3.2.3 Metaethics - 5 markers Flashcards
Explain moral naturalism
Moral naturalism is a realist, cognitivist meta ethical theory. Bentham, a naturalist, asserts that there are mind-independent moral properties, such as goodness (realism), and that moral language describes these properties (cognitivism). Unlike other forms of realist cognitivism, moral naturalists claim that moral properties like “goodness” are natural properties “utility-maximization”, a part of the world described by science, and we can discover them empirically.
Explain moral non-naturalism
Moral non-naturalism is a realist, cognitivist, meta ethical theory. This means that moral naturalists believe that there are mind-independent moral properties, such as goodness (realism), and that moral language describes these properties (cognitivism). Unlike other forms of realist cognitivism, moral naturalist claim that moral properties are not identical to natural properties. Rather they are sui generis - “of their own type”. One example of moral naturalism would be Moore’s intuitionism, which claims that moral properties like goodness are “simple indefinable notions”, which are known through moral intuition.
Explain error theory
Mackie’s error theory is an anti-realist, cognitivist, meta ethical theory. This means error theorists believe that when we use moral language, we are attempting to describe mind-independent moral properties (cognitivism) - but in fact there are no mind-independent moral properties (anti-realism). As a consequence of this, error theorists believe that all moral language i.e. good, bad, right, wrong, is false.
Explain emotivism
Emotivism is a an anti-realist, non-cognitivist meta-ethical theory. This means that emotivists believe that there are no mind-independent moral properties (anti-realism), but that moral language should not be treated as an attempt to accurately describe moral properties (non-cognitivism). What makes emotivism different from other non-cognitivist theories is that emotivists believe that the purpose of moral language is to express our moral feelings (like admiration or disgust). They argue that moral language has no descriptive meaning , however, as it does not pass the verification principle.
Explain prescriptivism
Prescriptivism is an anti-realist, non-cognitivist meta-ethical theory. This means that emotivists believe that there are no mind-independent moral properties (anti-realism), but that moral language should not be treated as an attempt to accurately describe moral properties (non-cognitivism). What makes prescriptivism different from other non-cognitivist theories is that prescriptivists think that moral language should be interpreted prescriptively, rather than descriptively. In other words, prescriptivists eould interpret moral statements as instructions that apply to all people in similar situations. For example, “murder is wrong” should not be interpreted as a description of murder. rather it should be interpreted as an instruction, to everyone in the world, not to murder people - or, to put it another way, it means “do not murder!”.
Issues include: Hume’s Fork
The division of knowledge into two types (a) relations of ideas (analytic, a priori, necessary) or matters of fact (synthetic, a posteriori, contingent).
Moral realists/cognitivists claim that we can moral knowledge is possible.
P1: Knowledge is either a “matter of fact” or a “relations of ideas”
P2: Moral utterances like “murder is wrong” aren’t matters of fact
P3: Moral utterances like “murder is wrong” aren’t relations of ideas
C1: Therefore, moral utterances are neither “matters of fact” nor “relations of ideas”.
C2: Moral utterances are not knowledge.
Issues include: A J Ayer’s verification principle
Moral realists/cognitivists claim that moral utterances express meaningful propositions/beliefs.
A proposition is meaningful if and only if either: (1) it is analytically true/false or (2) there are conditions under which its truth could be conclusively empirically verified in practice (strong version) or (at least) its probable truth could be empirically verified in principle (weak version).
Issues include: Hume’s is-ought gap
Hume’s claim that we cannot justifiably infer what ought to be done (‘ought’ statements) from
facts about what is the case (“is” statements) alone. Used to challenge the claim made by
some moral realists that moral obligations/duties can be justified by statements about what is
the case. Some see it as showing that moral utterances are non-cognitive.
P1: Beliefs are cognitive / descriptive / tell us about what is the case
P2: moral judgements tell us what ought to be the case (this point could be linked to
motivation)
C1: Therefore (possibly using a principle such as Leibniz’ law), moral judgments are
not beliefs
Issues include: Hume’s argument that moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not motivate us
Hume argues that a moral judgement (by itself) motivates us to act in a particular way, whereas believing a proposition (by itself) does not. This shows that moral judgements (like “X is wrong”) are not beliefs (so are not true or false) and so do not express propositions, showing that moral cognitivism is false.”
P1: Beliefs, by themselves, never motivate us to act (and nor do they necessarily cause any other
states that do)
P2: Sincere moral judgements (e.g. lying is wrong), by themselves, motivate us (at least to some extent) towards action (or necessarily cause another state that does).
C1: Therefore, moral judgements are not (or, at least, do not express)beliefs.
