T1 International

Question 1

Britain After WW2

Answer 1

• Britain had emerged victorious in WW2, with the idea that in Western Europe they had stood
  alone against Hitler, confirming the common patriotic idea that Britain was a world power.
• WW2 had left UK damaged and with huge financial debts which would impact on the economy
  for decades.
• 1947: Britain had to inform the USA that due to a lack of money they would have to withdraw
  from their commitments in Greece and Palestine, which led the USA to create Marshall Aid to
  support the recovery of Western Europe.
• The independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 was another indicator that Britain would struggle
  to maintain control over their sprawling Empire under the pressure of local nationalist activity,
  although in 1950 it was not widely believed that the Empire would disintegrate so quickly.
• The British and American ‘special relationship’ and the sense that Britain wanted to maintain her
  position as a ‘world power’ were largely responsible for Britain’s reticence to participate in the
  early form of the European Union – the EEC from 1957.

Question 2

Britain and the 1950s Cold War

Answer 2

• US and UK quickly developed into allies against the threat of the global spread of Communism.
• NATO was formed in 1949, with the UK and US founder members.
• An early example of the Cold War was the Korean War – after WW2 North Korea was occupied by
  the USSR, Souh Korea by the USA.
• In 1950 N. Korean forces, supported by USSR and Communist China invaded the South.
• The United Nations condemned this action, and over 20 countries committed to support the
  South, including the UK which sent 90,000 men
• Over 1000 British men died in Korea – a conflict which essentially ended in a stalemate between
  North and South.
• Although there was no direct war between UK, USA and USSR, this was by no means inevitable at
  the time, and there was widespread fear of WW3, with nuclear weapons. The presence of US
  bases in the UK meant that the British were certain to be in USSR’s firing line if a conflict did erupt.
• Britain was a partner with the US in the fight against Communism, but very much the junior
  partner.
• During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Macmillan was kept informed of events by JFK but he was
  little more than a bystander.
• The cost of the UK playing such an active role in the Cold War was huge – with interventions in
  Jordan in 1958, as well as Aden, Kuwait and Yemen, as well as four divisions based in West
  Germany.
• In 1950 the Korean War expense turned a balance of payments surplus of £307 million into a
  deficit of £369 million the following year.
• In 1958, over 100,000 UK troops still stationed in Middle and Far East, and spending of defence
  throughout the period was third highest in the world after US and USSR.

Question 3

Britain’s Nuclear deterrent

Answer 3

• In 1946 Attlee and President Truman had concluded a deal allowing the US to establish air bases
  in East Anglia from which they could launch atomic bombs in a European emergency. However,
  in the same year America stopped sharing nuclear secrets with Britain.
• Labour debated whether it was necessary to incur the massive costs associated with developing
  an independent nuclear deterrent but ended up committing to it after Bevin argued ‘We’ve got
  to have this thing over here, whatever it costs…. We’ve got to have the bloody Union Jack on it.’
• Britain eventually tested their first atomic bomb in 1951, only to find that the USA had moved
  further ahead by testing a Hydrogen bomb, and that USSR were also close behind. When Churchill
  was informed of these developments and the costs to the UK of following suit, Churchill said ‘We
  must do it. It’s the price we pay to sit at the top table.’
• The UK reasoning was two-fold – an independent nuclear deterrent was needed to protect the
  country against a possible USSR attack, and also to convince the USA that the UK were still an
  influential force.
• The majority of the UK were supportive (60% in 1952, 58% in 1955) of developing the bombs.
• In 1960 Macmillan made a deal with the US to buy the new long-range Skybolt nuclear weapons.
  As part of the deal, the US were given permission to use the Holy Loch on the Firth of Clyde as a
  Polaris nuclear submarine base.
• This was controversial to being relatively close to the densely populated Glasgow, and also
  because the US did not promise to consult the UK before potentially using the atomic weapons
• Macmillan quickly realised the error of the deal, but the US would not amend the terms, and there
  was widespread opposition among the wider public.
• The Skybolt missiles were a failure, but Macmillan did persuade JFK to supply the UK with Polaris
  submarine capability, much the concern and anger of the French.
• However, this was not really an independent nuclear deterrent. The Polaris fleet would be
  assigned to NATO unless Britain’s ‘supreme national interests’ were at stake. British scientists
  were reliant on US research – and the most important decisions about atomic weapons were
  made in Washington – not Whitehall.
• The CND, (Campaign for Nuclear disarmament) was one of the most influential pressure groups
  of the period, formed in 1958.
• Many middle class intellectual supporters calling for unilateral nuclear disarmament.
• There were 270 branches of the movement, 12 regional organising committees.
• Annual Aldermaston marches were the highlight, firstly from Westminster to Aldermaston, and
  then in subsequent years in the other direction.
• The left of the Labour Party, buoyed by support given to the CND pushed for the adoption of
  unilateral disarmament as policy – it was voted in the 1960 conference, but at the 1961
  conference Gaitskell managed to defeat this move by the CND to turn the Labour Party into
  political wing.

Question 4

The 1956 Suez Crisis

Answer 4

• The special relationship between the UK and US was strained over several issues such as nuclear
  development and Britain’s role in Europe, but most of all by the Suez crisis.
• The Suez Canal was a key transport route from Europe to the East, around 80% of W. European
  oil passed through this Egyptian waterway.
• Egypt had essentially been a British colony until the end of WW2, and the UK and the French
  essentially administered the Canal.
• Colonel Nasser, a nationalist leader who took power in 1954 and was the ‘personification of Arab
  self-assertion against the great powers of the West.’ (Sandbrook).
• Angered by continued attempts by the UK/European attempts to meddle in Arab affairs via the
  Baghdad Pact in 1955, and by the decision of the US and the UK to withdraw funds for the
  construction of the Aswan Dam due to the fact that Nasser was in discussions with the USSR about
  their support, Nasser suddenly nationalised the Suez Canal in a populist move to assert Egyptian
  power and use the proceeds to fund the Aswan Dam.
• Eden was enraged by this action and threat to UK interests, as was the majority of the electorate
  and British press – with many drawing parallels between Nasser and Mussolini or even Hitler.
• The US did not support a military response – a Presidential election was looming and Eisenhower
  did not want to be dragged in to a conflict - he pushed for diplomacy and conferences – which
  slowed down a quick British response which would have been more likely to carry public support
• A plan that was initially dismissed as being too reckless was eventually accepted – Israel would
  invade Egypt, the UK and France would issue Israel an ultimatum to withdraw, and then would
  invade to keep the peace. The real objective would be to topple Nasser and gain control of Suez.
• Key players in the Cabinet – eg. Lloyd and Macmillan supported the plan, believing the US would
  in the end back up Britain.
• The military action was very successful, with the British troops securing strategic positions and
  close to achieving objectives, however the international response had been misjudged
• The UN backed the US motion for a ceasefire, domestic opinion was divided – while many
  supported the aggressive stance, there was also considerable criticism.
• The Labour Party was divided between working class patriotism and middle class conscience, but
  leader Gaitskell did publically criticise the government and call for a ceasefire on 4th Nov.
• It was American economic pressure which caused the government to call off the military
  operation – there had been a steady loss of gold reserves through the autumn – in August £129
  million had been lost, in October £85 million had been lost – due to the recurrent balance of
  payment deficits reducing international confidence in sterling. In the first week of November the
  Treasury lost $100 million from its currency reserves. With the Canal blocked and a lack of oil, the
  situation was desperate. Macmillan phoned the US to ask for assistance, but was told the US
  would only support a loan if there was a ceasefire. The pressure from the UN and the US, the
  weak economy, division in Conservative ranks and the country all combined to lead Eden to
  concede defeat – but the US action was most important.
• It was a humiliating defeat for Eden and the UK, with the US insisting of a complete withdrawal
• The consequences for Eden was retirement and withdrawal from politics, more widely the UK lost
  the moral high ground, and seemed exposed as a weak global power who was totally reliant on
  the US.

Question 5

Macmillan’s Winds of Change Speech

Answer 5

• Even in 1956, the British Empire was vast and a source of national pride. John Wells describes a
  ship voyage to Korea, when en-route via Gibraltar, through Suez, Aden, Colombo, Singapore and
  Hong Kong, all places which flew the Union Jack.
• Although by 1951 the Empire was somewhat in retreat given India’s independence from 1947,
  most believed it would be many years before many colonies would be ready the cut ties.
• However, between 1957-1964 Ghana, Malaya, Cyprus, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Western
  Samoa, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zanzibar and Kenya were granted their
  independent.
• Nationalism played a part in the process of decolonisation – but it would be simplistic to suggest
  the British were pushed out by force in the majority of cases. Only in Palestine and Aden did the
  UK face serious rebellion – and unlike the French in Algeria or the Portugese in Angola, the
  transition between Empire and Commonwealth was relatively bloodless.
• Macmillan oversaw this process – he was more progressive than his Edwardian appearance
  suggested, and was more interested in the UK’s relationship with the US and West Europe.
• WW2 had undermined UK’s management of colonies – the need to ‘milk the colonies for all they
  are worth’ became paramount – eg. Production of cash crops to export to UK – which alienated
  African elites.
• The economic problems of the 1950’s together with Sandy’s military reforms which cut the
  numbers in the armed forces in half meant there was not enough money of manpower to
  realistically keep control of unwilling colonies.
• Britain were also concerned about the possibility of driving colonies into the grasp of the USSR in
  the context of the Cold War.
• While Britain anticipated a slow transition, the pace of change was quicker than expected – once
  one country was given independence – pressure from other countries developed.
• Macmillan gave a speech which gave him the reputation of being a supporter of African
  decolonisation - ‘The Winds of Change’ speech: ‘The wind of change is blowing through this
  continent, and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact.
  We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.’
• Macmillan in the same speech openly criticised the apartheid policies in South Africa – and a year
  later South Africa left the Commonwealth.
• Macmillan and Macleod were unpopular with white settlers – eg. White Kenyan farmers who
  were often very wealthy and felt abandoned by the UK government. Right-wingers in the
  Conservative Party, such as Lord Salisbury, were also critical of the rapid pace of events.
• Macmillan replaced Macleod with Maudling, but the pact of decolonisation was not checked.
• An image of a pleasant process of ending the empire over a cup of tea was cultivated, and while
  it should be remembered the process was not painless, (in many places African protesters lost
  their lives or liberty, and in Kenya and Nyasaland the record of the British army was nothing to be
  proud of) in comparison to other European countries the transition was remarkably smooth.

Question 6

Britain’s 1963 First Failed EEC Application

Answer 6

• 1950: The Schuman Plan aimed for a coal and steel community that would integrate France and
  Germany and promote economic growth, recovery and unity.
• A key idea was to promote greater unity in Western Europe to avoid any repetition of the two
  recent catastrophic wars in the decades to come.
• Britain were generally supportive of the idea, but did not accept the invitation to be part of it
• The original decision was made by Deputy PM Herbert Morrison, who after briefly being told
  about the scheme by his advisors who had interrupted his dinner at the Ivy Restaurant, dismissed
  the opportunity by arguing ‘the Durham miners won’t wear it.’
• This view was actually shared by Attlee, who believed Britain couldn’t sign the ‘blank cheque’ that
  Schuman wanted – and there were concerns about loss of UK sovereignty over issues.
• Attlee summed up many prevalent views about whether to join the EEC in a speech to Labour
  sceptics in 1957: ‘The so-called Common Market of six nations. Know them all very well. Very
  recently this country spent a great deal of blood and treasure recuing four of ‘em from attacks by
  the other two.’
• Wider concerns include concerns from the Left about the free market principles – the Common
  market, the Right were more concerned about maintaining the Empire and the related trade links,
  general belief that this was a ‘continental issue’, and that as victor of WW2 this was not a British
  concern, the view that Britain was a top world power and that the special relationship with the
  USA was more important than these European developments.
• The Coal and Steel union evolved into the EEC (European economic community) via the Treaty of
  Rome in 1957.
• France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg were the members, although
  France and Germany dominant.
• By 1959 some leading politicians were concerned about the stronger economic fortunes of the
  EEC in comparison with the UK.
• 1959 – UK took lead in the formation of the European free trade association with other countries
  not in the EEC, but only achieved moderate growth not comparable with the EEC.
• 1961 – Macmillan decided it was best for UK to apply to join EEC. Despite his best efforts to charm
  Charles de Gaulle, and months of painstaking negotiations around the Common Agricultural
  Policy, just when it appeared like the application would be accepted, de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s
  entry.
• De Gaulle wanted to protect the EEC against ‘le Anglo Saxons’ and was suspicious about the UK’s
  special relationship with the USA.
• This was a major blow for Macmillan, with the economic progress of the EEC highlighting the
  relative underperformance of Britain.