridge et al., 1999)
24
Q
Kentridge et al., 1999
A
- right field hemianopia confirmed with MRI and computerized perimetry, resulting from a car accident
- attention was cued to targets presented in a blind field using a cuing task (auditory tone + central cue 70% informative (directing towards blind hemifield))
- target occurs when the cue informed, or uncued target, or no target
- required response: (1) press a key if a target accompanied a tone (2) report any experience relating to the tone
- patient had a reaction time advantage for the cued target (that they’re unable to consciously report)
- valid discrimination around 70-80% (able to discriminate whether tone accompanied target)
- no reduction in discrimination accuracy of target presence
- so dissociation of attention without consciousness—attending to something they’re not consciously aware of
- attention can exist without awareness, and potentially may facilitate awareness
25
is there consciousness without attention?
* unclear
* pop out visual search: a salient target does not require attention, but it is consciously reportable (may provide evidence of consciousness without attention), but not strong evidence that perception of a salient target requires no attention whatsoever (in other paradigms, salient targets don’t pop out as readily (faces, other complex stimuli))
* whole report vs. partial report (Sperling, 1960): content in consciousness is reportable (more reportable when directed by attention)
* in whole-report, people can report a lot of the letters in the array but not 100% of them
* in partial report, when people are cued to a particular line, they are nearly 100% accurate in reporting the letters (attention mediates consciousness toward reportable content)
26
model 1: attention gates consciousness/awareness
* inputs = sensory analysis, some parts are attended = awareness = conscious report
* this is the partial report condition
* the other parts are unattended
27
model 2: consciousness gates attention
* inputs = sensory analysis, some parts are conscious = attended or unattended = only attended is consciously reported
* some parts are unconscious
* this is the whole report condition
28
disorders of consciousness
* altered states of consciousness resulting from brain injury
* umbrella term for several different states of consciousness
* this definition does not include altered states of consciousness due to medication, drugs, etc.
* has stratified into 7 states of consciousness and how responses change through these states
* assessment and diagnosis is ambiguous and difficult
* recent advances in neuroimaging are being used to examine altered states of consciousness without a need for overt response
* understanding altered consciousness is problematic since we still don’t know what consciousness is—many investigations equate consciousness with awareness
29
vegetative state
* a diagnosis is made only when repeated examinations have yielded no evidence of sustained, reproducible, purposeful response to sensory stimulation (visual, auditory, tactile). There must also be no evidence of language comprehension of expression
* unlike patients in come, patients in vegetative states display cycles of eye closure and eye opening, appearing as if they show a wake/sleep pattern
* show a wide range of reflexive behaviours which could also be misinterpreted as volitional actions
30
minimally conscious state
* new diagnostic category
* like vegetative patients, cycles of eye opening and closing are seen, but unlike vegetative patients, at least one of the following bx must be observed and reproducible:
1. simple command following (move your hand)
2. verbal or gestural yes/no responses
3. intelligible speech
4. non-reflexive purposeful movements
31
coma
a complete lack of arousal, no responses or cycles of sleep/wakefulness, stimulation does not lead to arousal, it is assumed that these patients have no awareness of their surrounding or themselves (this is the most severe in the taxonomy)
32
neuroimaging approaches to consciousness
* hierarchical approach: suggestion to study consciousness disorders by understanding brain processing for simple functions first followed by more higher order processing
* two patients in vegetative state were presented with spoken words:
* normal controls have temporal lobe activation, patients have reduced activation, but in similar brain areas as control
* little evidence for differential patterns of processing in disordered consciousness
33
differential brain activation in disorders of consciousness
* in general, little evidence for differences in brain activity in typical and disordered consciousness
* similar activity in the same brain areas
* imagining playing tennis = motor cortex activity in both control and vegetative patient
* no overt language of language comprehension in these patients, but we get the same brain activation as in a control, so this is a backward inference
* it would be impossible to tell just from the MRI scans that the vegetative patient doesn’t have consciousness
* so what is the significance/utility of the brain imaging approach to studying disorders of consciousness? the patient cannot confirm that they are thinking about playing tennis
* how useful is knowledge of brain activity without the behavioural output?
* interpretive issues regarding neuroimaging methods
34
Rama: Is the notion of a unified self inhabiting the brain an illusion?
The concept of a single, unified “self” may be an illusion.
Brain functions are distributed; many unconscious systems ("zombies") perform complex tasks without awareness.
These systems coexist in harmony, creating the illusion of a central “you.”
What you call reality is assembled from fragmentary information.
You are unaware of most brain activity driving perception and behavior.
35
Rama: How do we create our own reality according to brain studies?
Normal and brain-damaged patients show we piece together reality from incomplete data.
What we see is reliable but not always accurate.
Most actions are performed unconsciously.
Consciousness is a narrative layered on top of unconscious processes.
The brain constructs a seamless story—this is not direct perception but a construction.
36
Rama: Where in the brain does consciousness seem to arise?
Main regions involved:
Temporal lobes: amygdala, septum, hypothalamus, insular cortex.
Frontal lobe: cingulate gyrus.
These areas are associated with qualia—the raw feel of experience.
Must meet three laws of qualia (inspired by Newton): Richness, Integration, Irrevocability
37
Rama: What are "qualia" and why are they a philosophical challenge?
Qualia = subjective, raw sensations (e.g., red, pain, taste).
Challenge: how does brain matter (neurons, ions) produce experiences?
Philosophers call this the riddle of qualia.
Scientific descriptions seem incomplete without accounting for subjective experience.
38
Rama: Why are qualia considered private and not necessarily scientific?
Science gives a third-person view; qualia are first-person phenomena.
The problem is epistemological, not necessarily ontological.
Language creates a barrier—experience can't be fully conveyed verbally.
Philosophers argue this is a permanent barrier, but maybe it's just apparent and due to translation limits between languages (e.g., neural to spoken).
39
Rama: What is the "language barrier" problem in communicating qualia?
Example: color-blind superscientist can't experience red.
Explaining red verbally does not transmit the actual experience.
The “redness” of red is lost in translation.
Could be overcome by direct brain-to-brain links, bypassing language.
40
Rama: What happens if we stimulate a blind person's visual cortex directly?
Magnetic pulses could simulate vision without functioning eyes.
Outcomes:
If they feel novel sensations tied to external space, it's vision-like.
Topographic mapping in visual cortex could confirm this.
Suggests consciousness of seeing could arise without eyes—only brain processing is required.
41
Rama: What do Crick and Koch suggest about the origin of qualia?
Qualia may originate in lower layers of sensory areas.
These project to the frontal lobes, where higher-order processing happens.
Suggests conscious experience begins early in the sensory hierarchy but gains meaning through projection.
42
Rama: How might neural synchronization relate to consciousness?
Conscious awareness might come from synchronized neural firing.
Widely separated brain areas fire in sync when we pay attention.
Still speculative, but offers a temporal basis for consciousness.
No direct proof yet—remains a promising hypothesis.
43
Rama: What is reductionism, and how does it apply to consciousness?
Reductionism: explaining wholes as functions of parts and their interactions.
Challenge: unclear which level of reduction (neural, systems, experiential) is appropriate.
Consciousness may require multi-level explanations, not just neuron-level.
44
Rama: What is the epiphenomenon view of consciousness?
Some philosophers say consciousness is causally inert.
Like a train's whistle or a horse's shadow—present but doesn't do anything.
This view denies a functional role for qualia in behavior or decision-making.
45
Rama: What is “filling in” and how does it relate to qualia?
Brain “fills in” gaps (e.g., blind spot) with fabricated perception.
Not just deduction—you literally see the filled-in region.
Demonstrates that qualia can exist even in absence of external input.
Filled-in qualia provide actual sensory support.
46
Rama: What makes qualia-laden perceptions “tamper-resistant”?
You can imagine a hidden object behind your finger (imaginative flexibility).
But you can’t change what you perceive in the blind spot (e.g., yellow).
This rigidity = hallmark of qualia-laden perceptions.
Indicates these perceptions resist higher-level override.
47
Rama: How does seeing the dog in a bistable image change your brain?
Once seen, you cannot unsee the dog (in a bistable image)
Neurons permanently rewire after recognition.
Suggests perception alters brain circuits irreversibly.
Shows plasticity of consciousness and visual awareness.
48
Rama: What are the three functional features of qualia?
Irrevocability (Input side): Once a qualia-laden sensation is perceived, it cannot be “taken back” or questioned.
Flexibility (Output side): Allows for a range of behavioral choices or responses.
Persistence in memory: Must be held long enough in an intermediate buffer or immediate memory to enable decision-making.
49
Rama: How do qualia relate to Denise’s (blindsight) visual processing and memory systems?
Denise's "how" pathway (unconscious action system) is: Devoid of qualia & Lacks short-term memory
Her "what" pathway (conscious recognition system) is: Normally conscious and qualia-laden & Involves memory
Damage to the "what" pathway leaves her with only the zombie "how" system, limiting conscious visual processing and memory.
50
Rama: Why does the "what" pathway need memory, and the "how" pathway does not?
What Pathway: Involves making choices from perceptual representations.
Choice requires time → requires memory.
How Pathway: Engages in continuous, real-time sensorimotor loops.
Functions like a thermostat—automatic, no choice → no memory needed
51
Rama: What is needed for qualia to exist in terms of memory and representation?
Must begin with a stable, finite, irrevocable representation in short-term memory (e.g., yellow).
This representation can carry infinite implications (e.g., bananas, jaundice).
Revocable or inferred representations (e.g., cat under a sofa) lack strong, vivid qualia
52
Rama: Why must perceptions have vivid qualia, and beliefs not?
Perceptions: Drive real-world decisions, Need to be irrevocable for swift action.
Beliefs/Internal images: Should remain tentative and revisable, Flexibility prevents error from overcommitment to uncertainty
53
Rama: How does irrevocability of qualia aid in decision-making?
Helps avoid indecision: If you say, "Maybe it's not yellow," you can't act.
Perceptions must be treated as certain even if they’re 90% accurate.
Irrevocability confers decisiveness, avoiding paralysis in action
54
Rama: What’s the distinction between perception and conception in relation to qualia?
Seeing (perception): Involves vivid qualia, irrevocable representations.
Knowing (conception): Tentative, flexible, open to revision.
There may be a gray area, but they’re possibly mediated by different brain circuits
55
Rama: How does the brain treat qualia differently in blind spots vs. inferred regions?
Blind spot: Filled in automatically and irrevocably; no qualia distinction.
Behind the head (inferred space): Remains revocable and open to possibilities (e.g., an elephant could be there).
Level of danger or importance dictates the certainty threshold for qualia
56
Rama: Why don’t bees have qualia despite intelligent behavior?
Bees show complex behavior (e.g., waggle dance), but: Actions are hardwired and inflexible, Lacking symbolic representation and choice.
Qualia emerge from systems that: Allow multiple behavioral options, Require memory and decision-making, Have irrevocable representations to base decisions on
57
Rama: What are the computational preconditions for qualia?
A system with:
Choice among multiple responses (not just stimulus-response).
Intermediate representations held in short-term memory.
Irrevocable perceptual units for stability in decision-making.
These conditions are rare in evolution → qualia are rare
58
Rama: What does the split-brain phenomenon reveal about the self?
In split-brain patients:
Each hemisphere can act independently.
Left hemisphere often creates confabulatory narratives.
Suggests:
The sense of a unified self is an illusion.
The self is likely distributed, not centralized
59
Rama: What happens to the self during temporal lobe seizures?
Patients may feel: Merged with the cosmos, loss of ego boundaries, Timelessness, infinite significance.
Suggests that the self is:
Constructed by temporal lobe circuits.
Fragile and easily altered by brain activity
60
Rama: What role does memory play in the construction of the self?
Personal identity relies on autobiographical memory.
Damage (e.g., in amnesia) can disrupt the continuity of self.
Suggests self is:
A narrative built from remembered experiences.
Dependent on brain systems that can be damaged or lost.
61
Rama: Why might the unity of self be an evolutionary "trick"?
Brain may create a fictional narrative for coherence.
Helps in: Social communication, Long-term planning, Stable identity
But actually, mental functions are modular and distributed.
The "self" may be a post-hoc interpretation
62
Rama: How is the temporal lobe implicated in the generation of qualia?
Temporal lobe: Involved in symbolic representation and memory, Supports semantic knowledge and self-related processing.
Seizures here often produce: Hyper-qualia (e.g., intense emotional meaning), Mystical experiences or strong sense of presence.
Suggests it plays a central role in qualia and self-awareness
63
What components are needed for a sense of self to emerge?
Memory: for continuity and autobiographical narrative.
Language: to express and frame the self.
Attention and perception: to anchor the self in the present.
Emotion and motivation: to give the self personal relevance.
Brain structures: including temporal lobe, prefrontal cortex, default mode network
64
🔹 What is the distinction between third-person data and first-person data in consciousness science?
Third-person data: Concern the behavior and brain processes of conscious systems, Includes data from cognitive psychology, neuroscience, etc., Gathered through objective observation
First-person data: Concern subjective experiences (qualia), Gathered by introspection or verbal reports of conscious individuals, Data are private and available only to the subject
65
🔹 Why can’t first-person data be reduced to third-person data?
Third-person data explain objective functions (e.g., perception, report)
Even a full account of these functions leaves open the question: “Why is this functioning associated with subjective experience?”
First-person and third-person data are irreducible to each other
A complete theory must admit and connect both kinds of data
66
🔹 What is the goal of explaining third-person data?
To explain the objective functioning of the system
Requires specifying a mechanism (usually neural/computational)
Leads to a reductive explanation
Explains high-level phenomena (e.g., memory) via lower-level ones (e.g., neurons)
Still leaves open the “hard problem”—explaining experience itself
67
🔹 How can a science of consciousness handle both types of data?
Must articulate systematic connections between subjective experience and objective function
Through bridging principles: Explain how specific brain functions relate to specific experiences
Not necessarily reductive, but systematic
68
🔹 What are some views on reducing first-person data to third-person?
Dennett: Only objective functioning needs explaining
Churchland: First-person data may be reducible in future neuroscience
Correlational view: Correlations count as reductive explanation
69
🔹 What are examples of third-person projects in consciousness research?
Explaining functioning differences (e.g., sleep vs. wakefulness)
Studying voluntary behavior
Understanding synchronized neural firing for integration
Investigating the global workspace (Baars, 1988): Shared info across cognitive systems, Access to verbal report
70
🔹 How do conscious and unconscious processes differ in data?
From the third-person view: Both may involve perceptual registration, But differ in behavioral capacities and neural substrates
From the first-person view: One involves experience, the other doesn’t
Example Milner & Goodale: Ventral stream = conscious perception, Dorsal stream = unconscious motor control
71
🔹 What are neural correlates of consciousness (NCC)?
Minimal neural systems directly associated with conscious experience
Aim: isolate specific regions/processes that track experience
Not all of the brain is equally involved
Different NCCs may exist for different types of experience
e.g., Inferior temporal cortex for visual consciousness, Primary visual cortex: less predictive of subjective visual change
72
🔹 What are the six major projects in the science of consciousness?
Explain third-person data
Contrast conscious vs. unconscious processes
Investigate the contents of consciousness
Identify neural correlates of consciousness (NCC)
Systematize connections between 1st- and 3rd-person data
Infer general principles linking brain processes to experiences
73
🔹 What are the obstacles in gathering first-person data?
Privacy: Only the subject has direct access
Verbal reports: Can’t use with infants/animals, Some experiences (e.g., emotions/music) hard to describe
Methodological limits: Introspection is difficult and may alter the experience, Especially hard for non-attended experiences
Lack of formalism: Need tools to structure and represent experiences
74
🔹 What formal systems are being developed to study first-person data?
Parametric: isolate and measure experience features (e.g., color)
Geometric/topological: formalize experience structure (e.g., visual space)
Informational: represent experience as informational states
Representational: link experience to what it represents in the world
75
🔹 How can researchers deal with first-person data in nonverbal subjects?
Use behavioral indicators (e.g., primate responses)
Assume a degree of similarity in conscious experience
Combine verbal reports from humans with behavioral data
Example: neurophenomenology (Varela) combines introspection with EEG/fMRI
76
🔹 What is the ideal aim of a science of consciousness?
Derive general, simple principles linking neural states to conscious experience
Ideally: Applies to all conscious systems, Predicts features of subjective experience from neurophysiology
Can remain neutral on metaphysics (e.g., dualism vs. materialism)
77
"A convincing illusion can leave behavior unaffected": What does this suggest about the relationship between perception and action?
Observers do not adjust finger distance despite being deceived by an illusion.
Indicates that overt behavior can proceed independently from perceptual experience.
Suggests the existence of isolated visuomotor processes that operate without conscious perception.
Supports the idea that action and perception are handled by separate neural systems.
78
Can unconscious stimuli affect behavior?
Yes, behavior can be influenced by stimuli that are not consciously perceived.
Robust perceptual aftereffects have been shown even when stimuli are not consciously seen (Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002).
Implies much of brain function occurs outside of conscious awareness and control.
Automatic, domain-specific processing happens without the need for awareness
79
What does neglect reveal about the relationship between consciousness and brain function?
Patients with neglect often deny their deficits, lacking awareness of both space and their condition.
Lesions can destroy not only processing of certain stimuli but also the consciousness of those stimuli.
Early visual areas may remain intact, showing that higher-level integration is critical for awareness.
Demonstrates dissociation between intact sensory processing and conscious experience
80
Is the activity of the brain strictly continuous with our conscious experience?
No, neural activity can occur without entering consciousness.
Conscious experience represents only a fraction of total brain activity.
Much processing is unconscious and does not necessarily result in subjective awareness
81
What is binocular rivalry and what does it reveal about consciousness?
Different images shown to each eye lead to alternating conscious percepts.
Subjects report changes in perception despite static stimuli.
Neural activity correlates with what is consciously seen, not what is shown.
Brain areas specific to a stimulus type are more active when that type is consciously perceived.
Unperceived stimuli still activate category-specific areas (e.g., face areas), but less intensely.
Supports a graded or threshold model of consciousness—only sufficiently integrated processing becomes conscious
82
How does binocular fusion inform our understanding of unconscious processing?
When colors are fused (e.g., red + green = yellow), the original images (like faces) disappear from consciousness.
However, brain areas for faces still activate, suggesting unconscious processing.
Conscious perception requires more intense and widespread activation.
Reinforces the idea of a threshold for conscious experience
83
What is the Global Neuronal Workspace hypothesis? (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001)
Proposes that consciousness arises when localized, modular processes are integrated into a global system.
Requires amplification via attentional gating to enter awareness.
Consciousness = dynamic integration of activity across brain regions.
Explains neglect: local processing occurs, but lack of integration prevents awareness of deficits.
Wild confabulations may arise due to partial or fragmented integration of conscious contents
84
What is the role of confabulation and the left-hemisphere interpreter in consciousness?
Patients create rationalizations to resolve conflicts between hemispheres or explain deficits.
Left hemisphere generates hypotheses, even if incorrect, to maintain a coherent narrative.
Drives the construction of a unified conscious experience.
The constructive, interpretive nature of consciousness is typically not accessible to introspection.
Confabulations in split-brain and brain-damaged patients show how fragmented awareness can be stitched into a seamless story.
85
How can fMRI and statistical analysis of brain data help investigate consciousness?
Correlations between neural activations yield maps of cerebral interactivity.
Consciousness is associated with the activation of large-scale networks.
These maps help identify which brain processes correlate with subjective experience.
Integration with anatomical data strengthens these findings.
86
What role does diffusion-tensor imaging (DTI) play in studying consciousness?
DTI tracks neural pathways and models brain connectivity.
Allows mapping of structural connections that underlie functional activation patterns.
Helps determine which brain areas are wired to support integrated, conscious processing.
Expected to significantly enhance our understanding of the neural correlates of consciousness
