14th Am. Introduction- UNFINISHED

Question 1

Anticanon; Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856):

Answer 1

(1) Dred Scott was not a “citizen,” and therefore not entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, including filing a suit in court; AND

(2) the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, as Congress lacked power to prohibit slavery in new territories.

Question 2

Anticanon: Plessy v. Ferguson (1896):

Answer 2

Holding: Separate but Equal interpretation of the 14th Am.

Dissent (Harlan): The “Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.

Question 3

Reconstruction Amendments

Answer 3

13th Am. (1856) § 1: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime…

14th Am. (1868) § 1: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

15th Am. (1870) § 1: Right to Vote shall not be abridged due to race/freedman status

Question 4

The Civil Rights Act of 1875

Answer 4

Section 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement;

Question 5

Civil Rights Cases; US v. Stanley (1883):

Answer 5

Relevance: Establishes the “state action” doctrine: That the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to government action, not private individuals.

Dissent (Harlan): This decision defeats the objective of the reconstruction amendments: to secure rights inherent in a state of freedom and belonging to American citizenship.

Question 6

Tiers of Scrutiny

Answer 6

Strict Scrutiny- Race & National Origin
Intermediate Scrutiny- Gender & Bastards
Rational Basis- Everything Else & Pregnancy

Question 7

Steps of an Equal Protection Analysis

Answer 7

1. What is the classification?
2. What level of scrutiny applies?
3. What must be shown to satisfy it?

Question 8

Brown v. Board of Education (1954) (Brown I)

Answer 8

Holding: State-imposed segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection clause.
Relevance: Overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, at least in context of education, and set the precedent for invalidating state-sanctioned discrimination and discriminatory state action.

Question 9

Brown II (1955)

Answer 9

• Courts should be guided by equitable principles in fashioning and effectuating desegregation decrees
• Courts should require a “prompt and reasonable start” toward compliance with Brown I, but may find that additional time is necessary to comply in an effective manner
• Courts must issue decrees to end segregation “with all deliberate speed.”

Question 10

Cooper v. Aaron (1958):

Answer 10

“[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court by the Brown case is the supreme law of the land . . . No state legislative or state executive or judicial officers can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”

Question 11

Contemporary Interpretations of Brown

Answer 11

Anti-classification (MAJORITY): Government must treat citizens as individuals, and not classify them as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.

Anti-subordination (ALTERNATIVE): It is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups.

Question 12

Implications of Anti-subordination (ALTERNATIVE):

Answer 12

• Applies to any policy that has a “disparate impact” on a historically subordinated group, regardless of motive.
• “Asymmetrical”: Applies to race-conscious policies with purpose/effect of reinforcing social hierarchy, but not to race-conscious policies designed to remedy social inequality.

Question 13

Implications of Anti-classification (MAJORITY)

Answer 13

Applies only to “disparate treatment,” i.e., race-motivated actions/decisions
“Symmetrical”: applies to any race-motivated decision, regardless of whether intended to promote equal opportunity or to remedy social inequality.

Question 14

Washington v. Davis (1976) Disparate Treatment Claims

Answer 14

Holding: Evidence of disparate racial impact does not trigger scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause.

Relevance: Establishes that proof of discriminatory purpose is required to establish a violation of the Equal Protection clause; rejects the approach in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows discrimination claims based on disparate impact

Question 15

Arlington Heights v. Housing Dev. Corp (1977)

Answer 15

Denial of a zoning application did not violate the EPC, even though it had a disparate impact on racial minorities.
Discriminatory purpose does not need to be the sole motivating factor, but it needs to be one motivating factor in the decision.

Question 16

Personnel Admin. v. Feeney (1979):

Answer 16

“Discriminatory purpose” means doing something “because of,” not merely “in spite of” its adverse effects upon and identifiable group.

Question 17

McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)

Answer 17

Evidence of racial disparities in the administration of the death penalty are insufficient to establish an equal protection violation.

Relevance: Establish that (1) discriminatory purpose must be one motivating factor; (2) knowledge of discriminatory effects is insufficient to est. discriminatory purpose; and (3) discriminatory purpose may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including disparate impact. required to prove discriminatory purpose.

Question 18

Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989)(O’Connor)

Answer 18

Holding: A plan setting aside 30% of the awards of city construction contracts for “Minority Business Enterprises” violates the Equal Protection clause.

Rule: Strict scrutiny applies to any policy that classifies based on race, even if intended to remedy racial discrimination.

Relevance: Establishes that (1) strict scrutiny applies to race-based gov’t action intended to remedy discrimination; and (2) race-based remedial measures may survive strict scrutiny if they are narrowly tailored to remedy a particular, identified instance of discrimination.

Question 19

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)(O’Connor)

Answer 19

Holding: The University of Michigan law school’s admissions plan, which considers race as part of a flexible, holistic assessment, does not violate the Equal Protection clause.

Relevance: Established that the educational benefits of diversity may be a compelling interest in the context of higher education; and that using race as a ‘plus’ factor may be permissible (i.e., narrowly tailored) for achieving this goal, so long as there is no rigid quota, race is not determinative, there are no workable race-neutral alternatives, and there are time limits.

Question 20

Holding for Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023)(Roberts)

Answer 20

Holding: Harvard and UNC have not identified sufficiently compelling justifications for applicant’s race or ethnicity as a factor in admissions, and thus their admissions policies violate the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.

Question 21

R&R for Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023)(Roberts)

Answer 21

Strict Scrutiny applies: (1) Whether the racial classification is used to further a compelling interest; and (2) whether the use of race is “narrowly tailored”—meaning “necessary”—to achieve that interest.

Relevance: Suggests (though does not explicitly hold) that diversity is not a compelling interest that can survive strict scrutiny (overruling or narrowing Grutter?); establishes that race may be considered only as it relates to other qualities/experiences, such as grit, determination, overcoming adversity, leadership, [culture?].

Question 22

SFFA v. Harvard (2023)(Sotomayor, dissenting)

Answer 22

Diversity in educational institutions is a compelling interest: Under Grutter and prior cases, these programs are narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest in diversity: “The use of race is narrowly tailored unless ‘workable’ and ‘available’ race-neutral approaches exist, meaning race-neutral alternatives promote the institution’s diversity goals and do so at ‘tolerable administrative expense.’”

Question 23

SFFA v. Harvard (2023)(Jackson, dissenting)

Answer 23

Our country has never been colorblind

“For present purposes, it is significant that, in so excluding Black people, government policies affirmatively operated—one could say, affirmatively acted—to dole out preferences to those who, if nothing else, were not Black. In 2019, Black families’ median wealth was approximately $24,000. For White families, that number was approximately eight times as much (about $188,000).

Question 24

SFFA v. Harvard (2023)(Thomas, concurring)

Answer 24

“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”

Question 25

Gender Discrimination Standard of Scrutiny

Answer 25

Relevance: Establish that gender classifications (and gender-motivated policies) are subject to intermediate scrutiny; illustrate difference between intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review.

Question 26

Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)(Brennan, plurality)

Answer 26

Military’s policy providing different dependency benefits for female vs. male spouses violates the Equal Protection Clause (incorporated against fed gov’t by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).

Question 27

Craig v. Boren (1976)(Brennan)

Answer 27

Holding: A state law allowing women to purchase beer at a younger age than men violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Reasoning (Brennan): Classifications based on gender are subject to intermediate scrutiny: must “serve important government objectives” and be “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives”

Question 28

U.S. v. Virginia (1996)(Ginsburg)

Answer 28

Holding: VMI’s men-only admissions policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment; and the appropriate remedy is to admit women to VMI, rather than creating a separate women’s military academy.

Relevance: Rejects stereotypes about “inherent differences” as a justification for sex-segregated education, and rejects the idea that separate schools can be equal in this context [but not categorically].

Question 29

Categories “Benefitting” Women

Answer 29

Relevance: Establishes that classifications ‘benefiting’ women may be upheld if they serve remedial purposes (but see Richmond v. J.A. Croson (1989)), but are unlikely to be upheld if the justification rests on stereotypes about gender roles.
Remedial v. Stereotype-Based Justifications

Question 30

Remedial Justifications

Answer 30

Califano v. Webster (1977): Upheld policy of calculating women’s earnings in a way that resulted in higher retirement benefits for women.

Question 31

Stereotype-Based Justifications:

Answer 31

Orr v. Orr (1979): Statute requiring alimony payments for divorced women, but not for men, fails intermediate scrutiny. Promoting traditional gender roles is not a legitimate government objective.

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982): MUW’s policy of excluding men from nursing school fails intermediate scrutiny. This policy does not serve compensatory goals because women dominate the field of nursing.

Question 32

Nguyen v. INS (2001)(Kennedy)

Answer 32

Holding: A statute imposing more stringent requirements for establishing a child’s U.S. citizenship if the citizen parent is the father, as opposed to the mother, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Gender based classifications will be upheld if they “serve important governmental objectives” and the means employed are “substantially related” to achieving those objectives (compare w/VMI language: “exceedingly persuasive justification”)
Relevance: Shows that gender-based classifications benefitting women may survive intermediate scrutiny if the state’s justification rests on (what the Court deems to be) “real” biological differences. [But do gender norms/stereotypes influence perceived “biological differences”?]