תנו רבנן (שמות כב, א) והוכה בכל אדם ומת בכל מיתה שאתה יכול להמיתו בשלמא והוכה בכל אדם איצטריך סד"א בעל הבית הוא דקים (להו) דאין אדם מעמיד עצמו על ממונו אבל אחר לא Flashcards
תנו רבנן (שמות כב, א) והוכה בכל אדם ומת בכל מיתה שאתה יכול להמיתו בשלמא והוכה בכל אדם איצטריך סד”א בעל הבית הוא דקים (להו) דאין אדם מעמיד עצמו על ממונו אבל אחר לא
§ Concerning the verse that states: “If a burglar is found breaking in, and is smitten and dies, there shall not be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1), the Sages taught a baraita: “And is smitten,” by any person who strikes him; “and dies,” by any means of death by which you can put him to death. The Gemara clarifies this baraita: Granted, with regard to the words “and is smitten,” it was necessary to say that he may be struck by any person, as it might enter your mind to say that it is only the owner of the house whom the burglar is certain will resist him, because there is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore it is only the homeowner’s life that is in danger from the burglar. But as for another person, the burglar is not sure that he will try to stop him, and therefore that other person may not kill him, since the burglar did not come with the intention of killing him.
קמ”ל דרודף הוא ואפילו אחר נמי אלא ומת בכל מיתה שאתה יכול להמיתו למה לי
Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this burglar is considered a pursuer, and he is subject to the same halakha as anyone who pursues another in order to kill him, namely, that anyone may kill the pursuer in order to rescue the one being pursued. Therefore, even another person is permitted to kill the burglar in order to save the homeowner. But that which the baraita teaches, that the words “and dies” teach that he may be slain by any means of death by which you can put him to death, why do I need this?
מרוצח נפקא דתניא (במדבר לה, כא) מות יומת המכה רוצח הוא אין לי אלא במיתה האמורה בו ומנין שאם אי אתה יכול להמיתו במיתה הכתובה בו שאתה רשאי להמיתו בכל מיתה שאתה יכול להמיתו ת”ל מות יומת מ”מ
The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: This can be derived from the halakha governing a murderer, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse with regard to a murderer states: “He that smote him shall be put to death, for he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). I have derived only that the murderer is put to death with the mode of execution stated concerning him, namely, killing by decapitation. From where do I derive that if you cannot put him to death with the mode of execution written concerning him, e.g., if he is escaping, that you can put him to death with any mode of execution with which you can put him to death? The verse states: “He that smote him shall be put to death [mot yumat],” the doubled verb teaching that he is put to death in any case, by any mode of execution. Why not derive the halakha of a burglar from the halakha of a murderer?
שאני התם דאמר קרא מות יומת
The Gemara rejects this reasoning: There it is different, as the verse explicitly states: “Mot yumat,” which serves to include all modes of execution.
וניגמר מיניה משום דהוה רוצח וגואל הדם שני כתובין הבאין כאחד וכל שני כתובין הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין
The Gemara asks: But why not learn from it a principle that can be applied to all people who may be put to death? The Gemara rejects this reasoning: This case does not serve as a source for a principle, because the halakhot of a murderer and of a blood redeemer, i.e., a relative of one who was killed who is allowed to kill his relative’s killer (see Makkot 11b), are two verses that come as one, and two verses that come as one do not teach a principle. In other words, if a halakha is stated with regard to two specific cases in the Torah, the halakha is understood to apply only to those cases. Had the halakha applied to all other relevant cases as well, it would not have been necessary for the Torah to teach it twice. Therefore, the baraita had to teach us that this halakha also applies to a burglar who breaks into a person’s house.
