3A: Media, Propaganda and Religion.

Question 1

How did the new Russian government establish control of mass media and propaganda?

Answer 1

• Decree on the Press, Nov 1917: empowered the government to close newspapers that threatened the revolution (2000 by 1921).
• creating a state monopoly of advertising.
• nationalising the Petrograd Telegraph Agency and securing control of electrical means of communication.
• establishing a Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press in January 1918, with the power to censor the press.
• the cheka were empowered to punish criminal journalists.
• introducing the All-Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA) as the sole distributor of news.

Question 2

What were the features of Lenin’s cult of personality?

Answer 2

• initially based on pluralistic propaganda, which was not always approved by Lenin.
• following Lenin’s survival of an assassination attempt, the figurehead of the revolution became a ‘modern day Christ’, hailed as a miracle.
• though Lenin disapproved, the simple photos and posters helped communicate with the peasantry.
• Lenin was depicted as down-to-Earth, humane, modest, visionary and powerful, ultimately established as the human face of the revolution and Party.
• many techniques from cartoons and photomontage (Gustav Klutsis).
• Lenin’s legacy of public trust was continually appealed to by his successors.

Question 3

How did the Russian government use media to their advantage? Outline changes in the features of media.

Answer 3

• Throughout the Civil War, Lenin continued press censorship, and even victory did not lead to increased freedoms.
• in 1922, Glavlit was introduced by Felix Dzerzhinsky and tasked with policing publications in the Soviet Union, investigating books, banning literature and employing professional censors.
• Stalin continued this trend, purging the works of political rivals like Trotsky and Zinoviev, and even editing works by Lenin and himself that might tarnish his reputation; essentially, Stalin re-wrote history to emphasise his own importance.
• by 1928, Glavlit controlled access to economic data and no genuine ‘bad news’ stories were discussed publicly; rather, media focused on Stalin and the archetypal Soviet worker.
• Khrushchev worked to grow media pluralism, hoping to establish a consumer society (thus boost the economy) and expose long-term issues in the Soviet Union like male alcoholism in reader-oriented magazines like Rabotnitsa. Even in film and television, Khrushchev shifted the focus from the ‘successes’ of Stalin to the achievements of ordinary people like Valentina Tereshkova in 1963, hoping to encourage productivity.
• Brezhnev saw that television had a greater focus on consumer lifestyles, and even the KGB could not entirely stamp out the trade of Western publications, but worked to ensure that focus was on him when necessary and censored coverage of the Afghanistan war to limit opposition. However, this was a two-sided coin: Soviet citizens watched Brezhnev obviously deteriorate.

Question 4

State the features of Stalin’s cult of personality.

Answer 4

• the most extensive and elaborate.
• served to emphasise Stalin’s legitimacy and inspire public trust.
• perpetuated the ‘Myth of Two Leaders’ to convey the idea that Stalin played an equal part in the revolution with Lenin, though history had to be re-written: photographs were altered, false histories of the communist party were written…
• Stalin worked to depict himself as Lenin’s true heir, a committed revolutionary and Marxist-Leninist, e.g. Gustav Klutsis Marx->Stalin photomontage.
• seemingly provided Stalin unrestricted power as Vozhd.
• during WWII, celebrated Stalin’s military capabilities and power as Generalissimo.
• method of creating and sustaining personal rule.

Question 5

How did the use of personality cults by Soviet leaders change after Stalin?

Answer 5

• became much smaller-scale, and even sought to criticise Stalin’s ego.
• Khrushchev looked to paint himself as a disciple of Lenin, someone who had achieved success in the space programme and rising harvests, respected statesman on equal terms with Western leaders, ultimately an educated, cultured, reliable reformer. However, associating himself so closely with successes made him personally accountable for failures and undermined his reputation.
• Brezhnev saw his personality cult as a way to secure both his position and the regime, and portrayed himself as a Leninist, a military leader, an advocate of peace and diplomatic in terms of foreign policy, and true man of the people. In the end, this backfired: Brezhnev was mocked and resented by real Veterans, disbelieved and consequently mistrusted.
• implausible.

Question 6

Outline the relationship between communism and religion.

Answer 6

• from an ideological standpoint, communist leaders should naturally look to destroy religion, as Lenin and Khrushchev did, though Stalin and Brezhnev showed a more pragmatic side.
• Marx described religion as the ‘opium of the masses’, something that deluded and exploited ordinary people.
• in Russia, the Orthodox Church had been closely allied with the Tsar and perpetuated inequality. Thus, religion represented the threat of organised opposition to a communist government.

Question 7

Outline Lenin’s approach to religion.

Answer 7

• early legal reforms including the Oct 1917 Decree on Land and Jan 1918 DCSoCaS limited the resources and status of the Church, banning religious education in schools and redistributing church land, though the government appeared committed to ‘freedom of conscience’ and religious freedom.
• convinced the Church was an enemy to the revolution, Lenin used terror to undermine religion: Orthodox priests were massacred for excommunicating Bolsheviks, the Politburo sanctioned the Cheka to continue mass-executions of Orthodox priests and even Roman Catholic priests, persecuted under the Tsar, were deported.
• anti-religious propaganda was used to manipulate the church and Russian people; church assets were used to fund relief efforts following the 1921 famine, and resistance could be denounced as sabotage.
• this trend towards more subtle techniques continued after the Civil War: the introduction of the Living Church, presented as a reformed alternative to the old Orthodox Church, was part of a strategy to split the church that proved ineffective with the threat of free speech and failure to undermine faith in the Orthodox Church.
• Islamic groups, initially tolerated as they had no link with Tsarism, were criticised for allowing ‘cries based on custom’ and mistrusted for its widespread support. Mosques were closed, pilgrimages and traditional dress were discouraged, shrines were attacked, and anti-Islamic museums were set up.

Question 8

How did Stalin’s religious policy differ to that of Lenin?

Answer 8

• proved much more pragmatic.
• closed churches in the country that showed resistance towards his collectivisation drives.
• NKVD were used to persecute Islamic priests, intellectuals, defence groups and followers, especially in outlying Central Asian republics; however, Sufi groups were never entirely destroyed.
• during WWII, Stalin formed a pragmatic alliance with the Church to appeal to patriotism, humanity and faith; anti-religious publications were discontinued, 414 churches were reopened at the end of the War and the Orthodox Church allowed to grow.

Question 9

Outline the religious policy of Stalin’s successors.

Answer 9

• Khrushchev saw it as his mission to liberate society from the remains of religion, and was insulted by Church attendance in light of prophecy that the Soviet Union would end in a generation.
• from 1958, Khrushchev restarted church closures, reintroduced anti-religious propaganda like ‘Science and Religion’ and restricted freedoms of holy sites. He appealed to the misguided gullibility of repressed women, but found they fought for their religious freedoms.
• Brezhnev merely began to advocate atheism, and established links with anti-American Islamists. Religious faith remained stable under Brezhnev.