07. Ambiguity Aversion Flashcards

1
Q

What is the disposition effect and how can we explain it?

A

Disposition effect: people hold ‘losers’ too long and sell ‘winners’ too quickly.

Two features of prospect theory can explain this behaviour:

1) The reflection effect: value function exhibits diminishing marginal sensitivity to losses and gains
2) The reference point: outcomes are valued relative to a reference point

Important: so far we have dealth with situations in which probabilities were known.

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2
Q

How do we handle unknown probabilities?

A

Unknown probabilities = ambiguous situation. In many situations, we do not know the objective probabilities associatew ith outcomes.

Expected utility theory is concerned with situations in which probabilities are objectively known.

Alternative: subjective expected utility (SEU) theory (Savage, 1954) is concerned with situations in which probabilities are not necessarily objectively known.

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3
Q

What is uncertainty and risk?

A

A situation involves risk if prospects that one has to decides between entail known probabilities.

A situation involves uncertainty if prospects that one has to decide between entail unknown probabilities.

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4
Q

What is Ellsberg paradox?

A

Let p(r), p(y) and p(b) be the subjective probabilities associated with a certain color.

One prefers Gamble A to Gamble if: p(r)u(100) + (1-p(r))u(0) > p(b)u(100) + (1-p(b))u(0) this implies p(r)>p(b)

Furthermore, on prefers gamble D to gamble C:
P(r)u(100) + p(y)u(100) + p(b)u(0) < p(b)u(100) + p(y)u(100) + p(r)u(0) this simplifies to p(r)<p></p>

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5
Q

What is the sure thing principal?

A

One of the axioms of SEU

A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the outocme of the next presidential election relevant. So to clarity the matter to himself, he asks whether he would buy if he knew that the Democratic candidate were going to win, and decides that he would.

Similarly, he considers whether he would buy if he knew that the Republican candidate were going to win, and again finds that he would. Seeing that he would buy in either event, he decides that he should buy, even though he does not know which event obtains, or will obtain.

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6
Q

What are the different models to formalize ambiguity aversion?

A

1) Utility-based models: a simple way to express ambiguity aversion is to allow the utlities from winning bets on ambiguous and unambiguous events to be different (Karni, 1985)

If the ulitity from winning an ambiguous bet is lower, aversion to ambiguity is consistent with utility maximization (Smith, 1969, Franke, 1978)

2) Max-min preferences: Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989: the subject has too little information to form a prior. Hence he considers a set of priors as possible. Being ambiguity averse, she takes into account the minimal expected utility (over all priors in the set) while evaluating a bet.

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7
Q

What is maxmin expected utlity?

A

Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989’s model):

A MEU decision maker evaluates a prospect by its least expected utility over a set of possible subjective prior probabilities.

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8
Q

What did Sarin & Weber test?

A

1993, Sarin & Weber: test the effect of ambiguity aversion on market prices in 2 types of markets:

1) Sealed bid auction
2) Double oral auction

Three studies involving 14 experiments
1) The objective in the first 8 experiments: test whether the individual bids and market prices of ambiguous and unambiguous assets differ in sealed-bid and double-oral auctions

2) Experiments 9 and 10: investigation whether the results would be sustained if experienced executives participated

3) Experiments 11-14: results are robust to a larger number of trading periods.
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9
Q

What are the findings about the ambiguity in the lab?

A

The bid price for an ambiguous asset must be at least as much as the bid price for an unambiguous asset.

Findings: individual bid prices as well as market prices for the ambiguous asset were consistently below the corresponding individual bids and market price for the unambiguous asset.

The behaviour of experiences subjects is not different than that of student subjects. Their explanation = people regard an ambiguous asset as more risky.

The ambiguous asset has a potential to induce psychological discomfort = since the nature of the stocastic process is unknown, as well as regret due to hindsight

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10
Q

What are the consequences of the ambiguity aversion?

A

1) Ambiguity aversion might affect trading volume on organized exchanges:
Eg. US-invasion in Irak in 1991, this created/increased ambiguity about oil prices. Trading volume on stock exchanges went down. Stockbrokers told investors that it was a bad time to buy/sell stocks.

2) Ambiguity might be especially important for certain kinds of assets about wwhich little is known, like shares of smaller firms or IPOs of small privately held companies.
Stock prices of small firms do rise more than prices of large firms and IPOs tend to jump in price about 10% when the market for their shares first opens:
The apparent excess returns to small firms and IPOs might be premiums paid to investors who dislike ambiguity.

3) Another indication of financial ambiguity aversion comes from personal holdings of domestic and foreign securities.

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11
Q

What is the equity home bias?

A

People in several countries sacrifice about 3M in annual expected returns - a substantial amount, since stocks rise about 8% per year, by holding too many shares of domestic firms and not enough foreign shares = French & Poterba 1991.

Equity home bias puzzle is the term given to describe this fact: individuals and institutions in most countries hold modest amounts of foreign equity.

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12
Q

Why is the home equity bias puzzling?

A

it is puzzling since observed returns on national equity portfolios suggest substantial benefits from international diversification.

One explanation is that people feel less ambiguity as they have more knowledge about their own country’s economy.

The 3% loss they accept is the premium they pay for avoiding ambiguity about foreign investments.

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13
Q

What conclusions can we draw based on ambiguity aversion?

A

Many situations involve risk and uncertainty.

It is a persistent finding people shy away from uncertainty = they are ambiguity averse.

This is in contradiction to EUT and SEU.

Ambiguity aversion can psychologically be explained by fear of negative evaluation.

Different models have been proposed to account for ambiguity aversion: eg. MEU.

The consequences of ambiguity aversion are eg. Equity home bias, premiums for smaller firms and IPOs

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14
Q

What is the short introduction on ambiguity aversion?

A

In many situations, decision makers have only vague infroamtion about the probabilities of potential outcomes of their actions.

Such situations are often called ambiguous (as opposed to risky)

Elssberg (1962) suggested that decsion makers have a preference for risky rather than ambiguous options: ambiguity aversion.

2 different ways to model ambiguity aversion:

(1) Utility based
(2) MaxMin Expected Utility Preferences

Experimental evidence suggest: ambiguity aversion reduces market prices on financial exchanges (Sarin & Weber: 1993)

Individual bids and market prices for ambiguous assets consistently below corresponding individual bids and market price for an unambiguous asset.
Regardless of type of market mechanism (sealed-bid or double-oral)

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15
Q

What is the no trade region

A

Ambiguity aversion has many implications.
A theoretical example: no trade regions in asset prices: price arease where there’s no trade possible.

Down and Werlang (1992): “Uncertainty Aversion, Risk Aversion and the Optimal Choice of Portfolio”;

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16
Q

How did Down and Werlang do their experiment?

A

Imagine that there is a financial asset that pays 10 if a company is a succes and 0 otherwise. The price of the asset is p. You can buy 1 unit of this asset, or you can short sell 1 unit of the asset.

Shorting here is if you buy the asset, you pay p and receive 10 if the company is success. If you short sell the asset, then you have received p for sure, but have to pay 10 if the company does well.

17
Q

What is home bias?

A

An empirical example ambiguity aversion: one explanation for the home bias. Domestic investors hold mostly domestic securities.

This behaviour is called the home bias.

People in several countries sacrifice about 3% in annual expected returns - a substantial amount, since stocks rise about 8% per year - by holding too many shares of domestic firms and not enough foreign shares: French and Poterba (1991)

One explanation is that people feel more knowledgeable regarding their own country’s firms and economy (lower ambiguity)

3% lower return is the price they pay for avoiding ambiguity about foreign investments

18
Q

What is an alternative explanation of home bias?

A

It could also be that people feel optimistic about home markets relative to foreign markets.

French and Poterba (1991): “Investor diversification and international equity markets”

They simulate what expected returns have to be in order to justify the observed asset allocation.

19
Q

What is market participation and ambiguity aversion?

A

Nonparticipation in domestic public quity markets and home bias in international investing are two of the main stylized facts of household finance.

Only a minority of relatively well-off individuals, those with 100.000 in liquid assets, participate in the equity market (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991) and poorer investors tend to participate even less.

Similarly, almost 20% of households at the 80th percentile of the wealth distribution own no public equity: Campbell 2006.

According to more recent evidence in the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finance, less than 15M of US households report owning stocks directly, and only about 50% of households own stocks either directly or indirectly thorugh mutual funds or retirement acconts: Bricker et al (2014)

20
Q

What is the puzzle in both phenomena of ambiguity aversion and market participation?

A

As for home bias, investors often fail to participate in foreign stock markets despite the benefits to diversification and inter risk sharing: French & Poterba 1991)

Puzzle in both phenomena: why don’t investors fully participate in risky asset markets to improve diversification and risk sharing.

Non-participation a challenge to fricionless optimal portfolio theories (Campbell 2006): Market frictions: eg infromation asymmetry and transaction costs do not seem to fully explain puzzle.

To adress thispuzzle: research proposes that nonparticipation derives from investor ambiguity aversion.

In this explanation, investors do not know perfectly certain parameters of the distribution of assets payoffs - they face model uncertainty.

In making investment decisions, ambiguity averse investors place heave weight upon worst-case scenarios for these parameters.

In this explanation, investors do not know perfectly certain parameters of the distribution of assets payoffs, they face model uncertainty.

In making investment decisions, ambiguity averse investors place heavy weight upon worst-case scenarios for these parameters.

21
Q

What conclusion can we derive from ambiguity aversion?

A

Ambiguity aversion: aversion against uncertainty.

Uncertainty: unknown probabilities due to insufficient information.

Discomfort associated with potential ex-post self/other evaluation might drive this effect

Models: utility-based approaches and MaxMin preferences

Many potential consequences: no trade regions, equity home bias etc.