1.2, 1.3 - IT Security Design principles and Facets of Trusworthiness Flashcards

1
Q

Principle of Least privilege

A

A subject should only be given the privileges it needs to complete its tasks and no more

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2
Q

Principle of Fail-safe defaults (related to Secure by Design)

A

Unless explicit access has been granted, Access should be denied by default and the system should roll back to the start start for safety, if it cant complete a task. (relates to TSF Safety facet)

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3
Q

Principle of Economy of Mechanism

A

Security Mechanisms should be as simple as possible, this should mean fewer possibilities exist for error. related to TSF Reliable

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4
Q

Principle of Complete Mediation

A

All accesses to objects must be checked to ensure that they are still allowed and Verify all pages and resources by default require authentication except those specifically intended to be public, This principle restricts the caching of information. Related to Reliable

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5
Q

Principle of Open Design

A

The security of a mechanism should not depend on the secrecy of its design or implementation. Especially relevant to Cryptographic systems

Related to security

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6
Q

Principle of Separation of Privilege

A

A system should ensure that multiple conditions are met before granting access to an object. Also relates to seperation of duty, For example no one person should be able to open a bank safety deposit box, One permisson might have the key to the room where the box is stored and another person might have the codes to the box.

Related to Security (Avoid making mistakes)

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7
Q

Principle of Least Common Mechanism

A

Mechanisms to access resources should not be shared‏. Linked to Resilience, Resources not shared, could be linked to network segmentation

Sharing resources provides a channel along which information can be transmitted, and so such sharing should be minimized.

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8
Q

Principle of Psychological Acceptability

A

security mechanisms should not make the resource more difficult to access than if the security mechanisms were not present. Examples: ssh, login mechanism

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9
Q

Safety

A

The ability of the software to operate without harmful states

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10
Q

Reliability

A

the ability of the system to deliver services as specified (without bugs) - Reliable is the outcome - linked to economy of mechanism - the simpler the system the easier it is to make reliable.

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11
Q

Availability

A

The ability of the software to operate when required / The ability of the system to deliver services when requested

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12
Q

Resilience

A

The ability of the software to recover from errors quickly and completely. - System auto scaling in repsond to load to remain available or having a failover system

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13
Q

Security

A

The ability of the software to remain protected against threats

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14
Q

Compare TSI and IT Security Design Principles

A

Security Availability Reliability Resilience Safety - Fail-safe Least privilege Psychological acceptability Separation of privilege Least common mechanism Economy of mechanism Complete mediation Open design Fail-safe

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15
Q

What is a primary factor designing a secure system?

A

To understand what is being protected.

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16
Q

What is a functional requirement?

A

A Functional Requirement (FR) is a description of the service that the software must offer. (In Microsoft word you expect to be able to type, change font size, etc)

17
Q

What is a non-functional requirement?

A

A Non-Functional Requirement (NFR) defines the quality attribute of a software system. Judged by Safety and Security, (On a banking website you expect security and for the attacker not to steal all your money.)

18
Q

TSF Facets of trustworthy software

A

There are 5 principles, Safety, Reliability, Availability, Security, Resilience

19
Q

A subject should only be given the privileges it needs to complete its tasks and no more

A

Principle of Least privilege

20
Q

Unless explicit access has been granted, Access should be denied by default and the system should roll back to the start start for safety, if it cant complete a task. (relates to TSF Safety facet)

A

Principle of Fail-safe defaults (related to Secure by Design)

21
Q

Security Mechanisms should be as simple as possible, this should mean fewer possibilities exist for error. related to TSF Reliable

A

Principle of Economy of Mechanism

22
Q

All accesses to objects must be checked to ensure that they are still allowed and Verify all pages and resources by default require authentication except those specifically intended to be public, This principle restricts the caching of information. Related to Reliable

A

Principle of Complete Mediation

23
Q

The security of a mechanism should not depend on the secrecy of its design or implementation. Especially relevant to Cryptographic systems

Related to security

A

Principle of Open Design

24
Q

A system should ensure that multiple conditions are met before granting access to an object. Also relates to seperation of duty, For example no one person should be able to open a bank safety deposit box, One permisson might have the key to the room where the box is stored and another person might have the codes to the box.

Related to Security (Avoid making mistakes)

A

Principle of Separation of Privilege

25
Q

Mechanisms to access resources should not be shared‏. Linked to Resilience, Resources not shared, could be linked to network segmentation

Sharing resources provides a channel along which information can be transmitted, and so such sharing should be minimized.

A

Principle of Least Common Mechanism

26
Q

security mechanisms should not make the resource more difficult to access than if the security mechanisms were not present. Examples: ssh, login mechanism

A

Principle of Psychological Acceptability

27
Q

The ability of the software to operate without harmful states

A

Safety

28
Q

the ability of the system to deliver services as specified (without bugs) - Reliable is the outcome - linked to economy of mechanism - the simpler the system the easier it is to make reliable.

A

Reliability

29
Q

The ability of the software to operate when required.

A

Availability

30
Q

The ability of the software to recover from errors quickly and completely. - System auto scaling in repsond to load to remain available or having a failover system

A

Resilience

31
Q

The ability of the software to remain protected against threats

A

Security

32
Q

Security Availability Reliability Resilience Safety - Fail-safe Least privilege Psychological acceptability Separation of privilege Least common mechanism Economy of mechanism Complete mediation Open design Fail-safe

A

Compare TSI and IT Security Design Principles

33
Q

To understand what is being protected.

A

What is a primary factor designing a secure system?

34
Q

A Functional Requirement (FR) is a description of the service that the software must offer. (In Microsoft word you expect to be able to type, change font size, etc)

A

What is a functional requirement?

35
Q

A Non-Functional Requirement (NFR) defines the quality attribute of a software system. Judged by Safety and Security, (On a banking website you expect security and for the attacker not to steal all your money.)

A

What is a non-functional requirement?

36
Q

There are 5 principles, Safety, Reliability, Availability, Security, Resilience

A

TSF Facets of trustworthy software